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 The status of Christian–Muslim relations (CMR), which are difficult to assess, has 
been ambiguous in contemporary Lebanon.  Analysts, as well as individuals within Lebanese 
communities in Lebanon and within the diaspora have made conflicting claims.  One major 
claim has been that CMR are better now than before the Lebanese Civil War because the civil 
war ended in 1991 and a reoccurrence has never materialized.  Furthermore, the Ţā’if 
agreement, a working document aimed at ending the civil war and promoting solid CMR, was 
signed by most of the major communities of Lebanon in 1991.  For these reasons and more, 
Lebanese CMR were believed to have improved post-civil war.  Nevertheless, this writer 
explored the veracity of this proposition.  Through comprehensive quantitative and qualitative 
research, the poor state of CMR in contemporary Lebanon was revealed.  In face-to-face 
interviews in Lebanon, field experts reflected on the weakened condition of CMR and the 
reasons for the same.  University students participated in a survey to ascertain their feelings 
concerning CMR and the possible causes of problems within CMR.  Focus was also placed on 
the role identity has had in CMR.  These causes of CMR conflict and, at times, consensus 
were reviewed and compared for a clear understanding of the state of present-day CMR.  
Finally, based on an understanding of these factors, recommendations for improvement, 
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 In this thesis, the status of Christian–Muslim relations (CMR) in post-civil war (1975-
1991) Lebanon has been examined.  Much opinion, misinformation, and rumor exist 
concerning CMR.  Some important Lebanese observers have contended that CMR have 
improved and thus are peaceful and cordial.  Many others have raised concerns about the 
condition of Lebanese CMR.  Therefore, the question of whether Lebanon with its unique 
religious makeup (approximately 50% Christian and 50% Muslim) is a great example of 
interfaith co-existence or a living laboratory revealing that Christians and Muslims cannot live 
side by side in peace, has remained unanswered. 
 Analysts who believe that Lebanese CMR have improved in post-war Lebanon have 
buttressed their claim by noting that the civil war ended in 1991 and has not resumed.  They 
have also pointed to various sociopolitical and religious interventions that, in their 
understanding, have resulted in dramatically improved Lebanese CMR since the end of the 
civil war.  Even so, the evidence has not been unanimous.  This thesis, therefore, was an 
attempt to answer the following major research questions:  
1. How do mature Lebanese field experts and university students view CMR in post-
civil war Lebanon? 
2. What is the status or condition of CMR in post-war Lebanon according to these 
and other sources?  Have CMR improved post-Lebanese Civil War?  
3. Why are present-day Lebanese CMR in their present state?  What causes can be 
identified, treated, or supported for the benefit of positive CMR?  
4. How do the Lebanese understand their national identity?  Do they share a common 
view of their race, ethnicity, history, and culture?  Has this had an effect on CMR?  
2 
 
5. Could the civil war have been prevented altogether?  What are the risks of another 
civil war?  
6. Which community, Christian or Muslim, is working more effectively toward 
healthy CMR? 
Research Themes 
 Once an accurate understanding of the status of Lebanese CMR were established, the 
religious, educational, geographic, economic, political, advocacy and communal identity 
reasons believed responsible for present-day CMR conditions were uncovered.  As such, these  
were explored and became the themes of this research study. These themes were then 
separated and assigned to the 6 body chapters of this thesis.  In addition, what could have 
been done to prevent the civil war and the possibility of its reoccurrence were examined. 
 In chapter 1, the question of whether religious diversity resulted in complementing or 
complicating Lebanese CMR was explored, including findings regarding religious differences 
and their impact on CMR.  In chapter 2, because Lebanon is a small country with a long 
history, information concerning the roles of location, integration, and displacement of the 
Lebanese people was presented in terms of their effects on present-day CMR.  Specifically, 
evidence concerning whether the Lebanese were currently highly integrated and living 
together harmoniously was examined.  
 Chapter 2 also includes information on the impact of economic problems on Lebanese 
CMR.  During the centuries of Ottoman Turk rule, followed by a brief French mandate in the 
early 20th century, Lebanon often did not experience economic prosperity.  Even after its 
independence in 1943, Lebanon enjoyed only a few decades when its economy flourished, 
from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s.  Thus, the question of whether economic problems had 
an impact on how Lebanese Christians and Muslims relate to one another was examined.  
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 The effects of the Lebanese system of education on the quality of CMR have been 
explored in chapter 3.  Also, because the form of government, agreements, past practice  and 
political leadership all have roles in the well-being of any nation,  the political reasons that 
have resulted in either improving or hindering positive Lebanese CMR have been explored in 
this chapter. 
In chapters 4 and 5, questions concerning whether the Christians and Muslims of 
Lebanon have, or believe they have, a shared identity; whether the Lebanese have a shared 
consciousness of the major aspects of their identity; and what role, if any, identity has in 
present-day CMR have been examined.  The views of Lebanese field experts and university 
student were compared and contrasted with Lebanese history and DNA studies to determine 
the consistency between what the Lebanese believe their identity is and the historic and 
scientific evidence concerning their identity.  
 An examination of which community, Christian or Muslim, has worked more 
effectively toward healthy inter-communal harmony has been presented in chapter 6.  A 
discussion of what could have been done to prevent the Lebanese Civil War in the first place 
and the possibility of another civil war occurring have also been examined.  
 A summary of the research findings and general conclusions regarding the state of 
Lebanese CMR and the way in which they developed have been reiterated in the conclusion.  
Implications and questions for the future have also been briefly outlined.  
Field Expert and University Student Thought 
 Comprehensive quantitative and qualitative analysis was completed using information 
gathered from 17 diversified CMR field expert respondents (see Appendices 1–18) 
representative of the various communities in Lebanon and from 288 university students.  The 
students provided their information in the form of responses to a survey prepared specifically 
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for this research study.  This research was conducted almost exclusively inside Lebanon from 
2000 through 2006. 
Justification of the Research Issue  
 This research was an inquiry into the well-being of Lebanon.  In previous years, 
Lebanon had been labeled a failed state due to many factors, a major one being the poor 
relations between its Christians and Muslims.  The devastating Lebanese Civil War (1975–
1991) assumed Christian-versus-Muslim characteristics, which resulted in adversely affecting 
CMR.  Because the Lebanese are inevitably dependent on one another, the existence, 
prosperity, and success of Lebanon has been contingent on its various communities living 
together peacefully, with  healthy CMR.  Thus, the status of CMR after the cessation of 
hostilities has been crucial to the very existence and functioning of Lebanon.  Understanding 
the causes of discord could be the first step in conflict transformation.    
 From the previously stated major research questions, other queries were derived: 
 Whether improved or not, why were CMR in their present condition?  
 What were the risks if the Lebanese ignored this question?  Do they do so at risk of 
a repeat of past conflicts?  
 What influence did the status of CMR have on the current level of social 
functioning in Lebanon? 
 What could the Lebanese and others learn from the present state of CMR?  
 Are there positive aspects of present-day CMR that could be augmented to 
maintain this positive trend, or are there signs of discord that required urgent 
attention and intervention? 
 Various human service entities have been interested in the reasons for the condition of 
CMR, not least of which are the field expert respondents interviewed for this thesis, who 
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represent large portions of the communities in Lebanon.  Other entities with demonstrated 
interests in the state of Lebanese CMR include United Nations programs and services and 
nongovernmental help organizations (NGOs).  Indeed, from September 2009 to December 
2011, several NGO programs announced ongoing and upcoming programming to assess and 
address the state of Lebanese CMR.  Other organizations with demonstrated and ongoing 
interests in understanding and addressing CMR, are the Pontifical Institute for Arabic/Islamic 
Studies, CMR study centers, the U.S. Embassy in Awkar, Lebanon, Middle East studies 
programs and teacher education programs.        
  Aside from the small village where the author resided and worked, he was virtually an 
unknown foreigner in Lebanon with no prominent role in Lebanese CMR.  When seeking to 
meet and interview prominent Lebanese field experts, the author simply shared with them that 
he wanted to discuss CMR.  No further details were given.  Despite being unknown in 
Lebanon and indicating the few specifics about what the author wished to discuss other than 
CMR, each of the 17 field expert respondents felt it important to meet with him, giving 
weight to the idea that this research was important.  Indeed, each of these field experts from 
across the Lebanese religious spectrum met with the author either alone or semi-privately 
(e.g., security personnel, relatives, or translators) to discuss the factors affecting CMR.  Each 
field expert did so for no obvious personal benefit; rather, as they each stated clearly, it was 
felt important to discuss Lebanese CMR.  Separately, each respondent took time from their 
active, prominent roles to spend hours of time answering serious questions, the focus of which 
was CMR.  Within Lebanon, this was the equivalent of meeting former British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair or former U.S. president Bill Clinton along with prominent standing senators, 
members of the House of Representatives, leaders, religious figures, and more.  These 
Lebanese field experts represented large swaths of Lebanese society.  Encouraging this type 
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of inquiry, according to most of these respondents, could result in stimulating and satisfying 
this renewed and developing interest of the Lebanese in promoting positive CMR. 
 The Vatican has also had a clear, demonstrated interest in encouraging healthy CMR.  
The late Pope John Paul II made CMR a major focus of his papacy and traveled throughout 
the Middle East, just a couple of years before his death, preaching Christian–Muslim 
coexistence.  He visited Lebanon in 1997.  In 2001, he was the first pope ever to enter and 
pray in a mosque, which he did in Syria.  Since 1964, the Pontifical Institute for 
Arabic/Islamic Studies has been stationed in Rome.  Inasmuch as this institute is involved in 
studying and promoting healthy CMR, the present research might be of value to the institute 
in understanding the various elements of CMR in Lebanon. 
 The United Nations has had peacekeeping forces stationed in Lebanon for decades, 
including up to the present.  The U.N. presence has consisted mostly of soldiers who attempt 
to prevent potential conflict within Lebanon and at its borders and who provide humanitarian 
aid.  Ms. Nada Chedid,
1
 an executive secretary for a U.N. tribunal commissioner based in 
Lebanon, shared that the United Nations wants to add focus to inter-Lebanese community 
issues.  Ms. Chedid stated that research and subsequent reports are of interest to the U.N. 
programs.  Thus, this present-day research should be of interest as an update and reference to 
the condition of CMR and the reasons for the same in present-day Lebanon, for the U.N. 
programs assigned to Lebanon.  
 In addition, NGOs with a focus on interfaith coexistence should find the information 
contained in this thesis helpful.  As recently as September 2009, Search for Common Ground 
started a project based on “active listening” and “teaching the teachers” (Mahdawi, 2009, p. 
3).  This project was designed to address and explore an aspect of Lebanese society that this 
                                                          
1
 Nada Chedid, personal communication, August 11, 2007 (see Appendix 24). 
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author had identified and researched during which he found that the younger generation of 
Lebanese had significantly different views regarding CMR from those views espoused by the 
older generation.  The question, then, was whether the parents and teachers of present-day 
Lebanese university students had instilled a culture of tolerance toward other religious 
communities or not.  The author’s research findings became the subject of a pilot program to 
instruct teachers and parents in how to monitor discussion of CMR and to reinforce active 
listening.  An active coordinator of information about NGO programs regarding Lebanese 




 Several new CMR-specific study centers and projects have emerged in Lebanon over 
the past decade or so due to an increasing interest in CMR at the university level, attracting 
both the Lebanese and foreigners.  Just two examples are the University of Balamand (UB) 
Center for Christian-Muslim Studies and the long running Near Eastern School of Theology, 
both of which have indicated an orientation with CMR.  In both institutions, CMR is taught to 
a diverse group of Lebanese and foreign students.  Administration in both organizations have 
also reported that they have had difficulty finding Lebanese lecturers able to teach in an 
unbiased manner.  They have suggested that newer, non-native Lebanese researchers, such as 
the author, may perhaps research and teach CMR in a more unbiased manner. 
Literature Survey 
 This thesis was designed to be multidimensional in its areas of examination, 
necessitating a variety of surveyed sources.  Most of the texts reviewed for this thesis were 
written in English or translated into English from Arabic and French.  Some sources, 
                                                          
1
 Information about CRTD.KNOWLEDGE is available at knowledge@crtda.org.lb  
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however, were written only in Arabic; those have been listed toward the end of the literature 
review section.  
  The university student survey and study portion of this thesis was referenced to works 
by American University of Beirut (AUB) professors Halim Barakat, Hilal Khashan, and to a 
lesser extent Mohammed Faour.  In Barakat’s 1977 work, Lebanon in Strife, Student Preludes 
to the Civil War, he assessed the change in youth thought and movements, social class, 
family, and religion in relation to student politics.  He also displayed data regarding student 
religious affiliation and views on government, politics, the Palestinian issue, and education 
levels of the students’ families.  Barakat also incorporated study of Bahraini and Kuwaiti 
student thought in the areas just mentioned.  In Khashan’s 1992 work, Inside the Lebanese 
Confessional Mind, he examined how the Lebanese view their own sect and compared loyalty 
to their sect with that to the state.    
 The present research differed in several areas from both Barakat’s (1977) and 
Khashan’s (1992) works.  First, the present study constituted a newer assessment of 
contemporary Lebanon, incorporating changes that have occurred since Barakat’s (1977) and 
Khashan’s (1992) studies.  Second, both Barakat’s (1977) and Khashan’s (19921) works were 
primarily quantitative and predominantly deductive.  The present work was both qualitative 
and quantitative, deductive and inductive.  The originality of the present work was its direct 
focus on CMR within present-day Lebanon.   
 Third, in the present research study, a unique set of eight CMR-specific questions 
were formulated (see Methodology and Appendix 19) and posed to the 17 field expert 
respondents directly in private face-to-face interviews.  Additionally, a survey of over 40 
CMR-related questions was administered to 288 university students (see Appendix 20).  
Neither Barakat (1977) nor Khashan (1992) held live interviews with CMR or related field 
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experts and, thus, could not compare and contrast the thought of such experts with the thought 
of university students. 
  Fourth, this current assessment of present-day Lebanese CMR also differed in that, 
unlike Barakat (1977)  and Khashan (1992), the author could be regarded as more of a neutral 
outsider to the Middle East, given his status as a life-long native of the United States who was 
virtually unknown in Lebanon.  Barakat, a Palestinian–Syrian national, and Khashan, a 
Lebanese national, might be seen as insiders.  
 Fifth, the present research differed from that of Barakat (1977) and Khashan (1992) in 
the manner Lebanese identity was treated.  The two authors asked students how they 
identified themselves and then compared those data to national, social, and political thought.  
However, in the present study, the very problematic concept of Lebanese identity was 
analyzed in terms of three categories: race, ethnicity, and culture (Giddens,2001;  Macionis, 
2003).  This was done to provide a detailed understanding not only of Arabicity but also of 
Phoenicianism apropos to Lebanese CMR and identity.  This treatment was virtually 
nonexistent in the other authors’ works.  In the present research, the different layers of 
identity were analyzed, defined, and clarified from sociological and religious points of view.  
 Last, the importance of nationalism and cultural conflict was also examined in the 
present research.  This was accomplished, in part, through referencing the opposing 
viewpoints of Benedict Anderson in Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism (2006), Jerry Muller in “Us and Them: The Enduring Power of Ethnic 
Nationalism” (2008), and Samuel Huntington in A Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of 
World Order (1996).  
 The discussion of Arabicity in Lebanon in chapters 4 and 5 included references to 
Raghid El-Solh’s Lebanon and Arabism: National Identity and State Formation (2004), 
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Adeed Dawisha’s Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair 
(2003), and Kais Firro’s Inventing Lebanon: Nationalism and the State Under the Mandate 
(2003), inter alia.  These works were mostly discussions of Arabism as a political 
phenomenon; whereas in examining Arabicity in Lebanon in the present study, the role of 
Arab identity was defined and the resulting challenges within Lebanese CMR were assessed.  
Also included were the viewpoints on Arab identity from the American Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee and the Arab American Institute, both located in Washington D.C.  
In addition, Lebanese newspapers (The Daily Star; An-Nahar), magazines (Monday Morning), 
and journals (Arab Studies Quarterly, Journal for the Study of Islam/Christian-Muslim 
Relations) and several others were gleaned for perspectives on Arabism and CMR.  By using 
these sources in combination with the data from the field experts’ interviews and the 
university students’ surveys, the sometime elusive definitions of the terms Arab and 
Phoenician apropos to Lebanese CMR in particular were clarified.  
 Regarding Phoenician history (chapter 4), known sources were referenced, including 
Kamal Salibi’s A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Revisited (1988), 
Wolfram von Soden’s The Ancient Orient (1994), and Philip Hitti’s The Near East in History: 
A 5000 Year Story (1961b) and Lebanon in History: From the Earliest Times to the Present 
(1967).  More recent sources, such as Bassam Khalifah’s The Rise and Fall of Christian 
Lebanon (1997), Asher Kaufman’s Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for Identity in Lebanon 
(2004), and Kais Firro’s Inventing Lebanon: Nationalism and the State Under the Mandate 
(2003) were also referenced regarding the ambiguous Lebanese view of Phoenicianism.    
  To examine the present-day Lebanese–Phoenician identity enigma (chapter 5), the 
historical record of the Phoenicians was compared with the perceptions of present-day 
Lebanese and with evidence from genetic (DNA) testing.  Dr. Peter Zalloua and Dr. Spencer 
11 
 
Wells conducted Phoenician DNA-genetic testing studies of the Lebanese in 2004 and 2006 
(Zalloua & Wells, 2008).  These studies, as well as Daniel Asade Chuckralla’s racial 
anthropology and genetics study of 2004 (n.d), were referenced. 
 In reference to early Lebanese and Middle Eastern history, literature from known 
Lebanese scholars was cited, including Phillip Hitti’s History of the Arabs (2002) and 
Lebanon in History: From the Earliest Times to the Present (1967), Albert Hourani’s A 
History of the Arab Peoples (1992), Kamal Salibi’s A House of Many Mansions: The History 
of Lebanon Reconsidered (1988), and Leila Tarazi Fawaz’s An Occasion for War Civil 
Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860  (1994).  In addition to contemporary Lebanese 
newspapers, magazines, and Internet sources and newsletters, references to newer texts such 
as Robin Wright’s Dreams and Shadows, the Future of the Middle East (2008) and Sandra 
Mackey’s Mirror of the Arab World, Lebanon in Conflict (2008) were also included.  
 Views of Lebanese confessionalism and sectarianism were also explored.  Referenced 
works again included Bassam Khalifah’s The Rise and Fall of Christian Lebanon, which was 
more critical of the Maronites than of the Muslims from a sociopolitical point of view.  Kamal 
Salibi in A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Revisited (1998) was critical of 
previously accepted Lebanese history and of the confessionalism within it.  Ussama Makdisi 
in The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century 
Ottoman Lebanon (2000) explained the development of sectarianism during later Ottoman 
rule.  Carole Dagher in Bring Down the Walls: Lebanon’s Post-War Challenge (2001) was 
more empathetic of the Christian position within CMR.     
 The field experts who were interviewed for this thesis had also written articles and 
books and had given lectures regarding Lebanese CMR.  This writer did not review their 
works until after the interviews were completed to ensure information gathering was 
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conducted in a fresh and unassuming process.  The field expert respondents’ works were 
mostly found in Lebanese sources such as the magazines, newspapers, and journals mentioned 
previously, as well as occasional papers and newsletters published in organizations such as 
The Arab Working Group on Christian Muslim Dialogue, The Center for Christian Muslim 
Studies at UB, inter alia.  
 Several Lebanese–Arabic texts were also referenced: Co-existence in Christianity and 
Islam (UNESCO, 2002), Faisal Abou Al Nasr’s Phobias of the Lebanese Christian: Articles 
and Debates (2001), Mohammad Fadlallah’s In the Horizon of Christian–Muslim Dialogue 
(1998), Bishop George Khodor and Dr. Mahmoud Ayoub’s Toward the Better Debate: 
Christian–Muslim Debates (1997), and Dr. Tony Daou’s The Dictionary of the Twentieth 
Century: The White Face of Lebanon (2005).  
 Because of the frequency and intensity of sociopolitical phenomena in Lebanon, the 
most recent texts on Lebanon were referenced to keep up with the various changes.  These 
texts included David Hirst’s Beware of Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle 
East (2010), Tim Llewellyn’s Spirit of the Phoenix: Beirut and the Story of Lebanon (2010), 
Michael Young’s The Ghosts of Martyrs Square: An Eyewitness Account of Lebanon's Life 
Struggle (2010), Warwick Ball’s Out of Arabia; Phoenicians, Arabs and the Discovery of 
Europe (2010), Barry Rubin’s Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict, and Crisis (2009), Nubar 
Hovsepian’s The War on Lebanon: A Reader ( 2008),  Sandra Mackey’s Mirror of the Arab 
World, Lebanon in Conflict (2008), Robin Wright’s Dreams and Shadows the Future of the 
Middle East (2008), Assaf Kfoury’s Inside Lebanon: Journey to a Shattered Land With Noam 
and Carol Chomsky (2007), and Fawwaz Traboulsi’s  A History of Modern Lebanon (2007).  
 Several sources were also referenced in regards to proper methodology.  These works 
included Earl Babbie’s The Practice of Social Research (2001), Sakinah Salahu-Din’s Social 
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Work Research: An Applied Approach (2003), and Denise Medico’s Introduction to 
Qualitative Analysis of In-Depth Interviews (2005).  
The Prelude and Causes of the Lebanese Civil War 
 The focus of this thesis was CMR in post-civil war Lebanon.  However, the various 
historical and sociopolitical phenomena prior to the civil war must be reviewed to understand 
CMR after the civil war.  Doing so might also result in determining the points at which CMR 
deteriorated or progressed.   
 The Lebanese Civil War began in April 1975 and, according to some experts, lasted 
until October 1990 when the new Lebanese government of the elected president Elias Hrawi 
was formed and agreed to amend the Lebanese constitution (Hanf, 2003).  The amendments 
stemmed from the Ţā’if Accord of 1989, the major working document developed to end the 
civil war (Hanf, 2003).  Other experts identified either March or August 1991 as a more 
accurate end date for the war (Traboulsi, 2007), the former corresponding with the adoption 
of a war crimes amnesty law absolving the Lebanese for crimes committed during the civil 
war; the latter referring to the expulsion of Michel Aoun, who was then a renegade Christian 
general and leader and the short-term acting prime minister.  Aoun set up a second 
government opposed to the official government of President Hrawi (Fisk, 2002).   
During the war, Christians were said to be pitted against Muslims and the Lebanese 
against foreign forces, political and community groups (Friedman, 1995; Lesch, 2007).  A 
number of analysts considered the Lebanese Civil War a stalemate while most considered the 
Christians the main losers (Salem, 2004).  Therefore, wide resentment has existed among the 
Christians for their Muslim counterparts and has remained one of the issues that must be 
addressed in Christian–Muslim dialogue.  
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The Lebanese Civil War lasted 16-years  wherein 130,000 to 200,000 Lebanese were 
killed; another 100,000 were left seriously injured or disabled  (Rossi, 2008).  The Lebanese 
economy was debilitated.  Hundreds of thousands of Christians and Muslims were displaced 
(Dagher, 2001; Profile of Internal Displacement, 2004), the ramifications of which have been 
discussed in chapter 2.  The country was occupied by Syrian, Israeli, and Palestinian forces, as 
well as Iranian military advisers.  U.N. forces, as well as soldiers from the United States, 
Great Britain, Italy, and France, also intervened in Lebanon.  Foreign intervention has been 
discussed in chapter 3.  Eventually, most of the religious, political, and nationalist factions in 
the Middle East had some part in the war
1
 (Fisk, 2002; Mackey, 2008).  
 Just one outcome of the war was the change of the Lebanese political system to render 
more power to the Muslim majority in Lebanon
2
 (Lesch, 2007; Wright, 2008).  An original 
cause of the Lebanese Civil War was the distribution of political power among the religious, 
political, and ethnic groups in the country in 1943 when it received its independence from 
France.  Officially, Maronite Christians were recognized as the largest single group, followed 
by Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims, Greek Orthodox Christians, Greek Catholics, and Druzes.  
Upon independence, the most powerful Lebanese groups, the Maronite Christians and Sunni 
Muslims, created an unwritten power-sharing formula called the National Pact.  Among the 
requirements in the pact were the designations that the president had to be a Maronite; the 
prime minister, a Sunni; the speaker of the parliament, a Shia; and the deputy speaker, a 
Greek Orthodox (Khalifah, 1997; Traboulsi, 2007).  Another stipulation of the pact stated that 
the 55-member assembly had to have a 6 to 5 membership ratio of Christians to Muslims, yet 
each group had to have enough power to veto the policies of any other group (Traboulsi, 
                                                          
1





2007).  In time, a similar balance of power was replicated in the government bureaucracy, 
civil service, and the Lebanese army.  
Because the National Pact established a distribution of power based on religious 
beliefs, or confessions, the government became known as a “confessional democracy.”  Many 
political analysts praised this unique confessional democracy for combining democratic 
principles with power-sharing elements to placate the possible disruptive effects of having 
various Christian, Muslim, political, and ethnic groups all in one small country (Firro, 2003).  
The developers of the pact hoped that with this type of government, one religious sect would 
be prevented from threatening the interests of another, because all confessions would need to 
cooperate to put forth national policy.  Also, because each group was afforded proportional 
representation in Parliament and in the cabinet  prior to elections, no group should fear being 
blocked out from the government.  
 From the start, however, problems with confessional democracy existed.  Rather than 
defusing religious differences, the National Pact has resulted in directing attention on them.  
Political power remained in the hands of the same elite families, also known as the Zuama, 
who had held power under the French, especially Maronite families who were well-
represented in the upper class of colonial Lebanon
1
 (Khalifah, 1997).  Additionally, the pact 
did not include provisions to re-adjust the balance of power if the country experienced 
demographic changes, which it eventually did, in its Christian and Muslim percentages or if 
the support for political parties or leaders changed.   
This majority power granted to the Christians became a major grievance of the 
Muslims for decades and was a significant cause in the breakdown of CMR.  The Maronites 
were said to hoard political power and economic resources; thus, the confessional system 
                                                          
1
 Dr. Ibrahim Mousawi, personal communication, June 22, 2006 (see Appendix 5). 
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eventually revealed the flaws that resulted in conflict (Fisk, 2002; Joumblatt, 1982).  Even 
though Muslims became the majority by the early 1960s, most of the formal political power 
remained in Christian hands.  Still, the confessional system worked as long as Christian and 
Muslim factional leaders did not seek support from regional powers (which they eventually 
did) such as Israel, Syria, and others (see chapter 3).  Any effort by one group to forge foreign 
alliances was bound to threaten the interests of another group and to undermine the delicate 
balance created in the National Pact.
1
  
 Similar to other civil wars and conflict, history revealed signs that indicated a conflict 
was brewing.  Even so, for some lay Lebanese, the civil war seemed suddenly thrust upon 
them without warning.  However, some individuals detected causes of the civil war well in 
advance of actual armed hostilities.  For example, Dr. Bassam Khalifah, Lebanese author, 
journalist, and former founder of the Lebanese Democratic Party, maintained that many 
Christian attitudes relied more on sentiment than logic; 
The belief that the 1975–1990 civil war was the reason for the collapse of Christian 
power in Lebanon.  Yet, it was Christian Lebanon itself that failed long before 1975, 
and the war was just a by-product of that failure.  (1997, p.154)  
 
On the other hand, some Lebanese, such as Bridgette Gabriel, author, journalist, and 
founder of the American Congress for Truth, blamed the high Muslim birthrate and the PLO 
presence in Lebanon for causing the civil war (2008).  Khalifah and Gabriel, both Lebanese 
Christians, have also spent decades in the U.S. diaspora.  Interestingly, Khalifah (1997) 
blamed the Lebanese Christians for the “fall” of Lebanon, while Gabriel (2008) blamed the 
Muslims and the PLO of Lebanon for the civil war.   
Recent Historical Turning Points in CMR  
                                                          
1
 Ibid.; Halabi, personal communication, May 26, 2005 (see Appendix 4). 
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In this section, the recent historical turning points in Lebanese history prior to the civil 
war have been presented.  The very early history of turning points in CMR have been 
presented in part in chapter 5.  These earlier, critical CMR flashpoints were reviewed for their 
effect on CMR in present-day Lebanon and in relationship to the reasons the Maronites 
maintain a separate identity.  Although many explanations of the causes of the civil war 
existed, these certain historical events have been fairly well accepted as turning points in 
CMR that eventually resulted in civil war.  However, few, if any, sources listed historical 
turning points regarding the psychosocial thoughts and reasons for Maronite separatism.   
The Third Civil War of 1975 and the Stock Market Crash 
  The beginning of the Lebanese Civil War was a most devastating event in many 
regards, one of them being relations between Christians and Muslims.  The spark that resulted 
in this major civil war was a Maronite Christian Phalange militia attack on a bus filled with 
Palestinian civilians in East Beirut on April 13, 1975 (Nassib, 1983).  However, although 
often forgotten, another of the causes of that war was the stock market crash of 1975, which 
resulted in increased tensions and accusations of corruption in Lebanon.  Before the stock 
market crash and the ensuing civil war, two to three Lebanese lira/pounds equaled one 
American dollar.  Since that time, the value of the Lebanese currency has been devalued.  As 
of 2011, almost 40 years later, 1,500 to 3,000 Lebanese lira equal one American dollar 
(Currency Converter, n.d.). 
 The first few years of the war  focused on the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), a 
Druze force led by Kamal Joumblatt, and the Lebanese Front, a Maronite force led by then-
president Camille Chamoun (Joumblatt, 1982).  As in the war of 1860, the powerful minority 
Druze party was pitted against the majority Maronite Christian party (Fawaz, 1994).  Also, as 
was the case in 1860, each side enlisted help in the form of either local or foreign 
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intervention:  The LNM joined with the PLO and other Muslims, and the Lebanese Front 
allied with Christian militias.  The militias received many of their weapons by seizing them 
from the rapidl  breakdown of the Lebanese army (Khalaf, 2002).  Thus, the Lebanese Civil 
War of 1975–1990 took on a Christian-versus-Druze/Muslim scenario, just as the war of 1860 
had.   
 The LNM sought to abolish the National Pact.  However, the Lebanese Front said it 
would consider the proposal only after the PLO had left Lebanon.  Because the PLO was the 
chief military ally of the predominantly Muslim LNM, the LNM refused the Christian offer, 
engaging in several attacks on Christian forces instead (Lesch, 2007).  Syrian president Hafez 
Al-Assad feared that if the Muslim LNM won the war, Israel might invade Lebanon, touching 
off a wider Arab–Israeli war.  Therefore, in 1976, at the request of then-Lebanese president 
Suleiman Franjieh, Assad sent Syrian troops to Lebanon to intervene on the side of the 
Christian Lebanese Forces (Seale, 1995).  The Syrian troops succeeded in imposing order, 
giving Lebanon a brief respite from war.   
While the war was on hold, the PLO made several attacks on Israel from its bases in 
Lebanon.  Israel responded by invading Lebanon in March 1978.  The Israelis gave their 
support to Bashir Gemayel, a Maronite leader of one of the Christian factions.  Gemayel 
consolidated his control over rival Christians and established a Christian mini-state.  This shift 
in power prompted Syria to switch its alliance from the Christians to the National Liberal 
Party, a pre-dominantly Muslim and pro-Palestinian group that was well-armed (Lesch, 
2007).  The military conflict intensified in April 1981between Israel and Syria. Many 
observers feared a full-scale Syrian–Israeli war , prompting the United States to negotiate a 
cease-fire among Israel, Syria, and the PLO.  Israel withdrew in June but left a pro-Israel 
Christian militia headed by General Saad Haddad in control of the southern border area of 
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Lebanon (Friedman, 1995).  A Christian general allied with Israel in occupying the Muslim 
majority Lebanese south, became a major point of contention for the Muslims.  The civil war 
continued to be viewed as a Christian-versus-Muslim conflict, and CMR continued to 
deteriorate.  Beirut was even divided into the Christian east sector and the Muslim west sector 
(Fisk, 2002).   
The Israeli Invasion and Occupation of 1982  
 After the 1981 cease-fire, fighting declined drastically.  However, in June 1982, Israel 
began an air attack and followed by a ground invasion of Lebanon, inflicting heavy damage 
on the PLO militias, many of whom fled the country as Israel closed in on Beirut (Schiff & 
Ya’ari, 1984).  With Israeli support, Bashir Gemayel, a Maronite Christian, was elected 
president in August.  His election was decried by Muslims as Bashir Gemayel was seen as a 
fascist and a leader who wanted a Christian dominated Lebanon.  Three weeks later, he was 
killed by a bomb.  Many Western governments believed Syria was responsible for the 
assassination (Schiff & Ya’ari, 1984).  Partly in response, the Israeli-supported Christian 
Phalange militia massacred an estimated 800 to 1,500 Palestinian refugees in September 
(Ross, 2007).  After a great international outcry, an Israeli commission reprimanded its 
leaders for failing to prevent the massacre (Schiff & Ya’ari, 1984).  The Christians and 
Muslims of Lebanon became increasingly wary of one another, their relationship worsening 
as they were increasingly divided politically, socially and geographically.  
Bashir Gemayel was replaced by his older brother Amin, who concluded a peace 
treaty with Israel in May 1983.  The treaty resulted in a violent backlash from Muslim, Druze, 
PLO, and some Christian forces.  With Syrian support, they attacked the Phalange militia and 
Lebanese army, which had jointly occupied parts of the country (Fisk, 2002).  
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 The Druze–PLO attack and the assassination of Bashir Gemayel raised concerns in 
Israel, France, and the United States that the Christians might be defeated.  In mid-1983, the 
United States and France shelled the Druze–PLO force.  By September, U.S. and French 
troops were stationed in Beirut.  A month later, a truck bomb killed 241 U.S. and 58 French 
troops in their barracks, prompting the United States to shell Muslim forces in February 
1984(Schiff & Ya’ari, 1984, p. 300).  Rather than thwart the Muslims, however, this second 
United States intervention resulted in greater cooperation between the Druze and the 
increasingly powerful Shia militia, known as Amal (Afwaj al-Muqawimah al-Lubnaniyya or 
Lebanese Resistance Movement) (Lesch, 2007).  Together, they drove the Christian forces 
from West Beirut, prompting the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops in February.  Remaining 
Western forces withdrew shortly thereafter (Ross, 2007).  At that point, more than ever 
before, Lebanon was divided into Christian and Muslim areas (Harik, 1999 ).    
 The Israeli invasion of 1982, among other things, worsened CMR.  Christians and 
Muslims fled their homes, many never returning.  Thus, Christians and Muslims became 
increasingly segregated (Harik, 1999; see also chapters 2 and 3).  Israel supported certain 
Muslim and Christian groups and pitted them against one another:  Christians fought 
Christians.  Muslims fought Muslims.  Christians fought Muslims, and they argued viciously 
about who was more traitorous in allying with Israel (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002).     
 With the departure of U.S. troops and the defeat of the Israeli-backed Christian 
government, Syria pressured President Amin Gemayel to nullify the Lebanese–Israeli peace 
treaty (Seale, 1995).  In March 1984, Syria compelled the Lebanese Christian and Muslim 
leaders to form a government of national reconciliation.  Syrian attempts to impose order in 
Lebanon, while somewhat successful, were undermined by some of its other policies, 
especially regarding Iran.  Iran sent Syria monetary support and weapons to buttress the Shiite 
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militias in southern Beirut (Seale, 1995).  These militias, captivated by the Irainian 
Revolution of 1979, had grown in power and prestige as thousands of Shia refugees fled 
southern Lebanon for southern Beirut.  Iran sent  members of its Revolutionary Guard to train 
the Shias, who quickly became increasingly loyal to Iran and less to Syria (Saad-Ghorayeb, 
2002),  As a result, Syria had difficulty establishing a Syria allied government in Lebanon; 
and the Shia community became sharply divided concerning whom to support.. (Saad-
Ghorayeb, 2002).  For their part, in general, the Christians resented the Syrian presence in 
Lebanon and viewed Syrian policy and practice as favoring the Muslims at the expense of the 
Christians (Picard, 2002).   
 In the spring of 1988, fighting broke out between Hezbollah (some of whose leaders 
were interviewed for this assessment), the staunchly pro-Iranian Shia group, and the more 
secular Amal.  To prevent the fighting from spreading, Syrian president Assad and U.S. 
secretary of state George Shultz met and formulated a political plan of reform in Lebanon.  
However, the plan fell apart when the Lebanese legislators could not agree on a new leader 
(Lesch, 2007).  In October, General Michel Aoun, the interim prime minister (and an 
interviewee for this thesis) responded to the chaos by forming his own, pro-Christian cabinet 
and launching what he called a “war of liberation” against the Syrian occupiers (Khalaf, 
2002).  However, his troops first fought against his Christian rivals, many of whom feared 
Aoun’s war would rally all the Muslim militias in Lebanon against the Christians.  This fear 
proved well-founded when, in August 1989, several Muslim groups supported by Syria 
formed an anti-Aoun coalition (Khalaf, 2002).  
The Ta’if Accord of 1989 
 From September 30 to October 22, 1989, a number of the remaining members of the 
Lebanese parliament met in Ţā’if, Saudi Arabia, to negotiate a proposal for political 
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transformation  drawn up by the Arab League.  The result was the National Reconciliation 
Charter, commonly known as the Ţā’if Accord (see also chapter 3).  In this agreement, the 
members recognized that Christians were no longer the majority population.  Thus, the  
Christians and Muslims were to have equal representation in Parliament.  The number of seats 
was also increased first from 99 to 108 and later to 128 (Mackey, 2008).  The presidency 
remained a Maronite Christian post.  However, due to Muslim critique of a Christian 
presidency, the Lebanese government formed after the Tā’if Accord amended the constitution 
to ecrease the Christian president’s authority increasing the Christian feeling that they had lost 
the war (Haddad, Y., 2007).  In the agreement, the members also clearly defined Lebanon as 
an Arab nation and established the identity of the Lebanese people as Arabs.  This was done 
with dismay by some  Lebanese Christians, the Maronites in particular, but to the delight of 
Lebanese Muslims and some other Christian groups
1
 (Dagher, 2001).   
 Aoun rejected these changes and launched a revolt in 1990.  Syria, along with some 
Lebanese forces, quickly defeated Aoun’s forces, thus ending the civil war in October of 
1990.  They then started disbandind Lebanese militias and collecting their weapons and 
rebuilding the official Lebanese army and implementing political reform (Fisk, 2002).  To 
ensure political allegiance of Lebanon, Syria had earlier saw to the election of Elias Hrawi in 
1989 as president and Rafiq al-Hariri as Prime Minister in 1992 (Fisk, 2002).  Both men 
proved loyal and supportive of Syrian interests.  Parliamentary elections took place in 
September 1992 despite a Christian boycott.  Although the Syrian presence resulted in 
manipulated elections, the elections were basically peaceful and viewed positively by many 
outside observers (Khalaf, 2002).  The Christians in particular felt they were being 
undermined as a community by Syrian policy in Lebanon (Khalaf, 2002).      
                                                          
1
 Dr. Nidal Bou Habib, personal communication, November 3, 2004 (see Appendix 11). 
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More than 5 years after signing the Tā’if Accord, many improvements had been 
realized.  The war had ended.  Most Lebanese, except for one part of the southern population 
that continued to be at risk of Israeli attack, had enjoyed a near-forgotten peace since late 
1990.  The authority of the civil service had been reestablished.  The army had become more 
united and was gaining strength.  Economic conditions had stopped deteriorating, although a 
serious financial deficit and economic stagnation existed (Fisk, 2002; Mackey, 2008; see 
chapter 2).   
 After the war, Lebanon faced the challenge of reconstructing its economy and 
addressing the obvious Christian–Muslim, social, and economic inequalities that had existed 
before the war and had been subsequently exacerbated by it (Longuenesse, 2006; Salem, 
2006; UNESCO, 2002).  Lebanon had to contend with its new political system in which, 
although reformed, power was still allocated through confessional and ethnic quotas similar to 
those that resulted in the civil war.  Christians and Muslims were more segregated than ever, 
including the younger generations who were much less integrated in schools (see chapter 2).   
 The Israelis were forced out of Lebanon in May 2000 by the Shiite militia of 
Hezbollah, which launched attacks that sapped the Israeli army (Norton, 2007; Qassem, 
2005).  In April 2005, Syrian troops in Lebanon were forced to withdraw under strong 
international pressure, led by the United States, after the assassination of former Lebanese 
prime minister Rafiq Hariri in February 2005 (Harris, 2006; Ziadeh, 2006).  Shortly after 
Hariri’s assassination, the Lebanese split into two major political camps, the March 8 camp 
and the March 14 camp.  The former is backed mostly by Shiites, Maronites, and some Druze.  
The March 14 camp is composed mostly of Sunnis, Maronites, and Druze (Kfoury, 2007).  
Also in 2005, Aoun, the former general, returned from exile in France to Lebanon and signed 
an agreement of cooperation with Hezbollah.  At that time (and arguably to date), this 
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agreement, signed by the largest Muslim and Christian parties in Lebanon could have been 
considered a major CMR breakthrough.  However, in 2008, Aoun traveled to Syria and met 
with their leadership in a conciliatory gesture, which some Lebanese politicians labeled a “sell 
out.”  (Young, 2010).  
Methods for Assessing CMR in Contemporary Lebanon 
As might be imagined, assessing complex relationships such as CMR in Lebanon 
could be challenging.  The ideological, political, religious, and social networks and beliefs 
were fraught with shifting alliances.  In addition, extra-, inter-, and intra-national actions had 
to be included, which were difficult to encapsulate and assess.  A competent method to allow 
for these vacillations was the employment of a variety of means for assessing such 
relationships.  Therefore, in this thesis, the status of CMR in post-war Lebanon was 
accomplished through conducting private, face-to-face interviews with  mature field expert 
respondents representing all six of the major religious denominations in Lebanon and through 
administering a written questionnaire (Appendix 20) to a modest number of university 
students enrolled in the author’s classes.  These students came from 146 Lebanese cities, 
towns, and villages, including all seven of the major cities in Lebanon (see Appendix 21).  
This methodology was not previously used to describe the state of CMR in present-day, post-
civil war Lebanon.  Although historical, ethnic, cultural, legislative and sociopolitical 
phenomena were taken into account, this thesis was centered on information gleaned during 
the author’s 7-years residency (2000–2007) in Lebanon.  Such a methodology was, ipso facto, 
incomparable to other possible approaches.  
As with other possible methodologies, this too was an appropriate means of 
evaluation.  The methodology could have been focused on Lebanese legislation, for example, 
and its role in CMR.  However, although legislation and agreements such as the Ta’if Accord 
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were reviewed and included in this thesis, it was not the focus.  Legislation can be static, 
existing for years, even decades, with little change.  CMR are an interactional, experiential, 
social condition and humanistic feeling, belief and state.  As such, live interviews with native, 
communal representatives or field expert respondents were used to capture the direct mood, 
attitudes, and times of Christians and Muslims.  CMR, which are both ongoing and historic, 
involved a wide spectrum of communities, religions, and involvement.  In addition, 
information from the filed expert respondents could be compared and contrasted amongst 
them for conflict, consensus, and consistency.  The information gleaned from these interviews 
could also be referenced to what these field expert respondents have written on CMR to 
determine conflict, consensus, and consistency of their views.   
Through the administration of the questionnaire, information from a larger number of 
university students, the younger generation who will be living the future of Lebanon, could be 
obtained.  Those students might retain elements of the conflicts, contradictions, and hopes of 
the past and future of Lebanon.  Therefore, comparisons and contrasts could be made between 
the younger students’ viewpoints of CMR and those of the more mature expert respondents.  
The questions asked during the interviews and on the questionnaire were intentionally specific 
yet wide-ranging, designed to capture as much quality data as possible.  Confounding 
variables and possible biases have been reviewed at the end of this section.  
Interviews 
As indicated previously, one of the two primary research tools used to gather data for 
this research study was personal face-to-face interviews with 17 field experts.  This form of 
research was conducted for several reasons.  First, the interviews were rare opportunities to 
meet native field experts and speak directly with them concerning CMR.  As the name 
suggests, CMR are a social phenomenon.  Second, this research was identified as an effective 
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(but not the only) manner of data collection (Babbie, 2001).  Third, this method of research 
was also chosen because  
field research seems to provide measures with greater validity than do survey and 
experimental measurements, which are often criticized as superficial and not really 
valid.  Being there is a powerful technique for gaining insights into the nature of 
human affairs and all their rich complexity.  (Babbie, 2001, p. 299) 
 
According to Babbie (2001),  
Design and interviewing is interactive.  That means each time you repeat the basic 
process of gathering of probation, analyzing it, winnowing it, and testing, you come 
closer to a clear and convincing model of the phenomenon your studying . . . the 
continuous nature of qualitative interviewing means the questioning is redesigned 
throughout the project. 
   
Proper procedures based on The Practice of Social Research (Babbie, 2001, pp. 291-
300) were followed in conducting the interviews.  To start, open- ended questions were used 
rather than close-ended questions.  Double-barreled questions were avoided (Babbie, 2010).  
Questions were also kept as short as possible (Babbie, 2001).  The eight interview questions 
(IQ) were direct and clear in both written and spoken forms, formulated and phrased in a non-
leading manner and care was taken avoid topics extraneous to CMR.  The following is a 
complete list of the eight questions, along with the rationale/exegesis for each.  In those 
questions in which the interviewees had to determine whether something had “not improved”  
or was “better” or “worse” than something else, the interviewees neatly defined those 
concepts in detailing the who, what, when, where, why, and how of the “worse” or “better.” 
 Interview Question (IQ) 1 stated, “Since the war in Lebanon ended (1991), would you 
say the relations between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon are the same, better, or 
worse than they were before the war?  What makes you feel that way?”  This was a direct, 
non-leading  question designed to get the interviews to focus on whether the state of CMR 
had improved or deteriorated in post-civil war Lebanon in comparison with CMR just prior to 
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the civil war without delving into CMR during the actual civil war.  The data related to 
IQ1have been discussed in chapter 2. 
 IQ2 stated, “If there is a divide or harmony between the Christians and Muslims of 
Lebanon, what are the major causes of this?  For example, are they of (a) political nature, (b) 
a theological nature, (c) an economic or social stratification nature (i.e., the rich vs. the poor), 
or (d) some other cause or reason?”  This was a follow-up question designed to extract the 
respondents’ beliefs and opinions they expressed in answering IQ1 about the state of CMR in 
post-war Lebanon.  The data for IQ2 have been discussed thematically in chapters 1, 2 and 3.   
 IQ3 stated, “When did you get involved in the issues of the Christians–Muslim 
relations in Lebanon?  What have been the successes and challenges for you?  Please feel free 
to elaborate on this.”  Each respondent was either directly or officially involved in Lebanese 
CMR.  This question was designed to capture a “snap shot” of the respondents’ experiences 
and work in CMR, including their successes and challenges.  In answering this question, the 
respondents also had to reveal their relevance and suitability for participating in this 
assessment.  Some of the data for IQ3 are available in the appendices.  
 IQ4 stated, “Do you consider the Lebanese people to be Arabs?  Do you consider 
yourself as a Lebanese to be an Arab?  Has this issue been a difficult one to resolve for 
Christians and Muslims?  Why or why not?”  The question of the Arab identity of Lebanon 
has been a major issue for the Lebanese since just prior to their independence.  This interview 
question was designed to ascertain whether this question of  Arab identity had been resolved 
or remained problematic.  In answering the question, respondents also had to reflect on 
whether the Lebanese struggle with Arabism resulted in dividing the Lebanese along religious 
lines.  The answers to this question were of paramount importance because they reflected 
Lebanese cultural, ethnic, and even racial identity.  Interviewees also had to determine 
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whether, if this issue remained unresolved, it negatively affected related issues, namely CMR.  
Importantly, whether interviewees chose to be identified as members of the Arab people or 
not, their answers reflected the notion of “the other” and feelings of superiority of one group 
over the other.  The data from IQ4 have been discussed in chapters 4 and 5.  
IQ5 stated, “Is there a problem with radical or extremist religion (Christian and / or 
Muslim) in Lebanon and does it affect Christian–Muslim relations?  If so, how?”  From The 
Clash of Civilizations (Huntington, 1996) to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, to as 
the invasion and occupation of Iraq and the ongoing Palestinian–Israeli conflict, much has 
been debated about radical, fundamentalist Islam.  Implicitly, this notion of extremism is a 
Western one, particularly emanating from the United States as a partial strategy to justify 
some of its policies in the Middle East.  Thus,  IQ5 was designed to elicit from the Lebanese 
themselves whether or not radical Islam or Christianity exists in Lebanon and, if so, its impact 
on CMR.  The data from IQ5 have been discussed in chapter 1.  
 IQ6 stated, “ Is there any community in Lebanon that you feel does more or less or a 
better or poorer job in working for positive Christian–Muslim relations?  In other words, for 
example, could the Maronite community and/or the Shiite community and/or their leaders be 
doing more?”  This question was designed to discover who was doing what with CMR in 
modern-day Lebanon.  Implicitly, the question was posed to delve into whether or not enough 
was being done toward optimum CMR and to determine, if enough was not being done, what 
are the reasons/causes .  By extension, in answering the question, interviewees had to evaluate 
which community could be doing more.  The data from IQ6 have been discussed in chapter 6.  
IQ7 stated, “Can you think of anything in the past that, if it had been done differently, 
would have prevented the Lebanese war of 1975-1991, reducing the conflict between the 
Christians and Muslims of Lebanon?”  This question was posed to determine what could have 
29 
 
been done to prevent the Lebanese Civil War and its subsequent negative consequences on 
CMR.  The data from IQ7 have been discussed in chapter 6.  
IQ8 stated, “Is the relationship between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon today 
so poor that it could cause another civil war?”  IQ 8 was a “here and now” question designed 
to determine whether the current status was such that it could be the causal factor in the 
outbreak of another civil war.  In essence, in answering this question, respondents had to 
reflect on whether history is doomed to repeat itself.  The data from IQ8 have been discussed 
in chapter 6.  
According to Babbie (2001), within competent qualitative interviews, the respondents 
must be willing to answer.  In the case of the field expert respondents, they were extremely 
cooperative.  The questions were designed accordingly.  In addition, to ensure the clarity and 
accuracy of both the questions and the respondents’ answers, an interpreter was employed as 
needed during the interviews.  Nearly all of the field expert respondents answered the 
questions spontaneously with no prior knowledge of the questions posed.  
Babbie (2001) strongly believed that "the greatest advantage of the field research 
method is the presence of the observing, thinking researcher on the scene of action.  Even tape 
recorders and cameras cannot capture all of the relevant aspects of social processes" (p. 295).  
He recommended that researchers write notes during the observation or very soon after the 
observation.  In the present study, the field experts’ responses during the personal interviews 
were collected and documented meticulously through process recording, something this writer 
has done for decades as a clinical social worker and social researcher.   
In terms of the possible weaknesses of qualitative field research, Babbie (2001) 
discussed the potential problem of reliability.  This was potentially problematic because a 
second observer is unlikely to characterize an observation in the exact same way that the first 
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observer does.  He also warned that researchers may have difficulties in "interpret[ing] the 
meaning of responses, opening the possibility of misunderstanding in researcher bias.  There 
is also a danger that some respondents will get answers that are essentially irrelevant to the 
researcher's intent" (p. 291).   
Survey  
Surveys can be a particularly useful research tool to employ to describe the 
characteristics of a broader population.  Surveys make large samples possible and rational.  
Often a large number cases are critical for both descriptive and explanatory analysis, 
especially wherever several variables must be analyzed simultaneously.(Babbie, 2001; 
Salahu-Din, 2003).  Thus, according to Babbie (2001), “A carefully selected probability 
sample, in combination with a standardized questionnaire offers the possibility of making 
refined description assertions about the student body" (p. 240).  Surveys can also be used to 
determine various sociopolitical happenings with “uncanny accuracy" (Babbie, 2001, p.268).  
Although researchers can examine documentation such as civil records to procure accurate 
data for many research topics, “no other method of observation can provide this general 
capability" (Babbie, 2001, p.268).  Surveys are also flexible, and numerous questions may be 
asked.  Researchers can also develop operational definitions from actual feedback (Babbie, 
2001; Salahu-Din, 2003).   
Standardized questionnaires also have an important strength in regard to 
measurements in general.  Sometimes concepts can be quite ambiguous.  For example, one 
person's religiosity as discussed in this thesis might be quite different from another's.  In 
survey research, the researcher is required to ask exactly the same questions of all subjects.  
The researchers must also compute the same intent when respondents give a particular 
response (Babbie, 2001; Salahu-Din, 2003).   
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However, this is also one of the stated weaknesses of survey research.  By designing 
questions that will be identical for all student participants, for example, the researcher may 
miss what is most appropriate for a number of respondents.  Thus, sometimes surveys seem 
superficial in their coverage of complex topics (Babbie, 2001; Salahu-Din, 2003) or may be 
inflexible and subject to artificiality because “they cannot measure social action” (Babbie, 
2001, p.268).   
For this present research, a comprehensive survey was designed to allow for a fairly 
sophisticated level of analysis (see Appendix 20).  The survey was based in part on those 
completed by AUB professors Halim Barakat (1975) and Hilal Khashan (1992), which had 
not been administered in approximately 15 years.  However, this survey instrument was also 
original in that it was designed to gather information specifically regarding CMR.  Therefore, 
questions were generally multilevel in design rather than requiring simply yes, no, agree, or 
disagree responses.  Each question was specifically formulated to elicit student feelings and 
interpretations regarding CMR.  Even questions designed to yield demographic information 
served a double purpose in terms of identifying possible Lebanese identity issues.  Thus, 
multilevel questions were created.  To ensure student understanding of the survey items, the 
questions were written in simple English, the language of study at NDU.  In taking the survey, 
students could not only read the questions printed on the survey form but also hear the 
questions read to them in English.  Thus, the survey was administered in person rather than 
through mail or electronic survey sites.  The findings of the survey were consistent and 
showed clear tendencies among the students.   
The content of the survey items was also similar to the questions asked of the field 
expert respondents, with some exceptions.  Specifically, these students had not physically 
experienced the civil war at all.  Therefore, the question of whether CMR were better or 
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worse than in pre-war Lebanon was deemed inappropriate.  However, the survey did include 
items regarding Lebanese identity, education, politics, religion, and other topics also asked of 
the field experts in their interviews.  These items were designed to understand the students’ 
beliefs and to determine whether there was conflict or consensus between the younger and 
older generations.  Thus, given the reasonable assumption that a serious divergence of opinion 
might exist between the two generations, the impact of such differences on CMR might be 
ascertained.  
Descriptive statistics were derived from the data gathered from survey.  Specifically, 
frequencies, basic percentages, valid percentages, and cumulative percentages were calculated 
using Statistical Package for Social Sciences software.  These statistics were compiled in the 
Office of Research at NDU with the assistance of the office director, Dr. Kamal Abou-
Chedid.  
Participants 
 Two groups of participants were selected for this research study.  The first group 
consisted of 17 field experts chosen to participate in face-to-face interviews.  The second 
group consisted of university students in Lebanon selected to complete the survey instrument.  
A total of 288 students completed the survey, which was administered to students during 
2002, 2004, and 2006.   
The Field Experts 
 The 17 experts were divided into two categories: (a) advocates and working group 
respondents and (b) sociopolitical respondents.  Sixteen of the 17 respondents were native 
Lebanese.  The one exception had lived in Lebanon for over 45 years.  These field expert 
respondents were chosen from this research study because of their impressive backgrounds 
relevant to the main and subsidiary research questions (see Appendices 2-18).  In sum, they 
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came from diverse religious backgrounds, encompassing the six largest religious communities 
and 95% of the Lebanese population.  All 17 experts had also lived through the civil war, 
which greatly impacted CMR.  All respondents had direct yet diversified roles in Lebanese 
CMR.  They were CMR advocates and members of CMR working groups; they were 
scholars, writers, and political and religious leaders.  Despite criticism at times from their own 
communities, they nevertheless continued their work and belief in addressing CMR issues.  
As with any group of respondents, there were potential biases to consider.  Five potential 
sources of bias existed within this research study.  First, a wealth of available literature 
revealed that a great deal of Christian–Muslim, intra-Christian, and intra-Muslim profiling 
and stereotyping had occurred along religious, political, geographic, and identity lines 
(Khashan, 1992; Faour, 1998; Makdisi, 2000; Hanf, 2003; Ziadeh, 2006; Mackey, 2008).  
Often, no matter how rational or unbiased a Christian or Muslim interfaith pledge might be, it 
could be dismissed as biased, depending on the individual’s faith.  Therefore, the Lebanese 
might very well dismiss the field expert respondents’ testimonies and related information as 
biased and false.  
 Second, a sharper political divide developed between the March 8 and March 14 
political camps after the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri 
(Young, 2010).  The March 8 camp is composed primarily of Shiites loyal to Hezbollah (the 
largest Muslim population in Lebanon), Maronite Christians (the largest Christian community 
in Lebanon) loyal to Aoun and the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) party, in addition to 
smaller numbers of Sunni, Druze, and members of other Christian communities (Young, 
2010).  The Shiites in the March 8 camp were also thought to be strongly affiliated with Iran 
and, to a lesser degree, Syria.  The March 14 camp is composed primarily of Sunni Muslims 
furious about the assassination of Hariri, which they blame on the Syrian government and 
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agents; the followers of warlord Walid Jumblatt’s (who has switched loyalties between both 
groups) Progressive Socialist party (Lebanon’s largest Druze community); and Christian 
community members of former Maronite warlord Samir Gea-Gea (Young, 2010).  The March 
14 camp was believed to be strongly allied to the United States, France, Saudi Arabia, and, to 
a lesser extent, Israel (Young, 2010).  Therefore, because Lebanese allegiances were nearly 
divided in half between these two camps, the Lebanese viewed one another as biased.   
Third, the Lebanese people often feared speaking out, both publically and privately, 
against foreign powers and internal leaders.  Indeed, several Lebanese figures, some of whom 
were interviewed for this thesis, were assassinated for speaking out too directly against 
foreign influence in Lebanon.  Therefore, many Lebanese have learned to speak out 
cautiously, almost in code, in that they do not state directly who or what they are criticizing.  
 Fourth, the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon were also divided in regards to their 
national and ethnic identity.  They have disagreed to the point of fighting battles over their 
perceived identity differences, which has left them both wary and fatigued, making it difficult 
to discuss identity in depth.  Fifth, what the expert respondents reported was their perceptions 
of the condition of CMR, which might not be based on reality or fact.  
     Even so, these possible biases were minimal for the several reasons.  All the 
respondents met with this writer privately and separately.  With the exception of one, they did 
not know of the others’ participation in the interview process.  Their answers were not audio 
recorded and they knew this assessment was not going to be released in a public forum.  
Therefore, the respondents had little reason to exaggerate or to report inaccurately.  
Additionally, although to some extent this research was based on the perceptions of the field 
expert respondents, their perceptions were reality in and of themselves.  These experts were 
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the movers and shakers of CMR in present-day Lebanon.  Thus, their perceptions were indeed 
reality, although not the only reality. 
  Nearly all the respondents also shared that they were, on occasion, criticized by their 
own community members for being involved in CMR.  This showed to some extent that the 
respondents believed in what they were doing and saying about CMR to the point that they 
persevered despite the criticism and skepticism. 
Perhaps most important, however, was that the research revealed a complete or near 
complete unanimity among the respondents answers to the questions asked.  For example, 
when asked about the present condition of CMR, whether it had improved or deteriorated, 16 
of the 17 respondents were in complete agreement that CMR have not improved.  Throughout 
this assessment, the corroboration and consistency among field expert responses was very 
high.  
The Students   
To diversify and include a broader side of Lebanese society, a more detailed 
quantitative survey was administered to a larger sample of younger university students to 
compare with the data gathered from the smaller sample of the more mature field experts.  
Student participants were selected from the predominantly Maronite student body of Notre 
Dame University (NDU) over the course of several years (2002, 2004, and 2006).  NDU, 
located in the overwhelmingly Maronite Christian province of Jounieh, Lebanon, was founded 
by monks of the Maronite Marian Order.  A total of 288 surveys were completed during that 
time.  Some of these students were assigned to classes taught by this writer.  The surveys were 
administered in person.    
 Students from NDU were selected to assess the degree to which Maronites have 
accepted the Arab identity of Lebanon and the Lebanese people, one of the foci of this thesis.   
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The available literature revealed that nearly all of the various Lebanese religious affiliations 
agree that Lebanon is an Arab country with an Arab identity among its people.  What is much 
less established is the Christian view of this matter, specifically the Maronite view of 
Lebanese identity.  Not a great deal of literature was found indicating that the Maronites were 
opposed to identifying themselves as Arabs in pre-war Lebanon and several agreements and 
interventions (see chapters 3 and 4) occurred in post-war Lebanon that were designed to bring 
the Maronites into the Arab identity fold and agreement.  However, the question has remained 
as to whether the Maronite community leaders signing of the Ţā’if agreement in 1991 and 
their reaffirmation at the Maronite Synod in 2003reflected genuine or superficial agreement to 
the Arab identity of Lebanon and the Lebanese people.   
 Concerns about surveying this particular student body revolved around three issues.  
First was the near exclusion of Muslim respondents and the relatively small number of other 
Christians who participated.  Second, a total of 288 students completed the survey, a modest 
number.  Unlike the field expert respondents who felt no known obligation to respond to this 
writer’s questions, the students might have felt obligated to do so because most of them, but 
not all, were assigned to classes in which the writer was the professor.    
The number of students participating was affected by several factors.  First, university 
permission had to be obtained to conduct the surveys.  University officials at all levels, from 
department chairs to the university president, were reluctant to grant this permission.  A stated 
rule at NDU and other Lebanese universities was “never talk about religion or politics with 
your students.”  This made gathering CMR information tedious.  Because a number  NDU 
faculty and students held anti-Muslim, anti-Arab sentiments, the university did not seem to 
want this highlighted through this research study.  However, full permission was finally 
granted.   
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 Even with the modest number of student respondents, however, the predominantly 
Maronite student sample could be considered inductively sound and representative of wider 
and diffuse Maronite thought.  Specifically, the respondents represented all 26 cities and 
towns in Lebanon and dozens of villages throughout the country (see Appendix 21).  In all, 
students came from 143 ancestral villages, 102 present residences, and 3 foreign countries 
(Greece, Turkey, and Italy).  This was important because many Lebanese had historical or 
ancestral residences.  Although they no longer lived in these historical residences, they 
retained the rights and sentiments of those communities and were registered to vote only in 
those areas, even if they had not lived there in ages.  The Maronites, like the Lebanese in 
general, maintained the linguistic accents, food particularism, and sociopolitical thought of 
their ancestral or native villages (McKay, 2008).  The Maronites were also diffused 
throughout Lebanon, unlike the other Lebanese religious sects, who remained in consolidated 
areas in Lebanon: the Sunnis in the north and along the northwest coastline, the Shiites in the 
south and the Bekaa Valley, and the Druze in the Shouf and Aley mountains of Central-East 
Lebanon (Dagher, 2001).  
In addition, a general concern of the research was the comparison of the data from the 
field experts (a mix of Christians and Muslims) with the data from the predominantly 
Maronite Christian university student sample.  A more even distribution in the student sample 
between Christians and Muslims might have seemed more appropriate.  However, because 
one of the foci of this thesis was Maronite thought regarding identity and other CMR-related 
issues, NDU was an appropriate Maronite establishment in which explore that focus.  Aside 
from the important difference of faith, according to Lebanese researcher Muhammad Faour,  
Lebanese students are culturally and linguistically the same  and held comparably similar 
views about family, society and more to one another( 1998).  Therefore,  the comparison of 
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student data not only to the Christian but also to the Muslim field experts was valuable and 
representative.    
Comparison of Field Experts’ and University Students’ Responses  
 In regards to the actual quantity of information contained in this thesis, both the field 
expert respondents and university students were utilized and represented at nearly the same 
level.  However, in regards to academic and intellectual quality, the responses of the field 
experts were utilized much more for a few solid reasons.  All but one of the experts were 
native Lebanese and all had lived through the Lebanese Civil War.  They were also CMR 
experts and/or experts in closely related fields.  For all intents and purposes, they were the 
intelligentsia of Lebanese CMR and, thus, more weight was given to their responses.  On the 
other hand, the students’ participation was beneficial to this thesis in that their answers could 
be compared and contrasted with those of the field experts to ascertain agreement and 
disparity between the younger and older generations.  
Preparation of the Manuscript 
 In the preparation of this manuscript, University of Birmingham guidelines were 
followed in the structure and formatting of the text.  The format for citations and reference list 
entries was based on the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association 
(2010).  One exception to those guidelines was the inclusion of footnotes to reference the field 
experts’ interviews instead of using the APA citation format in text.  This was done per the 
recommendation of this writer’s supervisor to minimize in-text documentation redundancy.  
The reader may refer to the footnotes to find the appropriate appendices containing 




CHAPTER 1: THEOLOGICAL/RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES, RADICAL 
RELIGIOSITY, AND CHRISTIAN–MUSLIM RELATIONS 
 
 In this chapter, the effects of basic religious differences between the Christians and 
Muslims of Lebanon on their relationship have been presented.  The information was gleaned 
in part from queries regarding religious differences and radicalism.  Specifically, IQ2 and IQ5 
have been addressed: 
IQ2: Is there a divide or harmony between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon and 
what are the major causes of this?  For example, are the causes of a political nature; a 
religious or theological nature; an economic, social stratification nature (i.e., the rich 
versus the poor); or (d) some other nature?      
IQ5: Is there a problem with radical or extremist religion (Christian and/or Muslim) in 
Lebanon, and does it affect Christian–Muslim relations?  If so how?  
 Seventeen field expert respondents replied to these queries (see Appendices 2–18).  
The responses of 288 university students to two similar questions from the survey instrument 
have also been presented.  In addition, other possible causes of CMR discord identified during 
the discussion on theology, religious differences, and radicalism have been noted.  Although 
most of the experts corroborated one another’s information, the students’ responses were 
somewhat different.  The possible reasons for these differences have also been explored.  
Theology/Religion as a Cause of CMR Discord 
 That the civil war was caused by religious differences was soundly rejected by 14 of 
the 17 field expert respondents.  The remaining three respondents reported religious 
differences as only a mild to moderate, but not a major, cause of the Lebanese Civil War.  The 
concept of religious differences in this chapter simply refers to belonging to a different faith, 
as is the case between Christianity and Islam.  These faiths have, of course, different precepts 
and practices, which have simply been referred to as the factor of religious differences.  In 
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this study, this factor was assessed for causation.  In other words, did the Christians and 
Muslims of Lebanon believe that their separate (though sometimes similar) manner of 
prayers, rituals, and beliefs was the cause of CMR discord?         
 Massouh
1
 echoed the sentiments of his superior, UB President Elie Salem,
2
 stating that 
the problems between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon had not resulted from 
differences in religion, theology, or social stratification.  He noted that regardless of wealth, 
people in the same communities did not criticize their political leaders, who were usually rich 
and powerful, so that they would not be considered traitors to their communities or “carriers 
of Christian–Muslim dissent.”  Such might be the charge if a Christian were to criticize a 
Muslim leader or a Muslim, a Christian leader.  Halabi
3
 was more direct, stating 
unequivocally that  
the war was not at any time a religious war . . .  It was actually several wars within the 
same war.  It was the Palestinians versus the Christians [Lebanese Christians opposed 
the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, while the Muslims mostly supported their plight], 
the Palestinians versus the Lebanese, the Syrians versus the Palestinians, Iran versus 
Iraq, and Iran versus Syria. 
 
He also stated that spiritual leaders did not believe that the civil war was a religious conflict 
either.  Therefore, the discrepancies were more regional than confessional.  Massouh, a CMR 
specialist and Greek Orthodox priest, genuinely disregarded religious differences as a cause 
for poor CMR.  This might be due in part to the Orthodox Christians having close 
relationships with their Muslim counterparts based on their convergence in political issues 
and common Arab identity (Pacini, 1998).  Halabi belonged to the Druze community, which 
considered itself neither Muslim nor Christian, and  complained of persecution and 
marginalization in history (Firro, 2003).  As such, Halabi could be quite sensitive and aware 
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 Fr. P. George Massouh, personal communication, October 12, 2004 (see Appendix 2).   
2
 Dr. Elie Adib Salem, personal communication, July 11, 2004 (see Appendix 3). 
3
 Halabi, personal communication, May 26, 2005 (see Appendix 4). 
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of religious differences as a cause of intercommunal tensions.  Instead, he flatly declined 
them, which added credence to religious differences not being the main culprit within CMR.       
 However, pre- and postwar discrepancies were found concerning the role of religious 
differences in the Lebanese Civil War.  In 1976, at the start of the war(s), studies from Kaslik 
University, a Christian university located in the dominantly Christian province of Jounieh, 
Lebanon, clearly showed that CMR problems were caused primarily by religious differences 
(Khashan, 1990).  I. Mousawi
1
 of Hezbollah described then Maronite priest Beshara Ra’i of 
Kaslik as a Christian radical who expressed clear enmity for Muslims.  Thirty-five years later, 
I. Mousawi referred to the March 25, 2011, patriarchal inauguration speech of that same 
Beshara Ra’i.  In that speech Beshara Ra’i spoke of religious similarities and unity not 
divisions between the Lebanese Christians and Muslims (Abu-Jawde, 2011).   
 The concept that Islam and Christianity are virtually the same faiths was expressed by 
some of the field experts.  I. Mousawi
2
 viewed the two religions as such, indicating there were 
no major differences between them.  The leading Shiite religious figure, Muhammad 
Fadlallah Hussein, also went on record with a similar statement (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002).  
Husseini
3
 often invoked the Islamic adage “min asl wahid” (“from one origin”) when 
referring to Muslims and Christians.  Religiously, he felt both faiths were so similar that they 
were not and could not be a cause for CMR disunity.  Thus, religious differences were not 
viewed as a major cause of either present CMR discord or the civil war.  Because all three of 
these field expert sources belonged to the largest and very active Muslim community, the 
Shia, and held parallel positions with their Christian counterparts,  religious differences as a 
CMR antagonist were diminished. 
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 MP Hussein Husseini, personal communication, December 2, 2004 (see Appendix 6).  
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 However, other sources suggested that “recurring fault-lines in Lebanon were 
variously between Christians and Muslims” (Khouri, 2008, p. 9).  Author Dr. Omri Nir (as 
cited in Rubin, 2009) indicated that the idea of religious differences, however mild, being the 
cause of CMR discord might have originated from the Maronite population’s dismay 
regarding their decline in prominence.  The Maronites had 
continued to be dominant during the French mandate of Lebanon (1920–1946) and in 
independent Lebanon until the early 1980s.  From the mid-1980s . . . a substantial 
change took place in the main roles when Shi’a and Sunnis became the new main 
actor[s].  (Nir  as quoted in Rubin, 2009, p. 177)  
 
The Maronites had a record of divergent socio-religious-political views compared with 
Muslims in general and with some Christian denominations as well (Barakat, 1993; Khalifa, 
1997).  This divergence has been reviewed throughout this thesis for its impact on CMR.    




 and Matar) believed that vague 
religious differences were a cause, albeit minor, of CMR discord.  According to Khalil,
1
 both 
Christians and Muslims had taught each other’s religion in a negative context, resulting in 
misconceptions and tension between the communities.  Khalil was pleased that some imams 
were now teaching Christianity in a more positive manner but felt that Muslims still needed to 
improve the frequency and manner of teaching Christianity, noting that “many Muslims have 
still not yet been able to teach Christianity well.”  
It was unclear whether Khalil
2
 believed that religious differences were a minor or 
moderate cause of CMR discord, although he wanted to dispel the rumor that Muslims 
throughout Lebanon were persecuting Christians.  He stated, “It cannot be said that Christians 
are oppressed by Muslim(s) since Lebanon has freedom of religion.”  He also indicated that 
an even clearer distinction should be made in Lebanon between religion and the state than 
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currently exists.  A double standard in the treatment of Christians and Muslims existed in their 
inclusion as religious categories: “Christians pay bills while the Muslims don’t.”  In Lebanon, 
he explained, Christians must pay separate, personal fees for their affiliated churches and the 
schools; whereas the taxes for mosques and their partner schools were paid by the 
government.  Khalil believed that if the church and school were affiliated, both should be 
taxed accordingly.  Thus, if a Mosque and school were associated, they too should be billed 
within this context.  He also admitted that Christian clergy sometimes declined government 
funds to avoid the supervision and scrutiny of the Lebanese government, which he described 
as inept and corrupt.  
According to Khalil,
1
 a full democracy was unsustainable in Lebanon because the 
people were not ready to elect the most qualified leaders because of strong sectarian 
considerations.  He lamented the loss of good leaders in Lebanon and asked, “What good 
Christian leaders are around?”  He also noted the somewhat antidemocratic Lebanese 
Christian mentality, which he perceived as a weakness.  Lebanese Christians had continued to 
think in terms of community, either by area or by religion.  Instead, they must be honest, more 
self-critical, and less biased toward their own community. 
Gemayel
2
 was one of the few respondents who clearly felt that theological and 
religious reasons were a cause, albeit a mild one, of CMR discord in Lebanon.  He expressed 
concerns similar to Khalil in that, despite his personal pride in being a Christian, he believed 
ethnocentrism toward one’s sect damages intercommunal relations.  Gemayel insisted that 
CMR had deteriorated because of repercussions from the improper intermingling of religion 
and politics.  However, he also was the only respondent who felt CMR were better now than 
in prewar Lebanon.  Gemayel, age 33 at the time, was the youngest and least experienced of 




 Pierre Gemayel, personal communication, June 6, 2005 (see Appendix 8). 
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the field experts, particularly in regards to CMR.  This could be the explanation for his 
variance with other field experts in his belief that CMR had improved in postwar Lebanon.  
However, as an MP with a substantial Christian following and a member a politically 
prominent Lebanese family, Gemayel’s views should be considered (Daou, 2001).     
Matar
1
 also acknowledged but did not blame the existence of religious differences:  
There’s no merging of the religions.  They [Christianity and Islam] are different and so 
we leave it that way; yet as long as we don’t develop the citizen as a whole and the 
government remains ineffective, these religious differences will become political 
differences and cause problems. 
 
Interestingly, per the aspect of divergence just mentioned, these three field experts 
were Maronite Catholics, the largest Christian community in Lebanon.  None of the Muslim 
respondents reported any religious differences as impediments to healthy CMR; nor did the 
remaining four Maronite, three Greek Orthodox, and two Greek Catholic respondents.  
Salem
2
 raised another religiously connected cause of poor CMR when he stated, “Islam is not 
as tolerant and open as it used to be in the past.  The Christians are nervous because of this, 
and they are not united at all among themselves.”  Salem explained that when Islamic 
intolerance and Christian nervousness and disunity occur, “Everything gets worse.”  El 
Khazen
3
 concurred.  Some of the field experts expressed diversified views; yet in regards to 
religion as a main cause for conflict, most were unified in their belief that, in and of 
themselves, religious differences were not a major source.  
Nearly all of the field expert respondents, 14 of the 17, clearly denied that religious 
differences were the cause of conflict in Lebanon, which was surprising because the Lebanese 
Civil War has often been dubbed a Christian–Muslim war whose origin was based on 
religious rather than communal differences (Kerr, 1997).  However, three of the field experts 
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believed that vague religious differences were a cause, albeit a minor one, of CMR discord.  
Of interest and perhaps not surprising, all three were Christian and Maronite Catholic, the 
largest Christian community in Lebanon.  The Maronites had a history of contrasting socio-
religio-political views from Muslims in general and from some Christian denominations as 
well (Grafton, 2003).  This might be due to in part, according to then Maronite Patriarch Sfeir 
(as cited in Mroue, 2010), to the Christian worry of being a dwindling minority and potential 
victims despite Muslim attempts to reassure Christians that maintaining their presence and 
safety is “a common Islamic duty”  (Hornby, 2010, p. 1).  Writer Omar Nir concurred that the 
concern of religious differences, however mild, being the cause of CMR discord could be 
displaced and might actually originate from the Maronite population’s dismay regarding their 
decline in prominence and their experiencing the loss of being the majority since the 
Maronites had  
continued to be dominant during the French mandate of Lebanon (1920–1946) and in 
independent Lebanon until the early 1980s.  From the mid-1980s... a substantial 
change took place in the main roles when Shi’a and Sunnis became the new main 
actor.  (as quoted in Rubin, 2009, p. 177).  
 
Missing from the field experts responses were specific theological differences and 
criticisms.  For example, Christian criticism of the Muslim view of Jesus as a prophet and 
thus not as God incarnate was never mentioned.  In the view of many Western Christian 
clergy, the role of Jesus as simply a prophet and not God is unacceptable.  As one 
contemporary example of this, the Reverend R. Albert Mohler, Jr., argued that Jesus Christ 
was not simply a hero or prophet; rather, “He is the incarnate Son of God.  He is the second 
person of the Trinity.  He is the Lord over all.  Any minimization of that is a huge problem” 
(as quoted in Vu, 2008, p. 1).  Mohler continued, “This is the God who very clearly identifies 
Himself and says, 'I am this and I am not anything else.'  If you disagree about the identity of 
Jesus Christ, then you disagree about the identity of God" (as quoted in Vu, 2008, p. 1).  This 
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high-profile Southern Baptist theologian was responding to a full-page letter endorsed by 
nearly 300 Christian leaders that appeared in a December issue of The New York Times.  The 
letter was drafted by scholars at the Center for Faith and Culture at Yale Divinity School in 
response to an October letter signed by 138 Muslim scholars, clerics, and leaders that 
encouraged Muslims and Christians to work more closely for world peace.  Although some 
other Western Christians disagreed with Mohler, including co-religionists and members of his 
Southern Baptist denomination (Medley, 2010), none of the field expert respondents referred 
to this or to any other religious differences as impediments to CMR. 
In contrast to the field experts, student respondents overwhelmingly believed that 
tensions between the Christians and Muslims in Lebanon were caused by religious 
differences.  Of 288 students surveyed, 226 responded to the item concerning whether 
religious differences were the major cause of CMR discord.  Of those 226 responses, 33.3% 
indicated religious differences were the strongest factors in CMR discord (see Table 22.1).  
Another 34.9 % of the respondents felt religious differences were a significant cause of CMR 
discord.  Sixty-two of the students surveyed did not respond to this item.   
In a second item, students were asked to indicate whether religious differences were 
the major cause of the overall conflict in Lebanon, not just of CMR discord.  The results 
suggested that the students understood the slight difference between the two questions.  Of the 
288 students surveyed, 226 chose to respond to this item.  A total of 38.9% indicated religious 
differences were a major cause of the overall conflict in Lebanon, including 16.8% who 
indicated religious differences were the greatest cause (see Table 22.2).  Of the 288 students 
surveyed, 88.9% identified themselves as Christians, with 57.6% identifying themselves 
specifically as Maronite Christians. 
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Thus, student responses were quite different from those of the field experts.  Although 
the students seemed to believe that religious differences were a major cause of CMR discord 
specifically, they did not believe they were the major cause or problem of the Lebanese 
conflict overall.  However, 15 of the 17 field experts stated that religious differences and 
religious fanaticism were not major causes of either Lebanese discord overall or of CMR 
specifically.  
Religious Radicalism as a Cause of CMR Discord 
Radicalism (2004) is defined in Webster’s New World College Dictionary as “radical 
principles, ideals, methods, or practices.”  In addition, according to The American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language, radicalism (2010) is “the doctrines or practices of 
radicals.”  In an article published by The Journal of Islamic Studies, authors Sivan and 
Friedman (1991) stated that religious radicalism “encompasses both thought and action and 
that it entails the ‘rejection’ of all other nonindigenous values and cultures.  Faced with the 
challenges of modernity, the religious radicals’ response has been ‘excessive’ or ‘extremist,’” 
(p. 554).  These definitions were combined to represent the parameters of religious radicalism 
for this chapter.  In addition, for the purpose of this thesis, radicalism was considered 
synonymous with the two other terms: religious extremism and fundamentalism.    
Radical religiosity was also discussed with the field experts.  Thirteen of the 17 field 
expert respondents did not identify radical religiosity in Lebanon as a contributing factor in 
CMR instability.  They explained that this was because Lebanese of different faiths had been 
living together for centuries.  Thus, religious diversity was known and expected.  Four of the 
17 field experts did assess radical religiosity as a moderate cause of CMR discord.  Some of 
the experts considered Muslim or Islamic radicalism to be greater than Christian radicalism.  
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Others believed the opposite.  However, the 17 field experts believed the more detrimental 
CMR fault lines lay elsewhere, not with religious differences and radicalism.   
Salem
1
 stated religious radicalism or extremism in contemporary Lebanon was 
difficult to measure.  He reported growth in both Muslim and Christian fundamentalism but 
more so within Muslim communities.  Habib
2
 also stated that there were both radical Muslims 
and Christians, each group trying to dominate the country; the former group had been striving 
for a Muslim nation; the latter, for a Christian nation.  
According to Sammak,
3
 radicalism had indeed affected CMR.  A Sunni Muslim, 
Sammak had no qualms in reporting the existence of a larger number of Muslim 
fundamentalists than of Christian fundamentalists.  Another issue was what Sammak 
described as some Muslims being inflexible in their relations with Christians, pointing out 
how the Prophet Muhammad himself, in the heart of what is today Saudi Arabia, invited the 
Christians of Najran into his mosque to pray with him.  With this in mind, Sammak was 
baffled by the fact that in present-day Saudi Arabia, it was illegal to build any Christian 
churches.  This, he felt, hurt CMR.  Even though the field experts more than the students did 
not see religious differences as a problem, the Lebanese might do better by adhering to a more 
secular, rather than sectarian, view of society.  However, recent polls showed ambivalence in 
Lebanese willingness to separate politics and religion, even though the people very often 
bemoaned the mix as a detriment to CMR and political function (Hodeib, 2010).  He also 
indicated that Christian radicals were monitored and controlled more by the church, while 
much less control existed over Muslim radicals.  
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 concurred, acknowledging that Christian radicalism existed in Lebanon 
and posed a problem both to CMR and to Lebanon in general.  However, Muslim radicalism 
posed a greater danger because of its larger following and the limited control exerted over it 
in comparison with Christian radicalism.  Khalil,
2
 who stated earlier that Lebanese ills were 
not particularly based on religious and theological reasons, also believed that radical Islam in 




 did not believe that religious radicalism was as significant a problem in 
Lebanon as in other countries.  However, he mentioned that Hezbollah and the Qawaat 
Libnaneeyee (“Lebanese Forces,” a Christian party) were somewhat radical in their 
ideologies.  This notion that both parties endorsed radical ideology was shared by Gemayel,
4
 
although very few of the others agreed.  Those experts who did agree did so to a much lesser 
extent.  
In discussing religious radicalism, Franjieh
5
 explained that for a period of time during 
the civil war, both Christians and Muslims exercised religious extremism and radical schools 
of thought.  However, the Lebanese realized postwar, that radicalism was a failure and did not 
meet their societal needs and goals.  This belief has continued into present day Lebanon.  
During the war, Beirut was actually a model or laboratory for intolerance, violence, and 
anarchy.  
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 noted that some signs of interfaith harmony and consensus had 
begun appearing.  Neither Muslims nor Christians wanted to entertain religious radicalism.  
As Franjieh remarked, “No one can impose the chador [i.e., be forced to wear the long, black 
Muslim robe] or a Christian state on Lebanon.”  Other positive observations that pointed to 
unity included Lebanese youth working together and cooperating with one another in Beirut.  
He also observed young people in downtown working hard to be successful and being 
seemingly eager to unify.  According to Franjieh, unity was the first factor of independence 
and subsequent success.  




 expressed their dislike for a 
relatively new term emerging in the Middle East, Islamiyoun (“Islamists”).  Habib reported 
that Muslims had begun designating themselves as Islamiyoun rather than as Muslimoun 
(“Muslim”) or Arab.  This new term often denoted radicalism, according to Habib, Salem,
4
 
Khalil, and other expert respondents. 
Salem
5
 noted that “more secular Muslims are becoming more fundamental because it’s 
a fashion, a mood of the times.”  He gave as an example of such fundamentalism a female 
Muslim student at UB who used to shake his hand when she saw him but no longer did so, 
referring to the practice of some Muslims of the opposite sex to refrain from shaking hands 
because of the cleanliness taboos (Fadl, 2001; Maqsood, 2003). 
Habib
6
 added that although the Lebanese were facing the challenge of radical Islam, 
radial Christianity was even worse.  He noted that the Maronite Patriarch Sfeir, whose 30-year 
tenure as patriarch ended in March 2011, was often in the position to influence and dictate 
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political policy in Lebanon.  This upset Habib, who described himself as being secular 
regarding the separation of religion and the state.  
According to Khalil,
1
 “Christian extremism is not violent, and violence is the question 
Islam has within, one, the Quran and, two, the Hadith.”  Regarding Christianity, Khalil noted 
that the aim of all Christian texts was the betterment of people, helping them become more 
righteous: “Christ did not go against the Law of Moses but worked within it.”  He continued 
that the Christian gospels did not stress strict accountability for sinners and that Christ’s 
mission was to promote forgiveness rather than condemnation.  For Khalil, through Islam, 
“Muslims seek justice or punishment of the wrongdoers; in Christianity, Christians are to 
forgive and even love the wrongdoers.”  Khalil believed this fundamental difference between 





 believed that there was a difference between Middle Eastern 
Christians and those from outside the area.  People indigenous to the Middle East believed 
Middle Eastern Christians held the same sociopolitical views as Christian extremists in the 
West, particularly the United States.  Because of this, indigenous Middle Eastern Christians 
were unfairly treated and erroneously begrudged.  Thus, religious extremism did affect CMR 
in Lebanon.  Halabi
4
 went on to explain that although Christians in Lebanon were not 
extremists, they appeared to be because of their anger over their dwindling numbers and 
weakening political power.  The Christians were fearful and, thus, seemed to be extremists.  
Khalil
5
 also indicated there was some extremism in Lebanon, with Shiites being more 
extreme than Christians and Sunnis.  Such extremism was acceptable as long as it was kept 
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within the extremists’ communities; but it was not acceptable when it was spread to other 
communities.  He added, “Praying five times a day is good, but five prayers and jihad is no 
good.”  He recognized the debate over the exact definition of jihad but shared that if the word 
was connected to a deed, it became an extremist problem.  Khalil explained that the 
radicalism that did exist invoked feelings of insecurity in Christians yet denied the existence 
of radical Christians in Lebanon, stating that Christians in Lebanon were not advocating for a 
Christian-only state.   
Hajjar
1
 believed that some Christian and Muslim radicalism existed in Lebanon, with 
the members in each group labeling those in the other, not themselves, as extremists.  He 
indicated that as extremism spread, CMR was negatively impacted.  He noted, for example, 
that when the Christians heard the fanatical anti-Christian speeches of Osama bin Laden, they 
became fearful of their very well-being.  A few reports indicated that Christians were being 
forced to leave Lebanon due to Muslim persecution (Belt, 2009; Haddad, S.  2001a).  
However, all of the field experts dispelled these reports as false rumors.  
Of note was the diffusion of response.  Specifically, most of these respondents 
identified Muslims and Christians equally in regards to being religious radicals.  Overall, a 
slightly higher number of references was made to Muslim radicals, with the Muslim 
respondents themselves also making this reference.  There was also a reference to inter-
Sunni/Shiite conflict being a form of religious radicalism that could affect CMR in the near 
future.  Overall, however, the field experts clearly cited causes other than religious differences 
or radicalism as significant impediments to healthy CMR.  These causes have been 
thoroughly reviewed in the upcoming chapters.  
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Other Possible Causes of CMR Discord 
Gemayel
1
 identified three causes of extremism on both sides: poverty, oppression, and 
strong political causes.  According to Ghazal,
2
 a small number of radical Christians and 
Muslims exist because of poverty and lack of proper education, especially in the areas of 
religion and social sciences.  Habib
3
 cited politics as the main deterrent to interfaith 
conviviality.  N. Musawi,
4
 director of international affairs for Hezbollah, also stated the 
problems were political corruption and severe financial mismanagement of public funds, not 
people being excessive with religion.  He argued that when individuals or communities 
followed their faith strictly, that did not mean they were radical.  If someone was less a 
faithful Muslim or Christian, then that person was also less of a good citizen: “The more 
religious people are, or become, the more they will find common ground to meet.”  I. 
Mousawi
5
 concurred with his superior.  
N. Musawi
6
 also believed that the notion throughout Lebanon that one must be less 
religious and more secular to reconcile and be successful was being spread by misguided 
politicians.  These politicians were serving their own interests when they advised their 
constituencies to be less religiously inclined.  Again, I. Mousawi
7
 concurred, stating that little, 
if any, religious fanaticism was present in Lebanon.  He categorized the bit of radicalism that 
did exist as being “politically based and inspired by foreign intervention.”  
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 believed that the cause of some radical Islamic beliefs and behavior was 
poor education and underdevelopment in poverty-stricken areas.  As such, education and 
economic issues have been explored deeper in chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis.  According to 
Aoun,
2
 “Religious extremism of a minority of Muslims is a cause [of poor CMR], and they 
[extremists] even cause problems with other Muslims.”  Aoun did not believe, however, that 
Lebanon had a major problem with religious extremism.  As did nearly each interviewee, he 
believed that the problems in Lebanon were the result of politics, not religion.  Salem
3
 








 democracy in Lebanon was being hurt by radicalism.  With 
her affirmation that both forms of radicalism existed, Mouawad hoped that instead of 
radicalism, the Lebanese would choose to “have common values, beliefs and democracy . . . 
with its good institutions” (i.e., education, civil service, and so forth).  However, with some 
rare optimism, Habib
7
 interjected that Muslims were becoming more moderate.  Thus, 
radicals would be unable to destroy Lebanon and its democratic institutions.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
Nearly every expert respondent clearly denied that religious differences were the cause 
of conflict in Lebanon, which was surprising because the Lebanese Civil War had often been 
dubbed a Christian–Muslim war whose origin was based on religious rather than communal 
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differences (Kerr, 1997).  Also indicative of this position was the lack of governmental 
legislation and calls from community leaders to create a separate Christian or Muslim state or 
to mandate or implement canon law or the Sharia.  Thus, the notion that the Lebanese Civil 
War was based on religion was widely refuted.  
However modestly, the findings from this diversified group of native Lebanese 
Christians and Muslims, who had lived together before, during, and after the civil war, could 
be referenced as a counter point to that of author Samual Huntington in his book The Clash of 
Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (1996).  In this book, Huntington blamed 
the current restless world on cultural differences and identified, in particular, Islam as an 
intolerant and violent religion.  For their part, the field experts almost unanimously refuted 
this, matching the rebuttal put forth by Edward Said (2001) in his “Clash of Ignorance” and 
the premises put forth by Ussama Makdisi (2000) in The Culture of Sectarianism: 
Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon.  Still, the 
occasional journalist (such as Lebanese national Bridgette Gabriel) or leader insisted it was a 
Muslim versus Christian war (Gabriel, 2006).  
Some socioreligious factors did seem to have an influence on Lebanese conflict.  The 
Christians seemed to fear that, as a numeric minority in Lebanon, they might become second-
class citizens in a Muslim-dominated or Islamic state (Abu al Nasr, 2001; Dagher, 2001).  The 
expert respondents also pointed out that the zuama invoked religious rallying cries to 







 stated that Muslims and Christian instructors did not normally teach each 
other’s faiths properly, which could add to CMR discord.  In addition, both the Christian and 
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Muslims of Lebanon decried former Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir’s use of religious 
antagonism within CMR (Hatoum, 2006; Sfeir, 2009 ). 
The students surveyed felt that religious differences and their relation to the conflict 
were much more of an issue than did the expert respondents.  This reflected a divide between 
the two groups.  The field expert respondents, who witnessed the anarchy of the civil war, did 
not reactively point to religious differences as a hindrance to their relationships.  Yet the 
university students, who did not experience the horrors of the civil war, believed religion was 
a major cause of CMR discord.  These students were also not members of CMR working 
groups, and none of them were religion majors—both of which could have accounted for 
some of the direct resentment between the faiths.  Such glaring differences in attitudes and 
levels of tolerance between the older expert respondents and the university-aged students 
might be worrisome.  
One possible cause for the students’ views was identified by the Search for Common 
Ground, an NGO working on CMR and related issues in present-day Lebanon:  
Religious pluralism is a defining feature of Lebanon: so much so it is enshrined in the 
country's political system, designed to give political representation to all communities.  
But with Lebanon's population divided across 18 recognized sects, the country's 
politics and society have historically been wrought with bitter ideological differences.  
These differences are often perpetuated by the prejudices parents pass on, intentionally 
or not, to their children.  It is perhaps inevitable, then, that Lebanon's youngsters at 
times find themselves reinforcing the country's religious, socio-economic and political 
disputes with peers at school.  (Mahdawi, 2009, p. 3)  
 
However, the students did concur with the field experts in that religious differences 
were not the single major cause of CMR discord.  Hence, if religious differences were 
contributing factors in CMR discord at all, they existed as a side bar to other sociopolitical 
phenomena or were entwined with such phenomena.  Thus, a variety of sociopolitical issues 
and areas of Lebanese society, some of which were identified in this chapter, have been 
reviewed in the upcoming chapters to determine their impact on CMR.    
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CHAPTER 2: COMMUNAL DISPLACEMENT, EDUCATION, AND ECONOMIC 
THEMES IN CHRISTIAN–MUSLIM RELATIONS 
 
Because religious differences and radicalism were not shown to be major causes of 
CMR discord in chapter 1, other aspects of Lebanese society were explored as possible fault 
lines or strengths.  In this and the following chapters, the more serious causes of CMR discord 
have been delineated as identified by the field expert respondents and the university students 
and as found in the literature.  
Analysis of the interviews with the field experts revealed challenges to Lebanese 
CMR within several formal societal areas: communal displacement, educational issues, the 
economy, identity issues, political practices, and foreign interference.  The field expert 
respondents also placed some blame for these societal challenges on the Lebanese themselves.  
However, of the 288 university students (256 Christians, including 166 Maronite Christians)   
who responded to the survey, only 17.8% chose intra-Lebanese conflict as either the first 
(9.3%) or second (8.5%) major cause of Lebanese dysfunction (see Table 22.3).  As shown in 
Table 22.3, student respondents also showed little self-acknowledgement or disgust regarding 
the Lebanese role in the collapse of Lebanon.  The preponderance of literature reviewed 
throughout this thesis indicated that most authors blamed the various phenomena reviewed 
(i.e., religion, displacement, education, politics, etc.) for CMR discord, although a few 
authors, including Lebanese researcher of religion and politics Bassam Khalifah (1997), held 
the Lebanese people themselves responsible.  Moreover, Khalifah (1997) assigned more 
culpability to the Maronite Christians than to the Muslims.  Overall, however, the students 
surveyed and, more so, the field experts cited various societal factors for the disruption in 
CMR rather than the Lebanese people themselves, as was the case in the majority of literature 
reviewed.  In this chapter, the societal areas of communal displacement, education, and the 




As indicated by several of the field experts and in the available literature, geographic 
displacement has continued to be an unresolved, serious detriment to healthy CMR in present-
day Lebanon.  According to the Global Internal Displacement Program (IDP) Database of the 
Norwegian Refugee Council (Profile of Internal Displacement,2004), Lebanon underwent 
massive population displacement during the war years, 1975–1991.  In the early years, the 
majority of the displaced were Muslim; in the later phases, the majority were Christian 
(Profile of Internal Displacement, 2004).  Additionally, instead of occurring at a steady rate, 
the internal displacement of Christians and Muslims occurred in large waves throughout the 
conflict (Profile of Internal Displacement, 2004).  Dagher (2001) stated that “for a total 
number of 847,000 displaced people (that is 171,000 families on an average scale of five 
members per family), 680,000 were Christian and 167,000 were Muslims” (p. 84).  These 
statistics were supported and upheld by several sources and studies, including the Internal 
Displaced Monitoring Centre of Norway (Birkland & Karim, 2009) and the U.S. Committee 
for Refugees and Immigrants (2009) World Refugee Survey.  Individuals were displaced not 
only from their respective dominant areas but also from integrated Christian and Muslim 
provinces, cities, and villages, as Sammak
1
 reported. 
In 1999, Judith Harik documented the failure of displaced Lebanese persons to return 
to their homes: “Failing such a timely action, whatever symbolic Christian–Muslim co-
existence Lebanon formerly possessed might be finally drained by process of sectarian 
cantonization unleashed by the civil war” (p. 173).  Thus, the large numbers of displaced 
persons from both singular and pluralistic areas coupled with a very low percentage of 
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returnees resulted in greatly diminished Christian–Muslim coexistence (Dagher, 2001; Profile 
of Internal Displacement, 2004).   
Prior to the civil war, the Lebanese people experienced a more integrated, 







 although CMR were not perfect, Christians and Muslims lived in the same 
buildings within the same neighborhoods.  They shopped at the same grocery stores and 
malls, did business, and attended schools with one another.  This integrated intercommunal 
existence was also revealed in the literature; the civil war changed that for the worse (Harik, 
1999; Strohmer, 2007).  
Subsequently, some Christian-majority villages became Muslim-majority villages; and 
displaced persons showed little interest in returning to their villages and coexisting (Strohmer, 
2007).  Because of this, young people were prevented from interacting at the same level 
individuals of the older generations had interacted.  This resulted in the heightening of the 
ignorance, prejudice, and discrimination some Christian and Muslim communities had for one 
another (Faour, 1998; Nizzameddin, 2007).   
This writer observed numerous examples of this during his 7-year tenure at a Lebanese 
university.  For instance, in a discussion on ethnicity during an introduction to a sociology 
course this writer taught in 2006, a Maronite Christian student (whose name was fully Arabic) 
insisted that Lebanese Christians were not Arabs.  He stated loudly, “I can tell who is an Arab 
[Muslim] by smelling them,” and continued to insist on his ability to do so.  Later, another 
professor concurred with the student’s statement and belief.  He even shared a widely held 
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belief that because Arab Muslims were not baptized as Christians were, they had a distinct, 
offensive body odor. 
According to Sammak, a fundamental change occurred in the relationship between 
Christians and Muslims due to this displacement.
1
  The Lebanese people were divided 
geographically, resulting in a more segregated population rather than the integrated one that 
existed before the war: “Now you have ghettos everywhere in Lebanon with very few mixed 
areas,” Sammak stated.  He also discussed personal examples of the separation of the two 
groups, indicating the changes in the composition of the 14 families residing in his building 
from an almost equal number of Christians and Muslims to all being Muslim.  He and Khalil
2
  
both discussed the demographic changes in Beirut, including the movement of Christians out 
of Hamra, the creation of separate shopping areas for Christians and Muslims, and the 
movement of Christians from West Beirut to East Beirut, respectively, and of Armenians to 
Aley, a central east province of Lebanon.  
Some Lebanese, buttressed by the available data, contended a case could be made that 
the Christians of Lebanon suffered more than their Muslim counterparts suffered in regards to 
communal displacement, especially Maronites.  El Khazen
3
 reported that 70% of displaced 
persons during the war were Christians.  Places such as Dahieh and Haret Hreik that had been 
predominantly Christian became Muslim after the war, especially Shiite.
4
  A researcher at the 
Center for Muslim–Christian Understanding at Georgetown University indicated the 
percentage of displaced Christians due to the civil war was 81%; Muslims accounted for only 
19% of displaced persons (Dagher, 2001).  El Khazen
5
 and Dagher (2001) also pointed to 
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other areas of Lebanon, such as the Shouf Mountains, where large communities of Christians 
were displaced.  Dagher (2001) noted that “the number of Christians displaced from the Shouf 
and its vicinity reached 331, 000” (p. 84).  This resulted in part to the Christians feeling that 
they were the principal losers of the civil war (Lesch, 2007), although many sources reported 
it as a stalemate (Khalaf, 2002).  The Christians have maintained resentment over this 
perceived loss, which is something that will need to be addressed within the Christian–
Muslim dialogue.       
Several field experts, including Khalil,
1
  believed that the reduction in Christian–
Muslim co-living, with resulting decreases in their daily interaction, was the most important 
postwar change affecting Lebanese unity.  Prior to the war, CMR were better due to social 
living and community integration.  Socialists and Communists worked together without 
prejudice in all Lebanese communities for Arab unity, according to Hajjar.
2
  Just after the end 
of the war, Lebanese Christians’ and Muslims’ desires to unite dissipated because they were 
not nurtured.  Coexistence was no longer as it had been.  
Such changes resulted in a lack of social integration since the civil war.  Sammak
3
 
stated that by living together no longer as they had prior to the war, the Lebanese were 
depriving themselves of essential interaction, familiarity, conviviality, and harmony.  Khalil
4
 
echoed this sentiment, stating that the mentality of the people had been changed: “The people 







 and other field experts also felt that Christians and Muslims 
no longer had much in common.  They no longer shared various aspects of life, such as work 
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and school.  Khalil suggested that displacement of the Christians and Muslims has particularly 
affected the youth of Lebanon whom he feels have neither good understanding of each other 
nor relationships with one another.  Hajjar agreed and stated that Lebanese youth did not 
interact with one another as they should because they attended different schools on the basis 
of their religion.  
Khalil
3
 itemized the various areas of discord among the different Lebanese 
communities.  Discontentment among the Shiites was based on socioeconomics.  Although 
Lebanese Shiites became much more involved and respected in society, the previously 
dominant religious communities were either envious or fearful of the increased power of the 
Shiite community.  The discord between the Sunni and Greek Orthodox communities was not 
religious in nature but rather societal due to fallout from the war.  Prior to the war, these two 
groups intermingled, living together and even intermarrying.  This was true especially in 
Tripoli and to lesser extents in Sidon and Beirut, according to Khalil.  After the war, little of 
this intermingling continued.   
CMR were further worsened by “the ensuing violence, kidnappings, and lawlessness,” 
said El Khazen,
4
 that occurred during and after the civil war.  These affected CMR negatively 
in two respects.  The first was the geographic division of Lebanon into Christian and Muslim 
sections.  The second was the development of strong confessionalism throughout the society, 
something that had existed to a much lesser degree before the war.  As El Khazen and the 
field expert respondents maintained concerning this theme of communal displacement and the 
theological issues identified in chapter 1, separatism and confessionalism had increased 
significantly in postwar Lebanon.  El Khazen believed that the lengthy, protracted civil war 
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developed this negative mindset or culture toward CMR and that had the war been brief, then 
these issues would be less entrenched in present-day Lebanese society.        
 Ghazal
1
 stated that although intercommunal problems existed throughout the world, in 
Lebanon those problems had spiraled out of control from the war.  He acknowledged that 
even though people around the world think differently, those differences that are sometimes 
expressed through their religious beliefs should not result in war and terrorism as they did in 
Lebanon.  Ghazal believed that this “backward thinking” contributed in part to Lebanon 
becoming a third-world country, a notion increasingly acknowledged by the Lebanese people 
themselves.  For Ghazal, communal displacement intensified Lebanese intolerance of each 
other’s differences, thus contributing to the status of Lebanon as a third-world country.  
According to Ghazal, in first-tier democratic nations, constituents and politicians work to 
resolve differences through discussion and voting.  In third-world countries, people and 
politicians are impulsive, reacting emotionally and instinctively.  In addition to the constant 
political bickering, corruption of civil administrators, external threats, and the deterioration of 
CMR, Lebanon also had major problems with its electrical and water services (El-Daher, 
2011; Margane & Renck, 2011) and the state of its roads and highways, all contributing 
factors to third-world status (Giddens, 2001). 
 Sammak
2
 also pointed out the dilemma wherein Lebanese Muslim sentiment 
concerning the separate status of Lebanon versus a wider, blended Arab Middle East softened 
much sooner than the Christians realized.  Thus, the Christians had mistakenly believed that 
the Muslims did not support a separate Lebanon.  This was clearly shown in 1982, according 
to Sammak, during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon when CMR were perhaps at their worst 
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stage.  Dar Al Fatwa, an Islamic institution and media source, proclaimed Lebanon to be a 
homeland for Lebanese Muslims and Christians, a concept that was officially documented and 
accepted under the Tā’if Agreement of 1989.
1
 
The problem began, per Franjieh,
2
 when people were separated, residentially and 
socially, by the war.  Some of these people were still trying to recapture the past, continuing 
to live as they had during a short period in Lebanese history when Christians were the 
majority population and held positions of dominance throughout the government, civil 
service, and other areas of society.  However, Franjieh also noted that the Lebanese people 
were always competing, desiring winners and losers. 
Nearly all of the field experts agreed that, overall, CMR were worse than before the 
war and that communal displacement continued to be a major cause.  Mentioning some 
positive notes, Sammak
3
 indicated that a few aspects of CMR had improved and that others 
had the potential to improve; however, Khalil
4
 believed that in comparison with the other 
countries in the Middle East, CMR in Lebanon were better.  
The information shared here by the field expert respondents has been presented as 
valid in that it has stood the test of time.  In terms of this research study, the research was 
begun nearly a decade ago, with the field experts reporting the challenges and 
interrelationship between communal displacement and CMR.  They upheld their concerns 
intermittently throughout this research and warned that if communal displacement were not 
redressed, then healthy CMR would continue to wane.  Their concern was not limited to the 
return of the displaced but included communal reconciliation as well, which often did not 
occur.  For example, the 2006 Israeli invasion initially displaced “a million people, over a 
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quarter of the population” (Mroue, 2011c, p. 3).  Commenting on this and a slew of other 
displacements, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center and the Norwegian Refugee 
Council reported that 
the lack of effective reconciliation or remedy for past human rights violations has 
stood in the way of people achieving durable solutions, and they do not trust that their 
situation will remain stable . . . Although many families have received financial 
support to repair or rebuild their war-damaged houses, many people are still afraid to 
return, preferring to stay in locations where they are among their own communities 




In 1999, Inati (1999) stated,  
In trying to assess the causes of the most recent Lebanese civil war, some people place 
the blame, in part or in whole, on the Lebanese educational system.  Their claim is 
that, by giving the various religious sects the ability to destroy the identity of the 
Lebanese and, hence, their integration, [thus] owing to the fact that certain religious 
sects taught in their schools’ materials contradictory to those taught by other religious 
sects [sic].  (p. 56). 
 
Some of the interviewees, including Sammak
1
 and N. Musawi,
2
 suggested that the 
educational system in Lebanon had harmed CMR and needed to be overhauled.  Mouawad
3
  
suggested that the system did little to develop human beings holistically.  She complained of 
the poor curriculum, inadequate teacher pay, and disrepair of school buildings.  More 
important, she believed that the system continued to separate people on the basis of religion, 
thus failing to integrate Lebanese students and create unity.  This belief was also espoused by 
Inati (1999).  As a result of all this, many of the top students in Lebanon had migrated, 
creating what several individuals referred to as a “brain drain,” especially from the madarris 
hookomiyye (public or government schools).  Madarris khassa (private schools) in Lebanon, 
especially Catholic schools, continued to have an important role in educating Lebanese youth. 
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The emphasis on religion rather than patriotic unity was echoed by Ghazal,
1
 who 
suggested that the history books should be adjusted to promote patriotism and create unity in 
the country.   
An important note here is that Lebanon still, as of this writing, has not adopted an 
official history book for its public schools.  One of the main contentions has been that one 
Lebanese community will view a certain leader as a hero in Lebanese history but that others 
will view that same leader as a criminal (Abou Chedid, Nasser, & Van Blommestein, 2002; 
Adra, 2009; Hajjar, 2002; Inati, 1999).  Indeed, the existing texts differed vastly from one 
another, even though they covered the same periods of history.  According to these same 
sources, the civil war years in particular have been the most difficult to document to Lebanese 
satisfaction.  In addition, Christian schools either have not included the teaching of Islam in 
their curricula or have taught Islam in a very negative light.  Muslims have treated 





 and most of the field experts cited the absence of instruction in 
communal coexistence, as well as funding for such instruction, as another inadequacy of the 
Lebanese educational system.  N. Musawi
4
 reported that the Lebanese educational system was 
a problem because of its failure to address CMR and dialogue.  This criticism was shared by 
Inati (1999):  
One cannot but wonder whether there is a political effort to de-intellectualize the 
Lebanese, stripping them of the intellectual and linguistic superiority for which they 
have always been known in the region and turning them into laborers with strong 
bodies that can do the job and weak minds that can obey.  (p. 68) 
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Because Lebanon is a very small country, frequent interaction should be expected.  
However, the truth was that although Christian and Muslims had coexisted, they had not lived 
together, as stated by several interviewees (Hajjar, 2002).  For example, according to 
Sammak,
1
 Christian school enrollments before the war were 30% Muslim.  During the war, 
Muslim enrollment dropped to 5%.  After the civil war, the Christian–Muslim blend of 
students was reduced even more.  The Shia community of Lebanon, for example, had been 
very much segregated for decades, being located in the Bekaa, southern Lebanon, and the 
slums of West Beirut.  A combination of segregation, communal displacement, and poor 
education had resulted in stagnant CMR dialogue (Fadlallah, 1998).     
According to each of the field experts and the available literature, little coexistence 
and interaction occurred among students (Abou-Chedid et al., 2002; Inati, 1999; Mahdawi, 
2009; Najjar 2009).  A popular saying among the expert respondents was this: “The young 
don’t know each other.”  Matar
2
  noted how both he (approximately 45 years ago) and present 
students could be educated up to the high school level with very little interaction with students 
of other faiths.  Sammak
3
 cited a talk he gave at Kaslik University.  At the end of his lecture 
regarding CMR, a student asked a question and then commented how much she liked 
Sammak’s speech.  She stated, “This is the first time I talked to a Muslim.”  This might sound 
like an exaggeration; but in reality, it might not be very far from the norm.  Thus, it was 
typical that Lebanese children entered private schools and emerged 12 years later barely 
having met any children of other confessions and ignorant of the multifaceted history, 
geography, and particularity of their own country.  
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Much of the recent literature indicated that the lack of socioeducational interaction 
among Lebanese youth was damaging to healthy CMR and conviviality.  Senior journalist 
Rami Khouri, an Arab American usually based in Lebanon, was the editor at large of The 
Daily Star, the largest English newspaper in the Middle East.  He was also the director of the 
Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at AUB (Strohmer, 2007).  According to 
Khouri (as cited in Strohmer, 2007), 
It doesn’t matter what the context is, whether it’s business or education or tourism or 
sports or political engagement.  The best antidote to misunderstandings, stereotypes 
and racist misperceptions is for people to meet each other.  There’s nothing that has as 
much impact as physically getting together, chatting, having a cup of coffee, or going 
to someone’s house. 
   
Another criticism was that Lebanese private schools, the numeric majority, were 
subject to little government monitoring and standards.  Thus, officials of these schools had 
much freedom concerning curriculum and instruction before the Tā’if Agreement.  Inati 
(1999) and Abou-Chedid et al. (2002) wrote that this lack of monitoring and freedom was 
actually a hindrance in creating an integrated community for Lebanese students and could be 
the precursor of conflict.  Christians enrolled in French system schools more than did Muslim 
students, who usually were unable to afford the French system of private education.  In those 
schools, students often received a closed Christian viewpoint.  Thus, the Christians often felt 
superior to the Muslims, who developed feelings of resentment.  Rather than reinforcing 
camaraderie or nationalism among the youth, this situation was divisive (Dagher, 2001; Inati, 
1999; Ziadeh, 2006).  Therefore, according to Inati (1999) and Mackey (2008), the questions 
of whether the educational system thwarted integration and the creation of a clear Lebanese 
identity through the lack of monitoring of educational programs must be addressed.  Identity-
specific issues have been discussed in chapter 5.   
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On the other hand, Mouawad
1
 believed fewer restrictions and less government 
oversight should be required of private Catholic schools to provide appropriately flexible 
curricula and instruction.  She also criticized the government authorization and sanction of 38 
new religious universities since 1998 without proper accreditation.  
Some of the field experts
2
 and authors referenced believed that during the prewar 
years, the Lebanese system of education was imperfect and degenerative.  However, they 
emphasized that the large communal displacement that emerged in postwar Lebanon resulted 
in great damage to Christian and Muslim student integration, which was reflected in the 
deterioration of CMR, especially among the youth.     
For their part, the surveyed university students revealed a lack of confidence in the 
Lebanese education system.  New university students were surveyed regarding the quality of 
Lebanese education compared with several other modalities.  Of the 280 students surveyed, 
78.6% ranked American university education as having the highest quality, followed by the 
French system (14.6%) and the British system (3.5%).  Only four students (1.4/%) ranked 
Lebanese education as having the highest quality (see Table 22.4).  Thus, the students 
indicated their low level of confidence in the Lebanese system.  
In the January 12, 2005, edition of The Daily Star, Ghazal reported on a new project 
aimed at correcting the quality gap between public and private schools, the Adopt-a-School 
program.  Fifteen schools from the Bekaa region (the fertile western section of Lebanon) 
chosen based on need were to have their structure, curriculum, and instruction improved.  The 
article reported that “54% of public school teachers have no university training” and that 
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“39.4% of 12- to 15-year-old children drop out during the basic education cycle” (Ghazal, 
2005, p. 4).  UNICEF and the Bin Talal Foundation cosponsored the project to improve the 
overall quality of public education  
A Lebanese NGO, Youth for Tolerance, began an interconfessional Lebanese student 
exchange program between two schools in March 2009, the Antonine Sisters School of 
Ghazir, attended by Christians, and the Ras Beirut International School of Beirut, attended by 
Muslims.  This group also produced a documentary showing the interaction of three Muslim 
and three Christian students who were newly placed at the Antonine and Ras Beirut schools 
(Choukeir & Awad, 2011).  The documentary revealed the high level of unfamiliarity students 
of different faiths had with one another and the “hidden biases and prejudice that the Muslim 
and Christian communities of Lebanon at large hold towards one another” (Abizeid, 2009, p. 
3).  The project clearly revealed that the effects of the civil war were still being felt two 
decades after its conclusion: The majority of the population had continued to live in 
communities segregated along religious and confessional lines; thus, most schools had 
remained segregated, attended by students from one religious community or another 
(Choukeir, 2011; Choukeir & Awad, 2011).    
In terms of university education and CMR, Sammak
1
 pointed out that at Kaslik 
University and in the surrounding neighborhood of the same name, located in the Jounieh 
province of Lebanon, Islam and Muslims were negatively represented, fueling the war.  
Indeed, according to the Kaslik studies of 1976, published just months after the start of the 
Lebanese Civil War,  
The manifestation of negative or indifferent attitudes toward Muslim groups by the 
respondents is reinforced by many Maronite political writings which talk clamorously 
about the “backwardness” of Muslim thought . . . Islamic ethnic structure is 
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characterized by a destructive Bedouin outlook . . . The Maronite common man felt 




 also noted that some positive improvements in CMR had been made.  The 
predominantly Christian school of Antoura and the predominantly Muslim school of 
Mukassed were hosting each other’s student bodies for entire days, with both groups reporting 
the experience as very positive.  Muslim enrollment in Christian schools was up to 20%.  At 
Kaslik University, several Muslim professors had been added; and many Muslim students had 
enrolled.  New CMR institutions had been formed since the war, and the few previously 
existing ones had become more active.  St. Joseph University, an early, prominent Jesuit 
university of French language instruction, opened the Center for Christian–Muslim Dialogue 
with mostly Maronite students.  UB, a Greek Orthodox school, had added the Center for 
Christian–Muslim Studies.  The Makassed Institute for Higher Education, with a mainly 
Sunni population, hosted the Center for Muslim–Christian Relations.  Although the St. Joseph 
and Balamand centers were doing better than the Makassed center in terms of both work and 





 also noted that the various CMR committees to which he belonged, along 
with several Lebanese universities, had agreed and resolved that “Christianity should be 
taught at Muslim universities and institutions by Christians, and Islam should be taught at 
Christian universities by Muslims.”  Finally, Sammak gave this writer a book he and several 
other advocates of CMR had written in Arabic, “the first book of its kind where Christians 
write about Christianity, Muslims write about Islam, and both write about dialogue.”
4
  This he 











considered a positive change as they worked to get CMR back to normal.  However, he noted 
that they still had a very long way to go. 
However, Sammak’s feelings of accomplishment were mixed with dismay.  He noted 
that after the war, the government, especially the ministry of education, did not do its job, 
either failing to act or acting inappropriately toward CMR and reconciliation.
1
  People were 
separated from each other, unfamiliar with each other and begrudging one another.  
According to Sammak, because the stereotypes the Lebanese had of one another could only be 
corrected through education and coexistence, the educational system in Lebanon had failed 
the Lebanese in a manner similar to the communal displacement caused by the civil war.   
This sentiment was echoed by several other field experts, including Mouawad,
2
 a 
member of parliament and wife of a former Lebanese president.  Although political divisions 
existed, the main cause for the Christian–Muslim rift was—and still is—the lack of education 
concerning coexistence and harmonious CMR.  Because the reintegration of the present and 
future Lebanese student bodies, concurrent with the reconstruction of the education system, 
will take time to implement, it will not be a quick fix to the CMR ills in Lebanon. 
The field experts also mentioned concerns about identity issues, political practice, the 
political elite, the clergy, the Ta’if Agreement, the poor economy, and the striving for a 
Christian- or Muslim-dominated state, respectively.  These societal aspects were major 
affronts to healthy CMR and have been covered in the next chapters.   
Discussion and Analysis of Communal Displacement and Education Issues 
Field experts, students, and various authors identified several societal areas as the fault 
for the worsening state of CMR.  Thus far, communal displacement and the Lebanese system 
of education, and the divisions between the older generation and the youth begun in chapter 1 




 Mouawad, personal communication, November 17, 2004 (see Appendix 18). 
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have been discussed as significant areas of concern.  As Aoun
1
 stated, solid measures for 
building trust among all Lebanese communities must be employed to improve CMR and the 
divide between the older generation and the youth.  
The older, religiously diverse field expert respondents who were interviewed lived 
before, during, and after the Lebanese Civil War.  They had major engagements in the war 
and suffered its consequences.  Yet, despite religious and other differences, they continued to 
feel closer to one another than the younger generation did.  These older respondents discerned 
the causes and effects of the civil war and put them into a working perspective.  They posed 
solutions to promote healthy CMR.  One explanation for this, gleaned from the field experts 
and the literature review, was that the older generation lived together and developed positive 
familiarity with one another.  They did not encounter wide communal displacement until after 
living together with a level of conviviality for many years.  In addition, many of them 
experienced the very good economy in Lebanon from 1955 to 1975.  Others were there for the 
very founding and independence of Lebanon in 1943.   
The youth of Lebanon, however, were raised after major communal displacements.  
Thus, they were unfamiliar, if not hostile, with one another.  These youth, whose ages place 
them during the last vestiges of the war, did not directly experience the previous glory of 
Lebanon.  However, to their advantage, they also did not live during the horrific civil war 
years.  Ironically, the student respondents, who were not witnesses to the war, appeared to 
hold much more animosity about the war and CMR than the older respondents did.  
This was evident in the writer’s personal example of such feelings that occurred in 
2006.  A 17-year-old female student inquired about the subject matter of this dissertation.  
When told the subject was CMR, she became red in the face, raised her arm close the writer’s 
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face, and exclaimed, “You don’t know what you’re talking about!”  She criticized the fact that 
the writer had not experienced the Lebanese Civil War first hand and, thus, could not really 
understand it.  What she failed to realize was that she had been about 6 months old when the 
war completely ended and, therefore, also had no firsthand experience with the Lebanese 
Civil War.  Still, she held immense hostility about it within the Lebanese context.  
Thus, the question has become where these students and young people were gathering 
their animosity for “the other” if they had not experienced the civil war itself.  As mentioned 
in chapter 1, an NGO had begun working in Lebanon to address this very problem of the 
prejudices and hostilities the students’ hold toward individuals of different religions 
(Mahdawi, 2009).  
On the other hand, the older CMR experts could be publicly feigning appreciation of 
their religious counterparts while privately expressing acrimony.  Nadim Shehadi, a native 
Lebanese, was a former consultant to Lebanese politician Saad Hariri and the former director 
of the Lebanese Study Center based in England for 20 years.  He shared that a another reason 
for the disparity between the older field experts and the youth could be that discussing the 
divisions between Christians and Muslims was less of a taboo for the youth than for the older 
generation.
1
  Hence, the youth spoke more openly and sometimes more recklessly about these 
issues.  However, this seemed unlikely because although the field experts participated in this 
research separately, not knowing about each other’s participation, nearly all of their 
information was consistent.  Thus, they corroborated one another.  
All of this resulted in a “twofold negative impact on CMR,” according to El Khazen:
2
  
One was the geographic divide of Lebanon [between Christian and Muslim sections, a 
notion shared by most of the interviewees, such as Muhammad Sammak
3
] and the 
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second was the strong confessionalism that developed [that didn’t exist as intensely 
before the war] across political, social, and other phenomena.  
 
In sum, the field experts agreed that at the very least, close proximity and social 
interaction provided a good opportunity for the Lebanese to know one another.  However, in 
and of itself, proximity and/or the lack of the same was not the sole cause or cure of all CMR 
ills.  Proximity was only one of the multicausal issues raised in this thesis.   
Economic Strain and CMR 
CMR were also negatively affected by the Lebanese economy.  First, according to 
Matar,
1
 although military operations ended in 1991, the war did not.  The socioeconomic 
factors involved not only did not improve but also persisted.  As a result, the Tā’if had never 
been implemented correctly because of continuing reorganization to consolidate power.  Thus, 
Matar suggested that the Tā’if should be either modified or changed.  Second, Khalil
2
 noted 
that the large Christian diaspora was fearful of making financial investments in Lebanon if it 
was to become a Muslim-dominated country.  Finally, the shrinking Christian communities 
and the lack of cohesiveness within them resulted in part of a worsening financial situation for 
Christians in particular.  Many of the displaced, especially the Shiites now living on the 
outskirts of Baalbek and in the mixed communities of Beirut and its suburbs, existed in 
poverty or close to poverty levels (Dagher, 2001; Profile of Internal Displacement, 2004).   
 According to Massouh,
3
 “Lebanese society, CMR do not fit into the traditional 
sociological theories.  Karl Marx would be wrong [that society was a class struggle between 
the capitalists and the working class].”  He continued, “Even Ibn Khaldun, if he were alive 
today, he would be wrong,” speaking of the conflict and consensus in Lebanese society.  
Massouh rejected the “goodness of fit” model as well as other sociological theories for 
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Lebanon, including those of Durkheim, Comte, and Weber, stating with some dismay and 
humor that “Lebanon [its community functioning] is unique, a special case.  Its situation is 
like no other in the world.”  Indeed, Middle East scholar Ussama Makdisi concurred, sharing 
that many of the theories put forth regarding the sectarianism in Lebanon were inaccurate (as 
stated in Hovsepian, 2008).  
Halabi
1
 admitted that “before the war, the Christians were rich and the Muslims poor” 
but that “after the war, both the Christians and Muslims became the same,” that is, 
economically strained.  Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir also lamented, “I have been 
speaking to economists and they said the economy is deteriorating, employees are being laid 
off, hotels have few tourists and the Lebanese are emigrating in hundreds.  This is 
unacceptable” (as quoted in Hatoum, 2006, p. 1).  For Halabi,
2
 in addition to the many other 




 also felt that the poor economy was negatively affecting CMR and 
Lebanese society as a whole.  In 1997, an ad was run by the Lebanon Investment 
Development Authority that read, “The price of prosperity has already been paid” (Perthes, 
1997, p. 16).  This meant that the economic hard times of Lebanon should be behind her and 
the time for economic rejuvenation was now.  Unfortunately, the economy only worsened.  At 
the time of this interview, the debt of Lebanon was placed at $35 billion (“Debt and 
Destruction,” 2006).  Mouawad4 explained with sadness and disgust, “There is no more 
middle class” because “we’re not growing [producing] a society and a middle class; instead 
we’re growing poverty and ignorance.”  In addition to political phenomena causing tensions, 
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 offered that, “The [very weak] economy is also making the relations worse.  Money in 
all its aspects, especially the lack of it, can make a loving brotherly relationship turn bad.”  
Hajjar seemed certain that “if the Lebanese economy was good, then (CMR) would be better.”  
He continued,  
For example, when the economy is poor and let’s say some of the other community 
leaders see some Christians building houses and stores, they will point out these 
Christians with jealousy and say to their Muslim constituency, ‘Look, the Christians 
have money’ and then the tensions start. 
 
AUB professor Judith Harik (1999) linked two of Hajjar’s points, poor economy and 
the ongoing decreased level of integration, as devastating CMR.  Harik (1999) reported that 
the Lebanese people’s economic inability to return to their homes and the relaxed attitude 
toward the same had impeded integration and CMR.  She wrote that this was “obviously a 
serious impediment for rapid Christian-Muslim integration simply because it prevents 
mountain folks from entering each other’s daily orbits where coexistence can take place” 
(Harik, 1999, p. 173).   
Regarding economic/social stratification, Aoun
2
 said, “The economy and religion are 
linked because development in Lebanon was selective, unfortunately,” and cited “the Shiite 
example, where the Shiite section [of Beirut] was called ‘the belt of misery’ and/or the ‘belt of 
the deprived.’”  Aoun believed that “other countries” such as Israel, stating that they were 
“jealous of Lebanon’s democracy.  Lebanon was great, economically, so good that we were 
giving international loans in Lebanese liras,” referring to just prior to the outbreak of the 
Lebanese Civil War when two to three Lebanese liras equaled $1.  Today, 1,500 Lebanese 
liras equal $1 (“Debt and Destruction,” 2006).  This economic success of Lebanon, according 
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 “was disturbing to certain high ranking international places [countries].”  He 
continued, “Lebanon was the only country [in the oil rich Middle East and elsewhere] that had 
the least resources but had the highest GNP and so on.”  He believed that the economic 
successes of Lebanon “were the real reasons” for the conflict in Lebanon and that the other 
causes discussed, although important, were the “pretexts” for the conflict.  Aoun believed that 
“other countries” either conspired within, or were indifferent to, the conflict.  Aoun did not 
wish to mention those countries by name; but the translator, Ms. Marie-Therese Obeid,
2
 
revealed a fairly common belief in Lebanon that countries such as the United States, Israel, 
Saudi Arabia, and others were envious of the economic success of Lebanon and/or solid 
CMR.  For his part, as Khalil
3
 surmised, “The main problem is the economy, not religion or 
democracy, and unjust treatment between the confessional communities causes problems.” 
The university students were asked how significant a detriment the poor economy in 
Lebanon was to CMR.  Of the student sample, 256 (88.9%) of the 288 total respondents or 
were Christian, with 166 (57.6%) of them being were Maronite Christian.  Just 3.2% of the 
respondents strongly agreed that Lebanese CMR were predominantly negatively affected by 
economic difficulties; 30.2 % agreed that there was some negative impact on CMR due to 
economic reasons.  However, 58.7% disagreed that economic problems were a cause of CMR 
discord (see Table 22.5).   
Again, a pattern emerged: The Christian majority students seemed to believe that 
CMR was poor not because of economic reasons but rather because of innate religious 
differences as revealed from the student survey results given in chapter 1 (see also Tables 
22.1 and 22.2).  These findings also seemed to reflect the emerging pattern of disparity 




 Marie-Therese Obeid, personal communication, June 15,2006 (see Appendix 24). 
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between the experts’ opinions, many of whom believed the economic problems were the 
cause of CMR discord, and the students’ opinions, who declined economic problems as a 
major cause of CMR deterioration.   
The students were also surveyed as to how significant a role the economy had in the 
overall well-being of Lebanon (not specifically within CMR as the was the issue in the 
previous query).  A total of 288 students responded to this question; 256 (88.9%) of the 
respondents were Christian, with166 (57.6%) being Maronite Christians.  Of the respondents, 
34.5% felt that economic difficulties were the overall biggest problem in Lebanon; and 25.2% 
of the respondents believed the economy was the second biggest problem in Lebanon.  
Combining the students’ first and second choices, 59.7 % of the respondents felt that 
economic problems were a major cause of the overall societal ills in Lebanon (see Table 
22.6).   
In their responses to this question, the students believed that the economic problems in 
Lebanon were a major cause of the difficulties in that country from an overall view of the  
problems in Lebanon.  In contrast, the students felt the poor economy was not a major 
problem affecting CMR, as shown in their responses to the previous query.  However, the 
field expert respondents believed that the poor Lebanese economy was the cause of both 
CMR discord and overall Lebanese ills to a moderate degree.  
Discussion of Economic Issues 
The historically poor economy of Lebanon certainly was a cause of a great deal of 
hardship, anger, and jealousy between the Lebanese “haves” and “have-nots” (Ziadeh, 2006).  
In many ways, according to Lewis (2004), “this was easily explained by the equally well-
known fact that Christians were rich and Muslims were poor and that consequently Muslim 
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hostility to Christians . . . was socioeconomic in origin,” (p. 284).  For example, Aoun
1
 
pointed out that a whole section of Beirut and the surrounding area was and has continued to 
be called the Shiite Belt of Misery because of its grinding poverty and lack of civil 
institutions.  Because this section of Lebanon was recognized as economically “miserable” 
compared with other areas, this misery resulted in tension and hardship that negatively 
impacted CMR.  The university students who clamored for jobs and resources also identified 
the poor Lebanese economy as a major source of discord overall but not of poor CMR 
specifically.  Some of the respondents felt that a progressive form of socialism could be useful 
for Lebanon to adopt to combat poverty.  The poor economy was another area in which the 
Lebanese experienced feelings of disappointment, inadequacy, despair, and frustration 
(Longuenesse, 2006; Salem, 2006; UNESCO, 2002).  If the reader references twentieth-
century American psychologist Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs theory, this becomes 
understandable: If individuals or groups of people cannot meet their most basic needs (at the 
bottom of the hierarchy triangle) such as food, shelter, and income, then they cannot proceed 
to higher levels of functioning and need satisfaction (at the top of the triangle) such as self-
actualization and peak experiences (Hoy, 2010).  In regards to CMR, this means that if 
everyday citizens are struggling at the bottom of the triangle hierarchy to meet their families’ 
basic needs, then they have much more difficulty in progressing up the triangle to higher 
levels of functioning and problem solving, in this case, toward healthy CMR.  According to 
all of the experts interviewed and most of the student respondents, even if the Lebanese 
economy were to flourish, doing so unevenly between Christians and Muslims would not be 
helpful to CMR as evidenced by the civil war being fought over economic and resource 
inequality as much as over political and sectarian issues (Fisk, 2002; Mackey, 2008).  
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Inversely, CMR conflict could be the cause of economic woes as well, as put forth by 
Lebanese MP Anwar el-Khalil: “Continuing antagonisms will seriously prejudice the 
economy” (as quoted in Salloum, 2006, p. 14).  
Thus, what will become of Lebanese CMR has become the major challenge.  The 
historically poor economy of Lebanon could continue to act as an aggravator of CMR 
tensions.  When the research for this thesis began in 2002, the Lebanese economy was poor, 
with 1,500 Lebanese lira (pounds) equaling $1 American.  As of November 2011, there had 
been little improvement in the economy; and the lira-to-dollars ratio remained the same.  
According to Lebanese Patriarch Beshara Rai, the poor Lebanese economy has 
resulted in both tense CMR and intra-Christian and intra-Muslim relations and has become a 
hindrance to dialogue (Mroue, 2011d, p.2).  Lebanon’s economy is also inextricably related to 
its political stability.  Standard and Poor was concerned that the Lebanese economy “is 
projected to decline to an annual average of 5.8 percent, between 2011 and 2013” and that 
“the Lebanese economy remains vulnerable to external shocks and adverse swings in investor 
sentiment.  Political stability holds the key to continued economic growth in the short term” 
(Mroue, 2011, p.4).  Two other areas cited as reasons for poor CMR, political practice and 




CHAPTER 3: POLITICS, FOREIGN INTERVENTION,  
AND CHRISTIAN–MUSLIM RELATIONS 
 
As discussed in chapter 1, the field experts did not view religious differences as a 
major obstacle to healthy CMR; but the university students viewed them as a moderately 
significant detriment.  In chapter 2, education and communal displacement factors were 
deemed to play significant roles in CMR discord.  As has been shown in chapter 3, all 17 of 
the field experts and a very high percentage of the university students found poor political 
practice and governance to be much more significant or severe causes of CMR deterioration.  
The field expert responses in this chapter originated from IQ1 and IQ2 previously given in 
both the introduction and the beginning of chapters 1 and 2.  These questions concerned 
whether (a) CMR had improved or not post-civil war and why and (b) what the causes for the 
state of CMR were.  The university students were asked the same questions through the 
survey instrument.  In this chapter, inept and corrupt political practices, which were shown to 
figure quite prominently in CMR deterioration, have been reviewed. 
The Working Group Experts 
Politically speaking, Massouh
1
 offered that “the Lebanese did not adequately address 
the causes of the war, many of which are the causes of the problems of the relations between 
the Christians and Muslims” and that there was “an absence of a competent government (that 
would address CMR issues) here in Lebanon.”  Many Lebanese agreed with this assessment.  
For example, during an interview in February 2006, Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan 
Nasrallah stated, concerning the Lebanese government and politicians, that “there is no doubt 
that giving a chance to major political forces to take part in decision making burdens them 
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with larger political responsibilities and affects their decision making to a large extent” (as 
quoted in Wright, 2008, p. 158). 
For Massouh,
1
  the main reason CMR had deteriorated was “due to the corruption of 
Lebanese leaders and the administrators and commissioners.”  MacKey (2008), one of the 
sources reviewed during the literature review, expounded on this matter:  
On the surface Beirut was as luminous as ever . . . but beneath the surface . . . the 
underlying flaws widened.  Decades of communal competition had gutted every 
institution necessary to the maintenance of social cohesion and political unity.  Even 
the loyalties of the army and the police, those entrusted to enforce order and security 
of the state, were between contending communities and leaders.  In April 1975, the 




 explained that the Lebanese government was designed to follow a unique 
proportional confessional appointment system whereby not only must the president be a 
Maronite Christian but the prime minister must be a Sunni Muslim and the speaker of the 
house, a Shiite Muslim.  The civil service was also subject to the same type of appointment 
system, limiting constructive criticism due to confessional loyalties.  Thus, a community 
could misunderstand the motivations of an outsider criticizing one of their own appointees, 
resulting in an inevitable fallout of intercommunal tensions.  Unsurprisingly, office holders 
fell back on the virtually automatic support from their own confessional groupings whenever 
outsiders criticized them.  Indeed, in addressing a crowd of female relatives and widows of 
assassinated Lebanese leaders, the Maronite patriarch had exclaimed, “Public institutions in 
Lebanon are hampered . . . everything from the presidency to the Cabinet and Parliament.  
Those you elected to take care of your best interests and to maintain your safety, we find them 
clashing every day” (as quoted in Hatoum, 2006, p. 1).  Politicians routinely rallied their own 







communities when under pressure from perceived outsiders.  Accordingly, there was little 
incentive to correct problems of mismanagement or corruption.
1
   
Another reason CMR had worsened in postwar Lebanon, according to Massouh,
2
 was 
the power struggles between various political groups both internal and external to Lebanon.  
For example, the claims of Hezbollah to promote a stricter Islam served potentially not only 
to increase the base of the party but also to please the majority Muslim population of the 
Middle East, along with the governments and political leadership throughout the Middle East, 
especially those in Iran.  The problem, though, as Massouh saw it, was that by catering to 
non-Lebanese forces, groups such as Hezbollah instilled fear in other groups, such as 
Christians, who saw in a stronger Hezbollah the potential for imposition of dhimmi status (a 





 was quick to point out that he was just as concerned and disappointed in the 
actions and intentions of all the other Lebanese communities as well.  He found it unhelpful 
when nominally religious politicians took on religious roles to advance their political aims.  
He pointedly singled out the Maronites in this regard because they raised the specter of future 
persecution should they become a minority with no safeguards in Lebanon.  
Massouh
5
 was skeptical regarding the stated goal of the Christian opposition to seek 
democratic policies and principles in Lebanon, believing that this goal was politically self-
serving and disingenuous.  At best, it was aimed at outside powers, such as the United States, 
in particular, and the West, in general.  In actuality, according to Massouh, the group did not 
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want a democratically elected and deconfessionalized government in Lebanon because it was 
widely believed that elections would result in a Muslim majority. 
 When asked about the Syrian influence over Lebanon and its effect on CMR, 
Massouh
1
 was clear that he felt the Syrian government had been unhelpful.  Many Lebanese 
who had benefited from the Syrian presence (by employment and resources) wanted the 
Syrians to stay.  However, others, especially the Christians, wanted the Syrians to leave so 
that they might be free to engage in nepotism and patronage. 
 As for the possible effects of the Lebanese–Israeli conflict on CMR, Massouh
2
  stated 
that the Israeli government and its political ideology benefited from intercommunal conflict 
not only in Lebanon but also elsewhere, pointing out that due to the inflexibility of political 
Zionism and Israeli society, friendly relations with other religious communities was not easy.  
Thus, according to Massouh, the Israeli government often made the case that the Lebanese 
could not coexist due to their religious diversity.  The Israeli government and its many 
spokespeople stated that the Christians of Lebanon could not get along with the Muslims 
because, in general, “no one can get along with Islam,” buttressing their case that it was not 
the Israelis but the Palestinians (95% of whom are Muslim) through Islam who were causing 
conflict.  Thus, Massouh believed Israel could only benefit from religious conflicts in its 
northern neighbor.  
 Addressing the IQ2, Massouh
3
 was quick to state, as had been his superior, UB 
President Elie Salem,
4
 in an earlier interview, that the problem between the Christians and 
Muslims of Lebanon was not theological, economic, or social in nature.  He explained that 
peer pressure within a religious community could stifle criticism of the haves by the have-nots 
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within that same community.  In Massouh’s view, sociological theories as traditionally 
understood did not apply to the Lebanese situation:  A Marxist analysis or even Ibn Khaldun’s 
explanations did not match the way in which Lebanon was actually functioning communally.  
Similarly according to Massouh, Weber’s, Comte’s, and Durkheim’s explanations did not fit 
the Lebanese societal situation either.  He believed that the problems in Lebanon were 
complex and multilayered and thus difficult to reference with classical sociopolitical theories.  
As such, these problems were also difficult to treat and improve.  Massouh felt that the 
struggles in Lebanese CMR had to do with a rigid and poor mentality of the Lebanese 
themselves, among many factors.  This mentality, according to Massouh, was unique and, 
thus, was difficult to reference in terms of established sociopolitical theories and subsequent 
treatment.   
 Massouh
1
 also saw a culprit in foreign intervention, especially that of Israeli, Syrian, 
and Palestinian political, military and expansionist maneuvering in Lebanon.  Senior Shiite 
cleric Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah concurred with Massouh’s assertion by stating, “Most of 







 (all of whom were active participants in CMR advocacy 
groups), stressed the failure of the Lebanese government in supporting CMR.  Massouh 
admitted that the CMR center that he directed was bankrupt.  The center had been formed 
with generous funding from Issam Fares, a Greek Orthodox billionaire and former Lebanese 
official.  As such, Massouh expressed disappointment at the Lebanese government for not 
filling the funding gap for his center, which could have been a factor in his criticism of the 
poor record of government investment in CMR.  
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Also like Salem and Bou Habib, Massouh’s background was Greek Orthodoxy and 
included the added factor of being a priest,
1
 which afforded Massouh not only some important 
experience but also, perhaps, biases.  The Greek Orthodox community, for example, had a 
closer relationship to the Arab Muslim populations of Lebanon and the wider Middle East 
than other Christian groups (Khalaf, 2002).  Massouh also offered equal criticism of both 
Christians and Muslims for harming CMR, which, although presented as being diplomatic, 
might speak more to his concerns of Greek Orthodox marginalization.  According to 
Massouh
2
 and others, the Greek Orthodox, the second largest Christian denomination in 
Lebanon, feared being caught in the middle of the growing Muslim population with the 
potential for radicalism on the one hand and an over emphasis on the needs of the larger 
Christian community in Lebanon, the Maronites, on the other (Abu Al Nasr, 2001).  As such, 
his viewpoint that the blame for the downfall of CMR was split evenly between the two 
communities might also be an expression tailored to the plight of the Orthodox community as 
in few, if any, conflicts can the blamed be equally divided among the parties involved.   
Aside from the possibility of some mild biases, overall Massouh offered a thorough, 
in-depth, multifaceted understanding of the causal relationship between politics and CMR.  
Thus, his educated view on the role of politics in CMR should be taken seriously.  As 
mentioned in the introduction and in previous chapters, Massouh is not only a native 
Lebanese but is also the director of a university Christian–Muslim relations center and a 
member of Christian–Muslim relations working groups in Lebanon.  He has also written 
extensively on the subject in conjunction with other scholars of different faiths, with their 
views being corroborated.  
 









 clearly stated that CMR were worse than they were before the civil war.  
Whether they remained that way or would improve would be due to the way the Lebanese 
proceeded politically from this point.  Halabi argued that “we [the Lebanese] are not 
complaining about the unity of the people but rather of political leadership.”  A 
confessionalized system in which the access to medical services and education was divided 




 reminded this researcher that Syrian intervention, which worsened chances for 
Lebanese reconciliation, ended with the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister 
Hariri.  Thus, an opportunity existed for reconciliation, although there were still forces at 
work that Halabi characterized as “farriq tasud,” an Arabic adage similar to the English 
phrase “divide and conquer.”  
Similar to his colleagues, Halabi had an impressive CMR background.  A native 
Lebanese, a court judge, and president of BBC Bank, Halabi has been working for a few 
CMR working groups in Lebanon for decades.  Halabi also presented a unique point of view.  
He was a member of the Druze community, which constituted less than 6% of the Lebanese 
population, which was roughly 45% Christian and 55% Muslim (Daou, 2001).  Thus, the 
Druze were a small minority in Lebanon.  Halabi’s his wife and his son Marwan (at the time a 
university student) agreed with him during our interview at their home, that as Druze they did 
not consider themselves Muslims but rather Lebanese Arabs.
3
  As such, being neither 
Christian nor Muslim, the question emerged as to which voice Halabi used in contributing to 
CMR.  Additionally, the Druze of Lebanon were known for frequently shifting political 
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alliances, particularly one of their leaders, warlord Walid Jumblatt (Young 2010).  In sum, 
with the Druze population being less than 6% percent of the country, a denial of being 
Muslim, and vacillating partisan politics, Halabi’s views could be suspect.  Thus, his 
recommendation that the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon avoid a population census and a 
subsequent democratic majority rule in Lebanon
1
 might speak more to the desires of the 
Druze community specifically rather than the needs of the Lebanese in general.  Yet the 
Druze community had a long history in Lebanon.  They spearheaded the initial formation of 
Lebanon as a separate entity under their leader Emir Fakhreddine and were once the majority 
population and leadership of the Mount Lebanon province (Fawaz, 1994).   
Halabi had also devoted much of his adult life to being a strong CMR advocate.  He 
was referred to this writer as a reliable informant by then doctoral supervisor Jorgen Nielsen, 
PhD, of the Center for the Study of Islam and Christian Muslim Relations at the University of 
Birmingham, United Kingdom.  The information Halabi shared, though unbeknownst to him 
at the time, was direct corroboration of that produced by the other diverse field experts and 
university students.  Additionally, despite their small numbers, the Druze vote and approval 
were often critical and highly sought to address Lebanese political conflict.  Just as with the 
small Christian Armenian community of Lebanon, being included in the Lebanon census of 
1932, which barely resulted in identifying the Christian population as the majority for 
government rule (Firro, 2003), the Druze had a pivotal role in CMR and Lebanese politics.  
Thus, as a leading member of the Druze and a respected CMR advocate, Halabi’s views 
regarding politics and CMR appeared to be of value.   





As reviewed in chapter 2, for his part, Sammak
1
 felt the separation of Christians and 
Muslims throughout Lebanese schools was the main cause of CMR discord.  He also shared 
that poor political practice and governance  had had very negative effects on CMR.  He cited 
anger at the corruption in the government as a negative impact on CMR.  The role of 




 also cited political wrangling publicized in the media as another cause of the 
demise of CMR.  A journalist by trade, Sammak had an extensive work history in Lebanon.  
As an insider, he explained the role of the media in damaging CMR.  Each community or 
confession had its own media outlets through which they launched campaigns via the 
airwaves to the detriment of the others, whether Christian or Muslim.  Sammak stated that he 
and the various CMR committees agreed that this was a major detriment to CMR, and they 
had vowed to stop it and to create a better alternative.   
As another sign of improved CMR in postwar Lebanon, Sammak explained that 
sectarian labels of radio stations were no longer allowed and that governing boards included 
both Christians and Muslims.  Even religious programs had members of other religious 
communities represented on their boards.
3
  As an example, Sammak cited the predominantly 
Shiite Al-Manar (“the Lighthouse”), the television station of Hezbollah, as having Christians 
on its board.  With a sense of pride, Sammak deemed this as important progress that the 
Lebanese media had made in supporting CMR.
4
 
Unfortunately, such positive developments were fairly new and untested.  They had 
yet to be evaluated for positive outcomes.  A couple of years after the author’s interview with 
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Sammak, the media in Lebanon were still considered a divisive force.  In an article in The 
Daily Star, Khouri (2008) noted that, even when the media distort the news for political 
purposes,  
it usually does so at the behest of politicians.  It is no secret that nearly all of the 
country’s media outlets are either directly owned or indirectly manipulated by 
influential politicians and political parties . . . .  Future Television, NBN and Al-Manar 
are owned by MP Saad Hariri, Speaker Nabih Berri and Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah’s 
Hizbullah, respectively, while LBC continues to express the views of MP Samir Gea 
Gea’s Lebanese Forces and Orange TV comes under the obvious sway of MP Michel 
Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement.  The vast majority of viewers who choose to tune in 
to any of those channels do so knowing they will get the day’s news complete with 
their favorite partisan spin.  They have the country’s politicians-cum-media moguls, 
not its journalists, to thank for that.  (p. 9) 
 
Sammak had participated in Christian Muslim working groups officially for decades 
(Abu Al Nasr, 2001).  A native Lebanese, he was a very experienced news journalist and 
CMR activist in his late 70s.  He was often invited onto Christian television and other 
communal-based shows and, according to him, had received criticism from the Muslim 
community for doing so.
1
  He was considered a strong yet neutral advocate for solid 
Christian–Muslim relations.  Sammak was also a known empathizer of the Christian situation 
in Lebanon and had a reputation of being nonsectarian to the point that he was openly willing 
to criticize the Muslim community generally and the Sunni community, of which he was a 
leading member, specifically.  
Sammak had written extensively and passionately on CMR and, therefore, had gained 
the respect and appreciation of the various Lebanese communities (Fadlallah, 1998).  As a 
journalist and media specialist, Sammak shared his knowledge of the political causes of CMR 
discord through this specific lens.  However, because of his career as a sociopolitical 
journalist before, during, and after the civil war, he has been given exceptional exposure and 
insight.  These, along with his education and personal skills, have resulted in his being 





perhaps the best-known and respected Christian–Muslim relations advocate in Lebanon and 
perhaps in all the Arab Middle East (UNESCO, 2002).  Without Sammak’s information, the 
crucial aspect of the interrelationship between the media, politics, and CMR might have gone 
underreported in this thesis.  Because of these credentials and more, Sammak was considered 
to be a reliable informant regarding Lebanese politics and CMR.   
Khalil
1
 offered that there was some improvement in Lebanese political expression in 
that in the Lebanese protests and demonstrations increasingly participants showed just the 
Lebanese flag as opposed to individual political party flags—except among the Hezbollah.  
Khalil saw the efforts of Hezbollah as being counterproductive to Lebanese unity by creating 
a state within a state and turning the Palestinian cause, which was nationalist, into something 
religious.  Supporting the Palestinians, in Khalil’s mind, should be the work of the Lebanese 
state and its military, not the project of a particular faction such as Hezbollah.  For Khalil, the 
basis of the problems in Lebanon was not religious; rather, their problems stemmed from a 
lack of respect for one another.  He explained this to mean that the Lebanese “often do not 
respect one another; that they and some other countries, such as Syria, do not respect their 
national rights; and that members of the international community, such as Israel and the 
United States, do not respect Lebanon.”  Examples of this included Lebanese independence 
and political decision making.  Thus, it was difficult to secure the national and international 
rights of Lebanon because the lack of respect among the Lebanese was mimicked and 
exploited by outside actors such as Israel, Syria, and the United States, which seemed to have 
little respect for the idea of a truly independent Lebanon and its rights in the realm of political 
decision making.   
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 felt religious differences were not the cause of CMR 
discord in Lebanon, he believed that the Islamic notion of umma (the wider, universal Muslim 
community) and the modern nation state were incompatible.  That being said, Khalil stated 
that the problem was neither Islam nor Muslims, but rather Islamists.  Indeed, as far back as 
1988, Elizabeth Picard reported Christian fears of “the growing influence of Hezbollah and 
Islamic fundamentalism” (as quoted in Kerr, 1997, p466)  It was often unclear whether Khalil 
believed that the major cause of discord between the Christians and Muslims was political or 
religious, noting that forms of Christianity as practiced in Lebanon were not strongly 
democratic, with near autocratic authority lying with priests and not with the laity.  This was a 
reflection of patterns of patriarchy within Lebanese society as a whole and served to reinforce 
those patterns. 
 Acknowledging that Lebanon has a Muslim majority population, Khalil
2
 expressed his 
concern that democracy itself could result in major problems, including constitutional 
changes.  Such changes could result in the destruction of the pluralistic nature of the Lebanese 
state.  The trend, Khalil said, was aggravated by Christian emigration from Lebanon, which 
exceeded that of Muslims. 
Khalil
3
  introduced the subject of the long-standing worries of the Maronite Christians, 
which manifested themselves as a “siege mentality” (Mackey, 1991, p. 128) regarding the 
growing Lebanese Muslim community.  This mentality, which Khalil did not completely 
support, had resulted in Christian visions of their future destruction in Lebanon.  To counter 
this, Christians naturally tended to support “institutions that ensure their political superiority” 
(Mackey, 1991, p. 130), which was a major cause of Muslim disgruntlement and subsequent 









conflict.  Khalil’s background also indicated some mild concerns, which have been discussed 
with those of  El Khazen.    
Because Ghazal
1
 answered the interview questions in writing, the researcher used the 
services of the Office of Translation and Interpretation  to translate his written responses.  
This office was located at NDU in the village of Zouk Mosbeh, Lebanon.  In response to the 
first question, Ghazal answered,  
Today, after the war experience in Lebanon and the violence and schisms that 
followed it, I see that the majority of the Lebanese have learned a lesson from the 
mistakes of the past and are willing to establish new grounds for coexistence without 
neglecting the hardships and obstacles placed in their way, whether internal resulting 
from political discord and the precedence of personal and confessional interests or 
external issues related to the crises in the Middle East and the problems of Palestine 
and Iraq.  I am confident of the ability of the Lebanese people and their desire to 
continue this quest, stemming from the common will and the lessons they learned 
from the tragedies of the past. 
 During the interview, Ghazal shared that until the war, CMR were positive but that 
they were, in fact, worse now because of internal and external challenges such as those posed 
by Israel.  Ghazal believed that the Lebanese were now ready to readdress some of their core 
difficulties, although the road to peaceful coexistence among the religious communities would 
not be smooth.  For example, externally, the United States and France formulated a plan that 
all foreign forces (specifically Syrian) must leave Lebanon immediately and that all militias 
(specifically Hezbollah) must disarm immediately.  This plan was later adopted by the United 
Nations as Resolution 1559.  However, this plan divided the Lebanese public and the various 
political parties.  In addition, Israeli jets continued to fly over Lebanese airspace, threatening 
to bomb Lebanon.
2
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On the other hand, internally, the Lebanese government decided to amend the constitution to 
extend the mandate of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, which began in 2006,  for another 3 
years.  Subsequently, Lebanese politicians and their constituencies were deeply divided 
between progovernment and antigovernment camps.  The antigovernment camp was 
composed of groups such as the Qornet Shewan Gathering, made up primarily of Christians, 
and the Druze Progressive Socialist Party, led by its politically vacillating leader Walid 
Jumblatt (Zeineddine, 2008).  The more progovernment parties consisted mainly of Muslims, 
with a significant Christian minority following, and were referred to as the March 14 
Movement.   
A sample of how intense present internal and external pressures were dividing the 
Lebanese was summed up by the leading Shiite cleric in Lebanon, Grand Ayatollah Sayyed 
Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah.  In a sermon during Friday prayers on January 14, 2005, 
Fadlallah implored, “The public should carefully examine political figures who aspire to get 
into political life for the sake of internal and external apparatuses” (Taan, 2005, p. 1).  He 
warned that the Lebanese should not be “hypnotized by twisted ways in closed circles where 
people suffocate and remain distant from crucial issues for the sake of marginal ones” (Taan, 
2005, p. 1).  Fadlallah added, “Liberty and independence require a confrontation of external 
intervention and domestic chaos that confuse people, and thus they will lose the feeling of 
security” (Taan, 2005, p. 1).  Regarding CMR, Fadlallah urged that “Muslim-Christian 
dialogue should start in schools.”  In spite of these fierce tensions in present-day Lebanon, 
Ghazal
1
 felt “very optimistic about the willingness of the Lebanese to work for coexistence.  
Christians and Muslims have a common desire for coexistence.”  







 added that the Zuama (clan leaders), along with political families wielding 
inherited power, were also a problem, aggravated by the appearance of the PLO and 
Palestinian refugees on the scene.  Ghazal identified the Palestinian factor as divisive for 
Lebanese society, with many of the Lebanese people either siding with the Palestinians or 
opposing them, thus greatly aggravating the already brewing intra-Lebanese discontent.  
Ghazal provided another interesting example of the Lebanese social divide, citing Lebanese 
hospitals, which were characterized as serving the French, Americans, or Muslims rather than 
being at the service of the entire Lebanese population.  
Ghazal
2
 also concluded that CMR were worse now than previously because of 
business and retail relationships between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon.  Even 
though these relationships had existed for decades, they seemed to have had little effect in 
forging solid CMR and coexistence.  Finally, he cited internal political behaviors and 
“external interference” as the main culprits in harming CMR.
3
 
Ghazal, a Melchite bishop, had been assigned to minister parishioners in southern 
Lebanon for many years.  As such, he was a keener witness to Israeli atrocities in the south 
and the role those had in the disruption of CMR.  Although Ghazal’s partial emphasis on 
Israeli mischief could be seen as bias, without sharing his experiences within southern 
Lebanon, this important facet of CMR could have been overlooked.  Although several other 








 and more also pointed to Israeli 
behavior as a detriment to healthy CMR, few were as close to these phenomena as Bishop 
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Ghazal.  He was considered a hero in one southern Muslim community for shielding one of 
their youth from a Christian mob.  He reportedly was rued by the Israelis for uniting 





 checked his replies to this researcher with the Vatican beforehand and was 
pleased to report that his information had been approved for sharing with this researcher.  As 
a senior member of the clergy, Ghazal might have been better equipped to discuss religious 
matters (as set forth in chapter 1) rather than political ones.  However, Lebanon is a country in 
which politics and religion seem to interact daily and in which CMR are multifaceted and 
their demise multicausal, as this thesis has shown.  Thus, given his years of CMR “ground 
work,” as he named it; the backing by the Vatican for his information; and the correlation this 
information had to the other respondents, Ghazal was considered a competent respondent in 
reference to the relationship between Lebanese political issues and CMR.  
In response to IQ2, Bou Habib
3
 blamed both elite politicians and clergy for the sad 
postwar state of CMR.  However, the major factor for him was clearly political, given his 
view that the content of the Tā’if Accords were more favorable toward cabinet powers as 
opposed to presidential authority.  The Tā’if Accords, a document of understanding to which  
most Lebanese agreed and accepted, involved a major power-sharing formula for the 
Lebanese president, prime minister, speaker, and the Lebanese cabinet (Sakr, 2011a).  Bou 
Habib angrily cited what he felt was poor behavior on the part of the Lebanese before, during, 
and after the civil war, insisting that politics and a poor economy were mainly at fault for the 
deteriorating state of CMR.
4
 













 addressed IQ1, regarding if CMR has improved post war or not, with some 
dismay.  He cited his view that the history of Lebanon for a least a half century before the 
outbreak of the civil war was one of steadily and significantly improving CMR due to 
cooperation between the civil service, businesses, schools, and other parts of the public sector.  
He suggested that the history of Lebanon was largely one of Christian–Muslim harmony 
despite incidents such as the 1860 outbreak of Druze–Christian strife in the Mt. Lebanon 
region when thousands of Christians were massacred.  According to El Khazen, it took only 
months after such instances of conflict for relations to become good again; there was no 
permanent damage done to CMR.  In contrast, the Lebanese Civil War that broke out in 1975 
was different in that its negative effects appeared more long lasting.  El Khazen strongly 
believed that in the postwar period, Lebanese CMR were the worst they had ever been.  Part 
of the problem was the appearance of the PLO in Lebanon and its strong support by Lebanese 
“leftists” and the lengthy nature of the war itself. 
In response to IQ2 regarding the reasons for CMR deterioration, El Khazen
2
 believed 
that politics, not religion, was the basic cause for the Christian–Muslim divide in Lebanon 
because presently Lebanese Christians and Muslims were less communicative 
intercommunally than they were before 1975.  He expressed what he believed was both a 
positive and negative development in postwar Lebanon in that Muslims were now more 
politically involved, mobilizing for change.  This, of course, had political implications for the 
Christians, especially since the Shiites did not mobilize politically during peacetime but 
during the fighting, which began in 1975.  First, Amal emerged and then Hezbollah was 
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formed, the latter in direct opposition to the Sunnis with the formation of the Shiite Higher 
Council, founded by Moussa El-Sadr.
1
 
In addition, although El Khazen
2
 said that religion was not the major cause for 
problems in Lebanese CMR, he noted that several Muslim majority countries had experienced 
increasing sectarian issues: “Today, Muslims all over the world are restless.  Now every 
Christian–Muslim country has problems when 15 years ago there were no problems.”  To 
illustrate, he cited the examples of Indonesia and Nigeria.  Lebanon had not been immune to 
such developments.  The question was whether the confessional structure of the Lebanese 
state was a positive or a negative for CMR.  For El Khazen, it was not only the best structure 
but also the only viable structure for Lebanon.  This notion, held by many of the Christian 
Lebanese communities and, as discussed by respondent Khalil
3
 and some of the other 
Christian respondents
45
, included the belief that confessional sectarianism would be a form of 
protection for the Christians from the now larger Muslim–Shiite community.  A concern of 
many Christian communities in Lebanon was that democratic elections would result in a 
Shiite plurality; thus, sectarianism and confessionalism were actually more appealing to them 
than democracy.
6
    
El Khazen
7
 also believed that a great detriment to CMR in Lebanon lay within the 
relationship Lebanon had with neighboring Syria.  He believed that if the Christians and 
Muslims were living harmoniously together, then the Syrian government would lose its stated 
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reason for having military troops in Lebanon.  That reason was to prevent a Christian–Muslim 
civil war.  
Despite this assertion, El Khazen
1
 noted, as did Sammak,
2
 that some progress had 
been made among some religious communities, especially among the Maronites, Greek 
Orthodox, and Greek Catholics.  He explained this improvement as a convergence of 
understanding of each other’s positions.  He felt that these religious communities were now in 
political harmony and had developed a “greater ecumenical spirit,” which had resulted in 
more of a willingness to enter into dialogue with each other since the war.  In addition, El 
Khazen noted that in the realm of CMR, it was usually the Christians who took the initiative 
in interreligious dialogue.  In this, he was also in agreement with Sammak
3
 and a number of 
other Christian interviewees.  
El Khazen, as was stated in the introduction, is a native Lebanese Maronite, a PhD in 
political science, and former dean of the political science department at AUB.  As of 2011, he 
is a member of the Lebanese parliament and a leading member of FPM, which is headed by 
Michel Aoun, another respondent for this thesis.  His concerns regarding Lebanese politics 
and CMR were very similar to those of Khalil, a native Egyptian who has lived the past 45 
years in Lebanon.  He is a Jesuit priest, professor of CMR at Lebanese and international 





 shared similar concerns regarding foreign interference, confessionalism, 
sectarianism, and the increasing political power of the Muslims.  
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 identified the need for 
Lebanon to deconfessionalize and to become more democratic, they also did not want to see a 
majority-rule democratic system in place at present.  As members of a shrinking population, 
they feared that a plurality vote would result in Muslim majority rule in Lebanon, something 
these and other Lebanese Christians were worried about, whether real or imagined in terms of 
their siege mentality mentioned earlier in the chapter.  This duplicity did not seem to 
confound the importance of the views shared by El Khazen and Khalil.  That Khalil grew up 
in Egypt, where the Christian fear of being marginalized has continued to exist (Michael, 
2011), might have served to buttress his personal concern.  As mentioned previously, Druze 
leader Halabi was also very wary of democratic majority rule in Lebanon.  In fact, as 
previously stated in this chapter, an official census of the population of Lebanon had not been 
done since 1932  exactly because of the fear that the Lebanese had about subsequent 
calculations regarding distribution of power and resources (Firro, 2003).   
As shown thus far in this thesis, CMR is an interactive process that is affected by a 
slew of sociopolitical factors.  That Christians fear encroachment from Muslims should be 
stated and then addressed within a conflict resolution approach for the betterment of CMR 
(Abu Al Nasr, 2001).  That these and other Christians hope for a more democratic rule in the 
future but have declined the same now may not be unreasonable given the communal tensions 
that existed.  
Regarding the status of CMR in postwar Lebanon, Salem
3
 replied that they were not as 
good as in prewar times due to political and regional suspicions.  He cited the various 
Lebanese groups “jockeying for power,” resulting in a pronounced deterioration in CMR.  A 
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couple of years after this interview, Salem’s concern about poor behavior and practice of 
Lebanese politicians was widely shared by others.  For example, according to Sheikh Abdel-
Amir Qabalan, vice president of the Higher Shiite Council, “Politics is disuniting the 
Lebanese instead of unifying them at a time when they need their unity and cooperation to 
preserve their country and themselves away from tight [narrow] political interests” (Haddad, 
R., 2008,  p. 2).  Salem
1
 named another cause of poor CMR in citing his perception that Islam 
had grown increasingly intolerant.  This, of course, resulted in raised anxiety levels among 
Christians, who were disunited.  In this, he was in agreement with El Khazen.
2
 
In addressing IQ2, and as noted in chapter 1, Salem
3
 ruled out religious reasons for 





  Aside from poor political practice, Salem cited issues of 
identity (which have been reviewed in chapter 5) that stemmed from social and demographic 
concerns: Lebanese Christians simply did not feel themselves to be an integral part of the 
Middle East to the extent that Lebanese Muslims did. 
Mouawad
6
 addressed IQ1 by saying that CMR in Lebanon not only were worse than 







 she explained that it was the behavior of 
Lebanese politicians and the government that had actually harmed CMR in almost every 
conceivable manner.  
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 reply to IQ2 was similar to Sammak’s
2
 belief that there had been a 
“fundamental change” in CMR due to “new elements on the ground.”  However, differing 
from Sammak, she identified these “new elements” as being the increased political power 




 and a 
few of the other respondents.  In particular, she mentioned the rise to power of Shiite political 
parties such as Hezbollah.  What she termed Syrian “hegemony” in Lebanon had served to 
buttress both the emergence of Shiite domination in Lebanon and the decline in positive 
CMR.
5
  According to her, Syria had been the primary factor in increasing Shiite power vis-à-
vis the other Lebanese communities so that the Shiites now held influential and pivotal 
positions in various public sectors, from the army to the civil service administration and 
beyond.  Mouawad explained that due, in part, to this favoritism of the Shiite community by 
Syrian policy and government officials at work in both Syria and Lebanon, there was a 
resulting problem of retaining the Christian population of Lebanon.  She noted that more 
Lebanese lived outside of Lebanon than in Lebanon and that the majority of those were 
Maronites.  Years before this writer’s interview with Mouawad, the Lebanese were already 
concerned about what she lamented.  Indeed, this has continued to be a major concern of 
many of the Christian Lebanese.  According to Ghattas (1999, p. 3),  
Christians in Lebanon, a minority in their country as well as in the region, are 
generally defiant towards other religions, Islam in particular.  Before the war, a census 
set the Christian population at 60 percent, but today it is thought to be no more than 40 
percent of the total. 
 
In completing this research, this writer uncovered a change in the previously held 
notion that the Lebanese Civil War was fought primarily between Christians and Muslims.  
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The Lebanese admitted that the war did take on a Christian-versus-Muslim essence as it 
unfolded.  According to the Kaslik studies of 1976 (a series of journal articles and papers 
published at the completely Christian Kaslik university at that time) conducted shortly after 
the civil war began, “No matter what the causes of the war are, it is between Muslims versus 
Christians . . . the Christians are fighting the Muslims to safeguard the remnants of their 
Christian culture in this small part of the Muslim East” (as quoted in Khashan, 1990, p. 738).  
Another of many examples occurred in 1999 when a South Lebanese Army militiaman 
exclaimed, “It was a clear war.  We knew what was happening; Muslims killed Christians and 
Christians killed Muslims” (Ghattas, 1999, p. 1).  However, 10 years later, it was clear via the 
testimony of each of the respondents except one that in no way was the Lebanese Civil War 
predominantly a Christian-versus-Muslim conflict.  Instead, they deemed it a political 
conflict.   
Mouawad
1
 cited additional factors relating to the poor state of CMR in present-day 
Lebanon.  However, it is important to note that Mouawad was speaking from the perspective 
of a general political and Maronite Christian view.  Her assessments were focused more on 
the plight of the Christian Lebanese and less on the actual interrelationships of the Christian 
and Muslim communities. 
Mouawad
2
 stated that due to the poor behavior of current politicians and their 
corruption, most Lebanese were alienated from politics.  It appeared that the corruption of 
Lebanese politicians and officials had changed little over the years.  As Mouawad decried 
corrupt leaders in contemporary Lebanon, 10 years ago this same concern existed: 
“Corruption, never an alien phenomenon in Lebanon’s past, has been increasing with respect 
to sums of money involved.  Kickbacks from public spending are counted in millions rather 







than thousands,” (Perthes, 1997, p. 117).  These assessments by Perthes (1997) and Mouawad 
were accepted and diffused throughout Lebanon.  The citizenry and most major political and 
community leaders, including Hezbollah, had all bemoaned the mismanagement and 
absconding of funds by the civil service administration, particularly in the departments of 
electricity, water, education, tourism, and environment and in the Ministry of the Displaced.  
Mouawad
1
 then turned to what she termed “Syrian hegemony” and its “favoritism” of 
the Shiites in general and Hezbollah in particular.  This favoritism had resulted in 
destabilizing the traditional dependence on the Zuama (clan leaders) to maintain a closeness 
and loyalty to a community or political leader in the hopes of obtaining services such as lower 
school tuition costs and resources, particularly employment.  Zuama existed from family 
bloodlines or kin, history, or all three.  In prominent families throughout Lebanon, a few of 
their members had been more or less Zuama for hundreds of years.  Among these were the 
examples of the Jumblatts and Arslans of the Shouf and Aley region of Lebanon and the 
Frangiehs and Mouawads of the Zgharta village/district.  Mouawad was, in fact, a member of 
Zuama herself.  Her husband had been the president of Lebanon for 21 days before a Syrian 
agent allegedly assassinated him.   
When employed at a Lebanese university as a student affairs officer, this writer was 
instructed by the university director to reduce the tuition of certain students because they were 
supporters of Shouf MP Walid Jumblatt.  On the grand list of students who were being 
considered for financial aid and grants, dozens of the names had the initials of the local 
Zuama written next to them.  Thus, Mouawad
2
 saw the supplanting of the Zuama powers as 
disruptive to the Lebanese social order.  







However, this system was widely criticized by countless Lebanese and non-Lebanese, 
political analysts, and the like.  According to many Lebanese analysts, it was in the best 
interests of Lebanon to do away with the family clan rule of communities and the 
government, no matter how difficult (Haddad, R., 2008).  In this writer’s interview with 
Massouh, the director of the UB Center for Christian–Muslim Understanding, Massouh
1
 
considered this phenomenon as perhaps being the major deterrent to cordial CMR.   
During the course of the interview, Mouawad,
2
 a Maronite, seemed to contradict 
herself regarding the interrelationship between the Zuama, politics, and CMR.  She identified 
Zuama political practice as a problem yet also bemoaned the trumping of the Zuama practices 
by Syrian hegemony.  She explained how prior to Syrian hegemony, she preferred the practice 
wherein Lebanese constituencies befriended and supported leaders of prominent Lebanese 
families to obtain jobs, resources, and so forth.  This preferred practice of Mouawad was 
actually Zuama protocol.  As stated previously, she was a recognized Zaima (singular 
feminine form of Zuama) in North Lebanon.  In reality, Mouawad seemed to be sharing her 
disappointment that the Zuama of Lebanon had been subdued by foreign interference in 
Lebanon.  The Zuama were a fact of Lebanon and, although Mouawad contradicted herself a 
bit on the topic, she did identify the Zuama as a problem for positive, healthy CMR.  
Mouawad seemed to be realistic here in that she called for an improvement in the way the 
Zuama conducted themselves but not for their eradication from the Lebanese political scene, 
which might not be probable given their entrenchment in the Lebanese political fabric.  
Husseini,
3
 the main author of the Tā’if Agreement, found that the attitudes of 
individual Lebanese, as opposed to the images portrayed in the press, were expressive of a the 
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desire for peace.  What stood in their way were the politicians, who were the main cause for 
worsening CMR in Lebanon.  This writer got the distinct impression that Husseini was 
disappointed that CMR had not greatly improved since the Tā’if Agreement.  Husseini is 
known throughout Lebanon and by international politicians and scholars who focus on the 
Middle East as “the godfather of the Tā’if Agreement.”  Husseini believed strongly that Tā’if 
could still work even as he revealed some disappointment that Tā’if had not been 
implemented by the Syrians, who, according to most interpretations of Tā’if, should have 
withdrawn from Lebanon years earlier than they did (Ziadeh 2006).  He also showed some 
disappointment about some Lebanese politicians rejecting the Tā’if from almost the beginning 
and never giving it a chance to work.  He felt this was particularly true of Christian 
politicians. 
Husseini’s implicit disgust was evident and came to fruition on August 12, 2008, 
when the Lebanese Parliament finally convened after many months of political tumult.  
Husseini resigned from Parliament that very day, complaining that the rival political camps 
had “torn apart” (Mroue, 2008, p. 4) the Lebanese constitution and Tā’if Agreement.   
Shortly after this writer’s interview with Husseini, then U.S. ambassador to Lebanon 
Jeffrey Feltman asked to meet with Husseini, doing so on at least two occasions (Sfeir, April 
15, 2005 p.2)  Since the interview with Husseini, the United States, France, and the United 
Nations have become particularly persistent in attempts to enforce Resolution 1559, which, 
among other aspects, includes a call for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon.  
Feltman inquired about the portion of Tā’if that also included a call for Syrian redeployment 
and withdrawal from Lebanon.  Husseini’s exact understanding of Tā’if was referenced in 
order for Feltman to understand whether Syria was in violation of the agreement.  However, 
Husseini had not called for the withdrawal of Syrian troops and stressed that Lebanon should 
108 
 
have a good, strong relationship with Syria.  In the interview with this writer, Husseini 
indicated his hope of seeing a Lebanon that has strong national principles to ensure national 





 interpreted IQ1, which inquires if CMR have improved or not post war 
Lebanon, as implying that the Lebanese Civil War was clearly between Christians and 
Muslims, a notion he calmly yet seriously rejected.  In fact, N. Musawi spoke of Lebanese 
wars, using the plural rather than the singular.  He stated that their cause was political rather 
than religious.  He noted that Christians fought Christians, citing the Maronite leaders Aoun 
and Gea-Gea, while Amal fought Hezbollah, both of which were Shiite entities.  To call the 
conflicts that began in 1975 Christian versus Muslim was too simplistic.  However, the 
outcome of the war had an effect on CMR because it resulted in the separation of the two 
religious groups in society in general and in education in particular.  These insights by N. 





In addressing IQ2, Musawi
5
 believed the problem/cause was political and, more 
specifically, foreign interference.  Musawi explained that foreign powers such as the United 
States and Israel continued to try to divide the Lebanese and other Arab people through their 
political and military maneuverings.  He felt that the United States and Israel still used the 
“divide and conquer” policy throughout the Arab Middle East and the world and cited the 
examples of Palestine, where the Israelis wanted the Palestinians to fight and weaken each 
other, and of Iraq, where the United States was trying to implement the same tactic.  He 
believed that Israeli and American policy was the force behind this agenda in Lebanon during 
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its civil war and that these countries were still using that same policy decades later.  A few 
years after this writer’s interview with Musawi, foreign interference was still considered a 
major divisive factor among the Lebanese.  An editorial in the leading English newspaper in 
Lebanon, The Daily Star, stated that (Aug. 4, 2008, p. 9) stated that 
one reason that Lebanon gets so badly bruised in the international tug of war is that 
our own leaders fail to do the same [resist foreign interference].  Instead of setting 
down national priorities in the form of a party platform many factional leaders make a 
habit of taking cues from foreign sources. 
   
Musawi
1
 also complained that the Israeli model was terribly flawed, given that it was 
not based on dialogue with the Palestinians that was remotely evenhanded.  Instead, it was 
based on racism with religious overtones.  Therefore, it was up to the Lebanese to resist any 
effort by the Israelis to create a wedge between the various elements of Lebanese society.  
Norman Finkelstein, an American scholar and university professor of political science 
at DePaul University at the time of this interview, visited Lebanon and appeared on its 
television station Al-Manar in 2002.  Afterward, he wrote to this author, stating that he 
believed the philosophy of Hezbollah was a sound one in that it addressed “all of humanity,”
2
 
echoing Musawi.  On Al-Mustaqbal (“The Future”) television in March 2008, during another 
visit to Lebanon, Finkelstein stated, “I’m going to honor Hezbollah [for defending Lebanon 
against the Israeli invasion of 2006]; they showed courage; they showed discipline.  I respect 
that” (Hezbollah, the Honour of Lebanon, 2008). 
For Musawi,
3
 and for Hezbollah, the solution to the CMR woes in Lebanon could be 
found through dialogue to overcome “misguided politics” and efforts by politicians to use 
religion inappropriately.  Part of the dialogue should involve an as yet nonexistent CMR 
curriculum in the educational system.  Musawi’s call for dialogue had been supported, at least 
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publicly, by both the Christian and Muslim communities of Lebanon (Hashem, 2006b).  
According to the Maronite Christian Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, “Our problems cannot be 
solved but through dialogue and discussion.  This dialogue must be true in the heart and not 
only words in the mouth so that together we can face these problems” (Hatoum, 2006, p. 1).  
N. Musawi
1
 expanded his call for dialogue, citing its essential nature while bemoaning 
the fact that a gap between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon remained.  He believed 
that Tā’if made it possible to overcome hindrances, allowing the Lebanese to progress quickly 
in this area.  As a high-ranking representative of Hezbollah, Musawi had two main necessities 
for dialogue.  The first related to the healing that was necessary due to the bad outcome of the 
civil war.  The second related to unity not just in the “ghetto” called Lebanon but also 
throughout the world.  N. Musawi’s concept of a ghetto forming was found in some of the 
more recent literature on Lebanese CMR in which the phrase “cultural ghettos” (Dagher, 
2000) was sometimes used.  The literature indicated that, overall, CMR were worse today 
than they were prior to the Lebanese civil wars.  The strengths and possible biases of N. 
Musawi’s views have been combined and analyzed along with those of fellow Shiites 
Husseini and I. Mousawi following the latter’s remarks toward the end of the chapter.  
According to Hajjar,
2
 the strained relationships between the Christians and the 
Muslims of Lebanon were of a political rather than a religious nature because of the freedom 
to express one’s religion in modern Lebanon.  Nonetheless, Hajjar added that political leaders 
introduced religion and theology into political issues for political ends.  However, their doing 
so should not obscure the fact that the basic questions affecting CMR were political rather 
than religious.  Thus, Hajjar was in agreement with respondent Massouh, citing Christian-
versus-Christian and Shiite-versus-Shiite violence during the fighting.  









 responded to IQ1 by suggesting that the compromise of 1943 that laid the 
foundations for the confessional system could have worked had it been allowed to stand 
without external interference.  However, Gemayel stated that these good political intentions 
between earlier Lebanese Christian and Muslim leaders had been disrupted by transnational 
issues and problems, ranging from the Palestinian question to Nasserism and pan-Arabism.  
Under pan-Arabism, the Muslims of Lebanon and of the greater Middle East became 
enthralled with the notion of a greater Arab world and nation, which could result in blurring 
Lebanese nationalism and separatism.
2
  Specifically, Gemayel flatly stated that Lebanese 
Christians were not Arab (a discussion covered in-depth in chapter 5) and, thus, Arab 
nationalist movements would favor the majority Muslim population of the Middle East.  The 
result would be the upsetting of the close Christian–Muslim ratio of Lebanon.  
 Syria complicated matters by intervening in the post-1975 fighting, not to end the 
Lebanese war but for its own interests.  Syrian forces came because of the request of then 
President Suleiman Frangieh and because of an Arab league mandate.
3
  With Muslim 
Lebanese adhering to Arab nationalist ideology, along with the Palestinian and Syrian 
presences, the Christians felt increasingly isolated before war broke out (as Massouh
4
 also 
noted).  At that point, the Christians sought allies, a point also raised and shared by Franjieh.
5
  
Gemayel’s grandfather, of the same name, was quoted prior to the civil war as saying, “We 
are ready to strike a deal with the devil itself,” a code word for Israel and its formidable 
military (Schiff & Ya’ari, 1984, p. 12).  Therefore, it was the Gemayel clan, the dominant 
Christian militia and force in Lebanon at the time, who received military support from Israel.  
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This infuriated the Muslim population, Arab nationalists of Lebanon, and the rest of the Arab 
Middle East, as Gemayel
1
 acknowledged. 
 Unlike most of the other interviewees, Gemayel
2
 believed that CMR had improved 
after the fighting stopped because of Tā’if and UN Resolution 1559.  Through these, the 
Lebanese were allowed to articulate common aims, especially after the Syrian withdrawal.  
 It is important to note that this writer’s interview with Gemayel was conducted just 4 
months after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others, which was 
considered a major turning point in recent Lebanese history.  It was the catalyst that ended the 
Syrian military presence in Lebanon after 30 years, with full withdrawal occurring on April 
30, 2005 (Ziadeh, 2006).  Prior to the Hariri assassination, the interviewees who opposed the 
Syrian presence in Lebanon spoke in codes regarding their disapproval, thereby avoiding 
stating their opinions directly.  Gemayel had gone on record, as had his father Amin and his 
assassinated uncle Bashir (both former presidents of Lebanon), by making highly critical 
speeches concerning the role of Syria in Lebanon  (Ziadeh 2006).  Because this interview took 
place after the Syrian withdrawal and because of his record of criticizing the Syrian presence, 
Gemayel was unlike some of the other interviewees in that he overtly expressed his 
resentment of the Syrian role in Lebanon.  
Responding to IQ2, Gemayel
3
 denied that the biggest problems with CMR were 
caused by religious differences, although certainly some of the lesser problems might have 
been.  Rather, he asserted that Muslims, unlike Christians, were not able to separate politics 
and religion, thus causing intracommunal tension.  This sentiment was shared by one other 
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  Gemayel believed that although Christians could adapt more easily 
to Al-almaniyya or “secularism,” the Muslims could not and did not want to adapt to it. 
 Despite his pride at being a Christian, Gemayel
2
 preferred to think of himself as 
Lebanese and to speak of his compatriots as being Lebanese without any religious qualifier.  
Gemayel insisted that CMR had deteriorated in Lebanon because of the intermingling of 
religion and politics, obscuring the essentially political nature of the problem.  Gemayel saw 
the Syrian role as negative with regard to CMR, explaining that Syria keyed in on Christian–
Muslim discontent and supported and fomented the same through violence and propaganda.  
Comparing both Syrian and Israeli impacts on CMR of Lebanon, Gemayel contended that 
Syria was worse than Israel, which acted as a long-term weakening and destabilizing factor.  
However, Syria actually infiltrated Lebanon and became part of its sociopolitical fabric. 
Gemayel was the only respondent who clearly felt that theological and religious 
reasons were a cause of CMR discord in Lebanon.  Additionally, he was the only respondent 
who felt CMR were better now than in prewar Lebanon.  Based on the viewpoints of all the 
other field expert respondents, these positions of Gemayel’s were the exception.  This could 
be due in part to the fact that Gemayel was the youngest and perhaps least experienced of the 
field experts.  In addition, although Gemayel belonged to a politically involved family, he was 
a newly elected member of parliament at the time of his interview.  He also admitted and 
presented as not feeling fully comfortable with answering CMR-focused questions but wished 
instead to answer politically based ones.
3
   
In addition, Gemayel’s Maronite Phalangist party and former militia had been 
accused of anti-Muslim bias for decades, especially during the Lebanese Civil War.  
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His answers might have been an attempt to deflect some of the past blame assigned to 
his political party and to project a more optimistic tone.  Even so, the Gemayel family, 
which boasted two past Lebanese presidents, members of parliament, and a huge 
Christian following, needed to have their Christian viewpoint included in CMR issues 
because of their important and influential presence in Lebanon.  However, Gemayel’s 
other viewpoints regarding CMR were similar to those of the more experienced field 
expert respondents regarding the effect of poor politics, communal displacement and 
other cause of CMR discord.         
Aoun
1
 contemplated IQ1 before responding with a degree of disappointment that the 
Lebanese had not progressed to the point of achieving real peace despite efforts toward better 
CMR.  Aoun was quick to explain that, as the leader of Al-Tayyar, or the Free Patriotic 
Movement, he was working on CMR not from its political aspect but rather from a 
communitarian point of view, making the case that he believed in CMR from a humanistic 
rather than a political vantage point. 
 Aoun
2
 stated that although CMR had worsened since the civil war, he and the FPM 
had been making gains.  He proudly pointed to the agreement with Hezbollah that had been 
followed with engagement in dialogue with the Sunnis.  These developments, Aoun 
explained, were not due to politicians and their agreements but to popular support for such 
actions.  Aoun reported that he had been engaging the predominantly Sunni Muslim 
communities of Saida, Tripoli, and Akkar through recent visits to each.  It was known that 
political tensions existed between Aoun and the leader of the largest Sunni Muslim party in 
Lebanon, headed by Saad Hariri, the son of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, 
who was assassinated on February 14, 2006. 
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 Saad Hariri’s Al-Mustaqbal, or “Future Movement” party, had been in a political 
struggle with Aoun and the FPM for several months.  This struggle not only existed at the 
time of this interview but also continued to exist as of late 2011.  The Future Movement and 
its allies lost their majority in the Lebanese Parliament in January 2011 with Aoun’s FPM and 
Hezbollah having the largest number.   
An example of the tension between the two groups surfaced in the interview.  Aoun 
produced and discussed an article that he stated had appeared in a Saudi Arabian newspaper a 
few days earlier in which he had been called “Hitler and Mussolini.”  Aoun
1
 pointed out how 
the Future Movement, headed by the billionaire Hariri family, which also owned and 
published a Lebanese newspaper, had the resources and influence to publish such information 
in Lebanese newspapers.  Saad Hariri had spent years living and working in Saudi Arabia; he 
had very close ties with Saudi Arabia.  Aoun said he was unable to utilize the media as the 
Future Movement did, which also had a radio and television station, due to limited finances. 
 Even so, Aoun
2
 was proud that his message was received “at the community, people 
level” rather than through the media.  He stated that he was trying to unify the Lebanese as 
Lebanese rather than resorting to sectarianism, which had been the rule for 30 years.  
However, now Aoun could cite a local Lebanese comedy television show called “Bass Meit 
Watan,” or “When the Nation Died,” which lampooned the Hezbollah spiritual leader Hassan 
Nasrallah in June 2006.  Initially, tens of thousands of Lebanese, mostly Shiite, took to the 
streets to protest this insult to their leader.  Already experiencing heightened political and 
social tensions, Lebanon could have seen the protest spin out of control and into violence.  
Instead, asserted Aoun, the FPM and Hezbollah, which were the Christian and Muslim parties 
respectively, collaborated and prevented the protests from getting out of control.  This 











 stated that the causes of poor CMR were various, including 
political, theological, economic, and social stratification reasons, among others.  Aoun, like 
the other respondents, felt that several sociopolitical factors had resulted in the poorer status 
of CMR.  Unlike the other respondents, however, he considered religion as somewhat 
problematic and felt all the factors harming CMR held almost equal weight.  Most if not all 
the respondents who pointed to several detriments to CMR, nonetheless put more emphasis on 
one or two predominant causes rather than equally diffusing the blame on several factors. 
Aoun
2
 addressed each possible cause of poor CMR.  Regarding its possible political 
causes, Aoun pointed to regimes born of sectarianism that, ipso facto, had little reason to 
change the confessional system.  However, the factor receiving prominent attention from 
Aoun was the Palestinian presence.  This concept of the PLO presence in Lebanon being a 
catalyst was strongly supported by respondent El Khazen.
3
  Additionally, according to much 
of the literature regarding CMR,  
the issues that divided them were the Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon . . . The 
Christian Lebanese Front viewed the armed presence of Palestinians in Lebanon as a 
threat to its sovereignty.  It also perceived the PLO as having tilted the delicate 
balance of power between the religious communities in Lebanon in favor of the 
Muslims, and it demanded the PLO’s presence be curbed.  (Deeb & Deeb, 1991, pp. 
84-85) 
 
 To be sure, Lebanon held many attractions for the Palestinians, given the open nature 
of Lebanese society, including freedom of speech.  Aoun
4
 felt that Lebanese open society 
resulted in others abusing it.  Therefore, when tensions increased, some Arab countries did not 
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assist Lebanon during the war because they were “envious” or felt threatened by its freedoms.  
Thus, according to Aoun, a society that had been the “epitome” of CMR before the war was 
devastated due to external forces that were complicit in its destruction. 
I. Mousawi
1
 began his reply to IQ1 by stating that CMR in postwar Lebanon were 
worse than in prewar Lebanon.  I. Mousawi believed that this was shameful, given the very 
nature of Lebanon where CMR “should and could be wonderful.”  Similar to the statement of 
Nawaf Musawi, director of international relations for Hezbollah, I. Mousawi asserted that the 
fighting was not between Muslims on one side and Christians on the other, echoing comments 
from other respondent regarding Christian-versus-Christian and Shiite-versus-Shiite violence.  
He also added Shiite-versus-PLO violence, with the PLO being predominantly Sunni.  
However, he insisted that the violence was really “party versus party.”  
Responding to IQ2, I. Mousawi
2
  felt the main cause of community discord in 
Lebanon was the backwardness of political leaders and their practices.  Of equal weight was 
the interference from actors external to Lebanon, such as Israel and the United States.  The 
former was especially harmful in that it supplied small groups in Lebanon that would have 
had little support otherwise.  Their attainment of military power gave them disproportionate 
influence, making them negative factors on the Lebanese scene. 
Citing the Zuama as manipulators of religion for political purposes, I. Mousawi
3
 
believed tensions were the result of politics rather than religion.  In this, he agreed with 
Massouh.
4
  I. Mousawi singled out the “poor behavior” of the Maronites especially in this 
regard. 
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 and I. Mousawi,
2
 both of Hezbollah, gave very similar responses, 
while fellow Shiite Husseini,
3
 who was not a Hezbollah affiliate, had a noticeably different 
reply to the query regarding CMR and politics.  The former, whose party’s military wing 
fought several fierce battles with Israel, subsequently blamed Israeli policy, its military, and 
the U.S. support of the same for fomenting intercommunal rivalries.  Having faced the Israeli 
army and its now disbanded southern Lebanese militia, I. Mousawi and N. Musawi were 
exposed firsthand and were able to share how Israel had disrupted CMR in several villages 
(Fadlallah, 2001; Qassem, 2005).  The latter, Husseini, was the chair of the Tā’if Agreement 
and, as such, lamented the point that this agreement had not been adhered to nor implemented 
properly.  Husseini, a Tā’if Agreement expert, maintained and shared his position to date that 
lack of proper follow-up with the Tā’if Agreement had harmed CMR.  All three of these 
Shiite officials shared important information from direct experience without unfounded bias.   
Franjieh
4
 shared that the Lebanese “historical memory” was problematic, noting that 
people looked to their past to find something that made them different from each other, 
something that put them at odds with one another, and did not let go.  He cited massacres and 
protracted identity-driven conflicts, such as the 1860 Druze massacres of the Christians, as 
examples of such a memory (Mackey, 1999).  Because of such historical memories, the 
Lebanese had been unable to move away from conflict. 
According to Matar,
5
 CMR problems were not the result of class or confession.  
Rather, the Lebanese people must have a government and state in which leaders care about all 
citizens being free and equal.  If the government did not promote positive inter-communal 
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relations, the 18 different confessional communities in Lebanon should be mobilized wisely to 
do the job, forming a government that will create a melting pot and solve the CMR problem.  
Failure to do so could result in more political conflict.   
The inadequacies and failures of Tā’if had also been harmful to CMR, according to 
both Matar
1
 and Bou Habib.
2
  The original aim of the Tā’if Agreement was to create a new 
sociopolitical conviviality among Christians and Muslims.  Instead, the Zuama and Christian 
and Muslim civilians had remained distant rather than working together and the Zuama had 
exploited the people for their own interests and benefit.  Matar
3
 distinguished between 
religious leaders, some of whom were constructive toward CMR, and political leaders who 
exploited the people.   
In sum, all 17 field expert respondents expressed serious concern about the havoc 
wreaked on CMR because of Lebanese politics.  Although this writer interviewed each field 
expert separately, there existed a unity and corroboration regarding poor political practice and 
CMR.  The field experts, although religiously diversified, were known to have good 
relationships with one another.  As such, this writer clearly sensed that these experts, who had 
interacted positively with one another before, during, and after the civil war, were disgusted 
that Lebanese politicians could not do the same for the sake of Lebanon and CMR.  Unlike 
with the issues raised in chapters 1(religious differences) and 2 (communal displacement and 
education), the respondents were unanimous and expressed a higher level of concern about 
the negative role of poor political practice.  Many of the field experts made a point of 
emphasizing political practice over religious differences as a more potent cause of CMR 
problems.  They did this, it seemed, to dispel what they believed was a misconception about 
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the civil war and CMR.  The field experts yielded more information, intensity, and detail 
about the political causes for the downfall of CMR than about the other factors brought forth 
in this thesis thus far.  The respondents identified corrupt and inept politicians, foreign 
interference, confessionalism, factionalism, and the self-interest of the Zuama to name a few 
of the impediments to healthy CMR.  The native Lebanese field experts had lived before, 
during, and after the Lebanese Civil War and had personally witnessed the changes that 
occurred with CMR.  Since its inception, Lebanon had followed a confessional system of 
governance.  Therefore, the field experts had lived the political–confessional experience.  
Thus, their existence and views represented the reality, although not the only reality, of keen 
perceptions regarding what helped and/or hindered CMR.  The field experts’ corroboration on 
the intense role of Lebanese politics should be considered an important indicator of an area 
that needs to be addressed to improve CMR.    
The Students 
Per the student survey, the extent to which the tensions between the Christians and 
Muslims of Lebanon was caused by political differences was not at great variance with the 
expert respondents.  Nearly 9 out of 10 of those who answered the question saw political 
differences at the root of CMR discord.  The combined responses to the question of strongly 
agree and agree totaled 87.3% of the student responses, indicating that political differences 
were a major cause of CMR discord (see Table 22.7).  As shown in chapter 1, students also 
chose religion as a major cause of CMR problems, with 68.3% believing religious differences 
were a major cause of discord (see Table 22.1).  Here the students’ views were at great 




 Students also believed that poor political behavior was a major detriment to Lebanon 
holistically, not just to CMR; two thirds (67.3%) of those surveyed responded that such 
behavior was either the most important or the second most important contributor to negative 
CMR within Lebanon (see Table 22.8).  Based on the percentages of responses, the students 
felt that poor political practice had more of an impact on CMR specifically (87.3%) than on 
Lebanon holistically (67.1%).  By contrast, other phenomena such as the economy (discussed 
in chapter 2) were not seen as significant causes of CMR discord among the students.   
 The data indicated that the students carefully read the questions and answered with 
subtle and not-so-subtle nuances, even though the questions that were posed appeared to be 
similar at first glance.  In this instance, the student responses were indeed similar to the expert 
respondents on the same political query.  Both sets of respondents converged in their feelings 
that poor political practice was a major cause of both CMR and overall Lebanese discord.   
 Foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon was viewed by nearly half of 
the students (48.5%) as the first or second greatest problem in the country (see Table 22.9).  A 
common theme with most of the field experts and others in explaining the many societal 
struggles in Lebanon was that foreign intervention or foreign interference was the single most 
significant reason for its ills.  Historians and the Lebanese themselves mentioned the Israeli 
invasions; the Syrian presence; the influence of the United States and Russian; and Iraqi, 
Iranian, PLO, and Libyan interference, to name but few.   
Some Lebanese may find it surprising that students did not place foreign intervention 
at a higher level in precipitating the decline of Lebanon.  Although 48.5% is nearly half of all 
the respondents, the Lebanese in general have stated, as has been reported in Western media, 
that foreign interference destroyed Lebanon( Fisk 2002).  It may be that foreign intervention 
is so pervasive in Lebanon that it has become the baseline and seems normal.  Additionally, it 
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is possible that some Lebanese hold themselves responsible for their own demise rather than 
foreign interference, as authors such as Salibi (1988) and Khalifah (1997) believed.   
Perhaps the most persuasive reason the students did not place the same emphasis on 
foreign interference as did the field experts lies in their perceptions.  For the young Lebanese, 
travel abroad and foreign businesses represent the best employment and advancement 
opportunities.  Add to this the history of war and conflict in Lebanon and its poor economy 
and uncertain future and it becomes clearer why the students viewed foreign involvement in a 
more positive light than the older field experts did.  Foreigners may offer the gift of a better 
life and future.  This was buttressed by the student survey results, as shown in chapter 2 and 
in Appendix 22, which shows that students gave their highest preference to Western 
education, influence, and languages rather than to those of Lebanon.        
 In sum, the students reported that Lebanese political practices were a major cause of 
CMR problems and not an insignificant a cause for Lebanon discord overall.  These findings 
were consistent with those of the field experts.  The finding shown in chapter 1 of the students 
believing that religious differences were a significant detriment to CMR was at great variance 
to that of the field experts who found religion to be a minimal factor.  Just under half of the 
students saw foreign interference as a significant negative force in CMR, while all of the field 
experts found it to be a major impediment.  
 As mentioned in chapter 1, given their age, the students were not firsthand witnesses 
to the civil war and the fluctuations that occurred in CMR.  They were less mature in terms of 
life experience and educational and psychosocial perspectives.  Unlike many of the field 
expert respondents, the students interviewed were not CMR scholars, university professors, 
experienced politicians, or clergymen.  As such, they might not have been able to produce the 
intellectualized and reliable responses that the field experts did.  Still, their information was 
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valuable.  After all, it was the university students and youth who led the call, through large 
protests, for an end to sectarianism.  They were the ones trying to shape the political future of 
Lebanon (Dhumi, 2011; Meguerditchian, 2011; Sikimic, 2011).  Additionally, the information 
shared by the students had a high percentage of agreement and corroboration amongst 
themselves, which could be a base for unity among them.  Their information was 
representative of postwar present-day thought, which could be compared, contrasted, and 
assessed alongside the field expert respondents and the literature.  
Summary and Conclusions: Political Causes of CMR Discord 
 Based on the information gleaned from this research, CMR were faced with real 
political obstacles, replete with double binds and ironies.  To begin, all of the expert 
respondents except one insisted that Lebanese CMR were much worse than they had been in 
the 1960s and ’70s, prior to the Lebanese Civil War.  All of the field experts, in particular 
Massouh, Khalil, Hajjar, Husseini, Matar and Gemayel, and nearly all of the university 
students reported that a principal cause of this deterioration in CMR was poor political 
practices.  Specifically, they revealed that various politicians jockeyed for power while losing 
track of the needs and desires of the people.  This problem of jockeying for power was 
evidenced by several incidents in the past few years alone wherein Lebanese governments 
could not be formed for several months at a time.  Without an official government in place, 
little could be done to improve CMR.   
Most Lebanese also blamed many of their political leaders, often called Zuama, who 
wrongly riled and rallied their Christian or Muslim constituencies out of fear of the other.  
Based on the field expert reports, particularly Ghazal, Mouawad, and Matar, the Zuama 
impressed upon their constituencies the need for their support in order to have access to jobs; 
resources, such as lower school tuition costs for their children; the political process; and more.  
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A dichotomy here is that while most of the respondents decried Zuama practice, some were 
interested in keeping this in place, as stated by Mouawad, a political Zaima herself.  The Arab 
Spring protests that spread throughout  North Africa and the Arab Middle East came about, in 
large part, as an utter rejection of corrupt leaders remaining in power too long (Khouri, June 
4, 2011 p. 6).  These leaders are to the Arab Spring what the Zuama are to Lebanon.  In fact, 
Lebanon had its own Arab Spring(s) well before the ones sweeping the area in 2011.  The 
difference, however, was that the Lebanese Arab Springs were divided between the March 8 
and March 14 movements and a few other movements.  The Arab Spring protests have also 
exhibited more unanimity than those in Lebanon have.  Although the Lebanese Arab Spring 
protests were large in number, they were split.  Even so, that disgust that the Arab masses 
have for their dictators is the same that the Lebanese had for some of the Zuama and other 
dictators (Mroue, 2011c; Saab, 2011).   
Based on the respondents’ information, there was a nearly complete lack of 
government efficiency and strong political leadership.  They pointed out that civil institutions 
such as the armed forces, the police, electrical services, and so on were riddled with 
corruption and inept management and that these did not help in improving CMR.  
Specifically, the respondents’ stated and the student survey results showed that the Lebanese 
government had not put adequate resources into CMR advocacy.  When pitted against weak 
Lebanese institutions and basic needs such as water, electricity, and security, CMR issues 
were all but forgotten.  Indeed, the few present-day CMR working groups were all private.      
On the other hand, the field experts as well as Lebanese and foreign political analysts 
praised the Lebanese governmental structure and system of elections.  For example, most of 
the Arab Middle Eastern neighbors of Lebanon are kingdoms, emirates, dynasties, or false 
democracies (Bill & Springborg, 1994; Khater, 2004).  Saudi Arabia is a kingdom controlled, 
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as the name indicates, by the Saud family.  The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has been ruled 
by the Hussein family for over 50 years.  King Hassan II of Morocco ruled for 38 years until 
his death in 1999, with his reign being followed by that of his son, King Mohammed IV.  
Countries such as Syria, Egypt, and Libya, though not officially kingdoms, have been ruled 
by the Assads, Mubaraks, and the Kaddafis, respectively, for over 30 years each and have 
been grooming their next of kin to succeed them (Gelvin, 2008; Rossi, 2008).  This next of 
kin grooming has been disrupted by the Arab Spring protests that began across much of North 
Africa and the Arab Middle East in January 2011.  These protests have been motivated in 
large part by the desire of the people for much more frequent leadership changes in their 
countries.  In Lebanon, the president is elected by parliament every 6 years; parliamentary 
elections occur every 4 years.  Since its independence in 1943, Lebanon has had 19 separate 
presidencies; while the other countries mentioned previously have had as few as two or three 
top rulers (Daou, 2001; Smith, 2006).  
 Even so, as evidenced by the field expert and student responses and as revealed in the 
literature review, the Lebanese governmental structure and system of elections have been 
undermined by the political Zuama and other ruling classes, foreign interference, fraudulent 
elections, assassinations, and war (Firro, 2003; Khalaf, 2002).  Rather than the rule of true 
democratic law and elections that can serve to buttress healthy CMR, Lebanon has continued 
to be ruled by the same petty dynasties and elite political clans (Haddad, R., 2008).  Although 
Lebanon is not ruled by a king, it has been ruled by kingdom-like political families since its 
independence.  Just some of these are the Gemayels, Jumblatts, Arslans, Harirris, Franjiehs, 
Karamis, and Berris (Firro, 2003; Khalifah, 1997).  According to long-time Lebanese 
politician and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, “Lebanon is not a nation.  It’s a bunch of tribes” 
(Zacharia, 2010, p. 4).  
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 Several of the Christian respondents decried what they called the lack of democracy in 
Lebanon yet at the same time admitted that they did not want a democratic political system at 
this point, fearing that a plurality vote would certainly usher in more Muslim power and 
control over Lebanon (Sakr, January 16, 2010, p. 3).  Also of concern was the fact that there 
were still a few Lebanese political parties that continued to hope for a preeminently Christian 
or Muslim state in Lebanon (Khalifah, 1997).  As such, consolidating the Lebanese need for 
more democratic reforms with the hesitation of some Christian leadership and their 
constituencies to accept these reforms is a dilemma that will need to be resolved. 
 Additionally, as mentioned by Franjieh,
1
 the Lebanese have a historical memory that 
results in their not being likely to forgive and forget past grievances, many of which involve 
murder and the destruction of property and livelihoods.  Franjieh mentioned intra-Christian 
rivalries in his home district of Zgharta and Christian–Muslim rivalries throughout Lebanon 
as examples of this historical memory problem.  Because so many intra-Lebanon conflicts 
have occurred, historical memory runs deep.  Just some of these incidents that reverberate in 
present-day Lebanon as grievances are Muslim anger at Maronite assistance to Israel during 
the 1983 invasion of Lebanon; Druze massacres of Christians in the Shouf and Aley 
mountains in 1860 and during the civil war, 1975–1991; then Christian warlord Samir Gea-
Gea’s alleged assassination of a Sunni politician from Tripoli, Rasheed Karami; and Christian 
Southern Lebanese Army members occupation of  predominantly Muslim populated southern 
Lebanon, inter alia, in conjunction with Israel.    
 One of the most important causes of CMR discord identified by every field expert, as 
well as the university students, was foreign interference.  Treachery by neighboring countries, 
such as Israel, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, was strongly implicated.  Outside the Middle 
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East, the Lebanese pointed out that some of the superpowers such as the United States, 
Russia, and the European Union were jockeying for power and support in Lebanon, which 
results in a great deal of animosity, depending on countries from which the Christians or 
Muslims are accepting or declining support (Chomsky & Achcar, 2006; Hanf & Salam, 
2003).  Most of the respondents also pointed to the PLO presence in Lebanon as a major 
catalyst to CMR discord.  
 However, it is the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon themselves who leave 
themselves vulnerable to, or in need of, foreign intervention.  For example, it is the Maronite 
population of Lebanon in particular that has sought Syrian withdrawal from Lebanese 
territory (which occurred in March 2005) and limited Syrian influence thereafter.  There is a 
long record of the Maronite patriarchy’s criticism of the Syrian presence and influence in 
Lebanon.  The most recent Maronite patriarch, Beshara Rai, has a history of being extremely 
critical of Syrian influence in Lebanon. 
Even so, Beshara Rai shocked Lebanese Christians and Muslims alike with his strong 
public support for the Syrian government (and its ally Hezbollah) while the it was being 
confronted by the Arab Spring (Dakroub, 2011c).  Stunned by this, the Lebanese sought 
clarification but instead received a reaffirmation:  
Defying March 14 Christian politicians’ harsh criticisms, Maronite Patriarch Beshara 
Rai upheld his controversial statements on Syria and Hezbollah’s weapons as his remarks 
again came under fire Sunday from a member of former Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s 
parliamentary Future bloc.  (Dakroub, 2011c, p. 1).  
This demand for limiting Syrian and foreign influence in Lebanon and then its 
subsequent retraction has resulted in Christian–Muslim and inter-Christian confusion and 
tension.  For example, the Shiites of  Hezbollah and the so-called March 8th political group 
128 
 
now welcomed the patriarch’s remarks; while the Sunnis of the Future Bloc Movement of the 
March 14th  group now condemned them.  The Lebanese must now to address this issue as 
well.  Just as Ireland may always be influenced by the United Kingdom and Canada by the 
United States, so too Lebanon will continue to be greatly influenced by Syria and other 





 both stated that Lebanon often behaves like a third-world 
country in its reaction to diversity of opinion.  That same diversity in first-world countries has 
not resulted in violence and civil war as it has in Lebanon.  Each of the respondents 
mentioned how Lebanon, to different degrees, was once known as a symbol of healthy CMR; 






  Conflict for 
Lebanon has often seemed to be just a comment or event away from renewed violence, as in 
the case of the dispute over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, a U.N. investigative team 
project into the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Harri (Tensions in Lebanon, 
2010).  The March 8th group rejected Lebanese cooperation with the tribunal, while the 
March 14 political camp demanded it.  Another example of conflict brinkmanship has been 
the frequent threats by Israel to attack Lebanon again( Hirst 2011).    
As referenced by the field experts, the university students, and the literature, foreign 
interference and the divide-and-conquer practice have had negative roles in CMR and 
reconciliation.  In particular, N. Musawi
6
 of Hezbollah felt the biggest threat to CMR in 
Lebanon was external intervention by the United States and Israel.  He even predicted a large-
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 Franjieh, personal communication, March 8, 2005 (see Appendix 13). 
6
 N. Musawi, personal communication, December 20, 2004 (see Appendix 16). 
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scale attack against Lebanon by Israel, supported by the United States, which came true just a 
few months later in the 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.  For decades, the Israelis have tried 
to forge a separate agreement with the Lebanese Maronite political parties.  For its part, the 
United States have supported this—and the Israeli invasions of Lebanon in 1979 and 1982 as 
well—and offered to send Israel bunker busters and nuclear weapons to attack Lebanon 
during the 2006 invasion( Hovsepian, 2008).  After the 2006 Israeli invasion, the United 
States has sent Lebanon military equipment to help it “fight terrorism” ( Mozgovaya, 2010).  
Inasmuch as the United States considers Hezbollah a terrorist organization, it is thus 
providing the Lebanese with weapons to fight against one another in what the field experts 
considered a foreign divide-and-conquer scheme.  Herein lies a major obstacle to Lebanese 
CMR: foreign interference and its policy of splitting within.  The question then becomes how 
Lebanon, with its layers of national fragility and particularly weak governance, will hope to 
manage internal CMR divisions as well as super power interference.  
With all 17 field experts and nearly 90% of the university students identifying political 
dysfunction as a major cause of poor CMR, the issue here is if and when the Lebanese can 
revamp their political system and minimize poor political practice as one major step toward 
improving CMR.  The political system had a major overhaul in 1991 when the Ţā’if 
Agreement was signed, a new Lebanese government was formed, all Lebanese participants in 
the civil war were granted amnesty, and parliamentary and other political representation were 
split evenly between Christians and Muslims.  Even so, several of the respondents, such as 
principle Ţā’if architect Husseini,
1
 complained that CMR had also suffered because of 
improper implementation of the Ţā’if Agreement (Sakr, 2011a, p. 2).  A small number, such 
as Bou Habib, believed the opposite, that the Ţā’if Agreement as implemented resulted in 
                                                          
1
 Husseini, personal communication, December 2, 2004 (see Appendix 6). 
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stripping some of the Christian president’s powers, which ultimately increased Christian 
resentment and thus CMR discord (Dagher, 2001).  As such, with both supporters and 
opponents of the Ţā’if Agreement, the question becomes whether it can still be a useful tool 
for healthy CMR or should be abandoned for a more acceptable formula.  Although the Ţā’if 
Agreement was signed toward the very end of the civil war, based on the field experts’ reports 
and on the data from the student surveys, CMR has not improved in postwar Lebanon.  
Therefore, perhaps  an updated,  more suitable agreement is needed.  Even though the revised 
Lebanese political and civil service system is actually more confessionally based in that it 
calls for exact proportional Christian and Muslim representation, 20 years later, according to 
the expert respondents, the data from the student surveys, and the literature, CMR have 
become worse than ever before (Strohmer, 2007).  





 felt it was the lesser evil, at least for the time being.  This seems to 
indicate Lebanese ambivalence within the negatively fused, codependent relationship between 
the confessional system and CMR (Abu Al Nasr, 2001; Dagher, 2001; Khalifah, 1997).  If 
religion to Karl Marx is “the opium of the masses” (Giddens, 2001, p.537), in comparison, for 
the Lebanese, confessionalism is “the drug that weakens Lebanon’s body” (Hodeib, 2010, p. 
6).   
 The Lebanese may be in another double bind regarding confessionalism/sectarianism.  
According to Middle East scholar Ussama Makdisi (2000), confessionalism/sectarianism did 
not exist in Lebanon for centuries; it began as an outcome of the war between the Druze and 
Maronites of 1860.  One hundred fifty years later, based on the data from the field experts and 
the university students, confessionalism /sectarianism was a main factor that resulted in the 
                                                          
1
 El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix 10). 
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civil war and worsened CMR after the war.  This presents a cyclic problem: War causes 
confessionalism and confessionalism causes war. 
On the one hand confessionalism has not improved CMR; on the other hand, some 
Lebanese communities fear inequality without it.  Beginning in December 2009 and 
continuing to the completion of this thesis in November 2011, Lebanese politicians made 
almost daily newspaper and television headlines calling for abolishing or revamping the 
confessional system.  For example, in 2009, Lebanese parliament speaker Nabih Berri called 
for “abolishing political sectarianism, while his demand drew renewed criticism from 
parliamentary majority figures” (Sakr, December 31, 2009, p. 1); however, Prime Minister 
Saad Hariri called only for some mild amendments (Sakr, January 16, 2010, p.2).  For their  
parts, the Maronite Christian Phalange party and Metn district MP Sami Gemayel called for 
the establishment of a federal state as a guarantee of Christians’ equality in case political 
sectarianism were to be abolished.  Gemayel exclaimed, "The abolition of political 
sectarianism would lead to the rule of the predominant religious sect,” referring to Muslims 
and adding that his Phalange Party "rejected the logic of [confrontation] that Speaker Nabih 
Berri adopted” (as quoted in Sakr, January 16, 2010, p. 2). 
According to Middle East Scholar Ussama Makdisi, “The foundation of the concept of 
co-existence in modern Lebanon, therefore, depends on a notion that religious communities 
must be represented as political communities.  Diversity makes Lebanon possible; it also 
immediately and effectively impedes any sense of secular Lebanese citizenship” (as quoted in 
Hovsepian, 2008, p. 24).  Indeed, as of this writing in 2011, Lebanese identification cards still 
include a designation for the holder’s religious sect.  Alas, regarding sectarianism and CMR, 
Makdisi concluded that there are several other factors either separate from religious identity 
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or intermingled with it that have resulted in the intercommunal demise of Lebanon and must 
be examined:   
As a political culture it (sectarianism) promises national accord, but works against the 
very idea of a transcendent national identity.  Without recognizing the historical, 
social, and political complexity of sectarianism, the secular criticism of it will 
continue to be . . . as impotent as it is misdirected.  It will continue to miss the point of 
the intensity and proliferation of modern sectarian allegiances and antipathies.  (as 
quoted in Hovsepian, 2008, p. 26) 
 
(More information concerning identity issues has been included in chapters 4 and 5.) 
 Thus, it appears that the Lebanese cannot function with confessionalism and yet fear 
functioning without it.  The Lebanese confessional democracy, formed to diminish sectarian 
tensions and enhance CMR, appears to have actually aggravated conflict and may need to be 
abandoned altogether and replaced (Khalaf, 2002; Khashan, 1990).  Even so, the 
multiconfessional field experts are known to have healthy relationships with one another.  
Hence, the question both they and others are asking is why Lebanese politicians cannot do the 
same.   
 Unlike the issues raised in chapters 1(religious differences) and 2(communal 
displacement and education), a unanimous, perhaps even higher, level of concern was raised 
about the role poor political practice had within CMR.  Therefore, through inductive 
reasoning, one may propose that intercommunal/CMR conflict resolution and advocacy need 
to be focused primarily on rehabilitating poor political practice and governance.  With the 
lack of government involvement (reviewed in chapter 3) and the older CMR advocates aging 
and retiring, Lebanese CMR may be left in the hands of indifferent, even hostile, youth.  The 
Lebanese, however, do not agree on how to proceed, the extent to which they should change 




CHAPTER 4: PHOENICIAN AND ARAB IDENTITIES IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
The Christian and Muslim Lebanese have been in fundamental disagreement over the 
historicity of their country: the Christians by and large affirming it, and the Muslims 
denying it (Salibi, 1988, p. 3)   
 
Differences of opinion and even conflict have developed directly related to Lebanese 
identity.  Much of the identity uncertainty has been between, but not completely confined to, 
Phoenician and Arab identities.  Therefore, in this chapter, background information regarding 
Phoenicianism and Arabism in the context of Lebanese identity has been provided.  This 
thesis has been structured thematically and climatically, with the more serious causes of CMR 
dysfunction set out in the later chapters.  As such, the purpose of chapter 4 has been to explain 
briefly the histories of these identities.  The more recent sociopolitical ideologies apropos to 
Lebanese identity have also been reviewed, followed by a discussion concerning which 
identity is more justifiable or feasible.  Then, in chapter 5, the field expert and university 
student data, as well as a literature review, regarding these identities and their major impact 
on CMR have been presented.  
A Brief Understanding of the Phoenicians in History 
 
The Phoenicians were skilled seafaring merchants who existed from the 12th century 
BC until the Greek occupation of 334 BC.  The Phoenician people seemingly predated the 
Arab peoples.  However, early Greek historians and travelers to Lebanon, such as Herodotus 
and Arian, believed that the Phoenicians were early ancestors of the Arabs (Ismail, 1972).  
Another theory of the Phoenicians indicated that they were early Arabs (Ball, 2010; Salibi, 
1988).  
The definition of the word Phoenician has not been completely clear.  Some historians 
reported that Phoenician refers to the Arabs and is an Arabic term.  More common has been 
the reported Greek origin of the word, which appeared in history for the first time in the 9th 
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century BC (Ball, 2010).  The more accepted definition of the word came from the Greek 
phoenix, which means “red” and refers to the purple textile industry for which the ancient 
Lebanese were famous (Kaufman, 2004).  
The ancient inhabitants of Lebanon, however, did not refer to themselves as 
Phoenicians.  They called themselves Canaanites after the name of their land, Canaan (Ball, 
2010).  In the New Testament, the writers indicated that Jesus traveled to Tyre and Sidon, 
believed to be centers of Phoenician existence.  There he cured “a Canaanite woman” (Mark 
7:24–30 New American Bible [NAB]), leading historians to believe that Phoenicia was 
simply the Greek word for the land of Canaan (Kaufman, 2004).  
Whether the Phoenicians considered themselves a single community or political 
system has remained unclear, but they did maintain “a clear sense of being a ‘people’” 
(Kaufman, 2004, p. 4).  They formed several separate city-states, similar to those of the 
Greeks at the time, and referred to themselves by their city-state names (e.g., Sidonites, 
Tyrians, etc.; Firro, 2003; Hitti, 1961).  The heartland of Phoenicia was mainly along the 
coast of Lebanon but included parts of Syria, Israel, and the Palestinian territories (Ball, 
2010).  In addition, the Phoenicians established colonies on the major islands in the 
Mediterranean basin of present-day Greece, Italy, France, and Spain and in North Africa in 
places such as Tunisia (Ball, 2010).  Because of their series of colonies throughout the 
Mediterranean, all under one social and economic system, this area was considered a 
“Mediterranean civilization” (Kaufman, 2004, p. 3) for the first time in history.  
In ancient times, the Greek historian Herodotus reported having spoken with the 
ancient Phoenicians and placed their origin in the Arabian Peninsula (Salibi, 1988).  One 
theory of the Phoenicians was that they originated from the Aegean islands off the coast of 
Greece.  They spread and briefly lived not just in Lebanon but also throughout the 
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Mediterranean basin and North Africa in the areas of Turkey, Syria, Palestine, Tunisia, Libya, 
Sicily, Southern Italy, Sardinia, and Malta (Gore, 2004; Salibi, 1988).  The Muslims of 
Lebanon, in general, believe that the Phoenicians were ethnic and racial Arabs who migrated 
to Lebanon from the area of present-day Saudi Arabia and Yemen, principle origins of the 
Arabs.  The Maronite Christians believe that the Phoenicians were a people distinct from the 
Arabs (Salibi, 1988)  
 The Phoenicians were the first established society to make widespread use of an 
alphabet, the Canaanite–Phoenician alphabet, generally thought to be the ancestor of nearly 
all modern Western alphabets (Hitti, 1961; Kaufman, 2004).  This notion, however, has been 
doubted by some historians, such as the late Kamal Salibi in his text entitled A House of Many 
Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered (1988).  Through their seafarer merchant 
trade, the Phoenicians spread the use of the alphabet to North Africa and Europe, where it was 
used by the Greeks, who later spread it to the Romans and Etruscans (Clodd, 2003).   
The Phoenicians were considered the very first overseas colonial empire in the world and the 
first Middle Eastern power to penetrate Europe.  Their contact was basic and occurred over a 
very long period of time (Ball, 2010).  However, their dreams of establishing an empire in 
Europe were not to be. 
One of the greatest generals in history was probably the  most famous military leader 
of Phoenicia, the Carthaginian named Hannibal:  
But it must be emphasized that in confronting and overcoming Carthage, Rome, 
hitherto a local power, was thrust center stage: the beginning of Roman expansion had 
arrived as a direct response to the end of the Phoenician.  When Hannibal was finally 
defeated by the Romans and had to flee for his life, he sailed back to the Phoenician 
homeland to Tyre where he was greeted as a hero.  Almost symbolically Carthage's 
greatest man found his first refuge in the Phoenician mother country from which Dido 




Despite some of the most dazzling military victories the world had seen, Hannibal was 
in the end totally defeated.  With his defeat ended forever the possibility of the Phoenicians 
establishing an empire in Europe.  Thus, the final stage of the Phoenicians’ outward 
expansion ended in complete disaster, including the total destruction of their city, Carthage, at 
the end of the third Punic War in 146 BC (Ball, 2010).   
The Lebanese were probably most proud of their ancient cedar trees being imported by 
the Israelite king, Solomon, to build the great Jewish temple of Israel (Hitti, 1961).  The 
ancient Phoenician King Hiram cooperated with King Solomon in supplying the trees.  This 
project was so meaningful and memorable to the Lebanese that their national flag is adorned 
with a cedar tree.   
However, the varied Phoenician legacy has been challenging to pin down.  This might 
at first be difficult to perceive in looking back over two and a half millennia of civilization 
that appears ancient, remote, and irrelevant.  However, the rise of Rome, seen perhaps as the 
main root of European identity, was a response to the Phoenician challenges of the time 
(Warwick, 2010).  On the other hand, with so few material remains of the Phoenicians, seeing 
the exact legacy they bequeathed to the world, if any, has remained difficult.  Ludwig, writing 
in 1942, indicated the Phoenicians could be surmised as being merely "peddlers and 
swindlers"; he then launched into a full-scale panegyric of the Greeks as true instigators of 
civilization in the Mediterranean.  After all, no paintings, no great temples, no cities littered 
with standing ruins existed for the Phoenicians.  Western architects and craftsmen for over 
two millennia adhered very firmly to Greek and Roman architectural principles in 
constructing buildings; there was no hint of anything Phoenician.  Thus, the Phoenician 
civilization has remained one of the haziest of all early civilizations.  
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Again in clear contrast, Firro (2003) expressed in his book, Inventing Lebanon, that 
the everyday societal functioning of the Phoenician territory continued to flourish under the 
new Greek and Roman civilizations as evidenced by the numerous artifacts that remained, 
including magnificent ruins in present-day Lebanon (2003).  The Phoenician language, now 
extinct, was derived from the Canaanite group of Semitic languages, similar to Hebrew, 
Aramaic, and Arabic.  The Phoenician–Canaanite language was later replaced by Greek and 
Aramaic.  The Phoenician culture and religion, similar among the Phoenician city-states, was 
also subsequently replaced by Greek and Aramean cultures (Firro, 2003; von Soden, 1994).  
Kaufman stated,  
Following the Macedonian–Greek occupation in 334, the Phoenician civilization 
slowly declined and cleared the way for Greek and Roman domination . . . .  The 
Phoenicians disappeared as a people, not because of a major trauma such as expulsion 
or plague, but rather by a slow process of adaptation to the new political reality.  
(2004, p.4) 
  
As such, much of Phoenician history has remained unclear and elusive.  According to Spencer 
Wells, a geneticist who conducted several DNA studies of the ancient Phoenicians in present-
day Lebanon and the Mediterranean basin, the Phoenicians “were a slippery people.  They 
came.  They traded.  They left.  I guess that only adds to their mystery” (as quoted in Gore, 
2004, p. 49).  
The Phoenicians were at one time centered in Lebanon (but also existed in part of 
Palestine and Syria) and were a Semitic people.  Add to this the exciting and advanced 
Phoenician civilization of its time and it becomes understandable that Lebanese Christians 
and Muslims recognize with pride their Phoenician roots.  However, what those roots should 
mean to Lebanese identity today has been a major point of disagreement.  
A Brief Understanding of the Arabs in History 
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In the ancient history of the Arab peoples of the Arabian Peninsula, some theological 
scholars have pointed to the Bible to track the origins of the Arabs.  The prophet Abraham 
was said to have been born and raised in Ur of the Chaldeans, a village that still exists in 
present-day Iraq.  Abraham was a Semitic nomad (Hitti, 1961) who later traveled throughout 
the Middle East before settling in Canaan, present-day Israel and Palestine.  Somewhat 
controversial, said Yale Arabic professor Bassam Frangieh , has been the notion that the 
prophet Abraham was an Arab 
1
 and most theology historians understand that the Arabs trace 
their lineage directly to Abraham’s first son, Ishmael (Hitti, 1961; Wigoder, 2005).  Ishmael 
was said to have had 12 sons, one of whom was named Keder (Genesis 25:13; Wigoder, 
2005) to whom the prophet Muhammad traced his lineage (Wigoder, 2005). 
Although not well known by many Westerners and by some in the Lebanese Christian 
community, Arabs were mentioned in the Old Testament: Genesis 21:21; Ezekiel 27:7; 2 
Chronicles 9:14, 17:11, 20:7, 21:6, 22:1; 1 Kings 10:15; Jeremiah 3:2, 25:24; and Isaiah 
13:20, 14:21, 21:13, 60:17.  In the Old Testament, the Book of Job, Ayoub in Arabic, was 
believed by some to be a Hebrew version of an earlier Arabic narrative
2
 (Young, 1945) with 
Job’s environment reportedly set in the northern Arabian Peninsula. 
 The Arabs were also mentioned in the New Testament.  According to Acts 2:11 
(NAB), “Cretans and Arabs . . . we hear them speaking in our tongues of the mighty acts of 
God.”  In Galatians 1:16–17 (NAB), Paul wrote, “I did not consult any man, nor did I go to 
Jerusalem to see those who were apostles before me, but went away to Arabia and returned 
again to Damascus” for a period of 3 years.  According to Trimingham (1990, p. 41), “Jesus 
must have been in close touch with Arabs; in his homeland of Galilee he would meet them 
every day.”  
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 Bassem Frangieh, personal communication, November 16, 2008 (see Appendix 24). 
2
 Bassem Frangieh, personal communication, April 6, 2008 (see Appendix 24). 
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These religiohistorical junctures have been referenced for a few reasons.  First was to 
dispel the notions sometimes held by the Christians of Lebanon that (a) Arab means Muslim, 
(b) Arabic means Islam,
1
 and (c) Arabs are somehow newcomers to the Middle East, unlike 
the Semitic Jews and Christians.  Second, after the death of Jesus Christ but before the advent 
of Islam, small- to moderately-sized Arab Christian tribes and empires existed in the 
northwestern area of the Arabian Peninsula.  Of note were the Ghassanids of Damascus and 
the eastern border of Syria and the Lakhmids in present-day northern Iraq (Salibi, 1988;  
Trimingham, 1990).  
Based on the appearance of Muhammad in history and the ushering in, by name, of 
Islam in the 7th century AD, some Lebanese Christians and Muslims believed that the Arab 
people were late arrivals in the Middle East.
2
  However, these religiohistorical junctures 
indicated the Arab people were an entity in the Middle East between the second millennia 
BCE and the 5th century BCE.  These dates represented a stable reminder that Arabs or proto-
Semitic Arabs as a people existed in the present-day modern Arab Middle East and North 
Africa before the advent of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Barakat, 1993; Hitti, 1961). 
At its height, the Arab/Islamic Empire rivaled the great Roman Empire in its size and 
influence (Armstrong, 2002).  The Arab/Islamic civilization was the source of Lebanese 
language and culture for the last 1,200 years.  Islam was also found to be the fastest growing 
religion in the United States and Europe (Armstrong, 2002).  Currently, 22 recognized Arab 
countries exist, sprawling across the Middle East and North African; and over one billion 
people have become followers of Islam worldwide (Smith 2006).   
Even so, many Christians in present-day Lebanon, particularly the Maronites, have 
continued to equate Arab identity with Islam and Muslims, thus rejecting the Arab identity 
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 Mansour Eid, personal communication, June 21, 2004 (see Appendix 24). 
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 Sammak, personal communication, November 20, 2004 (see Appendix 12). 
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and embracing Phoenicianism as part of their own identity.  The reasons for this have been 
discussed in detail in chapter 5 (Dagher, 2001; Hajjar, 2002).  However, history and religion 
have been recognized as two of the main foundational factors within the concept of racial, 
ethnic, and cultural identity (Giddens, 2001; Macionis, 2003).  Therefore, because of their 
Middle East history, religion, and ethnicity, one could conclude that the Maronites are Arabs 
as well.   
Another major component of ethnic identity is language.  The Arabic language, just as 
the religious history of the Arab people, was developed in the immediate vicinity of Lebanon 
(Hooker, 1999; “Near Eastern Languages and Culture,” 2003).  Arabic is Semitic, belonging 
to the Afro-Asiatic group of languages (Bishop, 1998).  As such, it is similar to Hebrew and 
Aramaic (Hitti, 1961).  One origin of the Arabic language was found in the northern Aramaic-
speaking region near the ancient city of Nabataea, which was located in the northwest of 
present-day Jordan and around the southeast area of the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon (Bishop, 
1998).  These areas were just a few miles from one another and were adjacent to the border of 
present-day Lebanon.  Indeed, a southern Lebanese village named Nabataea lay a few miles 
from the Jordanian border (Ellis, 1970).  Arabic might have also developed in the area of 
present-day Ethiopia, Somalia, and Yemen; thus, the category was called Afro-Asiatic 
Semitic (Bishop, 1998).  As Afro-Asiatic Semitic languages, the “Assyro-Babylonian, 
Aramaic, Hebrew, Phoenician, South Arabic, Ethiopic, and Arabic languages should be 
viewed as dialects developing out of one common tongue, the Ursemitisch” (Hitti, 1961, pp. 
13–14).  Interestingly, both Ethiopia, whose native language is Amharic, and Somalia, whose 
first language is Arabic, exist side by side and are homes to two of the largest remaining 
spoken Semitic languages (DeYoung, 1999).   
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The Arabs soon spread throughout the Middle East with Islam, the Arabic language, 
and advancements in many fields of study.  For these reasons and more, it is understandable 
that many Lebanese may want to recognize themselves as Arab.  However, the term Arab in 
the present has also assumed a negative connotation in the western world and, as shown later 
in this thesis, could have a role in the disavowal of Arab identity by some.   
Discussed here and again in chapter 5 was the general Lebanese acceptance of 
Arabism, with the exception of many from the Maronite community.  The reasons for this 
must be assessed further.  Many questions concerning identity continue to exist, including 
whether the Maronites are rejecting Arab identity racially but accepting it ethnically and 
culturally, whether the Muslims accept Arabicity solely because of its relation to Islam, and 
whether the identity variance is solely between Christians and Muslims or if there are intra-
Christian disparities as well.   
Opposing Christian–Muslim Views of Identity 
 The Arabs have existed as both nomadic and sedentary cultivator communities since 
the time of Genesis (The Book of Genesis does not state when it was written.  The date of 
authorship is likely between 1440 and 1400 B.C., between the time Moses led the Israelites 
out of Egypt and his death (Wigoder, 2005)  They were arguably among the first civilizations 
in the world.  Even so, the Maronites and some smaller groups of Christians in Lebanon have 
declined the Arab identity of Lebanon as well as its still-popular Arab nationalist ideology.  
Instead, they have proposed a separate, non-Arab identity of the Lebanese people and, thus, a 
separate Lebanese nationalist ideology (Grafton, 2003; Hollis & Shehadi, 1996; Khalifah, 
1997; Shehadi & Mills, 1988).  Inseparably intertwined with the Maronite Christian Lebanese 
non-Arab theory is the notion of Phoenicianism, which has been discussed in more detail in 
chapter 5, along with Arabism.  The strong denial expressed by many indigenous and diaspora 
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Lebanese Maronites toward Arab identity was minimized and underrated throughout the 
available literature; the authors failed to capture the intense disavowal of Arabs, Arabism, 
Arabic, Muslims, and Islam that many Maronites express (Kaufman, 2004; Martin, 2009).  
The reasons for the Maronite declination of Arabicity, one of which is the perceived 
synonymity between Muslim and Arab (Yahya, 1985), have been detailed in Chapter 5.    
Generally speaking, both the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon have agreed that the 
Phoenicians were the once great seafarers who inhabited the coastal areas of Lebanon.  The 
major difference has been that the Muslims are skeptical of the Phoenician history of Lebanon 
as purported by the Maronites.  Instead, they have considered the Phoenicians to be their early 
Arab or proto-Arab/Semitic ancestors (Kaufman, 2004; Salibi, 1988): “We are all from one 
family,” stated Husseini,
1
 a Shiite, invoking a racial homogeneity among the Lebanese past 
and present.  Sammak,
2
 a Sunni Muslim, spoke of how many present-day Lebanese Christians 
are descendants from the Hashemite tribe of the prophet Muhammad and of the pre-Islamic 
Christians.  Both Muslim, Husseini and Sammak believed that the Lebanese have a blended 
Arab ancestry that includes the Phoenicians.  According to Halabi,
3
 a Druze, the Christian 
insistence that they are the only Lebanese from a separate, non-Arab race of the Phoenicians 
is both an illogical and divisive position.  On the other hand, Christians, specifically the 
Maronites, believe they are a distinct group of non-Arab people altogether (Mahfouz, 2009).  
As such, the Maronites believe that they and not the Muslims are the descendants of the 
Phoenicians of Lebanon (Kaufman, 2004; Khalifah, 1997; Salibi, 1988).  As shown later in 
this thesis, this belief of the Christians appears to be a form of ethnocentrism, resented by 
Muslim and some Christian communities, which has negatively affected CMR.  
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 Husseini, personal communication, December 2, 2004 (see Appendix 6). 
2
 Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12) 
3
 Halabi, personal communication, May 26, 2005 (see Appendix 4). 
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 Based on these two opposing viewpoints regarding identity, two important questions 
arose in this research concerning (a) which claim was more justifiable and feasible and (b) 
why this aspect of Lebanese identity has continued to be so important and to cause such 
acrimony among the present-day inhabitants of Lebanon.  To understand this subject better, 
readers have been provided a more recent history of Lebanese sociopolitical thought in the 
following section regarding the various identity ideology options for Lebanon.  
Lebanese Identity Theories and CMR 
Lebanese nationalism is one of four main Lebanese identity ideologies, the other three 
being Syrian nationalism, Arab nationalism, and the newer ideology known as the Islameeoon 
or the Islamist ideology for Lebanon.
1
  Interestingly, the first three ideologies originated in 
Lebanon, mostly from Christians (Khalifah, 1997; Salibi, 1988).  Many Maronites have 
expressed their non-Arab identity and ideology through the Lebanese nationalist movement.  
A subset within Lebanese nationalism is Christian Lebanon or Christian nationalism 
(Khalifah, 1997).  
Lebanese/Christian Nationalism and CMR  
One of the schools of non-Arab Lebanese nationalism came from the sociopolitical 
thought of Christian Kamal Al Hajj (Grafton, 2003; Khalifah, 1997).  Al Hajj proposed his 
argument through a critique of the validity of the other ideologies, the Syrian and Arab 
nationalist tracks, “postulate[ing] the existence of Lebanese Nationalism by successfully 
attacking the foundations of Arab and Syrian nationalisms” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 98).  The 
bottom line, according to Al Hajj, was that “there can be no nationhood outside a physical 
territory which finds its most complete expression in the institutions of the state” (as quoted in 
Khalifah, 1997, p. 99).  He supported his case with a number of points.  First, he stated that 
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 Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7); Salem, personal 
communication, July 11, 2004 (see Appendix 3). 
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“the Arabs themselves could not agree on unity and their different economic systems made 
unity more difficult” (as quoted in Khalifah, 1997, p. 98).  Second, he mentioned that the 
different historical developments, such as “the Phoenician past of Lebanon, the Pharaonic 
heritage of Egypt, and so on” had “created [a] separate consciousness” (as quoted in Khalifah, 
1997, p. 99).  Third, Al Hajj employed geographic considerations, stating, “The mountains of 
Lebanon, the Nile in Egypt, and the desert in Saudi Arabia add to the separate developments 
of each of these nations” (as quoted in Khalifah, 1997, p. 99).  He argued that “these factors 
are stronger . . . than the single factor of language, which provides a common denominator for 
the Arabs from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian Gulf” (as quoted in Khalifah, 1997, p. 99).  
Al Hajj espoused Lebanese nationhood, indicating his willingness to “defend it at all 
costs” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 99).  However, his arguments did not have the same weight 
intellectually as those of the Syrian and Arab nationalists because “he could not provide a 
comprehensive definition of Lebanese Nationalism and its origins and sources” (Khalifah, 
1997, p. 98).  Although Al Hajj used the premises of the Syrian and Arab nationalists against 
them in making his case for Lebanese nationalism, these same premises became the basis for 
refuting his notion of Lebanese nationalism.  
Although some critics of Al Hajj’s theory of Lebanese nationalist identity felt his 
arguments lacked intellectual weight (Khalifah, 1997), this was not the case with renowned 
Lebanese-American historian Philip Hitti.  Hitti developed a theory of Lebanese identity 
known as historical Lebanese nationalism in his book Lebanon in History (Hitti, 1967) which 
was upheld and referenced by the various Lebanese nationalist camps.  Hitti (1967) explained 
that Lebanon, as a mostly separate entity, had existed for nearly 6,000 years (Khalifah, 1997; 
Salibi, 1988).  Hitti pointed to the unique geography and landscape of the country as a main 
factor in the formation of Lebanon and its people as a separate entity in the Arab Middle East 
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(Khalifah, 1997).  The combination of  “mountains touching the shores of the Mediterranean, 
its moderate climate and its position in the middle of a great international highway gave 
Lebanon what no other land had . . . [and thus] gave the country certain determining factors in 
its historic mission” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 101).  To Hitti, Lebanon and its people were unique 
because of the mountains and coastline, “unique in not having a nomadic life, a desert or a 
Bedouin population” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 1010).  Thus, Lebanon was not an Arab country per 
se but “basically a Mediterranean county similar to Greece or Italy” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 101).  
 Hitti intended his work for Western academic audiences rather than for use by 
advocates of the various battling ideologies in Lebanon (Khalifah, 1997).  However, the 
Lebanese Christian nationalists saw Hitti’s work as a buttress to the Phoenician identity of 
Lebanon (see chapter 5) though Hitti also pointed out that ancient Phoenicia also included 
areas of Palestine and Syria.  That fact, which no Lebanese nationalist was willing to accept, 
was used by Syrian and Arab nationalists to support their theories of Lebanese identity 
(Khalifah, 1997; Salibi, 1988).  In his lengthy book, Hitti was “sympathetic to Syrian history 
as well, a country now despised by Lebanese nationalists” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 102).  Thus, 
separating Lebanon and Lebanese identity from a proto-Arab culture has been difficult.  
Records trace the original inhabitants of Lebanon to be the Semitic Canaanites, known 
as Phoenicians, who incidentally also populated the coasts of modern Syria and Palestine.  
The Canaanite culture is at the very foundation of Hebrew culture of Palestine and the 
Aramean culture of Syria . . . these people entered the land of Syria–Lebanon–Palestine at a 
later stage, and borrowed heavily from the Canaanite culture.  (Khalifah, 1997, p. 102) 
Another criticism of Lebanese Christian nationalists was that they pick and 
choose what they use as part of their theory:  
This ancient history was hardly taken up by the Lebanese nationalists, who 
could have bolstered their argument by making use of Phoenician heritage and 
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its links to present-day Lebanon.  The Lebanese ideologues did not appreciate 
the lessons of the rise and fall of Phoenicia on the Lebanese coast, but looked 
instead to the symbolism of a distant Phoenician past that belonged to the 
imagination in order to irritate Syrian and Arab nationalists.  In fact, the 
Phoenician scenario, superficially used by the Lebanese nationalists to argue 
for a separate Lebanese historical tradition, backfired as Arab and Syrian 
nationalists used this argument to brand Lebanese nationalists as a group of 
ultranationalist racists and isolationists. . . .  The Lebanese nationalists used the 
Phoenician argument for propaganda purposes, but never took it seriously in 
view of their inarticulate response when confronted with criticisms of the other 
two schools of nationalism.  (Khalifah, 1997, p. 102)  
 
Salibi, a Lebanese Christian was called “the foremost living historian of Lebanon” by 
Albert Hourani (Salibi, 1988), another renowned Middle East and Lebanese historian, stated 
that Hitti never meant to portray the Lebanese people and their history as homogeneous and 
completely separate.  Thus, Hitti had carefully titled his book Lebanon in History rather than 
using a title such as The History of Lebanon or Lebanese History.  However, the Maronite 
Christians of Lebanon, along with others, espoused a separate, non-Arab, Christian Lebanese 
nationalism despite the discrepancy of the Maronites originating from inland Syria, the 
Orontes Mountains, whereas the Canaanites and Phoenicians were believed to exist along the 
coastlines of Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine (Khalifah, 1997; Mackey, 2008; Salibi, 1988).  
 Another major subset or brand of non-Arab Lebanese nationalism/identity was the 
Phalangist nationalism of the Lebanese Kataeb (Brigades) party, or Phalanges Libanais.  The 
Phalangists favored a non-Arab, predominate, pre-eminent Maronite Christian Lebanese 
nationalism (Khalifah, 1997; Mackey, 2008).  In terms of Phalangist Lebanese nationalism or 
identity, according to Khalifah (1997), 
the national pact spoke of an “Arab Face” for Lebanon while Muslims and Arab 
nationalists interpreted this as a declaration of Lebanon’s Arab identity.  The Phalange 
saw this as a face, no more: at heart, Lebanon was Lebanese and not Arab, despite its 
Arabic language.  They even argued that up to the 7th century and before the Arab 
conquest, Lebanon spoke Canaanite and Syriac.  The Phalange claimed that Lebanon 
has a civilization that predates the Arabs, and it used other foreign languages as 
successfully as it uses Arabic.  While the Phalanges accepted Lebanon’s membership 
in the League of Arab States and defend this membership as a source of recognition of 
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Lebanese sovereignty, they recognize the league for what it is—a forum for 
discussion, not a conduit for achieving pan-Arab unity.  By the same token, they 
accepted Lebanon’s membership in the Islamic Countries Organization, where, on 
many occasions, the Lebanese delegate has been a Christian.  On this front, the party 
considers any sort of unity with an Arab state as a threat to Lebanon’s unique 
character and Christian identity.  (p. 108) 
The Phalangist party founder, now deceased, was a pharmacist named Pierre Gemayel.  
His grandson, also named Pierre Gemayel, was a member of the Lebanese parliament who 
was also interviewed for this assessment.  He was assassinated in Lebanon shortly thereafter.  
Both Gemayels, their family, and the Phalange party argued that “the tiny size of the country 
is no excuse for neighboring countries to swallow it” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 108), whether 
geographically or ideologically.   
Gemayel and the Phalangists became a powerful political force during the second half 
of the 20th century, especially during the Lebanese Civil War.  Two brothers in the Gemayel 
family, Bashir (assassinated in 1982) and Amin, served as presidents of Lebanon.  Their party 
believed that “Lebanon is bi-cultural” in that it is “neither Arab nor Western; it is both 
oriental and occidental” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 108).  This resulted in a struggle for the Phalange 
party in that it “shaped its politics to advocate sectarian interests within Lebanon and a 
continuous anti-Arab policy at a time when Lebanese Muslims agreed wholeheartedly with 
the Palestinian cause” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 107), which was clearly identified with an Arab 
nationalist cause (Dawisha, 2003).  Phalangist ideology had no Muslim or Druze following 
and very little Greek Orthodox support.  In addition, not all Maronites were adherents to its 
philosophy.  The Lebanese Christians, a slight majority population according to the only 
Lebanese census of 1932 and believed to be a minority from shortly afterward to date, 
believed that the better way to consolidate power was through a Christian nationalism.  
The continued interest of the Maronites in this Lebanese nationalism resulted in 
tensions with Lebanese Muslims, who could not feel they had a place within this ideology as 
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it promoted, despite its name, preeminence for Christians and little else.  The Muslims 
rejected this proposal for Lebanon, labeling it separatism and fascism.  
 
Arab Nationalism and CMR  
Another sociopolitical theory considered for the people of Lebanon was that of Arab 
nationalism, also called pan-Arabism.  Under Arab nationalist theory, all the Arabic-speaking 
people of the Middle East and North Africa belonged to a greater Arab nation.  This nation 
was artificially divided into separate states by meddling world colonial powers, such as 
Britain, France, and the United States, at the beginning of the 20th century (El-Solh, 2004; 
Togar, 2001).  Perhaps the greatest Arab nationalist expression came from Sati Al Husri 
(Dawisha, 2003; El-Solh, 2004; Khalifah, 1997).  Al Husri was of Syrian Muslim origin, 
although he was born in Yemen and lived much of his life in Ottoman Turkey.  Another well-
known Arab nationalist was Michel Aflaq, a Syrian who was originally Greek Orthodox by 
faith.  Aflaq was employed as a teacher in Damascus.  Both Al Husri and Aflaq were well-
known Arab nationalist ideologues, although their theories were somewhat different (El-Solh, 
2004).  
Al Husri’s Arab nationalist ideology was secular.  Although an Arab Muslim himself, 
Al Husri clearly separated Arab nationalism from Islamic nationalism (Dawisha, 2003; El-
Solh, 2004).  His theory was based on a common “Arab civilization, its language and its 
history, and the shared outlook of the Arabs” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 89).  His Arab nationalism 
centered on “the positive organic forces of language and history” and “culture” (Khalifah, 
1997, p. 89).  Al Husri believed that the Arabic language in particular molded the Arab people 
into a large, unified nation and that the deviation of the various colloquial Arabic dialects was 
a “divisive factor” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 89) in the aim of Arab nationalist unity.  His theory of 
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Arab belonging and detractors of the same were best described in his own words (Dawisha, 
2003, p. 72): 
Every Arabic-speaking people is an Arab people.  Every individual belonging to one 
of these Arabic-speaking peoples is an Arab.  And if he does not recognize this and he 
is not proud of his Arabism, then we must look for the reasons that have made him 
take this stand.  It may be an expression of ignorance; in that case we must teach him 
the truth.  It may spring from an indifference or false consciousness; in that case we 
must enlighten him and lead him to the right path.  It may result from extreme egoism; 
in that case we must limit his egoism.  But under no circumstances, should we say: 
“As long as he does not wish to be an Arab, and as long as he is disdainful of his 
Arabness, then he is not an Arab.”  He is an Arab regardless of his own wishes.  
Whether ignorant, indifferent, undutiful, or disloyal, he is an Arab, but an Arab 
without consciousness or feeling, and perhaps even without conscience. 
 
For Al Husri and many other Arab nationalist theorists, the people of all 22 Arabic-
speaking countries were Arabs, from Iraq in the northern section of the Arab Middle East 
down to the southwestern area of Somalia in north central East Africa to Mauritania in the far 
northwest of Africa to the far eastern area of Yemen and all the countries in between.  These 
were all considered Arab countries.  Although Al Husri was a Muslim by faith, his 
nationalism was “emphatically secular and extricated from Islamic political thought, even 
though Islam is the religion of the overwhelming majority of the Arab people” (Dawisha, 
2003, pp. 68–69).  Thus, his theory “allow[ed] him to include the Arab Christians under the 
unifying roof of Arab nationalism” (Dawisha, 2003, p. 70).  Al Husri expounded on his view 
of that nationalism and its inclusion of the Christians.  According to Dawisha (2003, p. 70), he  
pointedly argues that Christians are as proud of their Arab heritage as their Muslim 
brothers.  This pride is evidenced by the struggle by the Arab Christian Orthodox 
against Greek control in the patriarchate of Antioch and that of the Eastern Uniates 
against the encroachment of Latin rites and customs.  This message is purposely and 
purposefully stated: a Christian is as Arab as any Muslim. 
 
For Al Husri, “The chief factors in the making of a nation are language, history and several 
minor elements,” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 87) but not necessarily religion.  
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On the other hand, Aflaq was an Arab nationalist Christian who “saw Islam as the best 
gift Arabism gave humanity” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 95).  Although Aflaq’s philosophy was more 
nationalist than Islamic, he infused Islamic and Quranic philosophy into his theory.  For 
Aflaq, Islam was “the strongest expression of the wholeness of the Arab nation as part of 
humanity” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 95).  
Both Al Husri’s and Aflaq’s Arab nationalism included both Christians and Muslims 
and gave both groups prominent roles (Dawisha, 2003).  However, unlike Al Husri, Aflaq’s 
Arabism included and referenced Islam and believed Islam.  According to Khalifah (1997, p. 
95), it  
reflects the essence of the Arabs including Christian Arabs who will realize, when 
their nationalism is fully awakened and when they rediscover their true nature, that 
Islam is, for them, a national culture by which they must be saturated until they 
understand it to the point of guarding Islam as the most precious element of Arabic. 
 
For Aflaq, Islam and Arab were synonymous.  Muhammad was referred to as an 
“Arab prophet” and “Islam [was] viewed in an Arab context” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 95).  
Another difference between Al Husri’s and Aflaq’s theories was that Al Husri emphasized 
that all the Arabic-speaking countries belong to the greater Arab nation, while Aflaq put more 
emphasis on the Arabian Peninsula, including the Levant as the Arab nation, and a bit less on 
the North African Arabic-speaking countries (Dawisha, 2003; Khalifah, 1997).  
Aflaq and another Syrian teacher, Sunni Muslim El-Solh al Din al-Bitar, were the 
main founders of the Arab Nationalist Baath (Resurrection) party (Dawisha 2003).  Baath 
ideology was the political basis and the form of the current Syrian government.  It was also 
the ideology of the Iraqi government until its overthrow during the U.S. invasion in 2003 
(Rossi, 2008).   
Arab nationalism was, and still is, an attractive ideology to both Muslims and 
Christians.  The Lebanese Arab Christians with their pre- and post-Islamic history and pride 
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were able to identify with Arabicity.  As for the Sunni Muslims, Islam and Arabism became 
virtually inseparable.  The original Muslims were Arab, and the Quran was written in their 
language.  The Arab empire and all its successes were a point of pride for the Sunni Muslims 
on Lebanon.  The Sunni Arabs, the majority population of the Middle East, considered their 
affiliation with Arabism quite natural.  Lebanese Druze, only 6% of the population, often 
embraced Arabism on ethnic, cultural, and linguistic bases, not religious ones, according to 
Druze respondent Halabi
1
 and author Raghid El-Solh (2004).  The inclusiveness of Arabism 
to the small Druze community was more acceptable to them than Islamic nationalism because 
the Druze did not consider themselves Muslim and were at odds with other Muslim groups 
throughout history.  Even the Shiites, who normally had a religious and political allegiance to 
Iran, identified with being Arabs, albeit with some reservations (Saad-Gorayeb, 2002).  The 
Maronites, who have been discussed in more detail in this chapter and in chapter 5, were 
divided about whether to accept Arab nationalism, preferring Christian nationalism and other 
ideologies. They were unsure what would become of their uniqueness and needs if they 
merged completely into Arabism.    
Syrian Nationalism  
Under a different brand of nationalism, only a handful of the 22 Arabic-speaking 
countries were considered one nation.  This form of Arab nationalism was also known as 
Greater Syria nationalism, Syrian nationalism, or Levantine Arab nationalism.  The Syrian 
Social Nationalist Party was founded on November 16, 1932, by Antoun Sa’ada, a Lebanese 
Greek Orthodox Christian who taught German at the AUB (Khalifah, 1997).  According to 
Sa’ada, “Political unity is one of the main preconditions which give meaning to the socio-
economic dimensions of a nation” (as quoted in Khalifah, 1997, p. 99).  Like Arab nationalists 
                                                          
1
 Halabi, personal communication,  May 26, 2005 (see Appendix 4). 
152 
 
Al Husri and Aflaq, Sa’ada believed that the boundaries drawn by England and France in the 
Middle East resulted in “artificial . . . entities” (Firro, 2003, p. 130).  He proclaimed that 
“Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan” (Firro, 2003, p. 130) created a single nation.  
Because he and other Syrian nationalists felt the borders drawn for the Middle East were 
arbitrary, he also included in his Syrian nationalism parts of present-day Egypt (Sinai), 
Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait, and the island of Cyprus (Dawisha, 2003; Khalifah, 1997).  Different 
from Al Husri and Aflaq but in partial agreement with Hitti, Sa’ada stated that geographic 
area and the people within that area were the strongest factors in forming a nation.  He 
defined the area that formed the greater Syrian nation as follows: 
Syria is located in Western Asia.  It lies on the Mediterranean and stretches from the 
gulf of Alexandria [Turkey] in the North, to the Arish Valley in Sinai [Egypt], in the 
South, i.e., a distance of four hundred miles approx.  Its width is about the same and 
stretches from the Mediterranean to Iraq [the Arab-Persian Gulf].  (as quoted in 
Khalifah, 1997, p. 79) 
 
A good deal of literature existed in support of the notion that the countries mentioned 
do have the foundational makings of a single nation, namely language, history, ethnicity, 
culture, and family origins (Hitti, 1961).  However, Sa’ada’s theory of a greater Syrian nation 
did not include these aspects.  Some theorists also pointed to the “procession of invaders” 
(Ellis, 1970, p. 257) in these countries that added to the diversity of these countries yet 
actually formed their basic identities.  Sa’ada agreed that “this single geographic entity was 
able to dissolve the differences among its inhabitants ‘into one harmonious organic unity”’ (in 
Khalifah, 1997, p. 81) of “ethnic fusion” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 84) but “argued that the most 
important element in the making of nations was geography” (Khalifah 1997, pp. 79–80).  
Sa’ada’s theory of greater Syria was criticized for its  
exclusion of other Semitic and non-Semitic peoples—particularly the Arabs who gave 
Syria its modern tongue and main religion as well as a history and an outlook on life—
leads inevitably to the conclusion that Sa’ada sacrificed his scientific skills for his 
political agenda.  In excluding Arabs from the ethnic compound of Syria, he ignored 
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thirteen centuries of Arab culture in Syria and rendered them insignificant in his 
Syrian project.  Sa’ada’s hostility toward Arab nationalism and his deliberate 
exclusion of Arabs from the ethnic compound of Syria must be interpreted as an 
indication of his firm belief in the superiority of Syrians.  (Khalifah, 1997, p. 85) 
 
However, by the 1940s, as Arab nationalism became increasingly popular, Sa’ada 
began to change his theory as he deliberately attempted to become “more Arab” (Sa’ada, as 
quoted in Khalifah, 1997, p. 85) while he “continued to assert the superiority and priority of 
Syria and the Syrians to any Arab cause” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 85).  Syrian nationalism was 
attractive to both Muslim and Christians (particularly the Greek Orthodox) but had 
diminished considerably in present day Lebanon.  The attraction seemed to be the unity and 
the specialty of the Levantine peoples rather than the inclusion of North Africa and the Gulf.   
Islamic Nationalism/the Umma  
Another ideology or theory for Lebanese national identity was Islameeoon, or Islamist 
theory, Islamic nationalism, or the umma.  Islamism was not popular among the Lebanese in 
general, the Christians in particular, or many Muslims.  Al Husri, a Muslim, advocated for 
Arab nationalism completely separate from Islam, while Aflaq touted Arab nationalism with a 
clear understanding of the place of Islam within it (Khalifah, 1997).  However, in present-day 
Lebanon, Hezbollah has also advocated for an Islamic state, despite retracting its desire for 
such an entity since 1996 and calling for it only if the Lebanese plurality finds it acceptable.  
Instead, since 1996, Hezbollah has referred to the Islamization of Lebanon as “a dream” 
(Trendle, 1996, p. 63; Saad Ghorayeb, 2002, p.36).  In addition, two of the main founders of 
Islamic nationalism, Hassan Al-Banna and Sayyed Qutb (both of Egypt), believed that 
Christians can be reasonably included within this ideology (Abu-Rabi’, 2004; Armstrong, 
2002). 
Although many Christians recognized that their identity and culture had their origins 
in Islamic civilization (Salibi, 1988), many people theorized that Arab nationalism, which was 
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put forth by several Christian theorists, was created to counter Islamic nationalism.  However, 
some scholars pointed out that whether they acknowledge it or not, the Christians of Lebanon 
have been living within an Islamic civilization, and even under Islamic law to one degree or 
another, for centuries (Salibi, 1988).  The Muslim communities of Lebanon had an affinity for 
this ideology, although the Sunni and Shiites differed on what its form should be.  In some 
Islamist ideology, Christians were said to be welcome within an Islamic society (Saad-
Gorayeb, 2002).  
The Three Dominant Christian Communities and Their Views of Phoenicianism 
 Up to this point in this thesis, Lebanese Christian and Muslim thought have been 
reviewed, compared, and contrasted.  One of the main differences between Christian and 
Muslim thought was their views on Phoenicianism.  In this section, information to provide a 
deeper understanding of the three main Christian communities has been presented, followed 
by an inter-Christian comparison and contrast of Phoenicianism.  This was done because in 
much of this thesis, Christian and Muslim viewpoints regarding several societal issues have 
been compared and contrasted.  With different faiths, one might expect different responses.  
Yet, as mentioned in chapter 4, although inter-Christian differences regarding identity existed, 
the question as to why this was so remained.   
The Maronites  
The largest Christian group was the Maronites.  The Maronite Church was named after 
a 4th- or 5th-century hermit named Maron, whose brief life was recorded by Theodorit of 
Cyrrhus in his Historia Religiosa XVI (Parry & Hinnells, 1999).  In the late 7th century, with 
the advent of Islam, John Maron left Syria for Lebanon because of inter-Christian and pagan 
rivalries and oppression.  It must be emphasized that Maron and his followers did not leave 
Syria because of tension or persecution by the followers of the newly founded Islam.  Rather, 
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they left because of Byzantine Christian and pagan oppression (Bin Talal, 1998; Parry & 
Hinnells, 1999) .  Despite this, some Maronites of Lebanon have continued to state incorrectly 
that their ancestors left Syria for Lebanon because they were treated poorly by Muslims.  
During the 7th century, the Muslim Arab rulers of Syria severely punished all contacts 
with their main enemy, Constantinople.  The Maronite community, however, enjoyed good 
relations with the Muslim rulers of Damascus and proclaimed Maron their own bishop.  After 
assuming the seat of Patriarch of Antioch, he instituted the Maronite patriarchy and 
established the Maronite monastic community, which became an official church.  Maron’s 
followers were believed to have developed the Monastery of Bet Maroun, a great Maronite 
monastery built in Syria Secunda in 425AD by the Roman Emperor Marcian (Parry & 
Hinnells, 1999).  
 The acrimonious and often violent relationship between the Maronites and the 
Byzantine Christians made life difficult for the Maronite community.  Being considered “a 
wicked heresy” (Bin Talal, 1998, p. 67), the Maronites were cut off from the other Christian 
communities of Constantinople and thus developed independently.  Eventually, they migrated 
to the high mountains of Lebanon, particularly after the destruction of Bet Maroun during the 
first half of the 10th century (Grafton, 2003; Parry & Hinnells, 1999).   
 During the 11th century, the Crusaders invaded the Middle East.  Upon their arrival in 
northern Lebanon in 1099, the Franks received a warm welcome from the Maronites, who 
joined the Crusaders and gave up their monotheletism.  However, some of the Maronites from 
the high mountains of Lebanon were hostile to the Maronite–Crusader alliance.  Even so, the 
majority of Maronites, including their religious leaders and their administration, sided with 
the Crusaders.  Thus, the ongoing and increasing relationship with the Latin church of Europe 
began (Bin Talal, 1998; Parry & Hinnells, 1999).  This pro-Crusader response was a crucial 
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element both in Maronite and Lebanese history and in interfaith relations because it was the 
beginning of alliances with France and Europe and of the Western orientation of the 
Maronites. 
 After 1770, the Maronites formed the single largest community in Lebanon.  Most of 
these believers were peasants who eventually revolted against the Druze and Maronite feudal 
lords.  By 1860, the Druze population of Lebanon, an offshoot faith of Shia Islam and once a 
majority population in Lebanon, was engaged in a fierce, brutal battle with the Maronite 
community.  That battle resulted in thousands of deaths and the displacement of thousands of 
Maronites (Bailey, 2003; Fawaz, 1994).  
 In 1932, the Maronites, free from the rule of the Ottoman Turks but under French 
mandate, still comprised the largest single community in Lebanon, according to the one and 
only official census taken to date (Firro, 2003).  At that time, the Maronites were involved in 
Arab nationalism to various degrees and were also prominent in the revival of written Arabic 
(Bin Talal, 1998; Dawisha, 2003).  In 1943, as the majority population and as active members 
in the development of Lebanon, the Maronites were offered the presidency of the country 
under an unwritten national pact.  To this day, the office of president must be held by a 
Maronite (Firro, 2003).  
The Maronites requested the assistance of the Syrian government and army in 1975 to 
help quell the Lebanese Civil War.  In 1982, the Maronites sided with the Israeli army in its 
invasion of Lebanon to the great displeasure of the Syrian army, most of the Muslim 
community, and some of the other Christian communities in Lebanon (Fisk, 2002).  The 
concern that the Maronites will again seek foreign intervention to overpower their fellow 
countrymen, as they did during the Crusades, has continued to reverberate in Lebanon.  
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 Currently, the Maronite patriarchy has been divided into several dioceses in Lebanon, 
Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Egypt, and Sudan.  The Maronite Church also exists in various North 
and South American countries, Canada, Europe, and Cyprus (Parry & Hinnells, 1999).  
Although the Maronites had an early Syriac origin, their church underwent a great deal of 
Latinization.  Thus, even though the Maronite language for approximately 1,000 years has 
been Arabic, the Maronite liturgy is said both in Arabic and Syriac, a dialect of ancient 
Aramaic and the spoken language of Jesus Christ (Bin Talal, 1998; Parry & Hinnells, 1999).  
  The official name of the Maronite Church is the Antiochian Syrian Maronite Church.  
The Maronites believe that their independent character as a church and a society is due in 
great part to their isolation in Mt. Lebanon.  Thus, their identity has been strongly linked to 
that of Lebanon.  When speaking with Maronites, one might get the impression that they feel 
Lebanon is their country alone.  In fact, the Maronite church has played the major role in the 
creation of present-day Lebanon; and its followers hold several key positions, including the 
presidency (Mackey, 2008; Parry & Hinnells, 1999).  Although Lebanese Christians, the 
Maronites have had a somewhat different history and experience than the other Christian 
groups, resulting in their belief that they are different.  Subsequently, they have conducted 
themselves differently from a sociopolitical and communal standpoint.    
The Greek Orthodox  
The Greek Orthodox Christians of Lebanon and the Middle East have also been called 
Byzantine-rite Christians, Melchites, and Arab Orthodox.  The Greek Orthodox of Lebanon 
are mostly indigenous Arabs, referred to as Greek because of the Greek origin of the early 
colonizers of the Levant (Bailey, 2003; Pacini, 1998).  They comprise the second largest 
religious group in Lebanon.  In terms of Lebanese identity, the Lebanese Greek Orthodox 
Christians have generally agreed that they are of indigenous Arab origin, with some 
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reservations and qualifications depending on where in Lebanon they live and the prevailing 
political sentiment of their region.  
Followers of Greek Orthodoxy have traced their heritage to the earliest of Syriac 
origins.  Thus, the Greek Orthodox community descended from the early Christians of Syria, 
which included Lebanon, and Egypt who accepted the Council of Chalcedon in 451 (Bin 
Talal,1998;  Parry & Hinnells, 1999).  This council, the third of seven such ecumenical 
councils, insisted on the premise that Jesus Christ had two natures: human and divine.  
Despite their affirmations that they were not at odds with the resolutions of the council, the 
Maronites and the Copts of Egypt were considered by the Greek Orthodox Church to hold 
different views on the natures of Jesus Christ.  These views were referred to as the “wicked 
heresies” (Bin Talal, 1998, p. 67).  
The Melchite Greek Catholics   
Melchite is the designation for the Chalcedonian Eastern Christian patriarchies of 
Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem.  The Melchites have traced their origins to early Syriac 
roots.  Melchite Greek Catholics also descended from the main Greek Orthodox/Byzantine 
Church.  The word Melchite, which means “the royalists” or “the king’s men” in Syriac and 
Arabic (Bin Talal, 1998; Pacini, 1998), was a derogatory term in the beginning, signifying 
those individuals who followed the Christianity of Emperor Justinian.  During Justinian’s 
rule, the Melchites were the largest and most dominant group of Christians.  The name 
referred to the Greek administration and religious leadership of the time, although the 
indigenous Melchites of the Middle East were of Arab ethnicity (Bin Talal, 1998; Parry & 
Hinnells, 1999).  
Beginning in 1054, a schism occurred between Rome and Constantinople.  By 1516, a 
divide had also formed between Latin Roman Catholics and the Greek Orthodox of 
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Constantinople.  By 1724, the ancient Melchite community was completely divided between 
the Eastern Orthodox patriarchy and the Melchite Catholics.  The Orthodox patriarchy 
remained in Greek hands, while the Melchite Greek Catholic patriarchy remained in the hands 
of the indigenous Arab population.  This division occurred when the Roman Church and the 
Byzantine Church split, with the Greek Orthodox Christians having their patriarch in 
Constantinople and the Melchite Greek Catholics pledging their loyalty to the pope in Rome 
(Bin Talal, 1998; Parry & Hinnells, 1999).   
 The Melchites have been diffused throughout Lebanon, with concentrations in the 
central and southern parts of the country.  Currently, the third largest Christian community, 
the Melchites were among the first to put forward an awakening and support for Arab 
nationalism.  However, in recent years, much like the Maronites but to a lesser degree, they 
have denied affiliation with Arab ethnicity, race, and culture.  Therefore, the Melchites have 
become a break-off of the current Greek Orthodox Church.  Melchite church structure, design, 
and liturgy have remained nearly identical to those of the Greek Orthodox Church.  Having 
fairly similar histories, especially prior to the schism/split, the Greek Orthodox and the 
Melchites, but not the Maronites, often hold similar sociopolitical and identity views.  
However, the Melchites are under the Roman Catholic papacy; and their hierarchy is 
composed predominantly of Middle Eastern Arab clergy.  
Maronite Catholic Views of Phoenician Identity 
Along with Petro Trad and Omar Daouk, Michel Chiha was considered one of the 
fathers of the Lebanese Constitution (Traboulsi, 2007).  Through his ideas and actions, he had 
an important influence on the shaping of the country.  Chiha was born in 1891 to a Christian 
family of Mekkine, located in the Aley District in the Mt. Lebanon governorate.  His father, 
Antoine, was a banker and founded the Pharaon and Chiha Bank in Beirut in 1876 (Daou, 
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2001).  His mother belonged to a wealthy Melchite family in Beirut, the Pharaons.  Chiha was 
of Iraqi ancestry and was originally Chaldean Catholic (Daou, 2001).  Although not a 
Maronite himself, Chiha’s Phoenician identity theory and sentiments were completely 
copacetic with large numbers of Maronites who believed in their Phoenician, not Arab, 
identity (Daou, 2001).  Thus, his vast work on the Lebanese Constitution and his adherence to 
the concept of the Lebanese being Phoenician by identity represented a great deal of Maronite 
thought and sentiment.  Chiha was a banker, politician, writer, journalist, and more important, 
a Lebanese thinker. 
 During the original interviews with the field expert respondents, the writer gathered 
information regarding both Arab identity and the alternative Phoenician identity.  El Khazen,
1
 
the former director of the Department of Political Science at AUB, stated that the Lebanese 
are Phoenician, arguing that just because they speak Arabic does not mean they are Arabs.  
He noted that the Phoenicians existed prior to the Arabs.  The Arabs, who came from Syria, 
invaded Phoenicia.  Thus, the Lebanese were Phoenician, “particularly the Christians.”  
 The former first lady of Lebanese president-elect Mouawad was a Maronite Catholic.  
She acknowledged that the question was difficult to answer because they agreed to the Arab 
identity in agreeing to the Tā’if Agreement.  She noted that the history of the Lebanese clearly 
indicated they are “more so Arab than Phoenician . . . whether some like it or not,” while she 






 was interviewed in his office located in the Christian heartland of Dbayeh.  
Displayed in the office were several large, beautifully crafted wooden boat models, symbols 
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 El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix 10). 
2
 Mouawad, personal communication, November 17, 2004 (see Appendix 18). 
3
 Gemayel, personal communication, June 6, 2005 (see Appendix 8). 
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of the seafaring trade of the ancient Phoenicians.  Gemayel insisted that the Lebanese are 
“Phoenician by blood and Francophone by our culture.”  When presented with the fact that 
some of the other Lebanese Christian and Muslim denominations consider themselves Arab, 
not Phoenician, Gemayel acknowledged that the Muslims are Arabs.  However, the 
Christians, particularly the Maronites, are descendants of the Phoenicians and have adopted a 
Francophone culture. 
Lebanese Greek Orthodox Views of Phoenician Identity  
Gebran Ghassan Tueni was born September 15, 1957.  He was a Lebanese politician, 
the former editor and publisher of An-Nahar (“The Day”), the most-read Lebanese newspaper 
in Beirut (Llewellyn, 2010).  Tueni came from a family of journalists; An-Nahar was 
established by his grandfather, also named Gebran Tueni, in 1933 (Daou, 2001).  His father, 
Ghassan Tueni, ran the newspaper for decades.  His mother was the famous Francophone 
Lebanese poet and member of the Druze community Nadia Hamadeh Tueni.  His uncle was 
the Druze telecommunications minister Marwan Hamadeh. 
 This writer briefly met Tueni when he gave a speech at NDU in Zouk Mosbeh, 
Lebanon, in the spring of 2005.  During his speech, given in Arabic, Tueni decried the 
ongoing Syrian presence and influence in Lebanon.
1
  Even though he lamented Syrian 
political influence over Lebanon, he was a Syrian Arab nationalist for most of his adult life 
and dismissed Lebanese proponents of Phoenicianism as “liars.”  According to Tueni,  
Some time ago, a wave of Pharaonism flooded Egypt trying to engulf it.  Almost at the 
same time, another wave attempted to mark Lebanon with a Phoenician imprint.  
Those who preached these two sophisms were liars.  Personally I declare that 
Lebanon, Syria and Egypt are Arab and they form the core of the Arab countries.  We 
live and die for Arabism.  (as quoted in Kaufman, 2004, p. 195) 
 
                                                          
1
 Gebran Ghassan Tueni, personal communication, May 15, 2005 (see Appendix 24).  
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Although Tueni agreed to be interviewed by this writer, soon after our brief meeting, he 
relocated to France for fear of assassination.  Upon his return to Lebanon on December 12, 
2005, he was assassinated in a car bomb explosion. 
Three of the field respondents who were Greek Orthodox commented on the 
Phoenician identity.  Massouh,
1
 director for the Center for CMR at UB, stated that although it 
was possible that some of the Lebanese had descended from the Phoenicians, their “ethnicity 
and culture are not Phoenician . . . rather we are Arabs, even perhaps racially.”  Salem,
2
 
president of UB and a former foreign minister, dismissed the notion that the Lebanese are 
non-Arab Phoenicians.  He noted that the Lebanese should be proud the Phoenicians had been 
part of their country but believed the “cultural Arabness” was much stronger than any claim to 
Phoenician descent.  He added that those who persisted in claiming Phoenician identity were 
doing so “only because they want to be different.”  Bou Habib,
3
 who was secretary general for 
a regional Greek Orthodox community, argued that despite the lack of scientific evidence to 
support the premise of a Lebanese Phoenician identity, “some Maronites will continue to 
claim to be Phoenician.”  
Melchite Greek Catholic Views of Phoenician Identity  
Ghazal,
4
 a Melchite bishop and coordinator of CMR projects for South Lebanon, 
acknowledged his identity and that of the Lebanese as Arab: “I’m tired of this topic among 
the Lebanese.  What do they think we are?  Phoenician?  That makes no real sense.”  For 
Ghazal, the Phoenician identity for Lebanon was weak and ancient.  An Arab identity was 
much clearer.  Hajjar,
5
 a senior journalist for An-Nahar, concurred, noting that it was a 
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 Massouh, personal communication, December 20, 2004 (see Appendix 2). 
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 Salem, personal communication, July 11, 2004 (see Appendix 3). 
3
 Bou Habib, personal communication, November 3, 2004 (see Appendix 11). 
4
 Ghazal, personal communication, October 10, 2004 (see Appendix 15). 
5
 Hajjar, personal communication, August 5, 2005 (see Appendix 14). 
163 
 
minority of the Lebanese who had a problem with the Arab identity.  He pointed to the 
Lebanese language, history, and geographical location (the Arab Middle East) to support his 
contention that the Lebanese are Arab. 
Other Views of Phoenicianism 
Salibi, a renowned Lebanese historian formerly of the AUB, and other historians in 
Lebanon have seriously questioned the validity of the Lebanese Christian belief in 
Phoenicianism.  Salibi (1988) found the Phoenician identity of Lebanon weak at best.  In his 
famous work, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered (1988), 
Salibi wrote about the Maronite view of Phoenicianism and, to a much lesser extent, the views 
of some Orthodox and Melchite Christians.  
Concerning the Maronite Christian view of the Phoenicians, he wrote,  
In the Christian Lebanese mythology that developed around the Phoenicians, these 
people were depicted as the Lebanese of old, and the progenitors of the modern 
Lebanese who were simply not Arabs, and who had inherited from their Phoenician 
forbears not only their historically attested mercantile character, but also their 
intellectual eminence.  The Phoenicians, it was claimed were not only the people from 
whom the Greeks took their alphabet; they had actually been the original inventors of 
the alphabet—a claim which no serious scholar today would accept.  For this reason, 
the Phoenicianists argued, the whole of human culture owed the Lebanese a great debt.  
(p. 173)  
 
Thus, without a deep reference to supporting science, Phoenicianism was exposed, according 
to Salibi (1988): “By insisting upon praising the glories of their alleged Liban lumineux, the 
proponents of Phoenicianism actually did their idea a great disserve by exposing it to ridicule” 
(p. 174).  
Salibi (1988) also attempted to minimize the Phoenician identity of Lebanon: 
The longest inscription left in the Phoenician alphabet is found on the tomb of one of 
the kings of Byblos and consists of a series of curses hurled against anyone who 
disturbed the bones inside.  In any case, if anyone had a claim to be a descendent of 
the ancient Phoenicians, it was the Sunnite Muslims of the coastal towns, who actually 
considered themselves to be Arabs rather than the Christians of the mountains, or 




He bolstered his case with the current beliefs of Lebanese Muslims and many Orthodox and 
Melchite Christians (but not the Maronites) regarding the Phoenicians through invoking the 
beliefs of the Syrian and Arab nationalists and of an ancient Greek historian:  
The Syrian Nationalist Party of Antoun Saadeh took great interest in their history, but 
claimed their heritage for Syrian nationalism.  The Arab nationalists considered them 
ancient Arabs who had originally arrived in coastal Syria from Arabia.  To some 
extent, they were correct.  When the Greek historian Herodotus visited Syria in the 
fifth century BC, he was told by the Phoenician elders of Tyre that their ancestors had 
originally arrived as immigrants from the Arabian shores of the Red Sea, and even 
specified the time of their arrival as being twenty-three centuries earlier.  (1988, pp. 
172–173) 
 
Most Orthodox and Melchite Christians subscribed to Herodotus’s notion that the 
Phoenicians were Arab-Semites of early history.  The Maronites refuted this notion and 
criticized Herodotus as a dishonest and inept.  Rather than being referred to as the “father of 
history,” as he is often called, the Maronites considered Herodotus to be the “father of lies” 
(Salibi, 1988).  However, other writers supported Herodotus’ observations: “Writing of the 
conquests of Alexander the Great, the Greek historian Arian considered the inhabitants of the 
mountain country east of Tyre to have been Arabs even at that early date, which was in the 
4th century BC” (Salibi, 1988, p. 177).  
Some historical narratives of writers cast doubt on who the Phoenicians were and their 
relationship to the present-day Lebanese:  
For the Maronite disciples of Chiha, the inconvenient facts that ancient Phoenicia 
included many city-states outside Lebanon’s borders, that the Phoenicians spoke a 
Semitic tongue, and that the Maronites were immigrants from Syria became lost in 
romanticism and self-interest.  The Maronites so eagerly embraced the myth of a 
Phoenician heritage because it clearly differentiated them culturally from the Arab 
Muslims of Lebanon.  From this perspective, the Maronites, utilizing their privileged 
position in the French Mandate, promoted as the defining characteristic of Lebanese 
national identity the idea that Lebanon’s soul was to be found in the Phoenician ruins 




Some Lebanese thinkers, such as author and university professor Bassam Khalifah, a 
Greek Orthodox Christian, believed that the case for Lebanese Phoenician identity should 
have been a solid one.  However, because the theory was not analyzed, it was squandered in 
what Khalifah (1997) considered a lost opportunity:  
The Lebanese nationalists failed to do their homework and in doing so, missed a 
crucial ancient link, which might have driven home their argument against Arab and 
Syrian Nationalists in Lebanon.  The Lebanese ideologues did not appreciate the 
lessons of the rise and fall of Phoenicia on the Lebanese coast, but looked instead to 
the symbolism of a distant Phoenician past that belonged to the imagination in order to 
irritate Syrian and Arab Nationalists.  In fact, the Phoenician scenario, superficially 
used by the Lebanese Nationalists to argue for a separate Lebanese historical tradition, 
backfired as Arab and Syrian Nationalists used this argument to brand Lebanese 
nationalists as a group of ultranationalist racists and isolationists . . . The Lebanese 
Nationalists used the Phoenician argument for propaganda purposes, but never took it 
seriously, in view of their inarticulate response when confronted with criticisms of the 
other two schools of nationalism.  (p. 102) 
 
Thus, in terms of the present research, there was a recurrent pattern, coming from the 
Maronites in particular, of believing that being Phoenician meant exclusion of Muslims and 
Arabs.  For the Muslims, and to a lesser extent the Greek Orthodox and Melchite Greek 
Catholics, being Phoenician did not exclude being Arab.   
Lebanese Identity Confusion 
Lebanon, now more than ever, is considered one of the most politically divided 
nations in the world, to the point that it has been called a failed state, a nonentity, and an 
identity in search of a nation (Heisler, 2008; Mackey, 2008).  In its most basic and simplest 
form, the discrepancy regarding the identity of Lebanon has been that the Muslim and Druze 
communities acknowledge their Arabism and recognize their Arab culture while the 
Christians do not (Barakat, 1993).  In a closer look, however, one sees that the Greek 
Orthodox and other Eastern-rite Christians, for the most part, have acknowledged their 
Arabism (Mackey, 2008), as have the Shiites, Alawites, and the Druze, albeit “with some 
qualifications and reservations” (Barakat, 1993, p. 34). 
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However, many of the Maronite Christians, the largest Christian community in 
Lebanon, have declined Arabism and substituted for it the more obscure Phoenicianism and/or 
Syriac identity.  (Syriac/Aramaean identity can be traced to the Assyrian Empire of the 
Middle East, which roughly existed after the Phoenicians and well prior to the Arab/Islamic.  
Though important, however, Syriac/Aramaen identities were not a focus of this thesis).  
Therefore, a good deal of tension has remained between the Christians and Muslims of 
Lebanon regarding Arabism.  In 2007, during a 3-day seminar, The Horizons of Civil Society 
in the Arab Countries and the World Today, held at NDU, President Fr. Walid Moussa 
exclaimed,  
The crisis of identity has exhausted us in Lebanon.  It was a burden and the reason 
behind many crises . . . conflict on identity takes a confessional form in Lebanon, 
Arabism is reduced to Islam, Phoenician identity is reduced to Christianity . . . There 
lies the core of the Lebanese problem (Moussa as quoted in Moussa & Al Khazen, 
2007, p. 1).     
            
An examination of the history of the Maronite community revealed little evidence for 
an other-than-Arab identity (Khalifah, 1997; Salibi, 1988).  The Maronites have struggled to 
intellectualize their other-than-Arab and anti-Arab identity arguments.  Although many 
Maronites in Lebanon insist they are Phoenician, according to their own traditions, they have 
traced their origins to Syria and then to the South Arabian Peninsula and Yemen, which is 
considered the area in which the Arabs originated (Hitti, 1961; Salibi, 1988).  However, some 
modern Lebanese Maronite folklore indicated they trace directly to the Arabian Peninsula and 
the prophet Muhammad (Salibi, 1988).  
Indeed, on numerous occasions, this writer was told by Lebanese Maronites (and 
others) of their Arab and even Muslim origin.  For example, while employed as a full-time 
sociology lecturer at NDU in Zouk Mosbeh, Lebanon, between 1998 and 2006, this writer 
completed hundreds of observations regarding Arab identity.  In sum, the Maronite students 
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mentioned, and at times recognized, their Arab, even Muslim, ancestry only to reverse 
themselves and decline Arab identity.  Many pointed to a pre-Lebanon ancestry in the Arab 
lands of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Syria and to their Arabic language and culture yet 
maintained their other-than- Arab identity.  
 In support of the idea that many Lebanese Maronites and other Christians are of Arab 
and, in different cases, Muslim origin was Sammak,
1
 a Sunni Muslim journalist and chairman 
of several Christian–Muslim working groups.  Sammak shared the story of his attending the 
funeral of a Maronite Christian from Akoura (an overwhelmingly Maronite populated 
village).  He observed the tradition of a relative or close friend of the deceased recounting 
aloud the family history (i.e., Samir, the son of Abdallah; Abdallah, the son of Hassan; etc.).  
Sammak was both surprised and pleased to hear that the deceased’s family history traced 
“back to the prophet Muhammad himself.”  Indeed, the Maronites of Akoura could trace their 
lineage to northern Arabian and Yemeni tribes, suggesting not only an ethnic but also a racial 
tie to the Arab people (Salibi, 1988). 
In the interview with Aoun, former Lebanese Army general, prime minister, leader of 
the FPM political party, and present member of the Lebanese Parliament, a similar revelation 
was found.  In 1988, then president Amin Gemayel stepped down from office and appointed 
then general of the army Aoun interim prime minister of Lebanon.  At that point, Gemayel 
and Aoun, both Maronites, had predominantly Maronite Christian constituencies and backing.  
Because Syria was considered an Arab nationalist entity, its full name translated as the Arab 
Republic of Syria, Aoun was seen as the epitome of anti-Syrian, anti-Arab, anti-Muslim, and 
pro-Maronite forces (Mackey, 2008).  After a bloody battle led by Aoun against Syrian and 
Lebanese proxy forces to compel Syria to leave Lebanese territory, Aoun was defeated and 
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 Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12). 
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expelled from Lebanon for 15 years.  He returned on May 7, 2005.  During the private 
interview at his residence, Aoun described the meaning and the historical origin of his family, 
revealing that his family name meant “aid” or “assistance” in Arabic.  Speaking in Arabic, he 
shared that his family traced its origin to the prophet Muhammad, specifically to the 
Hashemite clan of the prophet Muhammad’s family.
1
 
Another  revealing experience of just how complex Lebanese Maronite view can seem 
regarding Arabism was gleaned from an annual cultural event that this writer attends 
regularly, A Taste of Lebanon, held at Our Lady of Lebanon Maronite Church in Waterbury, 
Connecticut, in the United States.  The church serves a fairly large Lebanese community, 
composed mostly of second- and third-generation Lebanese Americans and a number of 
newer Lebanese immigrants.  Although all members are of Lebanese origin, a strong cultural 
disparity has existed between the two generational groups, specifically in the areas of 
language, customs, and political ideology.  Ironically, the newer Arabic-speaking Lebanese 
Maronite immigrants have espoused a clearly anti-Arab mentality, eventually winning over 
the majority of the church community while the Americanized Lebanese continue to identify 
themselves as Arabs.  When expressed, this viewpoint may sound ironic, even misleading.  
Despite myriad stories such as these,  many Maronites have claimed an uninterrupted, 
pre-Islamic, pre-Arab lineage of Phoenician origin.  Thus, they are a distinct and separate race 
and ethnicity from Arabism despite the fact that this Phoenician claim is suspect (Gore, 2004; 
Salibi, 1988):  “The Arab nationalists considered them [the Phoenicians] ancient Arabs who 
arrived in coastal Syria from Arabia” (Salibi, 1998, p. 172).  According to Lebanese historian 
Kamal Salibi (1988) a former professor of Middle Eastern History at AUB, they were correct 
in this to some extent.  
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 Aoun, personal communication, June 15, 2006 (see Appendix 17).  
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Because the disparity among the Lebanese regarding Arabism has continued to have a 
negative impact on Lebanon and the Lebanese diaspora, the word Arab itself must be clearly 
defined.  The definition of Arab in the Oxford Dictionary of Current English (Soanes, 
Hawker, & Elliot, 2006, p. 39) is “a member of a Semitic people inhabiting much of the 
Middle East and North Africa.”  Interestingly, this definition is racial yet does not mention the 
Arabic language.  However, in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary (“Arab,” 2004, p. 35), the 
term is defined as “1: a member of a Semitic people of the Arabian Peninsula in southwestern 
Asia.  2: a member of an Arabic speaking people.”  
To understand the definition of Arab further, leaders and members of two Arab 
American advocacy groups were interviewed: Albert Mokhiber, former president of the 
American–Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee; Dr. James Zogby, head of the Arab 
American Institute, and several other members of the two groups.  To start, The American–
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee is the largest grass roots Arab American organization in 
the United States (Wingfield, 2001).  Headquartered in Washington, D.C., the organization 
also has offices in New York and California and has several chapters across the United States.  
The largest single-member group of the committee is the Lebanese, the vast majority being 
Christian and the majority of those being Maronite (Wingfield, 2001; Zogby, 2008).  Several 
former presidents of the committee, including Mokhiber, were Americans of Lebanese 
Maronite Christian extraction.  Zogby, a Lebanese Maronite Christian who heads the Arab 
American Institute, is also the brother of the well-known researcher and sociopolitical pollster 
John Zogby.  
According to the longstanding definition created by the American–Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee, Arab is “a cultural and linguistic term.  It refers to those who 
speak Arabic as their first language.  Arabs are united by culture and by history.  Arabs are 
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not a race” (Wingfield, 2001, p.1).  According to this definition, supported by the individuals 
interviewed, the Maronites of Lebanon should be considered Arab by identity.  For Zogby, the 
definition of Arab American and Arab might simply mean “Arab descent” (Zogby, 1997, 
p.11)  It might even be more appropriate to say that “identifying as an Arab American implies 
making a voluntary association with the community of Arab Americans” (Zogby, 1997, p.11).  
According to the Arab American Institute, the unfortunate result of this has been “that 
most persons of Arab descent in the U.S. still do not identify with or participate in Arab-
American activities” (Zobgy, 1997, ¶18).  This attitude has had the effect of reducing the U.S. 
census of Arab Americans instead of assisting them with recognition and advocacy through 
the Arab American Institute and other organizations.  In fact, in their interviews, Mokhiber, 
Zogby, and other members of the Anti-Discrimination Committee and the Arab American 
Institute revealed that a major problem for their organizations, aside from pressure from 
Jewish–American/Israeli advocacy groups, is the non-Arab position taken by Lebanese 
Maronites and, to a lesser degree in the U.S. diaspora, by the Melchites and Greek Catholics.  
While these organizations advocate for Arab Americans, the Lebanese Christians who make 
up 40% of the U.S. Arab American population either have not assisted or have hindered their 
advocacy work.  
The Maronite denial versus the Muslim and other Lebanese acceptance of Arabism 
must be assessed further.  Several questions emerged concerning this topic, including (a) 
whether the Maronites reject Arab identity racially but accept it ethnically and culturally and 
(b) whether the Muslims accept Arabicity solely because of its relation to Islam and the 
language of the Quran.  The concepts of race, ethnicity, and culture were often misunderstood 
(Macionis 2003), resulting in additional questions, including (a) whether Christians accept 
Arab ethnic identity but disavow the same racially and (b) whether Christians and Muslims 
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accept Arabs and Phoenicians as biological but not as ethnic ancestors, as in the case of the 
Phoenicians.  A fresh understanding of how the Lebanese view Arab and Phoenician identities 
must be undertaken to establish whether a disparity still exists and, if so, how CMR are 
affected by the same.  In chapter 5, data collected from the field experts and the university 
students, as well as the literature, have been reviewed regarding these identities and their 




Chapter 5: Phoenician–Arab Identity Issues and Christian–Muslim Relations in 
Present-Day Lebanon 
 
The Lebanese identity crisis has continued to be a critical link in the CMR issue.  
According to Huntington (1996),  
Identity wars constituted about half of all civil wars during the 1940s and 1950s but 
about three-quarters of civil wars during the following decades, and the intensity of 
rebellions involving ethnic groups tripled between the early 1950s and the late 1980s   
. . . Intense antagonisms and violent conflicts are pervasive between local Muslims 
and non-Muslim peoples.  (pp. 254–255)  
 
However, Said (2001) noted that 
identity is not in itself a barrier to openness and connectedness; to the contrary, it is a 
prerequisite for them.  The more we maintain identity the larger the scope for 
openness and connectedness becomes and the more consolidated diversity becomes.  
In the absence of that, openness becomes capitulation, exchange becomes tutelage, 
and interaction becomes defeat.  (p. 34) 
 
In this chapter, various aspects of identity have been explored.  Responses from the 
field experts to IQ4 have been analyzed in the first section.  Then, to understand the thinking 
of the younger Lebanese population, the student participants from NDU were asked to 
respond to similar questions pertaining to identity issues.  Their data have been presented in 
the next sections.  In addition, the issues of language and the possible relationship between 
name changes and identity have been explored, including a case study of the Atallah family.  
As stated by Fr. Moussa: 
The crisis of identity has exhausted us in Lebanon.  It was a burden and the reason 
behind many crises . . . conflict on identity takes a confessional form in Lebanon, 
Arabism is reduced to Islam, Phoenician identity is reduced to Christianity…There 
lies the core of the Lebanese problem.  (Fr. Walid Moussa as quoted in Moussa & Al 
Khazen, 2007, p. 13) 
 
The question of whether the Phoenician identity of the Lebanese is based on science, 
consciousness, or both must also be addressed.  As such, DNA studies conducted to ascertain 
the racial connection between modern-day Lebanese and the Phoenicians have been discussed 
in the next section, the results of which may be helpful in the Lebanese actualizing such an 
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identity.  To conclude, a discussion and analysis of the Maronites’ reasons for maintaining 
their belief in their Phoenician origins has been included. 
Views of the Field Experts 
To answer IQ4, the field experts had to consider the four different parts contained in 
the question: Do you consider the Lebanese people to be Arab?  Do you consider yourself as a 
Lebanese to be an Arab?  Has this been a difficult one to resolve for Christians and Muslims?  
Why or why not?  To present the data from this question, the responses were divided between 
the advocates and working group field experts and the sociopolitical field experts.  However, 
data from both groups were combined in the section on analysis.  To aid the reader in 
understanding the emerging patterns in the data, the faith of each of the field expert has been 
reiterated.  
The Advocates and Working Group Field Experts 
The literature revealed that “from the outset as a political community, Lebanon was 
divided along two not only competing but opposing visions and ideologies: particularist 
(Lebanism) and universalist (Arabism)” (Hovsepian, 2008, p. 35).  Particularism was 
supported mostly by Christians; universalism, mostly by Muslims.  When Lebanon became a 
separate state, Lebanese Muslims first believed they were being severed from their Arab 
homeland.  Muslims felt more Arab than did their Christian counterparts and had more of a 
sense of belonging with the Islamic Middle East.  
Massouh,
1
 a Greek Orthodox priest who strongly acknowledged his identity and that 
of the Lebanese as Arab, felt that, by definition, Arabism is not “radical”; it is not an 
extremist noninclusive ideology.  He believed that Muslims and Christians have the choice of 
Arab identity.  When discussing how some Lebanese, especially some Christians, deny Arab 
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identity, Massouh stated that in disagreeing on Arabism, they are actually disagreeing with 
their own identity: They are refuting the Islamic civilization, even though they are a part of 
that civilization.  This has resulted in them seeming to be somehow more superior.  He also 
stated that such denial, which also hurts Arab unity, is beneficial to Israel.  He explained that 
although he cannot say with certainty whether he has Arab, Phoenician, or Syrian blood, the 
Lebanese/Arabs can build a community because of their common history and language.  Thus, 
he felt that developing a bond as the countries of the European Union have done is 
appropriate.  Because the Greek Orthodox communities of Lebanon trace their lineage 
directly back to the pre-Islamic Arab Christians and modest empires (Trimingham, 1990), 
Massouh’s stance on Arabism was understandable.   
Halabi,
1
 a Druze by faith, affirmed his identity and that of the Lebanese as Arab.  He 
stated religion should not be mixed with their traditions.  He then explained that the French 
had tried to turn Lebanese Christians into Europeans, even though doing so was not “accurate 
or appropriate.”  
According to Halabi,
2
 in 1943, during the Lebanese independence pact, “the Christians 
accepted the Arabic face of Lebanon.”  This notion has been interpreted many different ways 
by the different Lebanese communities over the years.  In general, to the Christians, this 
notion has meant that Lebanon is not truly or completely Arab (Khalifah, 1997, p. 208).  For 
the Muslims, this same concept has meant that Lebanon is truly and fully Arab.  Halabi 
pointed out that under the Tā’if Agreement, the Lebanese are considered Arab and Lebanon is 
a separate Arab country.  These concepts should be helpful in unifying the Christians and 
Muslims of Lebanon and should please the Muslims.  Thus, Christians and minority groups 
should be pleased that Lebanon is definitively a separate country.  Halabi stated, as a Druze, 
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that he and his community choose the Arab identity for several reasons, one of which is as an 
alternative to Muslim identity.  
In terms of the Synod of Lebanon, held at the Vatican in 1995, Halibi
1
 stated that the 
pope “decreed an apostolic exhortation regarding Lebanon.”  Halabi also pointed out that in 
their convention in 2004, the Maronites stated that they are Arab.  Still, he believed that the 
“Christians made the idea of Arabism so when they change and deny it, what are they saying 
to us [is] that they’re unique/special.”  The Druze are a small minority in Lebanon and the 
greater Middle East.  As such, for the most part, they have opted for the inclusiveness of 
Arabicity under ethnic and cultural considerations (Barakat, 1977; El-Solh 2004).  
Perhaps Halabi, who shares in chapter 6 his admiration for the post-Civil-War 
Maronite efforts of reconciliation and self-criticism, can work with the Druze community to 
show tolerance in the face of the Maronites different opinion of identity.  If, as Halabi has 
maintained in his interview and writings,  that pluralism and diversity should be respected in 
Lebanon then the Maronite belief of not being Arabs should also be accepted.  
 For  Sammak
2
 the Lebanese people, both Christians and Muslims, are in fact Arabs.  
He pointed out that many of the Christians trace their ancestry to the Arabian Peninsula 
(present-day Saudi Arabia and some of the peripheral countries).  Sammak focused on the 
close relationship of the Lebanese as a people and pointed out that most family names exist 
throughout the Christian and Muslim communities of Lebanon and the greater Arab Middle 
East.  An example of this interreligious, cross relationship of the Lebanese was that of Emir 
Shehab of Lebanon.  Emir Shehab (also spelled Chehab), an early provincial leader, was born 
a Sunni Muslim and later in life converted to Maronite Christianity (Salibi, 1988).  His 
relatives were also converts and thus a mix of Sunni Muslim, Druze, and Maronite Christians 
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(Salibi, 1988).  To bolster this point of Lebanese Arabism and close ethnic, even racial, 
interrelationships, Sammak
1
 stated that the lineage of many Lebanese Christians can be traced 




 also made the case that the Christians of Lebanon and the greater Arab 
Middle East are actually more Arab [racially and ethnically] than the Muslims.  After the 
coming of Islam, many foreigners from other countries came to Arabia for Hajj (an obligatory 
Muslim pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca, the prophet Muhammad’s birthplace).  Often, 
after their Hajj, these foreigners stayed and lived in the Middle East, including in Lebanon.  
These foreigners were Muslim but were not Arab.  Instead, they were immigrants.  Thus, 
because the Christians were originally from the Arab Middle East and had never left the area, 
“they [were] actually more Arab than many Muslims.” 
 When this writer mentioned to Sammak (and the other interviewees) that some 
Christians were forcefully denying their Arab identity, he stated that this is really a “reaction 
against being pro-Arab.” 
3
  It was a completely human reaction of anger rather than an 
intellectual argument because of the lack of aid given the Lebanese by the Arab countries 
during the war.  Sammak suggested that this was the main, although not the complete, 
explanation for many Christians, particularly the Maronites, denying their Arab identity.  For 
Sunni Muslims such as Sammak and the overwhelming majority of the Arab Middle East, 
their identity is unquestionably Arab as evidenced by their history, Islam, language, and Sunni 
Arab Caliphate and dynasties (Dawisha, 2003).  









 However, Sammak’s Sunni community whom he described in chapter 1 as having 
problems with radicalism, can reference and learn from Sammak’s tolerance and acceptance 
of the Maronites refusal of Arabism.  Sammak has demonstrated an admiration and affinity 
for Christians regardless of how they identify themselves.  He has intellectualized the 
Maronites Arab denial stating it is “completely understandable” which can help promote 
acceptance of identity differences.     
Khalil,
1
 an Egyptian Jesuit Catholic priest, answered the question with a question: 
“What does Arab mean?”  Khalil had been referred to this writer as both an Arab and an 
expert on Arab Christianity.  In addition, this writer had heard Khalil describe his identity as 
Arab in his lectures.  However, although Khalil acknowledged that he is considered an Arab 
by those who invite him to lecture, including the University of Birmingham and Georgetown 
University, on the day of the interview, he stated that “if it means even only 10% percent 
Muslim, then I am not an Arab.”  He went on to say that the Lebanese Christians are “not 
Arab racially, ethnically, and religiously.”  
Khalil
2
 then discussed the differences between culture and religion.  Culturally, he 
considered himself basically Arab, noting that others (besides the Arab Christians) are “more 
pure Arab.”  Khalil disliked the Arab belief that the Arab identity is both religion and culture, 
believing that to be inaccurate.  He admitted that much of Islam exists within the Christian 
culture, although “not as a dogma.”  He stated that the Christians began the “Arab awakening” 
for two reasons: (a) “to liberate themselves from others” and (b) “not to be [considered 
purely] just Muslims.”  Khalil said that it would be better for Christians and Muslims to 
“think of it [Arab Christian identity] in terms of oriental culture because this is more 
inclusive.”  He also indicated that it is each individual’s personal choice to be identified as 
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Arab or not and that some do not identify themselves as Arab because the term is equated 
with antiquity and backwardness: “We want to be modern.”   
In Khalil’s homeland of Egypt, where the Christians are a minority, serious concerns 
about CMR exist.  In Lebanon, the Christians are also now considered a minority population; 
and CMR have been problematic as well.  Given his personal history and dedicated study 
concerning the topic, it was understandable that Khalil was wary of Arabism being equated 
more directly with Islam and that he felt that the Christians were suffering from Muslim 
encroachment.  Due to these reasons, Khalil, similar to much of the Maronite community, was 
uncertain of Arabism as a viable Lebanese Christian identity or only under very specific 
criteria.     
 Some of Khalil’s views on the Arab identity of Lebanon were similar to those of other 




 disliked the synonymous use of 
Arab for Muslim.  However, Hajjar, a Melchite Christian, believed that Lebanese Christians 
are Arab.  The Melchites, unlike the other Christian groups of Lebanon, have boasted that 
they are almost completely Arab, including parishioners, clergy, and hierarchy (Parry & 
Hinnells, 1999).  Thus, it was understandable that Hajjar acknowledged not only his identity, 
but also Lebanon’s as being Arab.  The Melchites, a split off denomination from Greek 
Orthodoxy, have also maintained most of the Orthodox traditions, including Arab identity 
recognition.  The Melchites, as fellow Lebanese Catholics to the Maronites, but who accept 
their Arab identity, can take a liaison role within Lebanese identity dialogue and reach an 
understanding or compromise toward a consensus.        
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 also a Melchite by faith and a bishop, expressed disappointment that the issue 
of Lebanon and Arabism is still a point of contention: “If we want to form one nation, we 
should not say [solely], ‘I’m Maronite’ or ‘I’m Melchite’ or ‘I’m American.’”  He believed 
that it does no harm to the Lebanese to say they are Arab, noting that the Lebanese “language, 
geography, economy, and education are Arab.”  Ghazal expressed skepticism at the idea that 
the Lebanese are Phoenician rather than Arab, suggesting that being Phoenician is really 
related to the desire for Western approval.  However, he did recognize the importance of 
multiculturalism in Lebanon, noting its resulting “richness in thought, ideology, and 
intelligentsia.”  Ghazal also referred to Pope John Paul II’s statement that he quoted as 
“Lebanon’s multiculturalism is a message for unity and that the people [of Lebanon] should 
be unified.”  At the face-to-face interview, Ghazal submitted this response, written in Arabic:  
I find it useless to go back to mottoes and headlines that were tackled before, such as 
the question of roots and belonging.  The present societies that are based on 
multiplicity do not tackle such questions that do not help in building a unified society. 
. . .  We have suffered a lot because of the issue of identity . . .  And these questions 
have only provoked more extremism and division.  I believe that the diversity present 
in the Lebanese society is a source of human and cultural richness and what should 
bring the Lebanese together is the establishment of a common national identity that 
unites and does not divide and that forms a strong base for the building of a new 
Lebanon. 
 
Ghazal expresses a dismay and disinterest in allowing identity preferences to continue 
to hinder Lebanese reconciliation.  Also a fellow Catholic to the Maronites,  Ghazal, although 
he identifies himself as being Arab, can encourage the Lebanese to accept diverse identity 
beliefs, such as those of the Maronites and not let this continue to plague positive dialogue 
and conflict resolution.  As he stated above, Lebanese identity diversity is/should be “a source 
of human and cultural richness and what should bring the Lebanese together is the 
establishment of a common national identity that unites.”    
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 a Greek Orthodox Christian, also wrote his answer in Arabic, stating, 
“We are all Arabs . . . Arabism is not exclusive to Muslims.”  He acknowledged the varied 
backgrounds of the Lebanese people, with different religions and denominations.  Still, he 
believed that the Christians are Arab, originating from the Arabian Peninsula prior to the 
emergence of Islam.  He had no problem with some Christians referring to themselves as 
Aramaean Arab or Syriac Arab, citing “the Arab empires of the Ghassanid and Lakhmid” as 
examples of Christians being Arabs before Islam.  Bou Habib concluded, “Some Muslims 
destroyed the Arab name and that’s why some Christians say they are not Arabs”; but he was 
certain that he as a Greek Orthodox, as well as the other Lebanese Christians and Muslims, 
are Arab. 
 In his role as an Arab Christian, Bou Habib can put forth his view that Arabism is an 
inclusive and diversified identity including Aramaean/Syriac Arabs which the Maronites also 
tend to relate.  As such Bou Habib’s input could assist with an identity compromise that the 
Lebanese can accept and move on to other issues.     
The Sociopolitical Respondents 
 
The question of identity has not been confined to issues of religion.  The politics of 
Lebanon and the region in general have had a tremendous impact on this continuing question.  
El Khazen
2
 stated that the Arab identity of Lebanon is ideological, connected to the Syrian 
regime (Baath Party Greater Syria Arab nationalism), although he did not overtly name Syria 
at first.  This type of coded, ambiguous talk in Lebanon has evolved from the people’s 
concern that they will be penalized by the Syrian government, whose military troops had been 
stationed in Lebanon for decades until their withdrawal on April 26, 2005.   
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 also mentioned that aside from Arab identity being linked to Syrian 
government ideology, it also encompasses being “pro-Arafat [Palestinian authority leader who 
died on November 11, 2004] and pro-Palestinian.”  El Khazen related with dismay that to be 
Arab, one must be pro-Syrian and pro-Palestinian.  He believed that the Arab identity issue is 
and should be of no concern because it is “irrelevant” to Lebanese matters.  He noted that 
despite Lebanese Arabism being agreed upon in the Tā’if Agreement, the issue is still 
unresolved.  A Maronite Christian, he reluctantly agreed that Lebanese Christians are Arab 
but did not seem comfortable directly answering whether he considered himself an Arab.  At 
the time of the interview, El Khazen was chairman of the AUB Political Studies Department.  
He became a member of the Lebanese Parliament in June 2005, shortly after the interview.  It 
was not surprising, then, that El Khazen placed more emphasis on political issues and less on 
social issues such as Arabism, ethnicity, and identity.  A Maronite Christian, El Khazen 
displayed characteristic ambivalence and discomfort with Arab identity.  
 However, identity and nationalism are difficult concepts to define clearly according to 
Benedict Anderson, a renowned author on the topic (2006).  Thus the Maronite ambivalence 
toward identity and nationalism should not be seen as an innate flaw but rather an 
understandable struggle with a sometimes obtuse construct.  According to Tom Narin,  a 
nationalism theorist: 
Nationalism is the pathology of modern developmental history, as inescapable as 
‘neurosis’ in the individual, with much the same essential ambiguity attaching to it, a 
similar built in capacity for descent into dementia, rooted in the dilemma of 
helplessness thrust upon most of the world (the equivalent of infantilism for societies) 
and largely incurable (as stated in Anderson, 2006, p. 5) 
 
As Anderson also points out, it is difficult to break down the rigidity some people have about 
identity and nationalism, even if it is not based on solid social science (Anderson, 2006).  





With this in mind perhaps the Lebanese can accept rather than try to change the Maronite 
consciousness that they are Phoenicians and not Arabs.       
Salem,
1
 a Greek Orthodox, stated that the Lebanese do not have a clear or solid 
identity.  He acknowledged his own identity as “politically Lebanese, culturally Arab, and 
religiously Orthodox” and that of Lebanon as Arab, with the qualification that the Lebanese 
are the higher functioning Arabs of the Middle East.  He considered the Lebanese to be “more 
cosmopolitan and metropolitan” than other Arab peoples.  Thus, some people from other Arab 
countries believe that the Lebanese, especially the Christians, are “not Arab enough” to which 
Salem countered that rather than becoming more Arab, the Arabs need to be “Lebanize[d].”  
Salem presents another nuanced acceptance of Lebanese Arabism that could make for a good 
starting point for identity discussion.   
 According to Mouawad,
2
 it was well established that the Lebanese are Arabs.  She 
noted that although Arab identity is a major point of interest and contention among the 
Lebanese, “for many years, Arabism did not show what it really is—a good history, 
enlightenment, and so on,” a sentiment shared by Salem.
3
  Mouawad indicated that Arabism is 
neither Christian nor Muslim; it is not a religion.  Rather, it is “diverse and accepting.”  
Mouawad, a Maronite, has been a supporter of the Tā’if Agreement of 1989, which called for 
all Lebanese to acknowledge the Arab identity of Lebanon, and the Maronite Synod of 2003, 
which upheld Lebanese Arab identity.  Additionally, Mouawad hailed from the Zghorta 
district of Lebanon, an area that has normally had good relations with the “Arab Republic” of 
Syria.  For these reasons and more, Mouawad is a Maronite who recognizes the Arab identity 
of Lebanon.  
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Given the diverse nature of Lebanon, the true definition of Arabism should fit its 
varied connotations within the Arab–Israeli conflict.  Thus, the more one sympathizes with 
the Palestinian cause and rejects Israeli political designs, the more one is considered a true 
Arab.  El Khazen
1
 raised this same notion, although he minimized the importance of Arabism 
and considered it more of an inconsequential distraction, similar to the “rich versus the poor” 
philosophies of Marx and Durkheim (Giddens, 2001).  
Regarding the Lebanese political model, Mouawad
2
 repeated with pride that the 
Lebanese are unique, that they have their own specialty within the Arab world, another 
sentiment shared by nearly all the interviewees: “Lebanon is the only place where Christians 
are rulers also [along with Muslims], yet it was a great responsibility for the Lebanese 
Christians to share political decision making.”  She also indicated that Lebanon is the sole 
democracy in the Arab world, although their democratic practice is not very good, referring to 
political favoritism, corruption, and patronage. 
Mouawad
3
 opined that some Christian leaders and their communities should not have 
tried to isolate themselves from the Arab world or to be hostile to Arabism and that denying 
their Arab identity is an insult.  She added that although extremist Christian radicals exist in 
Lebanon, they are smaller in number than Muslim extremists and can be more easily 
controlled.  Thus, Christian extremists are not as dangerous as Muslim extremists are, a 
sentiment echoed by Khalil
4
 during his interview.  
Similar to El Khazen, Mouawad
5
 took a political view of the Arab identity issue of 
Lebanon.  This was not unusual because both were politicians by profession and discussed 
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Arab identity in political terms of Arabicity.  However, in contrast, Mouawad acknowledged 
the Arab identity of Lebanon clearly and directly, which was somewhat surprising because 
Mouawad was from the northern Lebanese villages of Zghorta and Ehden, where the 
inhabitants are overwhelmingly Maronite Christian and are bitterly divided between anti- and 
pro-Syrian political camps.  According to Mouawad, the Maronites of this area and in the 
diaspora have a somewhat elitist view of their religious and ethnic origin, which they claim is 
either Phoenician, Syriac, or French but not Arab, thus making the Arabs feel the Lebanese 
Christians are ashamed or embarrassed to be Arab.  As a Maronite, a woman and one of the 
very few elected to parliament, perhaps Mouawad’s reasoning and comfort with Arabicity can 




 a Shiite Muslim, is known as “the father of the Tā’if Agreement,” the 
second principle of which is a clear reconfirmation of the Arab identity of Lebanon.  He stated 
that the source of the Lebanese contention concerning the issue of identity is fear based on the 
inappropriate handling of interpretations of the 1943 pact.  Under the pact, the identity of 
Lebanon was partially explained as “an Arab face,” a concept interpreted differently by 
Christians and Muslims.  The Christians believed the concept meant that Lebanon was less 
Arab, but the Muslims believed it meant that “Lebanon was fully Arab.”  Regardless, 
Husseini believed that the Lebanese are min usl wHad (“from one origin”) and thus are Arabs.  
Husseini
2
 traced his lineage to the prophet Muhammad’s family of the Hashemite tribe.  He 
also explained that Christians, Muslims, and Druze share the same family names and are, in 
fact, related to each other.  Based on this interview and Husseini’s other writings and 
statements, it was clear he felt that the unity of Lebanon and Arab identity go hand in hand 
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(Hourani, 2004).  During the interview, he produced both Arabic and English copies of the 
Tā’if Agreement.  According to Point 2(B) of the agreement,  
Lebanon is Arab in belonging and identity.  It is an active member of the Arab League 
and is committed to its charter.  It is an active and founding member of the United 
Nations Organization and is committed to its charters.  Lebanon is a member of the 
non-aligned movement.  The state of Lebanon shall embody these principles in all 
areas and spheres, without exception.  (p. 1) 
 
Although referring often to religious history, Husseini
1
 rarely used the terms Christian 
or Muslim.  He explained that the Lebanese people are from one origin; they are one family.  
He noted that throughout history, although family members changed their religions for 
various political reasons or war,  they could not change their relatedness.  Thus, when the 
Lebanese people experienced a time in their history when many wars occurred, one result was 
that some of the people changed their religions.  Despite this historical war phenomenon, 
however, the Lebanese remained ethnically, even racially, the same: “Christians, Muslims, 
and Druze all have similar family names between them and have relatives between each other.  
The Lebanese are one people, one family with the same race, history, and geography.”  He 
also included in the Lebanese family the Armenians of Lebanon, despite their fairly recent 
historical presence there.  Because they worked for Lebanese unity, they should be considered 
fully Lebanese.  
In discussing Lebanese unity, Husseini
2
 indicated he dislikes the term coexistence, 
believing the term al-aish al-mushtarak  (“living together”) to be more appropriate.  The 
former term has a negative connotation of “living side by side”; the latter is more harmonious 
and interactive.  Husseini also referred to the Muslim creed, explaining that it is blasphemy 
for Muslims to differentiate among people of different religions.  Christians, Muslims, and 
Jews are all “people of the book and people of God; any notion to the contrary is against 









 agreed that he and the Lebanese are Arabs.  His view of Arabism contained 
clear elements of the universality in Islam in that he believes that Christians and Muslims are 
both people of the book in Islam.  They have a similar Abrahamic faith scripture, or book, and 
are of the same racial, ethnic, and spiritual origins.  For Husseini, the universality of Islam 
allows for the universality of Arabism; he appeared to be comfortable with both.    
Despite the Tā’if Agreement that was supposed to settle the matter of Lebanese 
identity and other issues as well, resolving the Arabism issue in Lebanon has been difficult 
because of the numerous political and ideological conflicts among the people of Lebanon, 
according to N. Musawi,
2
 a Shiite Muslim who recognizes himself and the Lebanese as Arab.  
He divided these conflicts into four ideologies.  The first, Lebanon as part of Syria, was 
promoted by Antoine Saade, a Greek Orthodox Lebanese figure.  The second, Lebanon as one 
Arab nation, was based on Lebanon being part of a larger Arab nation.  The third, Lebanese 
nationalism, was promoted most notably by Pierre Gemayel, founder of the Kataeb 
(Phalangist Party).  The fourth was Antiochian Lebanon as promoted by Boulos Naaman.  
These ideologies, which were well documented in the numerous texts about Lebanese history 
and politics (Khalifah, 1997), have continued to remain separate.  Thus, many Lebanese 
parties and individuals have not fully acknowledged or accepted the Arabicity of Lebanon.  
Husseini’s position of oneness among the Lebanese regardless of religion may be helpful in 
dialogue regarding identity.  Husseini can be an influential force with his Muslim 
constituency that accepts Arabicity but is irked by the Maronite disavowal of the same.  As an 
example, N. Musawi
3
 cited the Maronite patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, known throughout 
Lebanon as vacillating between being outwardly anti-Arab and being coy about Arab identity 









(Dib, 2009).  According to N. Musawi, Sfeir used the Arab aspect of “belonging” from the 
Tā’if definition but rarely admitted to his followers the “identity” aspect mentioned and 
agreed upon in the Tā’if Agreement.  
N. Musawi
1
 stated there are two dimensions opposing Tā’if that interact with each 
other: civilizationism and federalism.  Although some people wish to adhere to the dimension 
of federalism, it is a political dimension: “Some churches don’t accept the political points of 
the Tā’if but rather want to maintain their own separate political agenda[s].”  Thus, despite the 
resolution of the identity issue within Tā’if, for many Lebanese it has remained an unresolved 
issue.  These individuals and forces have continued to follow their own ways of dealing with 
the identity issue.  N. Musawi found this contradictory, noting that even “the pamphlets of the 
Church of Rome encourage the Lebanese Christians to merge to Lebanon’s Arab 
identification.”  N. Musawi’s point was supported in the literature.  According to Bring Down 
the Walls: Lebanon's Post-War Challenge (Dagher, 2001), the Maronites of Lebanon were 
counseled that Arabism should be “embraced fully” and that this “mission statement . . . was 
inspired from Pope John II’s exhortation to the Christians of Lebanon” (pp. 194–195).  N. 
Musawi further noted that although some Lebanese consider the poor implementation of the 
Tā’if Agreement as reason for the continued problems with the issue of identity, the failures 
in adhering to the Tā’if should not change the fact that the Lebanese are all Arabs.  He also 
blamed renunciation of Arab identity and the Tā’if Agreement on outside political influences, 
such as the United States, chosen by some of the Lebanese parties.  
 As mentioned previously, Hajjar,
2
 a Melchite Catholic Christian, answered with 
certainty that the Lebanese are Arabs.  He added, “However, in the Arab world, they intermix 
Arab with Muslim,” citing British Broadcast Corporation newscasters who often refer to the 
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Arab world as the Islamic world, indicating that all Arabs are Muslim.  This equating of Arab 
with Islam has remained one of the reasons the Christians discard the idea of an Arab identity 
in favor of a Phoenician identity; they are not Muslim.  Other interviewees, such as Khalil,
1
 
shared this view.  Hajjar, a long time journalist and present editor of the most read newspaper 
in Lebanon, An-Nahar, added that in present times, the term Arab has a very negative 
connotation in the western world, another reason some Lebanese Christians reject Arab 
identity.   
 Hajjar
2
 stated that Arab Christians existed, even flourished, prior to Islam, referring to 
the Ghassanids, a Christian Arab dynasty in the eastern Roman Empire, and to the Lakhmids, 
a Christian community in present-day northern Iraq.  This information was corroborated in the 
literature (Bailey, 2003).  When this writer mentioned that most Greek Orthodox believe they 




 a Maronite Christian, declined Arab identity for himself and for the 
Lebanese.  Instead, he emphasized that they are Lebanese: “We know ourselves as a 
brotherhood of the Arabs but are not Arabs ourselves.  We are not directly Arabs.”  The use of 
the pronoun “we” raised more questions than it answered.  Initially, Gemayel said that he was 
referring to the Lebanese.  This writer then pointed out that the Tā’if Agreement, signed by 
both Lebanese Christians and Muslims, made it clear that the Lebanese identity is Arab.  With 
some frustration, Gemayel again specified that he was referring to some Lebanese Maronite 
Christians from the Mt. Lebanon areas who do not believe that they are Arabs.  Although 
Gemayel called this non-Arab identity a “Maronite Christian perspective,” he offered few 
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insights into what followers of this perspective actually profess except that they are neither 
Francophone nor European but Phoenician, which has been discussed at greater length later in 
this chapter.  Gemayel was the youngest of all the field respondents (age 33 at the time of 
interview) and was considered less experienced, especially regarding CMR, than the others.  
Even so, Gemayel is a native Lebanese who comes from a line of past and present Lebanese 
Maronite politicians whose opinions are shared by their constituencies.     
 A Maronite Christian, Aoun,
1
 stated, “Not everyone is originally [racially] Arab,” 
noting that some Christians may be Arab and some Muslims may not be.  This concept was 
also shared by many of the interviewees, including Sammak.
2
  Aoun listed the procession of 
empires and invaders that controlled Lebanon over the years, including the Phoenicians, 
Romans, and Greeks.  Thus, Lebanon is a “synthesis and transition of cultures” from both 
East and West, which makes determining whether or not the Lebanese are racially Arab 
difficult.  Instead, even though he could trace his family tree to the Hashemite tribe of the 
prophet Muhammad, an Arab, which fortified his belief in his own Arab identity, Aoun 
preferred to think of Lebanon and the Lebanese as “Mediterranean,” having “a heart for the 
West and a mind for the East.”  What counted were the Lebanese tradition, history, and 
ethnicity absorbed from all cultures and “the good Lebanon exported to other cultures.”  Still, 
despite mentioning several qualifications and historical scenarios, he did agree in general to 
his own Arabicity and to that of the Lebanese.  
Aoun was one of the field experts who grew up in a mixed Christian–Muslim village.  
As stated by Rami Khouri, a renowned Christian Arab American journalist and academic 
stationed alternately in Lebanon and the United States (as cited in Strohmer 2007), those 
Lebanese who live and socialize together have a greater interconviviality and tend to agree 
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more about political and identity issues that those who have not.  This was buttressed when 
Aoun’s predominantly Christian FPM party signed a major cooperative agreement with the 
Shiite party of Hezbollah in 2005, which has been maintained since.  
Addressing Lebanese Arabism with slightly ambiguous answers, I. Mousawi,
1
 a Shiite 
Muslim, stated that the Lebanese are Arabs.  However, he considered the Lebanese people 
part of a larger universality, not confined to Arabism alone.  When asked if he was referring 
to the Arabic term used in Islam, the umma or the universal nation, I. Mousawi agreed.  He 
noted the significant influence of the ancient Persian Empire on Lebanese culture and identity 
and the Lebanese Shiites’ affinity for Iran, a predominantly Shiite but non-Arab country.  He 
also noted the amount of travel by the Shiites of Lebanon to Iran.  In fact, one of his brothers 
resided in Iran.  Thus, an identity limited to Arabism alone might undercut their ties to Iran.  
Although I. Mousawi confirmed that he and the Lebanese are Arab, he agreed that Arabism 
was made difficult only because of the political conflicts that occurred.  
Samir Franjieh,
2
member of parliament, Christian envoy to the Muslim communities, 
and organizer of the March 14 movement, stated clearly that the Lebanese are Arabs.  A 
Maronite Christian, Franjieh did nuance his answer, referring to different cultures and subtle 
identity differences among the Lebanese, particularly in the area of religion.  He indicated that 
although at one time they were very close, Christians wanted a separate status from Lebanese 
Muslims at the beginning of the war, going so far as to make an alliance with Israel to 
accentuate this difference.  However, he stated that the denial of Arabism does harm CMR 
because it suggests, among other concepts, an elitist attitude and identity of the Christians 
toward the Lebanese Muslims.  Franjieh believed that as native Arabic speakers, the Lebanese 
qualify as Arabs.     
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 Arab identity should be a unifying factor among Lebanese 
citizens.  He found it absurd for Christians to form a separate, non-Arabic identity.  He 
believed this separate identity is one of the main reasons for CMR discord, noting that in the 
1950s and 1960s, a minimum of religious and social differences between Lebanese Christians 
and Muslims existed.  Franjieh compared this to the Germans.  During peace, there were no 
differences between being a German and being a German Jew.  Thus, when societies lived 
together in basic peace and harmony, few people cared about their religious differences.  
Franjieh also challenged those Lebanese who deny Arabism to consider that their language is 
still Arabic.  Because of his comfort level with Arab identity, Franjieh has often been 
employed as a Maronite liaison to the Muslim communities.  
Differentiating themselves from Arabs has been problematic for Christians.  However, 
Gemayel
2
 and his family have attempted to navigate through the Christian nuances from their 
Muslim compatriots, even with the language issue.  He spoke almost completely in colloquial 
Lebanese Arabic, with some occasional French expressions, during the interview.  Using the 
Lebanese Arabic dialect in formal and semiformal settings instead of formal Arabic is an 
identity and political statement practice employed by the Gemayel family and other Lebanese, 
mostly Maronites, who do not believe they are Arab.  To them, spoken Lebanese is actually 
not Arabic.  At times, this contention has resulted in a good deal of acrimony between the 
believers in this non-Arab identity, the other Lebanese communities, and the predominantly 
Arab Muslim communities of the greater Middle East, nearly all of which subscribe to 
Arabicity.  




 Gemayel, personal communication, June 6, 2005 (see Appendix 8).  
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 A Maronite Christian, Matar
1
 felt both he and the Lebanese are Arabs.  He believed 
that the term Arab had to be defined, however.  If the term meant that the individuals spoke 
the Arabic language, then the Lebanese were Arabs.  If, however, the term was used to mean 
Islam, “then the Lebanese have a different opinion on this,” noting as other respondents had 
done that Arabs and Christians existed prior to the emergence of Islam, as did “Arabic 
literature and poetry.”  Thus, Arabism should not be limited to Islam.  He suggested that 
“America and Europe are not thinking [differentiating] anymore about nationality,” even 
though the Lebanese are still stuck on the identity issue.  He questioned, “What will we all 
benefit from when we’re still fighting over this?”  As the director of international affairs for 
NDU, Zouk Mosbeh, Lebanon, Matar’s comfort level with Arabicity has been an asset for 
him, as it should be for any international academic coordinator throughout the Arab world.  
Analysis of the Respondents’ Answers Regarding Arabism and CMR 
Of the 17 respondents, 15 clearly acknowledged the Arabicity of Lebanon.  However, 
some of them did so with some qualifications and nuances, which seemed to be based on 
whether the respondents were viewing Arabism as racial, ethnic, or cultural.  The field experts 
but not the university students (as shown in the next section) seemed to understand these 
classifications.  As such, these subdivisions of identity, race, ethnicity, culture, and so forth 
have been thoroughly reviewed with the university student respondents (not the field experts, 
who in general already agreed on Arabism) later in this chapter.  
Of the two respondents who did not acknowledge the Arab identity of the Lebanese, 
Khalil vacillated, making it difficult to determine whether he was affirming or declining 
Lebanese Arab identity.  Gemayel was the one respondent who definitively denied Lebanese 
Arabism.  Although he admitted that the Lebanese have an “Arab belonging,” as stated in the 
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 Matar, personal communication, March 21, 2006 (see Appendix 9). 
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Tā’if Agreement, but denied in the same sentence of the Ta’if Agreement “Arab in identity.”
1
   
He did, however, confine the non-Arab identity of the Lebanese to the “Maronites of Mt. 
Lebanon.”  Khalil and Gemayel were both Christians, the former a Jesuit priest and the latter 
a Maronite politician.  Except for Gemayel, age 33, all the respondents were middle aged or 
elderly.  As such, Gemayel’s information was based on the least experience and academic 




 a Shiite Muslim, believed that all the Lebanese are min usl wahid, a 
classical Arabic saying meaning “from one origin.”  With this phrase, he seemed to imply that 
all Lebanese have a similar racial heritage.  Sammak,
3
 a Sunni Muslim, mentioned that many 
Christians can trace their bloodlines to the family of the prophet Muhammad.  This notion of 
racial Arabism has not been accepted diffusely throughout both the Christian and Muslim 
communities, even though the idea has generated interest as evidenced by some of the 
literature and from DNA sampling (Chuckralla n.d.; Hitti, 1962; Zalloua & Wells, 2008).  The 
Maronites of Lebanon and, to a much lesser extent, some of the other Christian groups, have 
continued to deny having an Arab identity (Bailey, 2003; Barakat, 1993).  On the other hand, 
several Christian respondents, including Franjieh, Salem, and Massouh, accentuated the 
ethnic and cultural factors that define the Lebanese as Arab.  Therefore, different opinions 
existed as to what factors comprise Arabism in Lebanon.   
Field experts can and should play a major role in helping consolidate the contentious 
Lebanese identity issue because they are representative leaders of the various Lebanese 
communities.Besides, they are not in conflict about identity issues.  Perhaps the Lebanese can 
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 Gemayel, personal communication, June 6, 2005 (see Appendix 8). 
2
 Husseini, personal communication, December 2, 2004 (see Appendix 6). 
3
 Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12). 
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apply these experts’ rationale and acceptance of identity to diminish the conflict.  However, 
the question remains as to where the discrepancy in the identity issue lies, if no major identity 
conflict exists among these experts.  
The Students’ Views on Lebanese Identity 
  
The research thus far has revealed a divergence of views between the older generation 
field experts and the university students who participated in this dissertation study.  In 
addition, a general polarity between the Maronite Christians, the Muslims, and the remaining 
Christian communities was found in their views of Lebanese identity.  Ideally, then, the 
viewpoint of a younger generation of Maronites should also be assessed.  Thus, this writer 
utilized his workplace at NDU, a Maronite-run university whose administration has attempted 
to follow the American system of education, to gather data for such an assessment.  NDU is 
situated in the province of Jounieh, a predominantly Maronite stronghold located in the 
mountain village of Zouk Mosbeh.  The student body is predominantly Maronite and 
overwhelmingly Christian. 
Gathering these data was no easy task.  To begin, each chairperson of the three 
different departments to which this writer reported seemed to have a staunch, perhaps racist, 
view of Arabicity and Muslims.  Moreover, the dean of humanities often expressed contempt 
for Muslims and Islam.  Despite these issues, permission was granted and data were collected 
from 288 Lebanese university students, spread diffusely throughout Lebanon and representing 
well over 100 different cities, towns, and villages (see Appendix 22).  Questions from the 
student survey instrument (Appendix 20) were posed to the university students between the 
academic years of 2001–02 and 2004–05.  The terms ethnicity, race, and culture were defined 
for the students, written in both English and Arabic.   
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Of these 288 students, 166 (57.6%) were Maronite Catholic, 46 (16%) were Greek  
Orthodox, 38 (13.2%) were Greek Roum Catholic, 22 (7.6%) were Druze, 6 (2.1%) were 
Armenian Christian, 6 (2.1%) classified themselves as Other, and 4 (1.4%) were Sunni 
Muslim.  Thus, 88.9% of the respondents considered themselves Christian.  
Ethnicity 
A formal definition of ethnicity derived from sociologists Giddens (2001) and 
Macionis (2004) was referenced.  In addition, a simpler definition was attached to the more 
formal definition to maximize student understanding of the question: Ethnicity means the 
shared national origin, religion, and language of a people; it is similarly stated as sharing the 
traditions, customs (rituals, way of doing things in daily life), and/or social views as a larger 
group of people (see Appendix 20). 
Students were asked to rank order six ethnicity choices in terms of closeness to their 
opinion of the ethnicity of the Lebanese (1 = closest to the Lebanese; 6 = farthest from the 
Lebanese).  Of the 256 students who responded to the question, only 92 (31.9%) indicated 
Lebanese ethnicity was Arab (see Table 22.10).  Thus, based on the definitions of Arab and 
ethnicity presented earlier in this dissertation, even though Lebanese Christians and Muslims 
appear to be Arabs by ethnicity, two thirds of the student sample did not identify themselves, 
as their first choice, as being ethnic Arabs.  Despite being Arabic speakers, readers, and 
writers; being geographically part of the Arab Middle East; and Lebanon being a member of 
the Arab League, two thirds of the respondents did not believe they were ethnic Arabs.  
Instead, survey results revealed that 120 (41.7%) of the respondents identified Phoenician as 
being closest to their ethnicity (see Table 22.11), while 28 (9.7%) identified French as being 
closest to their ethnicity (see Table 22.12).  Interestingly, 120 (41.7%) of the respondents 
identified French as being the second closest to their ethnicity, nearly identical to the number 
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of respondents choosing Phoenician as closest to their ethnicity.  Yet, in terms of the 
definition of ethnicity provided, no obvious aspects of Phoenician ethnicity (i.e., language, 
dress, etc.) exist in present-day Lebanon.  Still, the students, unlike the field experts, chose 
near nonexistent Phoenician ethnicity as closest to their own.   
Race 
A person’s race was defined as having the same biological traits and genetic 
characteristics as a larger group of people (i.e., the same biological makeup and bloodline).  It 
could be stated as White or Black or as African, Asian, or European.  The student participants 
were asked to identify the race of the Lebanese people by ranking the given choices from 1 to 
7 (1 = closest to the Lebanese race; 7 = farthest from the Lebanese race).  Students were also 
instructed that, if they believed the Lebanese people belonged to one single race, they should 
mark that choice as 1 and not rank any of the other choices.  Of the 244 students who 
responded to this question, 88 (30.6%) ranked Arab as the ethnicity closest to the race of the 
Lebanese (see Table 22.13), with 78 (27.1%) identifying Arab as their second choice.  More 
than half of the respondents (160, 55.6%) identified Phoenician as being closest to their race 
(see Table 22.14), with more than 65% percent of the predominantly Maronite respondents 
choosing Phoenician as their first choice of race.  
Culture  
Culture was defined as the customs, habits, skills, technology, arts, values, ideology, 
science, religion, and political behavior of a group of people in a specific period; a shared way 
of living (Giddens, 2001).  Students were asked to identify the culture they believed was 
closest to that of the present-day Lebanese.  Respondents ranked the choices from 1 to 7 (1 = 
culture closest to the Lebanese; 7 = culture farthest from the Lebanese).  Only 92 respondents 
(31.9%) ranked Arab as being closest to their culture (see Table 22.15).  Instead, 120 (41.7%) 
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of the respondents identified Phoenician as being closest to their culture (see Table 22.16), the 
same results as those for the question regarding ethnicity.  
Overall Identity  
Students were also asked to consider race, ethnicity, and culture together in selecting 
their choice for the overall identity of the Lebanese.  Again, respondents ranked the choices 
from 1 to 7 (1 = closest to the Lebanese; 7 = farthest from the Lebanese).  Of the students 
responding, 116 (40.3%) identified Arab as being closest to their combined racial, ethnic, and 
cultural identity (see Table 22.17).  Students were then asked to answer the following 
question: Do you believe the Lebanese are Arabs?  As shown in Table 22.18, of the 282 
students responding, 174 (60.4%) indicated the Lebanese people are not Arabs.  
Discussion  
The results concerning identity were similar to those from surveys taken in 1977 by 
Halim Barakat, a sociologist at AUB, and in 1992 by Hilal Khashan, a political science 
professor at AUB.  More than a quarter of a century after Barakat’s findings and 16 years 
after Khashan’s, the Maronites of Lebanon continued to reject an Arab identity, despite the 
Tā’if Agreement of 1989.  Maronite leaders at the time signed Tā’if, still considered a 
working document for conflict resolution, even though it directly mentioned and recognized 
the Arab identity of Lebanon.  In addition, early 20th-century Lebanese Christian thinkers, 
such as Yazigi and Antonios, were among the very first to develop the concept of an Arab 
renaissance and nationalism based predominantly on ethnicity (Salibi, 1988).  Therefore, 
because identity is a major point of contention between the Christians and Muslims and 
among the Christians of Lebanon, the Maronites’ rejection of Arabism has remained a 
deterrent to healthy CMR.   
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The denial of Arab ethnicity by the Maronites, appears to be unsound from a 
definitional standpoint.  According to some of the field experts, Maronite ethnocentrism 
regarding Phoenician identity projects a belief of superiority that is unappreciated by the 
Muslim population.  In terms of race, historians such as Hitti (1967) and Salibi (1988) 
described the racial makeup of the people of the Middle East as Arabs, proto-Arabs, and 
Semitic people with a similar racial makeup.  A DNA study conducted by Zalloua (Gore, 
2004), a Lebanese Christian, revealed that there is no significant racial difference between 
Lebanese Muslims and Christians and that their racial DNA is predominantly Arab or 
Araboid.  Thus, the Phoenicians were transient and did not leave a genetic marker on the 
Lebanese, either Christians or Muslims (Gore, 2004).  Yet despite no genetic trace of the 
Phoenicians within the Lebanese, over 50% of the student respondents claimed a Phoenician 
race.   
With most of the evidence indicating an Arab racial identity, the Maronites have 
placed themselves in a precarious position by denying Arabicity.  Given the procession of 
historical invaders of Lebanon (Ellis, 1970), a more tenable position for the Maronites is the 
rejection of the Arab race rather than the rejection of Arab ethnicity.  Instead, the Maronites 
hold to both.  Approximately one tenth of the student respondents believed that the ethnicity 
closest to their own is French.  More significant is the fact that French was the second most 
frequent choice of the respondents (approximately 50%).  This choice may be more 
understandable compared with the most frequent choice of the outdated Phoenician ethnicity 
of the Lebanese for several reasons.  First, Lebanon was a French mandate for a few decades 
in the early 20th century.  Second, France had a major engagement with Lebanon for a few 
centuries prior to their mandate and a major involvement in Lebanese affairs and culture.  The 
Maronites, in particular, have had a centuries-old involvement with the French.  Third, French 
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is still considered the second language of Lebanon, although English is rapidly emerging.  In 
Lebanese schools, French is taught at all levels.  The French language has also permeated the 
colloquial Arabic of the Lebanese, particularly that of the Maronites.  In addition, many 
French-system schools exist within the educational system.  Fourth, many Lebanese travel to 
France, some choosing to live there. 
In terms of culture, per the definitions of Arab and culture, the Lebanese appear to be 
culturally Arabs, based on their food and drink, language and literature, and politics and 
customs.  Indeed, their culturally Arab presentation is perhaps the most solid argument for 
Lebanese Arab identity.  A revealing sign in Lebanon regarding Lebanese culture and Arab 
identity is a recently popular tee shirt imprinted with the saying, “Talk Arabic.  Think Arabic.  
Feel Arabic.  Live Lebanese” (Wright, 2008, p. 141).  Even so, two thirds of the student 
respondents in this present study did not choose Arab as their first choice for their culture.  
More than 40% of the respondents chose Phoenician as the culture closest to their own, 
despite there being no Phoenician language, food, dress, gestures, customs, or social traits that 
exist with the present-day Lebanese.   
That the Maronites claim to have an active Phoenician ethnicity and culture when the 
analysis shows a clearer Arab ethnicity has resulted in major discord within CMR.  By stating 
that they are historically, ethnically, and racially different from the other Lebanese, the 
Maronites are explicitly saying they are separate, apart, and superior, enraging the other 
Lebanese.  As such, the students’ expression that they are culturally Phoenician is based on 
the same background or reasons as their feelings about ethnicity.  By conscience, they are 
Phoenician.  This has been discussed in more detail in the conclusion.   
 The student participants were also asked the question about their overall identity to 
capture an overall sense of what the Lebanese Christians, most of whom are Maronites, 
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believe.  They were specifically asked to consider the combination of race, ethnicity, and 
culture as a whole to illicit their beliefs.  The question was also posed and analyzed to 
determine the consistency of their responses.  The students were given the written definitions 
in both formal and semiformal forms and in both English and Arabic to ascertain their 
understanding of the question.  This question, as well as the others, was then repeated once or 
twice in slightly different forms to ensure student answers were consistent rather than 
sporadic.  The results were found to be consistent; but interestingly, they revealed that a 
slightly higher percentage of students (more than 40%) chose the Arab identity.  
Another method used to check the reliability of student responses was through asking 
students to answer one direct yes/no question: Do you believe the Lebanese are Arabs?  These 
results also appeared to be consistent.  In the previous question regarding overall identity of 
the Lebanese, just more than 40% of the respondents claimed to have Arab identities.  For this 
yes/no question, 60% of the student respondents denied overall Arab identity.  Thus, the two 
questions resulted in the same response.   
What is clear is that the students strongly believe they are Phoenicians.  The reasons 
have to do with claiming an ancient glory as their own and distancing themselves from 
Arabism and Islam.  These reasons have been discussed in greater detail in the conclusion of 
this chapter.  
Language and CMR 
 The role of the Arabic language must be broached as well.  According to Dagher 
(2001), “The Arabic language is the foundation of their identity and the expression of their 
specificity” (p. 19).  Albert Hourani, a famous British Lebanese historian of the Middle East, 
started his most famous book, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, with the statement that 
Arabs are “more conscious of their language than any people in the world” (as quoted in 
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Barakat, 1993).  According to Maalouf, a renowned French Lebanese historian, “Being 
Christian and having as a mother tongue the Arabic language, which is the sacred language of 
Islam, is one of the fundamental paradoxes that forged my identity” (as quoted in Dagher, 
2001, p. 19). 
Renowned Lebanese American poet and artist Khalil Gibran, a Maronite Christian 
from Bsharre, Lebanon, wrote and spoke of “the magic of the Arabic language” and called the 
Quran the “masterpiece” of the Arabic language (as quoted in Young, 1945, p. 49).  He 
espoused a pride in the Arabic language, his native tongue.  Gibran also referred to himself 
interchangeably as an Arab, a Syrian, and a Lebanese (Young, 1945).  He became a main 
point person for pride among Arab communities throughout the world.  In fact, in 2007, the 
Khalil Gibran Arabic International School opened in New York City.  However, in present-
day Lebanon, the community of Gibran’s birth village, Bsharre, has maintained one of the 
most virulent anti-Arab identities in Lebanon (Llewellyn, 2010 pp. 31-32)  
  In addition, Lebanese poet and journalist Said Akl, also a Maronite, has been insisting 
for more than a half a century that spoken Lebanese is not Arabic.  He proposed and 
developed a Latin alphabet transliteration as an alternative to the Arabic alphabet (Daou 
2001).  This writer and Akl were both lecturers at NDU during the same period.  Oddly 
enough, Akl taught journalism and poetry in Arabic and taught all his classes in what he 
reported to be Arabic.  Even at NDU, whose atmosphere was one of an anti-Arab, anti-
Muslim, and non-Arabic language mentality, catalog and summer courses were listed as 
“formal Arabic” and “spoken Arabic, Lebanese dialect” but not as other-than-Arabic 
languages (Summer Arabic Program, 2011).  Even so, Akl maintained that he was not an 
Arab and did not speak Arabic.  He spoke Lebanese, which he did not consider to be Arabic.  
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Both of these Lebanese writers, Gibran and Akl, were well known, Gibran throughout 
the world and Alk in Lebanon and the Middle East.  Gibran, who published mostly in English, 
considered spoken Lebanese to be spoken Arabic.  Akl, who wrote mostly in Arabic and 
sometimes in French, did not consider his spoken language to be Arabic.  Rather, he 
considered it a form of another unidentified language, at times said to be Phoenician or Syriac 
(Rabinovich, 1985).  
At NDU, Mansour Eid, a full-time Arabic professor who was still the chairman of the 
Department of Social and Behavior Sciences as of May 2010, agreed to be interviewed for 
this present research.  His office was adjacent to this writer’s for several years, and he tutored 
this writer in Arabic for a short time.  A Maronite Christian and known Arabic novelist, Eid
1
 
considered the question about spoken Lebanese not being considered Arabic not realistic, 
answering, “Of course, it is.”  He acknowledged that some Lebanese Maronites claim that 
spoken Lebanese is not spoken Arabic but that they do so for political and religious reasons: 
Some Maronites want distance from Islam and Muslims (Kaufman, 2004), whose holy book, 
the Quran, is written in Arabic. 
 It must be noted that seemingly no other community in Lebanon or the wider Arab 
Middle East makes the case that spoken Lebanese is not spoken Arabic.  Only some 
Maronites and, to a lesser extent, some Greek Catholics or Melchites of Lebanon have argued 
this point.  The Sunni, Shiites, Druze, Greek Orthodox, the majority of Greek Catholics, and 
other groups have all accepted spoken Lebanese as a form of colloquial Arabic.  This other-
than-Arabic claim by some Lebanese Maronites, the diaspora, and, to a lesser degree, some of 
the other Christians has not been analyzed well at all.  No recognized scholar has written on 
the premise that spoken Lebanese is not Arabic, nor has any recognized scholar (with the 
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possible exception of Lebanese poet Said Akl) accepted the notion that spoken Lebanese is a 
language other than Arabic.  Such facts, however, have not convinced some Lebanese 
Maronites from making such a case and from not settling with the idea that spoken Arabic 
contains different dialects and accents (Lebanese Language Center, 2004).
1
  
One of the arguments of some of the Maronites for the Lebanese not being Arab has 
been their understanding of diglossia.  According to the Concise Oxford Companion to the 
English Language, originally published by Oxford University Press (McArthur, 1998, s.v. 
“disglossia”), diglossia is 
a term in SOCIOLINGUISTICS for the use of two varieties of language for different 
purposes in the same community.  The varieties are called H and L, the first being 
generally a standard variety used for “high” purposes and the second often a “low” 
spoken vernacular.  In Egypt, classical ARABIC is H and local colloquial Arabic is L.  
The most important hallmark of diglossia is specialization, H being appropriate in one 
set of situations, L in another: reading a newspaper aloud in H, but discussing its 
contents in L.  
 
Another term used for formal Arabic is Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), a spoken and 
written form of Arabic used frequently throughout Lebanon and the Arab Middle East (Graff, 
Buckwalter, Jin, & Maamouri, 2006).  Spoken and taught in schools, MSA is used in formal 
speeches and public speeches given by indigenous Arab politicians and foreign diplomats 
speaking to the Arab world and in news broadcasts.  The U.S. ambassadors to Lebanon 
between 2000 and 2007, David Sutherland and Vincent Battle, spoke in MSA when 
addressing issues and giving speeches in Lebanon.  MSA is much the same in both its written 
and spoken forms, with the occasional exception of dropping extended word endings; the taa-
marboota or the final “at” pronunciation, usually feminine; the nunation or the “un,” “in,” and 
“an” sounds at the end of indefinite nouns; and so on (Brustad, Al-Batal, & T nis , 1995).  As 
such, MSA is widely understood in the Arab Middle East.  However, MSA in its written and 
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spoken forms is nonetheless different from spoken Lebanese Arabic and, to varying degrees, 
from all other forms of spoken Arabic (Abboud & McCarus, 1983; Rice, Sa’id, & Rice, 
1977). 
 Lebanese Christians, particularly the Maronites, have “describe[d] themselves as 
‘Lebanese Christians,’ a term that implies a non-Arab bloodline and the language they speak 
as ‘Lebanese’” (Mackey, 2008, p. 13).  They have claimed that because spoken Lebanese is 
different from formal written and formal spoken Arabic, then it is not Arabic.  Because of 
this, Maronites and other Lebanese Christians have claimed that colloquial Lebanese, is 
simply not Arabic. Linguistically speaking, however, this is a weak argument.
1
  However, 
because all of the colloquial Arabic dialects deviate from MSA, spoken Lebanese Arabic is 
not the exception to the rule (Wise, 1987).
2
  This is not unusual because Arabic is not the only 
language that is diglossic.  
Debate has continued concerning which form of spoken Arabic is closest to MSA.  
Some individuals have stated it is Yemeni Arabic; others have said Iraqi, Syrian, or Saudi 
colloquial Arabic.  Interestingly, the Syrian and Lebanese dialects of Arabic are virtually 
identical and have always been classified together as Levantine, Syrian, or Shami (Damascus) 
Arabic
3
 (Jaschke, 1987).  Spoken Lebanese and Syrian Arabic are considered so similar that it 
is improper to call them different dialects.  Instead, they are different accents.
4
  Even 
Maronites, who are critical of the idea that spoken Lebanese is Arabic, have admitted that 
spoken Syrian and Lebanese are virtually the same and are closer to one another than to any 
other third-party colloquial Arabic language or combination.  This similarity between the 
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 Eid, personal communication, June 19, 2006 (see Appendix 24); Obeid, personal 
communication, January 11, 2008 (see Appendix 24). 
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spoken Arabic of Lebanon and Syria to formal Arabic rather than to other dialects has been 
credited to two factors: (a) Lebanon being part of historical Syria, home of the first 
Arab/Islamic empire (the Umayyad), and (b) the geographical proximity of the two nations 
(Abdulhab, 2009; Salibi, 1988).  
 Some scholars have continued to believe that Levantine Arabic is closer to MSA than 
most other forms of spoken Arabic
1
 (Rozovskaya, Sproat, & Benmamoun, 2006).  
Additionally, colloquial Lebanese has been considered much closer to MSA than some of the 
northern African dialects, such as Moroccan Arabic
2
 (Rozovskaya et al., 2006).  However, the 
notion of Moroccan Arabic, given its distance from MSA, and the various colloquial Arabic 
dialects has also been utilized as an argument by some Maronites who challenge that 
Lebanese Arabic is not Arabic.  Specifically, they have stated that spoken Lebanese Arabic is 
very different from spoken Moroccan Arabic, which is very difficult to understand.  
Therefore, Lebanese Arabic is not Arabic.  
This also appears to be a flawed argument and comparison.  Moroccan Arabic is fairly 
well influenced by other languages, such as Berber, French, and Spanish.  Many Levantine 
and Eastern Arabic speakers admit that they struggle to understand Moroccan Arabic and that 
it is even more divergent from MSA than the other Arabic dialects (Farha, 1975;  Wayne, 
Sabongy, & Saad, 1990).  Moroccans seem to be aware of this fact.  This writer has spoken 
with Moroccans and observed that, when speaking Arabic, they often switch from their 
Moroccan dialect to MSA or Egyptian Arabic (a widely understood form of Arabic) to be 
understood by Levantine and Eastern Arabs (Wayne et al., 1990; Wise, 1987).  Interestingly, 
in creating or expanding Arabic language and culture programs because of the great demand, 
officials of U.S. universities have often chosen Moroccan teachers whose Arabic dialect 
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deviates far from formal Arabic (Wayne, 1990; Wise, 1987).  Thus, even though spoken 
Lebanese Arabic is different from MSA and Moroccan Arabic, these differences do not seem 
to be adequate reasons to classify Lebanese Arabic as non-Arabic.   
Also suspect is the argument of some Lebanese Christians that because they speak 
differently, they are non-Arabic speakers in comparison with Lebanese Muslims (Lebanese 
Language Center, 2004).  Lebanese Christians, for the most part, speak the inter-Lebanese 
accent of their area and village
1
 (Farnha, 1975).  Therefore, although some Lebanese 
Maronites attempt to modify and re-categorize spoken Lebanese, as in the case of Said Akl, 
these attempts have been not only unsuccessful but also offensive to Lebanese Muslims and 
Christians.  This has been particularly true for the Greek Orthodox, who cherish their native 
language from pre-Islamic Arabia to the Quran to the present as sacred. 
Given the importance of language to the arguments concerning Lebanese identity, the 
student participants were asked whether they considered spoken Lebanese to be spoken 
Arabic.  Just more than half the respondents (152; 52.8%) answered that spoken Lebanese is 
spoken Arabic (see Table 22.19), nearly the same results as those for the question of Arab 
identity.  However, the percentage might have been greater had the respondents been asked if 
spoken Lebanese is the same as formal Arabic.  As mentioned previously, differences exist 
between formal and spoken Arabic based on the concept of diglossia.  Regardless, however, 
the questions remain as to whether 50% of the students or civilians in Britain or America (or 
any other country) would deny that they speak English and whether such denial would or 
should result in as much controversy.   
 
The Name Change Theory 
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Names can indicate the ethnic identity of a person or a group of people.  To determine 
whether the ethno-linguistic first names of the students deviated from those of their fathers, 
the university students were asked to give their fathers’ first names and their own first names.  
Analyzing the differences between the fathers’ and students’ first names was a reliable way to 
evaluate the variations.  For confidentiality purposes, students were not asked for their last or 
family names.  
In terms of their fathers’ names, of the 252 students who responded, 65.1% reported 
that their fathers had Arabic first names; 22.9% reported that their fathers had French first 
names; and 6.3% reported English names (see Table 22.20).  In terms of the students’ first 
names, Table 22.21 shows that the number of English and French first names increased.  Of 
the 274 students who responded, only 51.1 % had Arabic names, a difference of 14% from 
one generation to the next.  Thus, although most of the students’ fathers’ names were Arabic, 
with a few being French, the students’ first names were mostly non-Arabic, most often 
English, even though Lebanon is an Arab country.  
In and of itself, such a change may not be indicative of Maronite identity deviation.  
Yet, combined with the information presented in this thesis, the percentage of name changes 
in just one generation should be considered supporting documentation for that premise.  The 
significance of such a change may be seen more clearly if one transposes that number on 
another culture (i.e., if half of the British had non-English names or if the French or Italians 
had nonnative names).  
In addition, students not only had English–Arabic shared names but also spelled their 
names with the English spelling.  In other words, names such as Paul and Joseph were not 
written in their respective Arabic translations, Boulos and Yusuf, but were spelled either in 
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English or in exact phonetic Arabic translations.  These data were further confounded by the 
fact that many of the first names originated from languages such as Latin and Greek. 
To illustrate the effect of the transient nature of Lebanese identity on name changes, a 
case study of the Atallah family was conducted.  Jean and Therese Atallah, Maronite 
Christians, were born in the early 1930s.  At that time, Lebanon was still a French mandate.  
As stated previously, Maronite Christians, in particular, had an affinity for French 
administration and for the French cultural influence on Lebanon.  Both Jean and Therese were 
given French names by their parents (both of whom had Arabic names) to distinguish them as 
Christians.  
Lebanon gained its independence from France in 1943, which seemed to correlate with 
a change in naming conventions.  By 1954, Lebanon considered itself to be an Arab country 
and was a member of the Arab League.  Among other cultural phenomena, Arabic literature 
began to flourish.
1
  According to Jean and Therese Atallah, they decided to move away from 
French names and give their children Arabic names.
2
  They had 10 children, 6 boys and 4 
girls.  Their first child, born in 1954, was named Nehme (meaning “gift from God” in 
Arabic).  Nehme was followed by Nabil, Kamil, Fares, Mona, Eid, Toufik, Zeina, Bushr, and 
Aida—all Arabic names.  
Nehme Atallah’s first child was born in 1982.  In this year, the Lebanese Civil War 
was raging; the Arab identity of Lebanon was in question; and the Maronite Christians 
opposed the Palestinian cause, which they deemed an Arab problem.  Nehme named his 
children Jean, Paul, and Anthony, spelling his first son’s name in French and the other two 
sons’ names in English.  Additionally, Nehme stated that if he were to immigrate to the 
                                                          
1
 Franjieh, personal communication, April 6, 2007 (see Appendix 13). 
2
 Therese Atallah, personal communication, September 29, 2008 (see Appendix 24). 
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United States, he would change the spelling of his last name to Atalia so it would appear to be 
Italian American rather than Arabic.
1
 
Thus, over the course of 50 years and four generations, the ethnic first names of the 
Atallah family changed significantly: Family members’ first names changed from Arabic to 
French, from French back to Arabic, and then from Arabic to English in the present 
generation (see Appendix 23).  The case of the Atallah family was just one example of the 
changing aspects inside Maronite Christian Lebanese identity.  Inasmuch as names can 
indicate the identity of a person or a group of people, this information reflects the premise that 
the Lebanese Christian identity is sometimes unclear, even transient.   
DNA Studies Concerning Phoenicianism 
 The February 1970 issue of National Geographic featured an article entitled, 
“Lebanon, Little Bible Land in the Crossfire of History,” written by Lebanese American 
William Ellis.  The article showed the problems the Lebanese had with identity 40 years ago, 
which were similar to the current identity dilemma.  In most of Ellis’s narrative, he seemed to 
be reporting about a country with a solid Arab identity; but also he stated, “The Lebanese I 
found cherish this heritage.  Many speak of themselves not as Arabs or Moslems or Christians 
or even as Lebanese but with emphatic pride as Phoenicians” (1970, p. 257).  Ellis shared that 
the Phoenicians were Semitic Arabs and that “as long as 4,000 years ago, people were coming 
into the country from other areas.  At that time they came from somewhere on the Arabian 
Peninsula.  They called themselves Canaanites; the Greeks called them Phoenicians” (1970, p. 
257).  He continued, “Could I then claim to be ‘part Phoenician’ . . . a heady thought indeed” 
(p. 258).  In addition, Ellis interviewed a Lebanese soldier who spoke of “those of our people 
who feel that Arab unity must come before all else” (1970, p. 245).  In the article, he 





discussed the points in history when the “procession of invaders [began]” (p. 257) in 
Lebanon, giving the impression that this little nation had a very complex identity. Thus, the 
article showed the decades of obtuseness concerning Lebanese identity on the part of the 
Lebanese themselves.  
After such occurrences as the Tā’if Agreement, which was to end Lebanese identity 
confusion, the Maronite affirmation of the Lebanese Arab identity in 2003 (Hourani, 2003), 
and so forth, the issues of Lebanese identity should have been resolved.  Still, as the reader 
may have concluded from the field experts’ and students’ interviews and surveys, Lebanon 
has continued to have an ongoing identity crisis.  Although a number people in present-day 
Lebanon are prepared to let the Phoenician identity issue rest, the Maronites have remained 
committed to their belief that they are Phoenician by ancestry.  For many Lebanese in general, 
the issue of Phoenician identity has become a tiresome one.   
Thus, few Lebanese showed interest in an October 2004 issue of National 
Geographic, 34 years after Ellis’s story on Lebanon first appeared in 1970.  In the October 
2004 issue, editors featured DNA samples taken from the Lebanese who lived along the 
coastline and in the ports, the areas believed to be where the Phoenicians once flourished.  In 
his article, “Who Were the Phoenicians?”  Gore (2004) stated that DNA tests were completed 
on ancient Phoenician remains and compared to the DNA of the present-day Lebanese coastal 
dwellers, particularly the fishermen.  American geneticist Spencer Wells and Lebanese 
geneticist Peter Zalloua conducted the tests.  According to the article, the scientists found that 
“most, but not all, samples indicate Middle Eastern or African origins” (Gore, 2004, p. 48).  
Perhaps more significant, Gore (2004) reported that “modern Lebanese people share a 
genetic identity going back thousands of years” (p. 48).  Somewhat astonishing were the 
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findings that the people who believed they were descendants of the seafaring Phoenicians 
showed no genetic relationship to them.  Furthermore, the geneticists explained,  
the Sea Peoples apparently had no significant genetic impact on populations in the 
Levant . . . the people living today along the coast where the Sea Peoples would have 
interbred have similar Y-chromosome patterns to those living inland.  They are 
basically all one people.  (Gore, 2004, p. 48) 
  
Therefore, the people who were believed to be the seafaring Phoenicians apparently “didn’t 
seem to interbreed much.  They seem to have stuck mostly to themselves,” (Gore, 2004, p. 
49).  According to Zalloua (as quoted in Gore, 2004, p. 48), a Lebanese Christian himself, the 
results were support for the belief that “both Muslim and Christian Lebanese populations 
share an ancient genetic heritage.”  Zalloua continued, “Maybe now we can finally put some 
of our internal struggles to rest,” (as quoted in Gore, 2004, p. 49).  
 Based on the information they provided, the older Lebanese experts seemed to 
understand that Phoenician identity for Lebanon, especially contemporarily, is a weak claim.  
However, a major disparity was found between what the older Lebanese intellectuals 
understood about their Phoenician identity and what the younger, current generation of 
students understood.  The findings of this study indicate that the students’ adherence to a 
present Phoenician identity racially, ethnically, and culturally is not based in solid fact. 
Discussion 
Putting the identity question into perspective, especially concerning the Maronites and 
the effect of identity on CMR must be accomplished prior to delving into the next issues 
affecting CMR: the causes and possible preventions of the Lebanese Civil War and the 
possibilities for such conflicts in the future (Chapter 6).  Therefore, this section has been 
divided into three parts: First, the possible reasons for Maronite identity separatism have been 
given.  Second, the effects of those issues on CMR have been examined.  Third, a 
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psychosocial historical perspective of the Maronites has been included to understand their 
separatist position concerning identity. 
Maronite Identity Separatism in Present-Day Lebanon 
 The field expert respondents and university students offered more emphasis and 
diverse viewpoints regarding Lebanese identity issues, perhaps more than any other in this 
thesis.  This writer hoped to uncover and address several issues in this thesis.  The first issue 
was whether, based on fact rather than on rumor, the Lebanese disagree on identity.  The 
findings indicate that the Lebanese do have a major, contentious identity issue.  Study 
findings also revealed that the Maronites are the primary group that oppose  an Arab identity 
for themselves and for Lebanon.  Furthermore, the Maronites do not seem to have a firm 
scientific argument for rejecting Arabism for Phoenicianism.  However, nearly all of the field 
experts acknowledged their Arab identity; they were not completely adverse to the Maronite 
rejection of the same.  It appears that with their level of conviviality, if the identity issue was 
left to them to solve, they would solve it amicably.  Study findings also revealed a 
discrepancy between the views of the upper middle-aged and elderly respondents and the 
views of the younger university student respondents.  The university students, who were 
predominantly Maronites, identified themselves as Phoenician.  Thus, the issue of Arab 
identity has remained a significant  point of contention between the Christians and Muslims 
and among the Christians themselves. 
 The Maronite denial is contradictory to the evidence that they are Arabs (Hourani, 
1992; Matar, 2008; Pacini, 1998) and not the “rose among thorns” (the thorns being their 
Muslim and non-Maronite countrymen; Khalifah, 1997 p. 4) as Pope Leo X referred to them 
in the 16th century.  During a historic visit to Lebanon, even Pope John Paul II questioned the 
more subtle and acceptable notion of pluralism of the people of Lebanon.  Muslims pointed 
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out that the Pope asked the Maronites “to merge with their Arab identity.”
1
  Furthermore, 
regarding Lebanese Christian Arab identity,  
Pope John Paul II challenged the concept of “pluralism” by some Christian Maronites 
of Lebanon, that is, a source of basic differences with their Muslim counterparts.  
Although he acknowledged that “each specific culture is still characterized by the 
religious and profane contributions of different civilizations that followed each other 
on their soil,” he adopted the view that “in all nations and cultures where they 
disseminated, Christians don’t demarcate from other peoples, neither by their country, 
nor by their language nor by their habits . . . They conform to local customs in 
clothing, food and the daily existence, even as they reveal the extraordinary and truly 
paradoxical laws that regulate their way of life.”  (Dagher, 2001, pp. 194–195) 
 
Other Lebanese Christians, including the second largest Christian denomination in the 
country, the Greek Orthodox,  
shared this view (of the pope) but they did not expect the Roman pontiff to call for the 
“re-Arabization” of his Catholic flocks in the Orient.  They were pleased.  Muslims 
were contented too, by the call for a greater solidarity with the Arab world (Dagher, 
2001, p. 195)  
 
They had previously been “disconcerted” (Dagher, 2001, p. 195) with the  inactivity of the 
Vatican in addressing Catholic Christian Arabicity in Lebanon.  Although the Maronites 
somehow knew prior to the Synod “that the Holy See intended to urge them to adopt a policy 
of harmony with their Arab environment, they were startled because they did not expect the 
Roman pontiff to be that categorical in the terms he used” (Dagher, 2001,  p. 195).  
One month after the pope’s synod and visit to Lebanon, the Papal Nuncio in Lebanon, 
Pablo Puente, revealed that “it was not easy for the pope to assert the Arabicity of Lebanon 
but when he made up his mind, he spoke it out” (Dagher, 2001, p. 195).  Despite his fairly 
strong urging that the Maronites merge with their neighbors’ Arabness, as well as the urging 
of the other Lebanese Christian and Muslim communities, the pope’s call was met with 
Maronite skepticism.  Indeed, just a few days before the pope’s arrival in Beirut, then 
Maronite Bishop Rai’ (later appointed patriarch on March 25, 2011) declared that not just he 
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 N.  Musawi, personal communication, August 5, 2005 (see Appendix 16). 
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but Lebanese Christians in general (an inaccurate assumption) did “not agree on the content 
and the methods to achieve that goal” (Dagher, 2001, p. 195).  Despite the jubilation the 
Muslims, Greek Orthodox, and other Christian communities of Lebanon felt as a result of the 
pope’s visit, the Maronites changed their stance regarding Arab identity very little.   
During the years this writer spent researching the crisis of identity in present-day 
Lebanon, he found that, when confronted with the fact that the pope himself urged the 
Maronites to recognize their Arabicity, the Maronites replied that the pope needed to make 
those statements to appease the Muslims and other Christians of Lebanon; that he may not 
have truly meant what he said or that he doesn’t really grasp the issue.  Although the pope’s 
urging might have had some impact on the Maronites, they nonetheless continued to assert 
that they are racially, ethnically, and culturally Phoenician, Syriac, Francophone, or European 
rather than Arab (Hajjar, 2002; Mrad, 2008).  As has been shown, based on the information 
presented thus far, the Maronites have maintained their position, in part, due to their great 
pride in Phoenician identity association and to their attempts to avoid the negative 
associations attributed to Arabicity.       
Prior to the civil war, Maronite Christians were a sectarian community invested in the 
creation of a very special, secular Lebanese nation distinct from the neighboring Middle 
Eastern countries.  The drive of the Maronites was based upon a set of historical and 
perceived threats that were the basis for a communal identity that existed upon both the 
spiritual and physical levels.  Religion was also the direct connection between the Maronites 
and Western allies, particularly with the Vatican and France.  Additionally, the Islamic 
background of Arab nationalism only served to reinforce Maronite religious identity.  
Recognizing the need for a larger Lebanese identity extending beyond their own communal 
one, the Maronites constructed a national identity of ancestry from the Phoenicians.  This  was 
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a“Mediterranean” identity based shakily upon Phoenician merchants who did establish towns 
and small trading posts on Lebanese shores many centuries earlier.  Maronites during the 19th 
and 20th centuries revived and glamorized this identity to serve as a unifying premise for all 
Lebanese.  However, as stated this identity was problematic and its flaws detectable, even 
when restricted to only the Maronites, particularly considering the Syrian origin of St. Maron 
himself.  Despite these problems, this Phoenician notion has proved resilient within the 
Maronite community simply because it presents a understanding  somewhat grounded in 
historical fact upon which a nation distinct from Muslims, Arabs, or Western European 
history may be built. 
Maronite Issues and Implications for CMR  
The perceptions of Arabicity among the Lebanese have important implications for 
present-day Lebanon and its diaspora, one of the most important of which is its effect on 
CMR.  When Lebanese Maronites deny an Arab identity, CMR is affected negatively.  This 
occurs for several reasons.  First, the field expert respondents, as well as the available 
literature, suggested that this denial of Arabism means the Maronites, formerly the largest and 
most powerful Lebanese community, consider themselves not only different but also superior 
(Cedarland, n.d.; Coalition of American Assyrians and Maronites, 2001).  Thus, the Maronite 
belief comes across as bigoted ethnocentrism (Abu Al Nasr, 2001).  By insisting that they are 
not Arabs, the Maronites offend the Muslims and other Christians, who actually feel loathed 
by the Maronites due in part to the extent  to which the Maronites go to deny the very identity 
the other communities uphold.  The perceived supremacy of the Maronite community over 
that of the Lebanese Muslims as arbiters of modern Western culture, particularly of coveted 
technologies and sciences, becomes fuel for the conflict.  This is a dual perception employed 
by Maronites to portray themselves both as superior to Lebanese Muslims and as equal to the 
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Europeans and to perpetuate as proof within their minds of their Maronite uniqueness, their 
importance to Lebanese culture, and, most important, their unremitting isolation relative to 
other Lebanese communities.  
The Muslims are especially indignant about this.  They point out that some Maronites 
who deny Arabicity work in Arab/Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia (a pillar of 
Arab/Muslim identity), where they make fortunes and openly admit they are able to manage 
this handily because of their Arabic language and culture (Llewellyn, 2010).  The Maronites 
admit to being treated as fellow Arabs in countries such as Saudi Arabia and to being 
considered part of the larger Arab family.  Thus, the Maronites’ willingness to utilize their 
Arabic skills for economic gain yet continue not only to decline but also to denounce Arab 
identity, culture, and even the language, is offensive to the Muslims of Lebanon.  However, 
several of the field experts, though they identify as Arab, had little issue with the Maronite 
position.  Sammak felt the Arab denial was “completely understandable” and that such a 
position should not be a problem for the Muslims.  
However, it is not simply the denial of Arabicity by the Maronites that is harmful to 
CMR but the firmness  with which they deny Arabicity.  For example, the Christian envoy to 
the Muslim communities of Lebanon, Samir Franjieh,
1
 stated, 
At one time Christians tried to preserve a separate identity through the civil war.  Then 
the Muslims reacted to the Christians wanting to be separate because we took them by 
surprise.  The Christians made an alliance with Israel in order to define themselves as 
different.  
 
The Muslims of Lebanon were infuriated with this alliance with Israel, formed in part to 
define the Maronites as different.  Nearly all of the Lebanese Muslims supported the 
Palestinian plight in theory, and many did so through social welfare programs and military 
support.  Because of the alliance with Israel, the Maronites, who were in power during the 
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 Franjieh, personal communication, March 8, 2005 (see Appendix 13). 
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civil war, fought against the Palestinians (Abi-Ebser, 2010; Smith, 2006).  Knowing the 
injustices suffered by the Palestinians at the hands of the Israelis, the Muslims detested the 
Maronite cooperation with the Israelis (Dawisha, 2003).  Thus, another reason for the 
Maronite rejection of Arabism and the goal of maintaining a separate identity was amplified 
within the Arab–Israeli conflict.  
 Nevertheless, the Lebanese Civil War ended two decades ago and so, part of 
the problem is the Muslim and other Christian communities inability to put this issue  to rest,  
is as much of an issue.  Bishop Ghazal and Fr. Moussa lamented the duration of the identity 
struggle and are accepting of the Maronite identity differentiation.  Aside from race, ethnicity, 
and culture, Arab identity is also intertwined with Arab rights and Arab causes, principally the 
Palestinian cause (Abu-Rabi, 2004).  Had the Maronites stayed neutral during the Lebanese 
Civil War, as the Greek Orthodox did for the most part,
1
 the Muslims might have found this 
less offensive than the Maronites’ actively seeking and participating in the Israeli destruction 
of Lebanon.  In the mid-20th century, Pierre Gemayel, founder of the Kataeb (Phalangist 
party) and the father of two Lebanese presidents, stated publicly that the Maronites of 
Lebanon were “ready to make a deal with the devil itself,” (as quoted in Nassib, 1983, p. 62), 
a clear reference to Israel, to maintain this separate, non-Arab identity, inter alia.  The lengths 
to which the Maronites are willing to go and the manner in which they act to distance 
themselves from Arabicity hurt CMR (Abi-Ebser, 2010; Matar, 2008).  As Franjieh stated, the 
Maronites were willing to go to lengths for a separate identity.  Yet twenty years after the 
Civil War ending and the Maronites holding to a separate identity has not caused a recurrence 
of war or conflict.  
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 Fr. Wehbe, personal communication, April 6, 2006 (see Appendix 24). 
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 Another reason for the Maronites’ denial is the connotations many of them have for 
the term Arab.  They feel the word sums up notions of pre- and anti-modernity, 
backwardness, Bedouins, and the heresy of Islam—all characteristics with which they do not 
want to be associated.  This writer held a teleconference with Lebanese Maronite Archbishop 
George Saad Abi-Younes on July 6, 2011.  The Arab Spring was raging in Libya and 
elsewhere in the Middle East at the time.  During the conference, the archbishop was asked 
about the Maronite uneasiness with being associated with Arab identity.  The archbishop 
answered, “Do you see Gaddafi [referring to former Libyan president Moammar Gaddafi]?  
That’s what I mean.  That’s why we don’t want to be Arabs.  We’re not Arabs!”  The 
archbishop went on to describe how Gaddafi’s unusual appearance, with his strange affect, 
wardrobe, and mannerisms, was an Arab embarrassment, something with which the Maronites 
did not want to be associated. 
  In the eyes of some Lebanese, Arabicity is a contrast to modernity (Karam, 2006a).  
Thus, because of the Maronites’ separatism and history of leaning toward the West, as seen 
with the Crusaders, France, and presently the United States, they have separated themselves 
from an Arab identity.  Instead, the Maronites prefer to promote the idea that Lebanon is 
modern and similar to America, France, and Britain, which they view as symbols of 
modernity.  For 7 years, this writer resided in the Christian District of Jounieh Lebanon in the  
pre-dominantly Maronite Yesu Al Malik or “Christ the King” neighborhood of the village 
Zouk Mosbeh.  When this writer first arrived and for many months later, many Maronites 
were anxious to show him the many fast food restaurants in Lebanon, including McDonald’s, 
Burger King, Subway, and Dunkin’ Donuts.  They boasted about the American restaurants 
that existed in Lebanon in a clear attempt to show that their country was similar to America.   
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 The Maronite denial of the use of the Arabic language, which is supported by very few 
scholarly sources, is also difficult for Lebanese Muslims and Christians to comprehend from 
sociological and academic perspectives.  For the Muslims, Arabic is the language of the 
Quran and of God himself.  As such, the Maronite disavowal of the language, rather than 
pride in it, is offensive (Dagher, 2001).  
One quite surprising issue is that, to the Maronites, the word Arab means Muslim,
1
 
despite the existence of Arab Christians well before the emergence of Islam and the 
subsequent Arab embrace of the that religion.  Although the Western lay person seems to 
confuse the terms Arab and Muslim as being synonymous, the indigenous people of the Arab 
Middle East should know the difference and be willing to explain the nuance between Arab 
and Muslim.  Thus, the Maronites should realize that the term is not synonymous with 
Muslim.  
This denial of Arabism to avoid being labeled a Muslim is exacerbated in the 
diasporas as mentioned in the case of the Atallah family.  For example, the official position of 
the U.S. Maronite Church for both the 2000 and 2010 national censuses was that Maronites 
should register as Syriacs, not as Arabs.
2
  Indeed, this writer witnessed the urgings to register 
as Syriac in his own parish of Our Lady of Lebanon Maronite Catholic Church in Waterbury, 
Connecticut, throughout the pre-census months of May and April 2010.  There, as well as 
across the United States, Maronite community members state they are not Arab.  Many 
Maronites change their family names to ensure they are not thought of as Muslim (see the 
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 Eid, personal communication, June 12, 2006 (see Appendix 24); Khalil, personal 
communication, February 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7). 
2
 Msgr. Gregory Mansour, personal communication, April 6, 2010 (see Appendix 24). 
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section of Name Change Theory in chapter 4).
1
  They distance themselves from Islam and 
Muslims in what appears to be an attempt to earn acceptance (Gabriel, 2006; Phares, 1997).  
In response to the Maronite Eparchy Choir Bishop Joseph Kaddo’s (2000) letter 
urging the Maronites to register as Syriac, the American Maronite Union went a step further.  
In a letter dated April 11, 2000, union leadership wrote the following:   
To all members of the Maronite community in the United States, as well as to all 
Lebanese Christians from Aramaic–Syriac descent.  The Eparchy of the Saint Maron 
of Brooklyn issued a historical call to all of us to identify as "Syriac" in the ongoing 
US Census.  We, as American Maronite Union, cannot but praise our spiritual 
leadership and our Church for this crucial move.  This ethnic self-identification will 
finally allow us to emerge as a proud community, reconciled with its history and 
confident in its American future.  The term Syriac (Syriani) is not Syrian!  (Suri).  
Syriac is our historical identity; Syriac is our historical language which we still use 
partially in our services.  But more importantly, in the current political and 
institutional frameworks, it will allow our community finally to distinguish itself from 
the Arab-American community (American Maronite Union, 2000a).   
 
However, many of the Maronite parishioners “don’t even know what Syriac is, but we are 
urging them to register that way.”
2
  On the other hand, Lebanese American Reverend 
Archimandrite Joseph Haggar of St. Basil the Great Melkite Catholic Church in Rhode Island 
stated that his Arab parishioners register as Arab Americans and are supported in doing so.
3
  
 Regardless, based on the field experts’ information and the available literature, the 
Lebanese want to de-confessionalize and secularize their society.  This being said then the 
Maronites, who have a long history in Lebanon should be accepted for what their 
consciousness tells them about their identity.   
 Another issue, according to Mohammed Sammak,
4
 for the Lebanese Maronites’ denial 
of Arabicity is out of disdain with several Arab countries in terms of their roles in the long 
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 Rev. Archimandrite Joseph Haggar, personal communication, April 18, 2010 (see Appendix 
23). 
4
 Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12). 
221 
 
Lebanese Civil War.  These Christians feel these Arab countries failed to offer much 
assistance in defending the Lebanese during the long war.  They believe these predominantly 
Muslim Arab countries of the Arab Middle East favored the Muslim militias and communities 
of Lebanon at the Christians’ expense throughout the civil war.  Those countries helped 
neither financially or militarily.  They also did not aid in the production of an effective plan to 
end the conflict, according to Sammak.   
Historical, Psychosocial Formations of Maronite Identity  
  Assessing the Maronites’ reasoning of  a separate identity is cumbersome for several 
reasons, one of which is the  lack of intellectualizing their separate identity theory.  An 
examination and evaluation of the Maronites through a historical psychosocial prism may be 
helpful in comprehending their preference of non-Arab status and their insistence upon with 
the more abstract Phoenician/Assyrian identity. 
 In the early centuries of Christianity, the Maronites were considered heretics.  Their 
brand of Christianity was called “a wicked heresy” (Bin Talal, 1998, p.67).  The Maronites 
were believed to have left the Orontes Valley of Syria for Lebanon because of Byzantine 
Christian, not Muslim, persecution (Mahfouz, 2009; Parry & Hinnells, 1999).  Therefore, 
early on, the Maronites were considered separate and different from fellow Christians.  Oddly 
enough, when the Muslim Arabs entered Syria (including Lebanon at that time), the 
Maronites welcomed their arrival because of the Maronites’ feelings of oppression under the 
Byzantine Empire and because of their Arab and Aramean Arab ethnicity and culture, which 
were similar to those of the Muslim Arabs (Bin Talal, 1998; Trimingham, 1990). 
 According to Franjieh,
1
 the Lebanese Christians, particularly the Maronites, have a 
historical memory.  Although the average Lebanese people may not be consciously thinking 
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of the early history of the Christian–Muslim conflict, nonetheless, they know the conflict 
exists and subconsciously use it as a reason for the Maronite desire for identity separatism.  
For example, St. John of Damascus, a high official in the Umayyad Empire and a prominent 
and admired saint among the Middle Eastern Christians, wrote some very disparaging 
narratives about Islam and Muslims.
1
  His negative view of Islam is known and is considered 
credible, thus negatively affecting CMR in present-day Lebanon and providing support for the 
Maronite insistence on a separate identity.  
 A few centuries later, Maronite support of the crusader invasion of the Arab Middle 
East again resulted in separating the Maronites from the other Arab and Muslim peoples of 
the Middle East.  The Arab Middle East Empire was in decline at the time of the Crusader 
invasion (Madden, 2005).  Most Maronites—certainly the religious hierarchy, leaders, and 
much of the civilian population—supported the crusaders in their invasion.  Most other 
Christian denominations, as well as the Muslims, suffered at the hands of the Crusaders 
(Paine, 2006).  Thus, Maronite support of the crusaders is another reason they may have 
developed their feelings of being separate and different (Bin Talal, 1998; Parry & Hinnells, 
1999).  
 Since the initial Crusader invasion of the Middle East, many well-known Christian 
philosophers, including St. Thomas Aquinas, have belittled Islam as an illegitimate faith.  
According to St. Thomas, Islam was a violent religion that talked about sensual rewards and 
produced no miracles (Stangroom & Garvey, 2006).  Therefore, according to St. Thomas and 
other Christian philosophers, Islam was irrelevant theologically at best and a wicked heresy at 
worst.  Yet these junctures in history are centuries old and hopefully can be seen in that 
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context by the Maronites’ Muslim counterparts as such as should the Maronites regarding 
century old Muslim polemics of Christians.   
Beginning around the 17th century, the Maronites began developing what later 
became very close relations with France and the Vatican to the dismay of the other Christian 
communities and the Muslims (Baily, 2003; Pacini, 1998).  As mentioned, early French 
explorers called the Maronites “a rose among thorns” and “anything but Arab” (Khalifah, 
1997, p. 4).  Napoleon himself stated that the Maronites were “French from time immemorial” 
(Khalifah, 1997, p. 4).  
In 1860, the Maronites were massacred by Druze warlords and fighters in Lebanon.  
Inasmuch as the Druze believed in their own Arabicity and had the support of other Arab 
Muslim groups, this violence added fuel to the Maronite anti-Arab, pro-Phoenician identity 
choice.  Directly following the Maronite massacres at the hands of the Druze, France 
increased its involvement in Lebanon, particularly with the Maronite Christians (Fawaz, 
1994).  Subsequently, protected by a powerful Western empire, the Maronites with their ideas 
of separatism began to focus on a religious and geographic area, Mt. Lebanon.  
 In the early 20th century, an Arab awakening resulted in an Arab nationalist 
movement (Abu-Rabi‘, 2004).  Although many Arab Christians, including the Maronites, 
were founders of this movement, the Maronites soon began to reject Arab nationalism for 
Phoenicianism.  During the presidency of Gamal Abdul-Nasser of Egypt, with his Arab 
nationalist philosophy, only the Maronites and perhaps a few others in the greater Middle East 
rejected this philosophy (Abu-Rabi‘, 2004).  Thus, the Maronites’ history of acting differently 
may be the reason they believe they are different from their fellow Lebanese and from the 
communities of the Arab Middle East.  
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 The Maronites did not support some socio- political causes identified with the Arab 
Middle East.  As Franjieh
1
 stated, the Maronites wanted so desperately to forge a separate 
identity that they sided with the Israelis in their attacks against the Palestinians and even 
fought with Israel during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon.  The Maronites, as well as other 
Christians, felt that the other predominantly Muslim Arab countries of the Middle East 
favored the Muslim militias and communities of Lebanon at their expense throughout the civil 
war (Harris, 2006).  Yet for Sammak,
 2
 a Sunni Muslim, and others, the Christian disgust with 
the neighboring Arab countries and their continued refutation of Arabism was “completely 
understandable.”  
 Additionally, the Arabs lost several wars to Israel which greatly decreased enthusiasm 
for Arab Nationalism (Abu-Rabiʻ, 2004).  For the charismatic Maronites, being associated 
with Arab Nationalism is an association with a loser.      
 The Maronites have also claimed that they are fighting for their survival (Abu Al Nasr, 
2001; Belt, 2009).  Specifically, they point out that they are minorities in the Arab Muslim 
Middle East.  Although they once were the majority population in Lebanon and held the most 
political power, they now feel that Muslims are encroaching upon them and making them a 
minority in a land that they believe is their own.  They also fear, whether accurate or 
exaggerated, that radical Islam is intolerant, even violent, and that they will be marginalized 
and perhaps eradicated (Belt, 2009).  They fear that one day they will be living under Islamic 
law (Grafton, 2003). 
Conclusion 
The field experts’ information and the data gleaned from the university students and 
the available literature have shown that the fallout from Maronite identity separatism and the 
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Muslim and other Christians’ inability to accept the Maronites identity consciousness, is a 
main part the collateral reasons CMR has not improved in postwar Lebanon.  These reasons 
are political, educational, economic, religious, and geographic.  Politically speaking, because 
of separatism, a feeling of being besieged and foreign interest, the Maronites have sought 
Western help in the form of French, European, American, and even Israeli intervention rather 
than political assistance from neighboring Arab countries.  This has resulted in political 
conflict with Lebanese Muslims (Laqueur & Ruben, 2008; Lewis, 2004).  In regards to 
education, the Maronites have sought French and American educational systems and enlisted 
their children in them rather than in the Arabic/Lebanese system (Dagher, 2001).  With the 
Muslims in general unable to do the same for financial reasons, the result was envy and 
neither the promotion of unity nor camaraderie with their Christian countrymen.  
Economically, Lewis (2004) explained that separatism “was easily explained by the equally 
well-known fact that Christians were rich and Muslims were poor and that, consequently, 
Muslim hostility to Christians . . . was socioeconomic in origin,” (p. 284).  Religiously, 
Maronites have often sought the separation of church and state, whereas “for Muslims 
religion is not, as for Christians, concerned with one part of life, leaving the rest to the state . . 
. its ruling institution is Church and State in one,” (Lewis, 2004, p. 285).  The Maronites have 
tended to emigrate more than the Muslims have.  They were also displaced geographically at 
a higher rate than other Lebanese during the long Lebanese Civil War (Dagher, 2001; Harik, 
1999). 
 At one time, the Maronites were major progressives in the awakening of Arab identity 
and its renaissance.  They made advances in Arabic literature and translation.  They existed in 
the Arab Middle East before Islam as Arabs and proto-Semitic Arabs (Hitti, 1967; Salibi, 
1988).  However, although they were among the founders of Arab nationalism, to the 
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Maronites, Arab nationalism never seemed to succeed because it did not result in prosperity 
and productivity in Lebanon or in the Arab Middle East (Abu-Rabiʻ, 2004).  
For the Maronites, the Phoenicians have remained an ancient, enlightened, and exciting 
people.  They represent an ancient pride, if not fantasy, no matter how weak the connection to 
the present-day Lebanese may be.  To the Maronites, the Phoenicians traveled the 
Mediterranean, produced the alphabet, and founded the modern world.  Thus, even though the 
Maronites currently live not only in Lebanon but also in Syria, Egypt, and Palestine and 
speak, read, and write Arabic, they have refused to relinquish their Phoenician identity in part 
because it is their way out of Arabicity and Islam.   
Thus, the Maronite identity issue and the Muslim and other Christians inability to 
accept or resolve it, has continued to have an impact on Lebanese CMR, nationalism, and 
unity.  Nationalism, expounded in various theories, is heavily dependent on a group of people 
who either share or agree to share a common race, ethnicity, culture, history, and language, 
among other aspects (Macionis, 2003; Salem, n.d.).  Even though Lebanese Christians and 
Muslims are trying to solidify a continuously threatened sense of nationalism, the Maronites 
have in part contributed to the difficulty in reaching consensual nationalism because of their 
refusal to embrace any of these shared aspects.  For their part, Muslim rigidity regarding the 
association of Arabism and Islamism left little room for consensus and has not alleviated the 
Maronite concern of what may come to pass if they merge their identity with Arabicity.  Thus, 
Maronite acknowledgement or compromise regarding Arabism and the needed Muslim 
compromise and flexibility with the same, may be helpful in resolving this important aspect of 
CMR discord.  As Aoun
1
 stated, “We are a mixture of Arab, Greek, Phoenician, and other 
peoples; we are a mix, but we are still Lebanese.”  
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CHAPTER 6:  INTERFAITH ACTIVISM, PREVENTION,  
OR ANOTHER WAR 
 
The question of which community, Christian or Muslim, is more engaged with quality 
and consistency in developing and maintaining healthy CMR has been examined in this 
chapter.  In addition, because CMR deteriorated during the civil war, respondents were asked 
to theorize what could have prevented the civil war and whether another civil war could 
occur.  To assess further the effect of the factors affecting CMR in present-day Lebanon, the 
following research questions were posed to the respondents.  The rationale for each of these 
questions was explained in chapter 1 in the Methodology section:  
IQ6.  Is there any community in Lebanon that you feel does more or less or a better or 
poorer job working for positive Christian–Muslim relations?  For example, could the 
Maronite community or the Shiite community and/or its leaders be doing more?  
IQ7.  Can you think of anything in the past that, if it had been done differently, would 
have prevented the Lebanese Civil War of 1975-1991, reducing the conflict between 
the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon? 
IQ8.  Is the relationship between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon today so poor 
that it could cause another civil war? 
Fieldwork and Advocacy for Positive CMR 
The field experts were specifically asked which community was more effective in 
their advocacy and fieldwork for positive CMR.  Their answers ranged from (a) neither 
Christians nor Muslims working effectively to improve relations to (b) the Christians doing 
more to improve CMR to (c) the Muslims also doing their part but using different approaches 
to (d) the problems being caused not by either community but by the politicians and political 
parties out to bolster their power and position.  Seventeen field experts responded to IQ6 in 
their interviews.  Five spoke more about what the Christians were doing to improve CMR, 
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five gave credit for working toward CMR to both communities, and four indicated neither 
community was doing enough to make any real progress toward positive CMR.  One 
discussed some of the specific efforts of the Muslim community in working toward the goal 
of positive CMR.  Others talked more about the differences in the approaches of the two 
communities.  Interestingly, however, six of the field experts identified politics and politicians 
or government as being the problem with improving CMR regardless of the efforts of the 
Christian and Muslim communities. 
Neither Community  
Massouh
1
 believed no one was “working to their capacity” to improve relationships.  
He not only included the two communities but also reiterated his concern about the 
government and the educational system.  As an example, he cited the poor funding for the 
Center for Study of Islam and Christianity at BU.  The content of the Web site for the center 
revealed, as mentioned in chapter 3 (Political Causes of CMR Discord), confirmation of 
Massouh’s statement: The Web site was devoid of any programs and contained a plea for 
substantial funding (i.e., millions of dollars).  Salem
2
 echoed Massouh’s beliefs, noting that 
the country needed to reconcile at the national level because they could not “ignore this 
anymore.”  Somewhat more cynical in responding, Matar
3
 said, “There is no party in Lebanon 
or area of Lebanon that [publicly] calls for conflict between the Christians and the Muslims; 
everyone calls for a good relationship, but some people lie.”  He noted the calls by educators 
and politicians—including universities, schools, and political parties—to “establish good 
CMR” and believed that many institutions, including the media, and religious leaders agreed 
but that few of them, “especially the political media,” probed CMR  deeply or suggested ways 
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to progress.  Hajjar
1
 reiterated the idea that both the Christians and the Muslims were “all 
working at the same level” toward better CMR.  However, he felt that level was “inadequate.”  
Most Christian and Muslim politicians and leaders, even community members, were content 
with the way things were.  They did not desire improvement or stronger relations because 
they might “lose their individual and group power.”  
Based on the field experts’ information, the nature of the university student’s replies, 
and the available literature, CMR do not appear to have improved in postwar Lebanon.  This 
lack of improvement seemed to elicit an overall level of frustration and disgust from 
Massouh, Salem, Matar, and Hajjar and to give them reason to make blanket statements that 
the advocacy in both communities was equally incompetent.  However, although most 
conflicts involve various participants and causes, few if any contain precise parity of blame.  
Perhaps these respondents were hasty in their responses but given their diversified and 
educated, first-hand knowledge and experience of CMR conflict, their insight holds merit.  
Here again is the respondents mentioned issues such as the media, politics, and CMR, 
reemphasizing the interaction between various societal issues and CMR.  
Massouh works directly in the field of CMR advocacy.  As such, he sees first hand 
which community is more proactive than the other in terms of interfaith dialogue.  Therefore, 
his observations that neither community is pursuing communal relations to an optimal level 
should be taken seriously.  Additionally, as Greek Orthodox, Massouh and Salem must have 
felt the “marginalization” of their proud community in Lebanese society and politics (“New 
Committee and New Goal,” 2011).  The Greek Orthodox community has felt caught at times  
between the larger Muslim and Maronite communities to the point that their needs and 
interests are not given equal priority (Larkin, 2011; “New Committee and New Goal,” 2011).  
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Therefore, having been marginalized by both communities, Massouh’s and Salem’s wanting a 
stronger commitment to equitable CMR advocacy makes sense.  
Hajjar was a senior journalist at An-Nahar, the largest newspaper in Lebanon, at the 
start of this thesis.  In early 2011, he became editor-in-chief of An-Nahar, a position he 
continues to hold as of the writing of this paper.  As a newspaper editor (who has reported on 
numerous intercommunal issues) in war-torn Lebanon, he and all media staff have had to be 
extremely careful with what they publish lest they put themselves in real, not imagined, 
danger (Daou, 2001; Fisk, 2002).  Thus, Hajjar (who also belongs to a marginalized Christian 
sect of Lebanon, the Melchites) may have been exercising diplomacy in assigning equal 
responsibility for CMR weaknesses.  Yet, because of his position with An-Nahar and 
experience in his hometown, the historically mixed Christian–Muslim village of Mashgara, 
Hajjar brings real experience and understanding of CMR issues that should be considered. 
The Christian Community  
Other field experts believed that the Christians were working more effectively to 
improve CMR than their Muslim counterparts.  Halabi
1
 admired what the Christians had 
undertaken post-civil war, noting that they had been reflexive and self-critical of their 
behavior during the war.  This was especially true of the Maronites.  A Druze, Halabi noted 
that from 1983 to 1987, the Druze had been involved with “the war of the mountain.”  This 
part of the war pitted the Druze and Christians of the Shouf and Aley districts of Mt. Lebanon 
against one another (Khalaf, 2002).  Afterward, including during recent times, they wished to 
live in peace.  Halabi then cited several positive examples of Christian–Muslim reconciliation, 
including the meeting between Patriarch Sfeir and Walid Jumblat in 2001, which he 
considered “a Druze and Maronite reconciliation the likes of which had not occurred since 
                                                          
1
 Halabi, personal communication, May 26, 2005 (see Appendix 4). 
232 
 
after the war of 1860.”  A review of Lebanese history revealed that the war of 1860 
particularly involved the Druze and Maronites in a major intercommunity war against one 
another.  Thus, Halabi’s statement seemed to confirm Franjieh’s
1
 response, that the Lebanese 
maintained a problematic memory in terms of their history and that grudges were held long 
term.  In this case, the grudge dated to the war of 1860, if not earlier.   
Halabi is a respected senior member of the Arab Committee for Christian–Muslim 
Dialogue in Lebanon.  He has gone on record advocating for solid CMR.  Even though his 
Druze community was involved in very violent wars against Maronite forces and the resulting 
grudges run deep, Halabi appeared interested and able to separate past conflict from present 
advocacy.  His praise for Christian CMR efforts appeared bona fide, especially given the past 
and present acrimony these communities and their leadership have had for one another.  
Also concurring that the Christians were doing more on different levels than the 
Muslims in working toward positive CMR was Khalil.
2
  He noted that the church taught “that 
everyone is my brother, not [simply] cousin, friend, etc.”  Therefore, in general, Christians 
had official documentation that Muslims could attain salvation and that was God’s will.  
There were no exclusions; Christianity was inclusive.  Thus, Christians shared their services 
and institutions, such as schools, with the Muslims.  On the other hand, because the teachings 
of Islam stated that heaven did not exist for Christians, the Muslims were exclusive and 
normally did not share with the Christians.  Therefore, by the nature and philosophy of their 
faith, Christians were doing more to foster healthy CMR.  
El Khazen and Ghazal concurred.  According to Khazen,
3
 the Christians were always 
the ones initiating Christian–Muslim dialogue, referring to what he called “the pattern”: The 
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Maronites usually initiated the dialogue, followed by the Greek Orthodox Church and then by 
the Greek Catholics.  Ghazal
1
 cited the good work accomplished through CMR programs at 
BU (Greek Orthodox), St. Joseph’s University (Maronite), the Al Mukassed Institute (Sunni), 
and the Church of St. Paul (Melchite Greek Catholic).  
In acknowledgment of the Christian community being more involved in promoting 
positive CMR, Sammak
2
 talked about his personal efforts to help in the CMR process when 
he attended a conference at the University of Malta in 1989.  At that time, he had the 
opportunity to meet Pope John Paul II, along with other participants and scholars, some of 
whom were Lebanese.  When it was Sammak’s turn to meet the pope, he greeted the pontiff, 
announced his name, and asked, “What are you doing for Lebanon?”  The pope seemed 
surprised by the question and hesitated before answering, “You will see what I’m going to do 
for Lebanon.”  Sammak felt that his direct question to the pope, in its own small way, helped 
to inspire the pontiff to hold the Vatican Synod for Lebanon.  Only the second synod in more 
than 200 years, the meeting was convened in 1994.  
Prior to the synod, Sammak
3
 spent a month at the Vatican in preparation.  Although 
the pope barely remembered Sammak’s name, he did remember his question.  Sammak 
seemed proud that he was “one of the very first Muslims” ever to attend the pre-synod 
preparation meetings at the Vatican and to meet privately with the pope in his private 
quarters.  In addition, the Vatican assigned him, along with then Maronite Bishop (now 
patriarch since March of 2011) Beshara Rai and Greek Orthodox Bishop George Khodr, to 
prepare a draft document for implementation at the synod.  After the preparation work and the 
synod itself, Sammak reported that many of the Muslim communities of the Arab Middle East 
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had criticized him harshly because of his close work with the Vatican and with Christians in 
general.  The criticism from the Lebanese Muslim community had been mild or “controlled,” 
he stated.  However, the non-Lebanese Muslims had been very critical and angry.  He had 
even been called kafer, a “nonbeliever” in God, one of the worst insults in the Arab Middle 
East.  This resentment of his work with the Vatican lasted until after the attacks against the 
United States on September 11, 2001.  After those events, “the Muslim world realized that 
many Christians did not know what true Islam was,” he stated.  His former Muslim critics 
then conceded that Sammak had been correct and that the Muslims should initiate dialogues 
with the Christians to explain “what Islam really is.”  After years of being criticized by the 
larger Arab Muslim world, Sammak believed he was now better understood and was viewed 
as a visionary.  Throughout this criticism, Sammak, a Sunni Muslim, maintained his 
admiration and advocacy of Lebanese Christians and called Lebanon “a Christian need.”  He 
stated,  “Lebanon would not be Lebanon without Christians.”  Therefore, his recognition that 
the Christians were at the forefront of CMR efforts was a valid assessment.     
Sammak
1
 reiterated that the situation had now changed and that Muslims were also 
initiating dialogues to improve CMR, just as the Christians were doing.  He reported that 
Qatar was funding the building of churches by its foreign Christian residents and that the king 
of Bahrain had donated land for the Christians to use in building churches.  He also noted that 
Catholic churches now existed in Kuwait.  All of these occurrences were also indicative of the 
positive notes Sammak had given in his response to IQ1.   
Like Sammak and El Khazen, Gemayel
2
 believed that the Lebanese Christians, rather 
than their Muslim counterparts, were more proactive in initiating and maintaining Christian–
Muslim dialogue.  He credited the Christians with thinking more about the problems and their 
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solutions.  As an example, he cited—albeit somewhat timidly—that it was the Christians who 
had realized that “federalism [wouldn’t] work.” 
Thus, both Christian and Muslim field experts agreed that Christians have done more 
than their Muslim counterparts in initiating CMR dialogue.  Of note in the respondents 
answers to IQ6 were the papal synod for Lebanon and the Christian–Muslim dialogue 
seminars.   
Four of the six respondents are full active members in Lebanese CMR working 
groups, which suggests their observation that Christians were doing more was genuine 
although Christian efforts had begun to wane in recent years.  With Christians and Muslims 
together recognizing and admiring Christian efforts, it is hoped that the Lebanese can peak the 
Christians’ interest in returning to their role of solid advocacy to increase chances for 
successful CMR dialogue.   
Of note, however, is the dichotomy that exists in the Maronite community.  In chapter 
5, the Maronites were shown as seeking and holding a separate identity.  At the same time, as 
shown in this chapter, they were seen as the most engaged in CMR dialogue.  Thus, if the 
identity issue can be consolidated within renewed Christian-supported dialogue, CMR may 
benefit.   
Both Christians and Muslims   
Some of the field experts believed that both the Christian and the Muslim communities 
were working toward positive CMR at the same level.  Bou Habib
1
 noted the existence of a 
committee for dialogue in Lebanon, a group of Arabs working for Christian–Muslim 
propagation and dialogue.  As mentioned, field experts such as Sammak, Halabi, and Ghazal 
are active members of this group.  He also indicated other organizations exist that are working 
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on CMR, including political parties with their “secular inclinations.”  Mouawad
1
 believed that 
no one person or community was doing any more or less to promote CMR than any other 
person or community.  However, according to El Khazen,
2
 although the Muslim community 
also initiated and maintained dialogue, they did so less frequently.  Husseini
3
 indicated that 
everyone wanted the same goal, “a free and sovereign Lebanon and brotherly Christian–
Muslim relations.”  However, everyone had a different way to achieve those goals.  Franjieh
4
 
echoed Husseini’s sentiments, noting that Christians and Muslims “did not have the same 
approach[es] in time” to solidifying peaceful CMR.  He explained that when the Christians 
were eager for dialogue, the Muslims did not seem to be as eager at the same time and vice 
versa: “When a community exits out of a war, then things are not finished [resolved] and not 
synchronized.  There is not one group that is bad and one that is good.”  As an example, he 
cited the fact that in 1983, the Shiites were moderate but the Christians were radical.  Then it 
was the opposite.   
Somewhat surprisingly since some respondents such as Bou Habib blamed “the elite,” 
Aoun
5
 stated that the elite were the ones working for positive CMR.  The elite were not 
necessarily the rich, though.  Rather, they were communities in which strong leadership 
existed, such as “the FPM, Hezbollah, and other organizations.”  In those cases, better 
Christian–Muslim relations existed.  Aoun, who had once gained an anti-Arab, anti-Muslim 
reputation during his campaign to drive the Syrian troops out of Lebanon in the late 80s and 
early 90s, is now seen by the Shiite community, through his agreement with Hezbollah, as a 
CMR advocate.  This can be explained in part by the fact that Aoun was raised in a mixed 
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Christian–Muslim suburb of Beirut, Haret Hreik, which is one of the key areas of 
intercommunal conviviality (Dagher, 2001; Khoury, as cited in Strohmer, 2007).   
Franjieh
1
 mentioned synchronicity as an essential aspect of dialogue.  It appeared that 
when the Christians reached out to their Muslim compatriots for dialogue, the Muslims were 
hesitant.  The reverse was also true: Muslims reached out to Christians, who on occasion were 
unresponsive.  Obviously, both communities must be committed to dialogue in unison for it to 
be meaningful and successful.   
The Muslim Community 
Although most of the interviewees noted that either the Christians were working more 
toward CMR or the two communities were equally working toward that goal, Halabi
2
 focused 
on some of the Shiites who were working toward CMR.  He noted that Sheik Shamseddine, in 
particular, had made many efforts on behalf of CMR.  Shamseddine, a Shiite Muslim cleric in 
Lebanon, commanded a large Shiite following.  Halabi also mentioned that under former 
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, the Sunni Muslims had been working positively toward CMR.  
The late Hariri, in his role as the Lebanese prime minister, had distributed loans and 
scholarships to Christian and Muslim students almost evenly, although a slightly higher 
percentage of the aid actually went to the Christians.   
Ghazal
3
 also talked specifically about the Shiites, noting that they held an annual 
seminar, the souwaal, that was focused on interfaith dialogue.  For his part, Ghazal was born, 
raised, and conducted much of his ministry in southern Lebanon with its high Shiite 
population.  Like Hajjar, he too hailed from the mixed Christian–Muslim village of Masghara.  
Again, this shows the case made by the field experts and the available literature that proxy 
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and social interaction usually make for healthier CMR (UNESCO, 2002).  As such, one can 
understand why Ghazal is perhaps more aware of Muslim advocacy in CMR than some of the 
other experts and is content to share his view.  One problem has been that although many 
Lebanese live side by side, they have not lived together.   
That the Muslim communities appear to be advocating dialogue more than they had in 
previous years is a positive sign.  This newer, welcome interest comes at an important yet 
precarious time in the Middle East with the ongoing Arab Spring.  Christian–Muslim tensions 
have since increased in Egypt and Iraq, along with concerns that the same can reoccur in 
Lebanon.  As such, there is no time like the present for said dialogue, particularly since it is 
not yet known how the Arab Spring will affect CMR and the region.    
Politics, Politicians, and Outside Influences 
Several of the respondents—whether they believed both, either, or neither of the 
communities was working toward positive CMR—indicated that the underlying problem in 
achieving the goal was political, not religious.  According to Bou Habib,
1
 “Politics ruins 
everything; if you take away the politics, everything would be alright. . . .  Every political 
party has a religious party or sect attached to it and politics ruins it [CMR and coexistence].”  
The politicians were not investing sincerely in CMR; rather, they were working only for their 
own or other agendas.  Mouawad
2
 concurred, noting that problems with CMR are “a 









 noted that, either by default or by design, the 
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Lebanese government had depreciated CMR.  The government often hired less qualified 
people to fill positions based on the individuals’ home regions and religion.  Politicians were 
using such information and practices in their quests to attain and maintain their political 
power rather than working for the betterment of the Lebanese people and CMR. 
Referencing his answer to IQ1, I. Mousawi
1
 went even further:  “Again, there is 
certainly not a religious problem,” he stated, his frustration evident.  “It is poor leadership and 
foreign intervention that is causing Christian–Muslim discord.”  In a similar vein, Husseini
2
 
cautioned that problems resulting from alliances that different Lebanese communities formed 
with “external forces” must also be avoided.  He again identified the failure to implement the 
Ţā’if Accord as having negatively affected CMR.  He also noted that “Israel had and 
continues to try to hurt CMR,” citing the continuing occupation of Lebanon by Israel. 
The assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was mentioned by several 
of the respondents.  Hariri had been assassinated on February 14, 2005, less than 1 month 
before the interview with Franjieh.  In talking about the assassination, Franjieh
3
 seemed 
hopeful:  “We have reached a new period during these past few weeks,” he stated, hopeful 
that a Lebanese renaissance would occur very soon during this critical point in Lebanese 
history.  Matar
4
 was also hopeful that the assassination would result in “stronger unity and 
interaction between Christians and Muslims.”  He pointed out that whether people were 
supporters or detractors of Hariri was not of importance.  What mattered was that they were 
“all against his murder, both Christians and Muslims.”   
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Because IQ6 was essentially a hypothetical offer to examine whether Maronite and 
Shiite communities could be doing more to enhance CMR, N. Musawi
1
 referenced both 
communities specifically in answering the question.  Musawi felt that the Maronite 
leadership, parties, and community must do more to rectify the problems of Lebanon and 
CMR.  He maintained this position because, by and large, the Maronites and their leaders 
were in charge of administering the affairs of Lebanon and had been for decades.  He 
explained that the individuals who composed the 1943 agreement concerning Lebanese 
independence had been chosen only from the Maronite community.  N. Musawi noted the 
tradition that only Maronites could hold the office of president in Lebanon.  The president 
wielded so much power, controlling “the army, the judicial system, and more,” N. Musawi 
added, that the Maronite president had been turned into “a king-like leader.”  Therefore, the 
Maronites from 1943 to the present were responsible for the consequences of their “poor 
leadership and policies.”   
However, N. Musawi
2
 indicated that not all Maronites were to blame.  He stated it was 
“Maronite politics and politicians, not the intellectuals and elites that [were] causing a 
disruption to CMR.”  In his opinion, the “intellectual Maronites” were preferable to the 
politicians.  They were “better” for CMR and Lebanon overall.   
N. Musawi
3
 was also concerned that the good message of the Maronite intelligentsia 
did not seem to reach members of the Maronite community in full.  He recalled his recent 
attendance at meeting of the Maronite Patriarch Council held at an as Safir newspaper 
headquarters.  There he saw Fr. Yussef Beshara and shared his sentiment that more needed to 
be done by Beshara and his community to ease tensions among the Lebanese communities.  
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 noted that the Lebanese Christians had given “a great contribution to 
Arab–Islamic civilization, Arabic literature, and the Arab awakening.”  Because of this, he 
was somewhat puzzled about why some Christians denied Arabism.  In the interview, he 
pointed out that, in his address, the pope had asked the Maronites and Christians in general 
“to continue to be and take part in the Arab civilization.”  He wondered why some people still 
resisted this message when it came from such a high religious official.   
Then N. Musawi
2
 began to refer to the Shiite community.  He noted, “Not all the 
Shiite leaders and communities are doing enough [or] the right thing toward CMR and 
reconciliation in Lebanon.”  He did not believe at the time of this interview that the new 
Shiite appointees to the government of President Emile Lahoud in October 2004 were the best 
possible choices to help the overall recovery of Lebanon and reconciliation of its people.  He 
revealed that Hezbollah was disappointed that none of its members had been selected for the 
new government.  Additionally, without mentioning his name, Musawi seemed to be saying 
that Nabih Berri, the Lebanese Shiite Speaker of the House and leader of the Amal Party, was 
not acting like an efficient leader intent on helping all the Lebanese.  Berri was widely 
considered a political hack who used extreme political patronage and favoritism to his benefit.  
It should also be noted that Hezbollah and Amal fought a vicious battle against one another in 
the mid-1980s.  
3
  
In another aspect of politics and its effects on CMR, Hajjar
4
 postulated that focus on 
religious sects might be blurred if practices such as interfaith marriage were more acceptable 
in the country.  Matar
5
 also called for liberalization in the area of marriage, including the 
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implementation of civil marriage, noting that the “acceptance of civil marriage . . . would 
bring the Lebanese together, united.”  According to both Hajjar and Matar, enacting civil 
marriage could result in the Lebanese becoming “a neutral people,”
1
 religiously blended and 
tolerant, because they would not focus as much on someone’s religion.  However, Hajjar also 
noted that neither party truly desired this to occur. 
Using the common colloquial phrase “ma fi aish,” Gemayel
2
 echoed the effects of the 
political problems in Lebanon.  Referring to the weak Lebanese economy, which had resulted 
in few meaningful employment opportunities, he continued, “The people of Lebanon have 
this idea that there is no life in Lebanon.”  Gemayel explained this as meaning that the 
Lebanese people were divided politically under an already corrupt political establishment and 
that they felt anxious about their financial capabilities, about providing for their families, and 
about the future.  Mingled with the feeling that no (productive) life existed in Lebanon was 
the nationalist disunity of the Lebanese people in general and of the Christians and Muslims 
in particular. 
Summary               
In responding to IQ6, although most of the interviewees leaned toward the Christian 
community as being more involved in promoting positive CMR, they also acknowledged that 
Muslims were now working more toward CMR.  As Halabi
3
 stated, using a fairly new adage 
among the Lebanese regarding CMR, “Lebanon without Christians is not Lebanon and it 
makes no sense for Lebanon.  Lebanon without Muslims is not Lebanon.”  Although the lay 
people of Lebanon seemed truly to want good relations and were willing to work for them, 
they often did not know how to accomplish that goal because of the interference brought on 
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  Notably, and in relation to chapters 1 and 2, the failure to make 
adequate progress toward positive CMR was placed more on politicians and political parties 
than on the Christian and Muslim communities.  The politicians and their respective parties 
were more interested in increasing their own political clout rather than in improving CMR and 
handling the related needs of Lebanon.   
Interestingly, of the suggestions given to improve the situation, at least two of the 
interviewees called for the implementation and acceptance of civil marriages.  Through this 
institution, an increase in intermarriages of Christians and Muslims may occur.  Thus, civil 
marriages may serve as one way to unite the two communities and neutralize the effects of 
Christian–Muslim  division.  On the other hand, Lebanon is a confessional, faith-based nation 
wherein civil marriage remains unrecognized and may remain so long term.   
Additionally, synchronized Christian–Muslim commitment to dialogue is needed.  As 
discussed previously, when one community is recognized as less invested in dialogue than the 
other, then the Lebanese should develop ways to return their would-be dialoguers gently back 
to the negotiating table.  Given the multiple, complex, and long-term status of CMR discord, 
it is easy to be skeptical that such remedies will result in fast relief to CMR woes.  This 
researcher understood that the respondents wanted to be positive about the future of CMR.  
Thus, they appeared to sound more idealistic than the facts warranted.        
The Civil War:  Past, Present, and Future 
With IQ7 and IQ8, the field experts were essentially asked to look at both the past and 
the future.  The respondents were asked to identify anything that, had it been done differently, 
might have prevented the Lebanese Civil War from occurring, thus reducing the conflict 
between Christians and Muslims (IQ7).  They were then asked to comment on whether the 
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relationship between Christians and Muslims was currently so poor that another civil war was 
possible (IQ8).  It was this author’s intention that IQ7 be a restatement of IQ2 to test and 
retest the information provided by the experts to see if there was agreement among and 
between their responses.  Analysis of the experts’ responses to the two questions did indicate 
a high degree of corroboration.   
As with the other research questions, the field experts were only slightly divided in 
their opinions.  Fifteen of the 17 respondents believed prevention of the civil war could have 
been possible.  Only two held that the civil war was essentially inevitable.  However, the 
reasons for their opinions varied.  Nine of the respondents commented more specifically on 
the causes of the civil war as well.  In terms of the possibility of another civil war in the future 
because of the current state of CMR (IQ8), 14 of the 17 respondents believed that this would 
not happen.  However, three of the field experts had different opinions: Two believed another 
civil war was conceivable.  One was convinced that another civil war was not only possible 
but also probable. 
The Past: The Possibility of Preventing the Previous Civil War    
Fifteen of the respondents believed the civil war could have been prevented.  All 
pointed to the influence of foreign powers, especially in terms of the Palestinian–Israeli 
conflict and its effects on the political stability of Lebanon.  Gemayel
1
 specifically discussed 
U.N. Resolution 1559, which was a call for all foreign forces to be withdrawn from Lebanon 
and armed militias disbanded in Lebanon.  Implementing this resolution would have meant 
that Palestinian militias and the Syrian forces would have been withdrawn from Lebanon and 
Hezbollah as the sole remaining Lebanese militia would have been disbanded.  The United 
States, Great Britain, and France strongly advocated the implementation of Resolution 1559.  
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However, a portion of the Lebanese people and other Arab countries saw the resolution as 
biased, focused solely on reducing Syrian influence in Lebanon.  Thus, many Lebanese, 
mostly Muslims, believed the resolution to be a tool to meet the goals of Israel, a country still 
at war with Syria.  According to Gemayel, however, “if U.N. Resolution 1559 had been 
implemented in 1975 [the start of the Lebanese Civil War], then there would have been no 
problem.”  He also believed that had America and Russia stopped “playing” with Lebanon at 
the time the resolution was introduced, the civil war would not have occurred. 
In a similar vein, El Khazen, Franjieh, and Salem blamed the Palestinian–Israeli 
conflict for resulting in the civil war.  However, neither El Khazen nor Franjieh referenced 
U.N. Resolution 1559.  According to Franjieh,
1
 “The creation of Israel started a change in the 
whole Arab world.”  He referenced the democracy that had existed to some extent in Egypt 
and Syria prior to the Palestinian–Israeli conflict.  With that conflict, however, “dictatorial 
regimes” replaced the vestiges of democracy.  These regimes with their oppression have been 
a main cause of the present-day Arab Spring protests.   
El Khazen
2
 focused more on one of the major consequences of the conflict, the 
immigration of thousands of Palestinian refugees and the active presence of the “armed PLO.”  
He and Gemayel blamed the PLO and its behavior in Lebanon for causing the political 
problems that resulted in the disintegration of the Lebanese state.  Had neither the refugees 
nor the PLO taken residence in Lebanon, the civil war would not have occurred.  In general, 
the Maronite Christians, El Khazen being one, were in conflict with the Palestinians in 
Lebanon more than the Muslims were; the Muslims were mostly supportive.  Thus, El Khazen 
(and the Maronites in general) tended to blame the Palestinians/PLO and their activities in 
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Lebanon for igniting the Lebanese Civil War and subsequent ills, which he stated in his book, 
The Breakdown of the Lebanese State (2000).  
Salem
1
 offered a slightly different scenario, stating that Israel should have “accepted 
its responsibilities.”  In other words, Israel should have accepted the U.N. resolutions and 
given the Palestinians the right to return to Israel/Palestine.  Had Israel done so, Salem 
believed, “the Palestinians would not have presented us with such a [difficult] political 
problem.”  IQ7 seemed to elicit frustration and disappointment from Salem.  He had tried 
several interventions—with little tangible success to show for them—during his tenure as 
foreign minister of Lebanon (1983–1989), the period that all of the interviewees considered 
the most difficult in Lebanon.  However, he also suggested that if foreign intervention had 
been refused, the war would not have occurred. 
I. Mousawi
2
 concurred with the assessment of the other respondents that if the 
Lebanese had not allowed the involvement of foreign powers in their country, no civil war 
would have ensued.  He specifically identified Israel and the United States as two such 
powers, indicating those governments did not have “Lebanon’s best wishes at heart.”  He 
agreed with N. Musawi, indicating that although it was appealing to engage foreign powers in 
the solutions of the problems in Lebanon and elsewhere, doing so was taking “the easy way 
out.”  He stated that when foreign powers become involved, they invariably “seem to support 
the least popular leaders and give them a disproportionate and unrepresentative amount of 
power.”  I. Mousawi identified former President-Elect Bashir Gemayel of Lebanon, President 
Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, and Kings Abdullah Al Saud of Saudi Arabia and Abdullah Hussein 
of Jordan as the “least popular despotic leaders” in the Arab Middle East who nonetheless 
were supported by the United States and Israel.  I. Mousawi’s statements in 2006 seem valid 
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today.  Major Arab Spring protests have emerged in all these countries, resulting in the ouster 
of the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, and others.    
Khalil
1
 also believed that had Israel not denied the Palestinians their rights and 
expelled them from what was Palestine, causing them to come to Lebanon eventually, the war 
might not have occurred.  This thought was shared by some of the other interviewees, 
particularly El Khazen, but with a different outlook.  While Khalil blamed Israel for creating 
and then not solving the Palestinian problem in Lebanon, El Khazen
2
 blamed the behavior of 
the Palestinians and PLO for causing major problems in Lebanon.  Khalil declared that “the 
reason why the Palestinians came [were expelled to and accepted by] to Lebanon was because 
Lebanon was too liberal and weak,” politically and militarily, especially compared to Israel.  
He added, “You must have a strong army, order and structure, but then you don’t 
[necessarily] have an open and liberal society.”  Despite his belief that the civil war might not 
have occurred had it not been for Israel creating the Palestinian problem in Lebanon, Khalil 
asserted, “I have compassion for the suffering of the Palestinians and Arafat from Israel; I 
pray for them.”  
Four of the respondents were less confident than the previously discussed 
interviewees.  Still, these field experts felt that the civil war could possibly have been 
prevented.  These respondents concentrated more on what should have been done in terms of 
the relationships between the various Christian and Muslim communities.  Halabi
3
 focused on 
the mistakes made by both the Christians and the Muslims.  Although he began by stating that 
“Maronite politics made the war,” he acknowledged that the Druze and Muslims also 
contributed to the eventual eruption of civil war.  In addition, he discussed the ongoing 
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problems resulting from the war that were often ignored, specifically mentioning the changes 
in Lebanese demographics since the war that had resulted in a Muslim majority that, for the 
most part, was poor.  
Halabi
1
 also discussed the role of both Christian and Muslim leaders who incited their 
respective followers to move toward civil war rather than toward reconciliation.  He recalled 
in a speech given on the eve of the civil war that a Maronite leader instilled fear in the people 
by stating, “If we [Christians] give in to the Muslims at this point, we will be destroyed.”  
Similarly, some Muslim leaders gave speeches just before the war, saying that if they (the 
Muslims) did not resist at that point, then they would be neutralized forever as a people.  Both 
Halabi and Massouh
2
 felt that had some of the Christian leadership not riled their respective 
communities with fear of annihilation, the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War and the 
worsening of CMR could have been prevented.  
Massouh  and Bou Habib discussed the role of the Greek Orthodox community in 
relation to the civil war.  A member of the Greek Orthodox community, Massouh
3
 noted the 
lack of authority the community had in Lebanon despite being the largest Christian 
community (along with the Coptic Christians of Egypt) in the Arab Middle East.  Because the 
Greek Orthodox community had been living with Arab Muslims “for centuries” though, they 
were in a better position than most to resolve the conflict.  Adding emphasis to Massouh’s 
point, Gemayel
4
 noted that the Greek Orthodox existed in Syria, Palestine, and Jordan.  He 
also stressed that because the Greek Orthodox referred to themselves as Arabs, they were 
“able to get along better with the Lebanese Muslims, Syrians, and Palestinians, all of whom 
played a role in the Lebanese Civil Wars.”  













 offered a different response.  According to him, even if the Greek 
Orthodox community, rather than the Maronite community, had been the largest and thus the 
most influential Christian group in Lebanon, the civil war would still have occurred.  He 
explained this was because “it is human nature to argue, disagree, and eventually get violent 
regarding different issues.”  He suggested that even if Wadi Nasara (a predominantly Greek 
Orthodox community on the Syrian side of the Lebanese–Syrian border) had been included as 
part of Lebanon, thus making the Greek Orthodox a majority, things would not have changed.  
He also believed that even though the Greek Orthodox could identify closely with Arabism 
and the Arab language, “CMR would still have suffered.”  Yet, in contrast to his negative 
reference to the Tā’if Accords in IQ1, he believed that now everyone was equal, noting in his 
written response to IQ7 that “the reasons for the conflicts remain[ed] the same . . . [but that] 
the situation [had] developed into conforming and dividing shares on all state levels.”  
In thinking about the question, Sammak
2
 identified four scenarios that might possibly 
have prevented the outbreak of the civil war and, specifically, the deterioration of CMR.  The 
first was the Muslim community not becoming overly involved, particularly militarily, with 
the PLO.  The second was the Christians realizing that the Muslims had come to believe in the 
independence of Lebanon above the notion of being part of the larger Arab Middle East.  The 
third was the Lebanese government emphasizing coexistence and CMR within the educational 
institutions of the country.  The fourth scenario concerned CMR in terms of more than just the 
civil war.  According to Sammak, if the Christians and Muslims had continued to live together 
and had not lived separately for so many of the war years, the resulting major rift in CMR 
could have been lessened.  
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The Past: Preventable Causes of the Civil War 
In addressing  IQ7,  Khalil
1
 revisited IQ1 instead, referencing what he called the 
“true” causes of Christian–Muslim discord (i.e., politics, theology, economy, and social 
stratification).  He stated that if all of those causes had been addressed, the war could have 
been prevented.  Ghazal
2
 also stressed that there were many factors involved, including 
politics, economics, and religion.  He believed that these factors, both internal and external, 
worked in combination to cause the civil war in Lebanon and the deterioration of CMR. 
Husseini
3
 placed the blame for the civil war on external forces, specifically Israel and 
foreign intervention.  He also noted that the war would not have occurred “had the politicians 
served the people, the state, and not themselves.  There was too much bickering.”  Mouawad
4
 
concurred, stating that had the Lebanese people been united to do what had to be done to stop 
the buildup and onset of the war, the war would not have occurred.  She also believed politics 
and foreign influences spurred the war but that the Lebanese, especially the politicians, “were 
also very much at fault for not doing the right thing,” which she identified as “putting the 
people’s interest first and not joining foreign forces against one another.” 
The Lebanese political confessional system was blamed by Hajjar,
5
 who noted that 
with such a system, “there was no way to prevent this war.”  He cited the resentment created 
among the rest of the Lebanese because only Maronite Christians could be considered for the 
presidency.  As noted, Hajjar is a member of the Melchite Greek Catholic Christian 
community, which is smaller in number than both the Maronites and the Greek Orthodox.  
Although fellow Catholics with the Maronites and formerly with the Greek Orthodox before 
                                                          
1
 Khalil, personal communication, March 1, 2005 (see Appendix 7). 
2
 Ghazal, personal communications, October 10, 2004, and November 9, 2004 (see Appendix 
15). 
3
 Husseini, personal communication, December 2, 2004 (see Appendix 6).  
4
 Mouawad, personal communication, November 17, 2004 (see Appendix 18). 
5
 Hajjar, personal communication, August 5, 2005 (see Appendix 14). 
251 
 
the schism, the Melchites have felt disadvantaged within the Lebanese proportional 
confessional system, giving Hajjar reason to mention such concerns.  He discussed the 
competency problems created as a result of the system that was “sectarian and confessional.”  
Because of a quota system within each Christian and Muslim community, often the 
individuals who were most competent to fill positions were not chosen.  As an example, he 
suggested that even if there were a number of qualified Melchites for a job “but they need[ed] 
a Shiite Muslim, however under qualified, the Shiite” was selected.  Bou Habib
1
 concurred.  
Only a few of the interviewees consider the Palestinian presence and its related 
problems to be the main cause of the civil war.  One of them, Aoun, stated that “the 
repercussions of the armed clashes between the Palestinians and the Lebanese” was the cause 
of the war.
2
  He believed that both sides, the Lebanese and the Palestinians, feared each other.  
El Khazen
3
 held the same views.  Aoun,
4
 a former general of the Lebanese Army, reminded 
the author that “most of my battles were against them [the PLO].”  In the early 1980s, after 
PLO leader Yasser Arafat was exiled to Tunisia as part of an evacuation agreement during the 
long invasion and occupation of Lebanon by Israel, Aoun had met with Arafat.  Just prior to 
the meeting, Aoun recalled feeling that somehow he and Arafat were “opposing brothers who 
fought in a trench.”  At their meeting, he recalled telling Arafat that the Lebanese wanted the 
Palestinians out of their country but that it was for their own good.  In other words, Aoun 
wanted the Palestinians not only to leave Lebanon but also to return to their own land.  
Also identifying the events that had taken place since 1943 that affected the peace of 
Lebanon, Matar
5
 focused on the Israel–Palestinian issues.  The internal influence of these 
                                                          
1
 Bou Habib, personal communication, November 3, 2004 (see Appendix 11). 
2
 Aoun, personal communication, June 15, 2006 (see Appendix 17). 
3
 El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix 10). 
4
 Aoun, personal communication, June 15, 2006 (see Appendix 17). 
5
 Matar, personal communication, March 21, 2006 (see Appendix 9). 
252 
 
events had been problematic for Lebanon.  In 1948, the country of Israel was formed and the 
Palestinians were expelled to Lebanon.  Then, in 1967, the Arab–Israeli war occurred, 
wherein the Arabs were defeated.  This affected Lebanon negatively because the PLO took up 
arms in Lebanon to defend themselves against the Iraelis.  All of this resulted in the war 
between the Lebanese and the Palestinians in 1975.   
The Present: Preventing a Future Civil War 
According to Matar,
1
 future civil war could only be avoided by “the building of the 
state [solid civil institutions, law and order, and freedom].  He believed that had the Lebanese 
built such a state in the period after 1943, the civil war would not have occurred.  In the 
present, however, the Lebanese were “caught now between Israel and Syria.”  Thus, “the only 
guarantee to avoid future conflict [was] to develop strong government institutions that treat all 
citizens the same and dispense the same resources and services to all.”  N. Musawi,
2
 director 
of international affairs for Hezbollah, echoed these sentiments.  Massouh
3
 also insisted that 
the Lebanese had not addressed the causes and outcomes of the war.  He believed they were 
“in denial . . . trying to forget the war without addressing its root causes,” asserting that this 
was an immediate and major problem for the Lebanese. 
Rather than answering IQ7 concerning what could have been done to prevent the civil 
war, Ghazal
4
 focused on what the Lebanese should do to prevent the recurrence of civil war.  
He specifically stressed that the Lebanese needed to be educated properly and to learn from 
their mistakes.  As he continued, he identified six factors that were needed to rebuild Lebanon 
and admitted they were more ideals and goals rather than immediate solutions:  
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1.  Radicalism by both Christians and Muslims had to end. 
2.  Communication between both groups had to be the basis for building sound 
relations. 
3.  The clergy had to stop insulting one another in the speeches they gave in their 
respective churches and mosques.   
4.  The Lebanese had to educate themselves in the idea that they were all “one social, 
civil society that is related to one nation, not separate sects or Ţā’ifiyye 
[confessions].” 
5.  Christians had to be dissuaded from leaving Lebanon.  To do so, the Muslims had 
to respect Christians rather than “downgrade [their] minority state.”   
He felt strongly that Christians would not feel they needed to leave Lebanon if this occurred.  
Ghazal also reminded this researcher that he was sharing an ideal goal here and not an easy, 
quick, or certain resolution to CMR conflict.  
 Ghazal’s
1
 final point was that preventing civil war was not the purview just of 
Christians or Muslims or politicians from either community.  For Lebanon to rebuild and 
ensure such events did not occur again, everyone had to work toward the goal: “We are all 
called to make this happen.”  
The Future:  The Possibility of Another Civil War 
According to a poll, even during and after the most recent attack by the Israeli Army 
and its invasion of Lebanon (July 12, 2006), which might have stirred up interreligious 
tensions there, the vast majority of the Lebanese people did not believe in the probability of 
another civil war (“Clerics Rule Out,” 2007, p. 3).  This corresponded with the responses of 
the overwhelming majority of the field experts (14 of the 17 respondents), who had made 





their convictions known prior to the mentioned poll, and thus served to corroborate their 
beliefs that another civil war would not occur.  Despite numerous forms of political tension 
and political strife, these field experts’ insights have been proven valid and reliable because, 
to date in this millennium, civil war has not reoccurred.  However, two of the other 
respondents felt that another war was possible; and the final respondent believed another war 
was a certainty.   
Those who believed another war would not occur did not necessarily believe that the 
underlying problems resulting in the civil war had been resolved, however.  Instead, they 
seemed more attuned to the feelings of the Lebanese people that war was not an answer.  
Several of the respondents voiced similar beliefs in their rejection of the possibility of war 
because the Lebanese people, in Massouh’s words, had learned “that the war solved nothing 
at all.”
1
  According to Franjieh,
2
 “It was a long, painful war; and people were hurt in all 
aspects of their lives.  People lost their dignity and financial assets, and there was no 
consideration given for the other.”  Halabi
3
 stated that the Lebanese people had “paid a hard 
price for the war.”  This was echoed by Khalil,
4
 who indicated the Lebanese people, both 
Christians and Muslims, were “tired and disillusioned by the war.”  El Khazen
5
 concurred 







 echoed these sentiments: The Lebanese people had suffered too much to allow 
themselves to be drawn into such a conflict again.   
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Some of these field experts and others gave different reasons for the improbability of 
another civil war.  Halabi
1
 indicated another war was not possible because the Syrians, 
catalysts for CMR conflict, had left Lebanon.  Khalil
2
 believed that the Lebanese simply 
“want[ed] and need[ed] the normal life” and were more interested in contemporary issues, 
such as having adequate and meaningful employment and supporting their families.  
Gemayel
3
 concurred that the Lebanese people were more interested in their contemporary 
wants and needs, suggesting that “the Lebanese economy could never handle another war.”  
However, he also seemed more matter-of-fact in his belief, posing the question, “Who are we 
going to wage war with?”  He explained that the Lebanese Civil War had been both all-
inclusive and inconclusive, with no apparent winner or goal attainment.  The Tā’if system was 
the reason Bou Habib
4
 espoused for not having another war.  He explained that because all 
authorities had been defined in the Tā’if system, “every confession [had] its rights and share 
in the state.”  Aoun
5
 again pointed to the FPM–Hezbollah agreement and its effect on 
coexistence in Lebanon, noting that the agreement “cover[ed] 80% of Lebanon’s problems 
and [was] supported by 70% of the Lebanese.”  Thus, the agreement had resulted in reducing 
the chances of another civil war.  
Other respondents, although stating that there would not be another war, did so more 
tentatively, often focusing on unresolved issues and the possibilities for future wars that were 
not of the same vein as the civil war.  Sammak
6
 was concerned that because of the remaining 
“gap of misunderstanding” between Christians and Muslims, another war was slightly 
possible.  He emphasized, as he had in his responses in chapter 2, that the young people had 
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not been educated to live together and thus were unfamiliar with one another, yet they were 
the future leaders of Lebanon.  Sammak again lamented that although some comingling 
existed in private schools, Christians and Muslims continued to be separated in public 
schools.  He also remarked on the low educational standards and overall quality of education 
afforded by Lebanese University (LU), the official public university.  At LU, healthy CMR 
were neither encouraged nor promoted in the curriculum.  
Matar
1
 did not believe another Christian–Muslim war would occur in Lebanon, but he 
did not rule out another war completely, stating that it could be “a political war.”  I. Mousawi
2
 
differentiated between another Lebanese Civil War, which he clearly believed would not 
occur, and a foreign power-inspired war, which he felt was a real and imminent possibility.  
Hajjar
3
 believed that CMR were so delicate and impressionable that the Lebanese were not 
the ones deciding whether to declare war or not.  That decision was being made by foreigners: 
“Yes, weapons are gone [outlawed under the Tā’if Agreement], but foreigners can make 
problems.” 
Two respondents, Ghazal and N. Musawi, asserted that another civil war was certainly 
possible.  Ghazal
4
 believed war to be a possibility if the Lebanese did not learn from their 
mistakes and take steps to avoid them in the future: “If the Lebanese stay the same and use the 
same old methods of problem solving, of course, this could cause another war.  If our 
foundation is not strong, we can return to our same old difficulties.”  He referred to the 
commonalities between Christians and Muslims: common problems, common interests, and 
common wants and desires.  According to him, “We both want good medical care and 
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hospitals; we both want good schools for our children, so why should we fight over who is 
going to be the boss or the Zaim?”  
N. Musawi
1
 stated that the previous wars had not been wars between Christians and 
Muslims.  Therefore, he predicted that if another war occurred, it would be because of 
American policy, which he stated was “to make and provoke several wars in Lebanon and the 
Middle East.”  Such wars would be political, not religious, in nature.  He repeated that 
American and Israeli policy was to “put your enemies into war against each other” and that 
“American foreign policy could cause another civil war under its client–patron relationship 
policy” and pointed to the “divide and conquer American schemes in Iraq and Palestine.”  
To understand fully N. Musawi’s statements, one must realize that at the time of this 
interview, Lebanon and Syria had come under unprecedented political pressure from the 
United States and France, specifically in regards to U.N. Resolution 1559, which had been 
sponsored by those two countries.  As stated in chapter 3, through this resolution, the United 
Nations in part demanded the immediate withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and the 
dismantling of the military forces of Hezbollah in Lebanon.  The author observed that U.N. 
Resolution 1559 had resulted in dividing the Christian Muslim communities of Lebanon.  For 
example, in December 2004, two large demonstrations were held in Beirut, one 
(predominantly Christian) in support of the resolution and one (predominantly Muslim) in 
opposition to it.  Other displays of disharmony regarding U.N. Resolution 1559 that were 
divided more along political lines also occurred. 
Less than 3 weeks after the interview, N. Musawi’s prediction seemed accurate.  On 
January 7, 2005, Israeli forces along the Lebanon–Israeli border shelled a truck occupied by 
Lebanese civilians inside Lebanese territory (Mroue, 2005a, p. 1).  No deaths were reported.  
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Two days later, on January 9, Hezbollah launched a “well-planned and unprecedented bomb 
attack, deep inside the Shebaa farms” (Mroue, 2005b, p.1), a small strip of farmland occupied 
by Israel and claimed by the Lebanese and Syrians as Lebanese territory.  According to the 
report, the operation “in which an Israeli officer died and three others were wounded, marked 
the first time Hezbollah fighters [had] infiltrated deep inside the Shebaa farms to attack an 
Israeli target” (Mroue, 2005b, p.1).  More significantly on July 12, 2006, Israel launched a 
major war against Lebanon, which lasted 34 days and caused major damage to the 
infrastructure and the people of Lebanon (Hovsepian, 2008).   
In discussing the state of CMR and the possibility of another civil war, some of the 
respondents felt things were going well.  According to Franjieh,
1
 the Lebanese people had 
come to understand that society had to change, especially “the militias and attitude.”  He felt 
this was occurring and that Lebanon was “the first good example on how to end a war.”  
Franjieh also pointed out that “Lebanon [had] succeeded in resolving its conflicts while 
Cyprus and Yugoslavia . . . [had] not.”  Aoun
2
 did not believe there would be another civil 
war in Lebanon anytime soon because the Lebanese people had “gone a long way” toward 
resolving their differences, which he believed would continue.  
Others found that even though CMR were not what they should be—and in nearly 
each case, the experts felt they were worse—civil war was not a possibility.  El Khazen
3
 was 
very clear that although his prognosis for CMR was very poor, the country was not at risk of 
another civil war.  Bou Habib
4
 stated that another such war could not happen and that the 
situation could not get worse because “everything must be even (more fair and equitable) now 
and, if it is not, it must be made equal.”  
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Several of the respondents talked about the issues still facing Lebanon, making 
passionate pleas to the Lebanese to work together to resolve their differences.  Salem,
1
 who 
conceded that CMR were much “worse” in present-day Lebanon, denied that present state of 
CMR could result in another war.  He admitted, however, that unresolved issues remained:  
“We haven’t reconciled; we’re in denial and trying to ignore and forget [the unresolved 
problems].”  Ghazal
2
 asked his country to “get rid of favoritism and division.”  He specifically 
entreated the Lebanese not to turn to outside forces, foreigners, to solve Lebanese problems.  
He insisted that the Lebanese must “work together . . . to get along, be intellectual, and use 
dialogue” and that “Christians and Muslims must work to unify one country, one nation with 




 suggested that he could not envision “the Middle East or Lebanon without 
Christians.”  He worried about the decreasing numbers of Christians and about their minority 
status, explaining that “Lebanon is a Christian need.”  Thus, “if the Christians are being and 
feeling like minorities,” a sentiment echoed by some of the other Christian interviewees, “it 
[could be] very destructive for Lebanon.” 
The theme of outside forces continued in Bou Habib’s ending comments.  He focused 
on the Lebanese of the diaspora, “many of whom are Maronite,” who were falsely portraying 
themselves as “representing Lebanon.”
4
  Their actions, he believed, were “creating conflict in 
Lebanon,” albeit from abroad.  Mouawad
5
 referred to outside forces that were “ruling the 
country,” referencing Syria.  This was neither helpful nor acceptable.  Even though she did 
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not think another war was imminent because the people “know that violence” cannot be used 
to resolve the issues, she acknowledged that “too much chaos and pressure” could result in 
another war.   
Thus, concern for another conflict remains high.  According to the Grand Mufti 
Mohammad Rashid Qabbani, the top Sunni religious authority in Lebanon, “The political 
situation in Lebanon stirs permanent worry among the Lebanese about the future and fate.  
Lebanon needs serious and effective work which reconciles political action and the citizens’ 
needs” (Dakroub, 2011b, p. 2).  President Michel Sleiman summed up the Lebanese 
predicament and voiced fears about the future, noting that the leaders of Lebanon had failed to 
understand “ the lessons of the Civil War” (Dakroub, 2011b, p. 1) and “lamented that the 
1989 Arab-brokered Tā’if Accord that ended the war has not been fully implemented” 
(Dakroub, 2011b, p. 1).      
In retrospect, N. Musawi’s
1
 response to IQ8 was ominously insightful.  Although he 
always seemed relaxed and confident with the way Hezbollah handled the hostile behavior of 
Israel toward Lebanon, he believed that another war initiated by Israel in Lebanon was 
imminent: “We know Israel and the U.S. are planning another war against Lebanon.”  His 
prediction, similar to that of I. Mousawi’s, came true soon after this interview, which took 
place on June 22, 2006.  Just 3 weeks later, on July 12, Israel unleashed a widespread attack 
on Lebanon, particularly in the south, dropping more than 4 million cluster bombs and 
flattening miles of infrastructure and thousands of residences throughout Lebanon 
(Hovsepian, 2008).  
 
 
                                                          
1




In regard to which community in Lebanon, Christian or Muslim, is working harder for 
CMR (IQ6), almost all of the respondents agreed that the Christians until 2006 initiated and 
maintained CMR dialogue more so than their Muslim counterparts did.  This might have been 
due in part to the Christians’ decreased population and their feelings that the larger Muslim 
community is encroaching upon them.  Interfaith and communal dialogue has been one of 
their interventions.  However, most of the respondents also agreed that the Christians seemed 
to be retreating from their initiation and maintenance of such dialogue and that the Muslims 
seemed to have a renewed investment in the same.  Sammak
1
 believed the newer engagement 
in CMR dialogue was due to the September 11 attacks and subsequent developments because 
the Muslims feel Islam was receiving a very poor and inaccurate assessment.  Therefore, 
interfaith and communal dialogue was one of their interventions as well.  Thus, the challenge 
is for the Lebanese to synchronize CMR advocacy in time.  Without synchronicity within 
CMR advocacy, a solid partnership cannot be formed (Karam, 2006b; Pakradouni, 2005).    
Aside from synchronicity, the respondents felt that neither the Christians nor the 
Muslims adequately invested in CMR dialogue in the first place.  Most of the respondents 
also agreed that rather than blaming one religious group over another, the Lebanese people 
need their government to invest in the reconciliation process.  The lack of government interest 
in this process is the real problem with poor CMR and, according to the information put forth 
in this thesis, stems from at least two areas of concern: (a) the stated corruption and ineptness 
of successive Lebanese governments that did not invest in CMR and (b) the Lebanese people 
with their historical procession of invader and strong dislike of big and intrusive government 
into their affairs.  One should also understand that all major Lebanese communities and 
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factions started a historical hiwar or national “dialogue” in March 2006 (Hashem, 2006a), the 
prognosis of which was poor at best as of November 2010.  In addition, since the very start of 
his tenure in February 2010 as president of Lebanon,  Michelle Sleiman has continually called 
for a new hiwar but has not committed to a starting date (Dakroub, 2011b; Sakr, 2011b).  
Therefore, it seems critical that the various NGOs and private CMR advocacy groups of 
Lebanon (of which these field experts are major activists) continue their work toward healthy 
CMR due to the historical and current lack of government involvement.   
Through personal interviews, the field experts who were part of the older generation in 
Lebanon, also concurred with this author’s research findings that revealed poor attitudes and a 
lack of engagement among the youth of Lebanon as other impediments to healthy CMR.  As 
the older CMR field experts admit mistakes, engage in dialogue, and offer prescriptions for 
CMR improvement, the Lebanese youth have been indifferent, if not hostile, to interreligious 
relations.  Thus, the course of action in Lebanon must be focused on improving and 
maintaining healthy CMR through the reengagement of the Lebanese government in CMR, 
the involvement of newer CMR advocates as the older advocates retire, and the education and 
preparation of Lebanese youth to establish rational, peaceful coexistence.  
Regarding what could have been done differently to prevent the Lebanese Civil War 
and the deterioration of CMR in the first place (IQ7), the field experts offered various 
responses.  Again, the Lebanese government and military were too weak, which resulted in 
the admittance of armed Palestinian fighters into Lebanon, a serious disruption to the previous 
semiharmonious CMR.  Ghazal
1
 stated that historically the Lebanese had demonstrated that 




 said the civil war could have 
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been prevented if political power had been evenly distributed among the Lebanese.  Several of 




 and Halabi believed that if there had been 
more economic equality, the civil war could have been avoided.  Musawi and Halabi also 
mentioned the problem of political leaders, such as those from the Maronite community who 
riled their constituencies through provocative speeches.  Sammak
4
 and several other 
respondents summarized the lead-up to the civil war as follows: The Christians did not 
believe that the Muslims were dedicated to a separate, independent Lebanon; while the 
Muslims did not fully understand that the Christians were indeed indigenous Lebanese and 
not outsiders.  The Muslims erred in their support of the PLO militants attacking Israel from 
Lebanese soil, a sentiment supported by El Khazen,
5
 a political scientist.  The respondents 
also agreed that if Israel had adequately addressed the Palestinian question, CMR tensions 
would have been eased greatly.  Finally, most of the respondents felt that had the Tā’if 
Agreement been implemented years earlier, the civil war in Lebanon would have ended 
sooner or might even have been prevented.  
An important observation must be made here between the results of IQ7 and those of 
IQ2.  With IQ2, the field experts gave reasons for the deterioration of CMR.  Nearly all of 
these reasons corresponded to their answers to IQ7, which was actually an inverse of IQ2.  
Specifically, IQ2 asked for the causes of CMR breakdown and the civil war in Lebanon; IQ7 
asked for what could have prevented the same in the first place.  Subsequently, for example, 
the respondents in answering IQ2 offered foreign interference as one of the causes of CMR 
conflict and also indicated that if the Lebanese had resisted foreign interference, the conflict 
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might have been avoided in the first place.  Thus, the reasons for the deterioration of CMR in 
the past corresponded to the causes of present.  This finding indicated not only that the 
Lebanese did, in fact, recognize and understand the reasons for the demise of CMR, both pre- 
and post-civil war but also that addressing the causes of the civil war and what could have 
prevented it in the first place is a natural point of departure and focal point for conflict 
resolution and dialogue.   
In answering IQ8, nearly every respondent, with the nuanced exception of Mouawad, 
believed there would not be another civil war in Lebanon.  Their beliefs appear to be holding 
true, given the absence of major hostilities in the 21st century thus far.  Indeed, tensions and 
circumstances from 2000 to 2010 were similar to those just before and during the civil war, 
including political assassinations; questionable elections; provocative, fiery speeches from 
political and community leaders; and several Israeli attacks on Lebanon.  Added to these 
circumstances were superpower  and local power (Israel, Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia) 
competition for influence in Lebanon (Rossi, 2008) and the Arab Spring protests of 2011, the 
outcomes of which and their effect on CMR have not yet been identified.  Yet, despite all 
these and more, civil war in Lebanon has not reoccurred.  This adds to the validity of the 
information gleaned from the expert respondents.  Even though these fact-finding interviews 
were conducted a few years ago, the respondents’ insistence that there would not be another 
civil war in Lebanon, despite their equal insistence that CMR were worse than ever before, 
adds credence to the field experts’ knowledge and insight of their own people.   
According to the respondents, the Lebanese want to move from the war to a normal 
life, including adequate employment and decent education.  Thus, their exhaustion may have 
more to do with the prevention of another war than the Lebanese successfully completing 
a postwar debriefing and conflict resolution process.  However, according to psychosocial 
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theory, relying on a secondary cause of resolution (i.e., Lebanese exhaustion from the war) 
rather than on the primary cause (i.e., poor CMR and related factors) is ineffective (Mednick, 
Higgins, & Kirschenbaum, 1975).  Although it is impressive that another civil war has not 
broken out, the great concern is that the Lebanese have not resolved the aftermath of the war 
psychologically.  The ingredients for another war remain in place.   
Although the Lebanese may want to “let sleeping dogs lie,” as evidenced in the decree 
of amnesty issued by the government in 1991 for all who participated in the civil war (Fisk 
2002), a gap continues to exist between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon.  This is 
particularly true between the older generation and the newer, college-age generation.  
Therefore, the Lebanese should consider addressing the various issues presented in this 






We are what we think.  All that we are arises with our thoughts.  Speak or act with a 
pure mind and happiness will follow.  The wind cannot overturn a mountain, like 
temptation cannot touch those who are awake, strong and humble.  Fill yourself with 
desire.  See the false as false, the truth as true.  Look into your heart and follow your 
nature.  Know these truths and you will find peace.  
 
Virtue of Attitude  
Siddhartha Gautama Buddha (563–479)     
CMR are an interactional, experiential, social condition; they are humanistic feelings, 
beliefs, and states.  The point of departure for this assessment was whether CMR in Lebanon 
have improved since the Lebanese Civil War.  The belief was that CMR should be better and 
are better than prior to the outbreak of the civil war.  The notions behind this belief were 
several, one being the absence of another civil war.  Even so, the hypothesis of this thesis that 
CMR have not improved but have rather deteriorated in the post-civil war period was upheld.  
In direct questioning during face-to-face interviews in Lebanon, 16 of the 17 field expert 
respondents explained that CMR have not improved but have worsened in post-war Lebanon.  
As shown in each chapter of this thesis, the field experts supported their positions by 
explaining the causes and reasons for the decline of CMR.  As seen in this thesis, the causes 
for the deterioration of CMR are multifaceted.  The positions of the field experts were also 
buttressed by information gathered from the university student surveys and from the available 
literature.   
The findings of the present research appeared to be time tested and consistent.  For 
example, as of June 2010, according to the Daily Star, the leading English-language 
newspaper in the Middle East, professional public soccer games can no longer be held in 
Lebanon as they have been in the past (Lyon, 2010, p. 3).  This change was due in large part 
to dysfunctional CMR within several contexts, including politics.  According to Rahif 
Alameh, secretary general of the Lebanese Football Association, "Politics came into football 
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and destroyed it" (as quoted in Lyon, 2010, p. 3).  He also dated the "death of football" to 
2001, the year when the government intervened in a murky match-fixing scandal (as quoted in 
Lyon, 2010, p .3).  That was when “Lebanon's politico-religious leaders began treating the 
association as a pie to be carved up, just as they share power among Muslim and Christian 
communities” (Alameh as quoted in Lyon, 2010, p. 3).  In addition, Lebanese scholars and 
politicians, such as Prime Minister Saad Hariri, have continued to point to the need to 
improve CMR in Lebanon (“Hariri Stresses Equal Shares,” 2009).  
A new phenomenon presented itself toward the end of this present research study that 
was a further indication of the deterioration of CMR.  This phenomenon was a draft law put 
forth by the Lebanese minister of labor Boutros Harb (Dick, 2010).  Harb drafted drafting a 
law making interfaith land sales illegal.  Christians could not sell property or land to anyone 
except another Christian, and Muslims could only sell to other Muslims (Dick, 2010; Sakr, 
2011a).  Harb, a Christian, was especially concerned that Shiites were purchasing land to 
weaken the Christian presence, an allegation the Shiites denied (Dick, 2010; Sakr, 2011a).  
Thus, the suspicions the Muslims and Christians have of one another have remained high.    
As detailed in chapter 3, several areas of societal function have resulted in damaging 
Lebanese CMR.  Lebanese politicians have been chronically derelict in their duties to the 
state, often being extremely corrupt.  The Lebanese system of confessionalism, designed to 
placate religious differences, has actually highlighted them and, thus, has not helped in 
fostering healthy CMR.  These and other factors that have damaged and worsened CMR will 
be a major challenge to repair.  
Four remedies were offered by the Lebanese participants in this research study.  First, 
develop a different political system to avoid political patronage and to open political 
leadership positions, jobs, and resources beyond the political ruling class families.  Second, 
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consider a more secular approach to politics and CMR.  Third, institute a form of federalism.  
Fourth, institute civil marriage.  
 Another factor major factor in the disruption of healthy CMR has been foreign 
influence.  As revealed by the field experts and indicated by the university student responses 
given in chapter 3, some foreign powers have acted like bullies toward the Lebanese, having 
their own national interests at heart rather than the interests of Lebanon.  To diminish this 
problem, according to the information presented in this thesis, the Lebanese need to unify and 
to commit to managing and resisting negative foreign interference much more competently.   
 In addition, as shown in chapter 2, the Lebanese educational system has not been 
conducive to fostering an atmosphere and feelings of camaraderie among the youth.  Four 
remedies to this situation were offered in this thesis.  First, the monitoring of Lebanese private 
school curricula should be increased.  Second, the educational gap between Christians and 
Muslims must be addressed.  Third, the disparity in quality between public and private 
education must be minimized.  Fourth, the art of healthy CMR should be taught in the school 
system.  
Also noted in chapter 2, geographically speaking, Christians and Muslims in Lebanon 
historically have lived in somewhat segregated communities.  This was exacerbated by the 
civil war, which resulted in the displacement and demarcation of Christians and Muslims to 
an even greater degree.  The Lebanese Ministry of the Displaced must address and rectify this 
issue in a renewed and more effective manner.     
The historical and ongoing economic problems in Lebanon have also resulted in a 
great deal of duress in CMR, as reviewed in chapter 2.  For many years, the Christians were 
generally better off economically, bolstering major Muslim grievances that were factors in the 
Lebanese Civil War.  The middle class in Lebanon has continued to shrink, resulting in 
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problems of social stratification (i.e., rich vs. poor).  Because little is produced within the 
Lebanese economy, imports have remained at high levels and the national debt has continued 
to increase.  The poor economy has also been blamed for the high rate of emigration, 
predominantly Christians, and the purported “brain drain” of would-be Lebanese talent.  
Because of the constancy of the poor state of the Lebanese economy, the Christians and 
Muslims must learn to improve their relationship in spite of economic difficulties.   
An important finding from this research, explained in chapter 1 and throughout the 
thesis, was the discrepancy between the field expert respondents and the university students 
concerning religious differences as a major cause of CMR discord.  The field expert 
respondents, who had witnessed the anarchy of the civil war, did not reactively point to 
religious differences as a hindrance to their relationship.  The university students, who did not 
experience the horrors of the civil war, nevertheless believed religion was a major cause of 
CMR discord.  This represents a glaring, worrisome difference in attitude and in level of 
tolerance between the older field expert respondents and the younger university students.   
In addition, as shown in chapters 4 and 5, communal identity is one of the major 
hindrances to CMR.  The Maronite Christians do not agree with their Muslim counterparts, or 
even other Christian counterparts, regarding the Arab and Phoenician identities of 
Lebanon.  Thus, currently, the Lebanese do not have a unified or even firm sense of identity 
and self as a nation.  Because ethnic nationalism continues to drive global politics and may do 
so for generations, the Lebanese must come to an acceptable level of identity consensus.  
Doing so will also constitute a major measure of improving CMR.   
 Whether a golden age when CMR were excellent ever existed in Lebanon is 
questionable.  The evidence showed discontent was often brewing throughout long 
processions of sociopolitical problems.  Thus, whether a failed state or a nonstate, Lebanon 
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presents an interesting paradox.  In January 2009, The New York Times listed Lebanon as the 
number one tourism destination in the world, calling it “the best party place in the world” 
(July, n.d.).  At the very same time, Israel was making serious threats about attacking Lebanon 
again; and intra-Lebanese politics were as divided and acrimonious as ever.  Thus, it is hard to 
imagine that such a small country as Lebanon, wherein the various communities are so 
physically close to one another that cordial familiarity is assumed, has so much 
intercommunal distance and discontent. 
Until the recent past, the Christians of Lebanon were generally more proactive in 
initiating interfaith dialogue.  More recently, though, the Muslims have appeared keener on 
pursuing CMR advocacy.  Thus, the problem is one of synchronicity.  As discussed in chapter 
6, the Christians’ and Muslims’ interests in fostering healthy CMR often have not coincided, a 
necessary occurrence for the success of such initiatives.  To make matters worse, both camps, 
have failed to do enough to address CMR issues, according to the expert respondents and the 
poor state of CMR.  This failure is also evidenced by the almost hostile attitude toward CMR 
found among the university students.   
Somehow, although this country has suffered more chaos, turmoil, and violence than 
most of the other countries in the world, Lebanon has survived.  Thus, CMR may weather the 
Lebanese storms under the sociological theory of functionalism.  The functionalism 
perspective holds that “society is a complex system whose various parts work together to 
produce stability and solidarity” (Giddens, 2001, pp. 16–17).  According to this perspective, it 
is crucial to “investigate the relationship between parts of society to each other and to society 
as a whole,” (Giddens, 2001, pp. 16–17).  Apropos to Lebanon,  
We can analyze the religious beliefs and customs of a society . . . by showing how 
they relate to other institutions within it,” and “moral consensus exists when most 
people in the society share the same values  thereby contributing to the maintenance of 
social cohesion.  (Giddens, 2001, p.16).  
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Perhaps, then, follow-up studies should be focused on the factors that hold this tiny country 
together.  Additionally, future studies should include the issue of the Arab Spring and its 
possible effects on Lebanese CMR.  
Although it is difficult to consider Lebanon to be a high-performing, functionalist 
society, a fusion, albeit a negative one, seems to exist among the Lebanese that keeps 
Lebanon intact despite all the pathology.  Somehow Lebanon survives.  As the field experts 
shared in chapter 6 and the literature revealed, despite all sorts of societal tensions, Lebanon 
has not had a recurrence of civil war.  Perhaps Christianity and Islam “reaffirm people’s 
adherence to core social values, thereby contributing to the maintenance of social cohesion” 
(Giddens, 2001, p. 16).  Thus, Lebanon does seem to be a functionalist society wherein 
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APPENDIX 2: FR. P. GEORGE MASSOUH  
Interview: October 12, 2004 
Faith: Greek Orthodox 
Position: Director for the Center for CMR, University of Balamand 
The interview took place at the UB Center for Christian–Muslim Study located in Deir 
El-Balamand, El-Koura, North Lebanon.  Fr. P. George Massouh, the director of the center, 
spoke mostly in formal Arabic and occasionally in colloquial Arabic.  A translator was 
utilized as needed during the interview.  
Massouh preferred to be called Abouna or “Our Father.”  This was interesting because 
the Greek Orthodox, the Greek Catholics, the Maronite Catholics, and the other Catholic 
denominations in Lebanon refer to their priests as Abouna.  On the other hand, the evangelical 
Christians and other Protestant denominations in Lebanon call their clergy Asees or 
“Reverend” and correct those who mistakenly call them Abouna.  Muslims prefer to refer to 
Christian clerics as Asees and more often than not decline to call a priest of any denomination 
Abouna, as was the case with Nawaf Musawi, the director of International affairs for 
Hezbollah, during the interview with him on December 20, 2004.  
During the interview, Massouh pointed out with pride that one of the successes of UB, 
to which he has contributed much, is its Center for Christian–Muslim Studies.  Through the 
center, founded in 1995, one may earn a master’s degree in Christian–Muslim studies.  
Additionally, the center staff publishes a journal and articles and gives summer sessions in 
CMR where “Christians and Muslims from different countries come to study together—
Lebanese, Jordanian, and Egyptians [etc.].”  Some of the challenges Massouh spoke of 
included the need for more researchers and funding.  Presently, he was the sole researcher.  In 
his opinion, Christians usually took the initiative to do research; therefore, he wanted to see 
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Muslim participation in CMR and research.  While he was pleased with the accomplishments 
of the center thus far, he described how, at the beginning when the center was first opened, 
many Christians were “very critical and negative” about such a center.  
Massouh was quick to state that the problem between the Christians and Muslims of 
Lebanon was “not theological at all” and that the conflict was “not between the rich and the 
poor, nor a problem of social stratification.”  He explained himself: 
The rich and poor of the same and even different communities will not criticize the 
usually rich and powerful political leader so as not to be accused of being a traitor of 
their own community or a carrier of Christian-Muslim dissent as in the case of a 
Christian criticizing a Muslim leader and vice versa. 
  
He believed shared that religious radicalism was not as significant a problem in 
Lebanon as it was in other countries.  However, he mentioned that “perhaps Hezbollah and 
the ‘Qawaat Libnaneeyee’ (Lebanese Forces, Christian party) are somewhat radical in their 
ideology.”  He also believed that both communities had aspects of radicalism. Massouh 
believed that “no one is working to their capacity in improving CMR; neither the Christians 




APPENDIX 3: DR. ELI ADIB SALEM  
Interview: July 11, 2004 and August 2004 
Faith: Greek Orthodox 
Position: President of University of Balamand, former foreign minister of Lebanon  
Dr. Eli Adib Salem was interviewed Salem on July 11, 2004, and again one month 
later.  Salem had no knowledge of the questions that were posed to him prior to the interview.  
He answered all the questions asked in English.  
Salem was selected for this assessment for several reasons.  Salem is currently the 
president of the University of Balamand, owned and administered by the Greek Orthodox 
Church, having served previously as the former dean of the Political Studies Department at 
AUB.  He has also written several articles and books on Lebanese intercommunity relations 
and politics.  He was the foreign minister of Lebanon (1983-1989) during the height of the 
Lebanese Civil War.  During his tenure as foreign minister, the Israeli invasion and 
occupation of Lebanon was ongoing and the civil war was raging.  Salem was also the former 
dean of the Political Studies Department at AUB. 
He stated that his various careers and life experience in Lebanon have dictated that he 
be deeply involved in CMR of Lebanon.  He added that he is a member of the Greek 
Orthodox community, which “usually” identifies itself more directly with Arabism than other 
Christian denominations of Lebanon (Hajjar, 2004); thus his involvement in CMR was 
somewhat more “natural” and “deliberate.”  By this, he explained that the Greek Orthodox 
belief in Arabism has been appealing to the Muslims in general and that the Greek Orthodox 
found themselves residing in some mixed Muslim/Greek Orthodox villages wherein both 
groups “got to know each other.”  Subsequently, Muslim and Greek Orthodox communities 
276 
 
“have lived together in peace for hundreds of years and [at times] their families have inter-
married.” 
 Salem found himself hard pressed to measure and explain his successes with CMR 
during his years as foreign minister of Lebanon.  Indeed, his tenure spanned the civil war 
years of Lebanon.  He published a book on January1, 1995, Violence and Diplomacy in 
Lebanon: The Troubled Years, 1982-1988, the time period each of the interviewees 
characterized as the most difficult in Lebanese history.  He did mention the positive 
Christian–Muslim student interaction at UB, which he has had a role in supporting.  He also 
pointed out his involvement in the establishment of a Christian–Muslim studies center in the 
university. 
According to Salem, “No community, neither the Christians nor the Muslims, are 
doing enough” for improving CMR.  “Lebanon needs a national reconciliation, we don’t have 
this but that is what we need, a big national reconciliation.  We can’t ignore this anymore.” 
Perhaps because of the enmeshment of academics and politics, university affiliations 
are as, if not more, effective than political action per se in determining success or failure of 
CMR.  They might certainly appear to be less threatening, as would the natural evolution of 




APPENDIX 4: JUDGE ABBAS HALABI  
Interview:  May 26, 2005. 
Faith: Druze 
Position: Judge, bank director, chairman of The Arab Working Group for CMR 
Abbas Halabi was interviewed at his home in Beirut.  The meeting lasted 3 hours.  He 
spoke English throughout the interview, although rather haltingly.  Therefore, on occasion, he 
spoke in Arabic to express his point more fluently.  Halabi was referred to this writer for 
inclusion in this research by both Dr. Jorgen Nielsen, professor of Islamic Studies at the 
University of Birmingham, and Marwan Halabi, the son of Judge Halabi.  This writer knew of 
Marwan Halabi as a student at NDU in Zouk Mosbeh, Lebanon. Halabi is currently a judge in 
the Lebanese court system and director of the Bank of Beirut and the Arab Countries (BBAC) 
in Lebanon.   
Halabi is a judge in Lebanese court system and is chairman of the Arab Working 
Group for CMR.  (This writer witnessed him chairing a meeting of the group on April 20, 
2005.)  He is a senior member of a national Lebanese committee for CMR dialogue and 
belongs to The Lebanese Encounter for Dialogue committee.  In addition, Halabi represented 
the Druze community of Lebanon to the Vatican during a Vatican initiative regarding CMR in 
the late 1990s. 
During the interview, Halabi reported that his involvement in CMR advocacy started a 
bit before the Lebanese CIVIL WAR and continued somewhat during the war but that his 
main involvement occurred after war.  He had an idea of how to maintain good relations with 
Christians.  He began to visit, with other members of the Druze community, six or seven 
Christian neighborhoods and agreed to continue this practice.  In 1989, he attended the Tā’if 
conference in Saudi Arabia, where he and others worked on national reconciliation.  He 
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described how he and the other members, the Lebanese community, and the Arab world 
discussed what and where they had all gone wrong and what to do for the betterment of the 
future.   
One of Halabi’s precepts regarding CMR was “to view you as you are, not as I want 
you to be.”  However, he was more direct when addressing the possible causes of CMR 
discord and the civil war:  
Let me tell you something.  The war was not at any time a religious war, whether it 
was before, during or after the war.  It was actually several wars within the same war.  
It was the Palestinians versus the Christians, the Palestinians versus the Lebanese, the 
Syrians versus the Palestinians, Iran versus Iraq, and Iran versus Syria. 
 
He continued, stating, “During the war, no spiritual leader described it as a religious conflict.”  
He noted that “there are regional differences much more than confessional differences.  In 
Lebanon, we want diversity and not division.”  He added, “We have a hope that Christians 
and Muslims can form one political bloc within the government, and for the Lebanese to talk 
more about a national bloc, not a separate Christian-Muslim bloc.”  
Concerning the premise that the Lebanese Civil War was actually several different 
(not religiously based) concurrent wars, Halabi added, “During the Lebanese Civil War, there 
was also Israel versus everyone.”  He also believed that “international situations at the time of 
the civil war allowed for the foreigners to exploit the relations between the Christians and the 
Muslims.”  It was an ominous sign, he explained , that at one time foreign interference was a 
cause for the civil war and that decades later the same problem existed.  The civil war “ended 
with Muslim versus Muslim and Christian versus Christian, and every community was 
involved,” he said.  “There was Sunni versus Druze and Shiite versus Druze and Shiite versus 
Shiite.”  However, he did note a positive step in CMR development when “in 1990, the 
Christians and Muslims put down all their disagreements under the Tā’if” Agreement.” 
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Halabi stated that, in general, he has “a fear, somewhat, of extremism.”  However, he 
added that the notion of extremism in the West, particularly in the United States, seemed to be 
skewed, noting that “the U.S. has Christian extremists.”  He stated that religious extremism 
“affects CMR in Lebanon.  For example, if the Muslims think that Middle East Christians are 
the same as the U.S. [fundamentalist] Christians, this causes major problems.”  According to 
Halabi, indigenous Middle Eastern Christians were unfairly and erroneously begrudged: “The 
Christians of Lebanon are not extremists, but they appear that way because they are angry that 
they are becoming weaker [politically and numerically].”  He added, “Lebanese Christians are 
in fear and that is why they seem to be extremists.”   
He felt that for CMR to be positive at this point “we must remain 50–50 [Christian–
Muslim] in population for a long time.”  He explained this to mean that until the Lebanese 
stop worrying about religious percentages and political power and resources, it is best if the 
communities are equal in number so that there is no appearance of one group being stronger 
than the other.  
H stated, “I admire what the Christians have done after the war.  The Christians, 
especially Maronites, were self-critical of their behavior during the war.”  He also shared, 
“The Muslims were also asked to do the same and now they are doing this.”  Halabi, a Druze, 
noted that “the Druze from 1983 to 1987 were involved with the war of the mountain.  
Afterward and more recently the Druze now say, ‘Let’s live together in peace again.’”  He 
cited several positive examples of CM reconciliation, mentioning how “Patriarch Sfeir and 
Walid Jumblat met and reconciled in 2001.”  He considered this “a Druze and Maronite 
reconciliation, the likes of which has not occurred since after the war of 1860.”   
 H also shared that “the Shiites are also working well for CMR.”  He expounded, 
“Sheik Shamseddine has made lots of efforts in CMR reconciliation.”  (Shamseddine is a 
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Shiite Muslim cleric in Lebanon that commands a large Shiite following.)  He also mentioned 
that the “Sunni Muslims under Hariri were good with positive CMR,” pointing out how the 
late Rafiq Hariri, in his role as Lebanese PM, had distributed loans and scholarships almost 
evenly to Christian and Muslims students, with a little higher percentage of the aid actually 
going to the Christians.  Halabi summed up IQ6 with a fairly new adage among the Lebanese 
in regards to CMR: “Lebanon without Christians is not Lebanon and it makes no sense for 




APPENDIX 5: DR. IBRAHIM MOUSAWI  
Interviews: June 22, 2006 and March 25, 2011 
Faith: Shia 
Position: Director of the Political Department of Al-Manar Television, Phd in Islamic Studies  
Dr. Ibrahim Mousawi is a high-ranking member of Hezbollah.  Because of his high 
degree of activity in that role and his mastery of English, he has also been interviewed often 
by individuals associated with the Western media.  Indeed, during the most recent Israeli 
attack on Lebanon, beginning on July 12, 2006, this writer observed Mousawi being 
interviewed frequently on CNN.  He is also a professor of politics and Islamic studies.  
Mousawi and this writer were doctoral students in Islamic studies at the University of 
Birmingham Center for the Study of Islam until Mousawi completed his degree in 2007.  
They have also been in contact with each other on many occasions regarding CMR in 
contemporary Lebanon.  
Regarding his involvement in CMR, Mousawi stated, “It has been a duty of mine, and 
all of ours [the people of Lebanon] for a very long time, both casually, in everyday life, and 
formerly, as a member of Hezbollah, to have a healthy relationship with everyone.”  For his 
part, Mousawi was more than willing to refer the author to several Christian leaders and 
clergy for interviews and assistance:  “There is no difference between Islam and Christianity.” 
Responding to IQ5, Mousawi seemed aware that some in the West, particularly Great 
Britain and the United States, view Hezbollah as a radical Islamic terrorist organization.  He 
believed that “the more faithful a Muslim or Christian is, then the more decent citizen one is.”  
He pondered, 
Why is it that when people get closer to their faith they are considered fundamentalists 
or radical while Zionism, which is usually devoid and separate from religion and 
produced very violent behavior, is not considered radicalism?  This makes no sense.  
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Then those who resist violent, destructive behavior from some Zionists, they are then 
considered radicals.  It is not logical. 
 
He stated his belief that little, if any, religious radicalism is present in Lebanon but 
categorized that bit of radicalism that he feels does exist as “politically based and inspired by 
foreign intervention.”  However, he described then Maronite priest Beshara Ra’i as a 
Christian radical, who expressed clear enmity for Muslims. 
In responding to IQ6, he offered with some frustration, “Again, there is certainly not a 
religious problem.  It is poor leadership and foreign intervention that is causing Christian-
Muslim discord.”  Regarding who is doing more to facilitate good CMR, he stated, “Perhaps 
both communities should unite together and do more to address Lebanon’s problems.  We 







APPENDIX 6: MP HUSSEIN HUSSEINI  
Interview: December 2, 2004 
Faith: Shia 
Position: MP, former Speaker of the Parliament, Drafter of the Tā’if Accords and Co-Founder 
of Amal  
The interview with Hussein Husseini lasted for over 2 hours.  He spoke both in formal 
and colloquial Arabic.  The questions were read to him in standard Arabic form, and his 
answers were translated when needed by his daughter-in-law Rima.  Husseini, age 66, was 
elected to parliament in 1972, 1992, 1996, and 2004.  He is presently MP for the Baalbek-
Hermel district of Lebanon.  He served as speaker of the Lebanese parliament from 1984 to 
1992.  Husseini is often called the “godfather” and “father” of the National Understanding 
Document, better known as the Tā’if Agreement.  Husseini chaired the formulation of this 
agreement, signed in 1989, which was designed to end the Lebanese Civil War.  Its major 
component was a power-sharing and reconciliation formula between the Christian and 
Muslim communities and leaders of Lebanon.  The Tā’if Agreement has been considered 
perhaps the major force in ending the Lebanese Civil War. 
It was because of Husseini’s role in the Tā’if Agreement and his life-long involvement 
in Lebanese politics and CMR that he was considered a crucial informant for this assessment.  
He was also a cofounder of the Lebanese Shiite Amal (“hope”) movement of Lebanon in 
1973.  After the disappearance of Imam Musa Sadr, in 1978, Husseini served as the president 
of Amal till 1980.  
Husseini reported being “raised in a political family” whose members had “religious 
titles from a long time ago: people of the flame of the Prophet Muhammad.  His great, great 
grandparents contributed to the formation of Lebanon, and “all have shared and served in 
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public office.”  Therefore, in regards to CMR, he claimed a long historical heritage in which 
“my home and history have decreed that I work to elaborate on the Lebanese and Arab 
identities.”  For Husseini, the Lebanese “have a good nation but this is not paralleled with 
good institutions and this has created a vacuum or inadequacy in the republic of Lebanon.”  
He went on to summarize briefly the two main points of  “the 1943 pact,” which 
resulted in the formation of an independent Lebanon: “One, that the Christians would no 
longer seek foreign intervention or alliances such as the Maronites had with France; and, two, 
the Muslims gave up the idea of being completely part of greater Syria and the Arab World.”  
He explained that this pact should have been sufficient for the unity of Lebanon but that 
“problems resulted from a horrible war and thus a more official constitution was needed, the 
Tā’if Agreement.”  Tā’if “gave us a way to form solid Lebanese institutions in order to 
safeguard the Lebanese state and its sovereignty with Arab identity.”  He continued that Tā’if 
“gave Lebanon a system of rule and a parliamentary system” and that “nothing should come 
into being if it doesn’t conform to the wishes of the people.”  He also proudly pointed out that 
Tā’if divided the government leaders (president, prime minister and speaker) into three prime 
ministers with equal powers, regardless of the numerical ratio of the religious sects.  Although 
“Tā’if has not been implemented” in its entirety, Husseini asserted optimistically that “it will 
be and it is the best prescription for Lebanon to deal with its relationship with Syria, the 
Palestinians, and Israel.”  It was obvious that Husseini had great faith in the Tā’if Agreement 
and that he worked arduously in its development.   
In Husseini’s opinion, “Everyone wants a free and sovereign Lebanon and brotherly 
Christian-Muslim relations; it’s only the expressions [methods of achievement] that are 
different.”  He explained, “Repercussions from alliances with external forces [by the different 
Lebanese communities] must be avoided” and that “not implementing the Ţā’if Accord” were 
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the failures that negatively impacted CMR.  He believes that the lay people of Lebanon, 
Christian and Muslim, truly want good relations and are willing to work for it, “Yet at times, 
they don’t know how to proceed as the other problems I have been mentioning interfere.”  He 
added, “Israel had and continues to try to hurt CMR and Israel still occupies Lebanon.” 
He believes “there would not have been a civil war in Lebanon had it not been for 
external forces, Israel behavior and foreign intervention,” and, “had the politicians served the 
people, the state and not themselves.  There was too much bickering.” 
He was saddened at the thought of another civil war.  “No, no, I can’t even think about 
another war,” he said.  “I can’t even think of another war.  We are the same people; there will 





APPENDIX 7: FR. SAMIR KHALIL  
Interview: March 15, 2005 
Faith: Jesuit Catholic 
Position: International scholar of CMR and professor/researcher in CMR at St. Joseph’s 
University  
This writer interviewed Father Samir Khalil on March 15, 2005, at the Center of 
Documentation of the Research of Arab Christianity, St. Joseph University, Lebanon.  In 
addition to being a major participant at the center, he is a well-known scholar on Eastern 
Rite/Arab Christian theology and Middle Eastern CMR.  Khalil, an Egyptian, grew up and 
lived among the much larger Muslim population in Egypt but has lived in Lebanon for over 
40 years.  He taught Islam in Egypt, an impressive accomplishment when one realizes that 
90% of the population is Muslim.  He has authored several articles and books on Arab 
Christianity and CMR and has lectured at Georgetown University, the University of 
Birmingham, and the Vatican, inter alia. 
Prior to the interview, this writer e-mailed Khalil the questions that were asked for this 
assessment.  He replied as follows: “Dear George, these questions are very interesting.  They 
are very deep and thought provoking.”  During the interview, Khalil spoke almost entirely in 
English, although haltingly; his native language is Arabic.  He stated he is more fluent in 
French.   
Khalil felt that he was deeply and intimately part of a Muslim environment.  Living 
with Muslims throughout his life has given him a camaraderie and understanding of Muslims 
that set the stage for his work in CMR.  He stated, “I never suffered from Muslims, although 
in the late fifties there were some problems,” alluding to the 1952 revolution in Egypt.  In 
1955, he entered the Jesuit Order after he finished his bachelor’s degree.  The austere lifestyle 
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in the Jesuit Seminary in Egypt is where “they impressed on us to love everyone, including 
Muslims.”  He credited his monastic life with empowering him not only to accept but also to 
appreciate Muslims.  For Khalil, this proved to be an early, invaluable aid in his interest and 
career of forging positive links within CMR.  
Khalil credited his residencies with Muslims in helping him understand and respect 
Muslims and Islam and to work with them: “I lived with Muslims as much as I could.”  He 
completed a doctorate in Islamic studies and has dialogued with Muslims sincerely, telling 
them, “I am looking for [the spiritual] truth with you.”  His involvement with CMR also 
involved teaching in academic positions beginning in Egypt in 1962 and continuing with the 
teaching of religion and interfaith dialogue throughout his life.  At the time of the interview, 
he was teaching Islam, Christianity, and CMR at St. Joseph University and throughout 
Lebanon. 
However, because of his faith, Khalil has not considered conversion, even with his 
major study of Islam and major engagement with Muslims.  Khalil’s faith “prevents 
conversion, while wanting to know Islam and understand it.”  He and other Christians, when 
conducting interfaith dialogue with Muslims, “can have esteem for Muslims . . . but although 
Christians can have sympathy, feel, and seek the truth together, they must remind themselves 
[to be careful] of everything we do, but retain our distance, be critical.”  He ended his answer 
to IQ3 by reporting an impressive CMR record, stating, “Since 1962 till now, I studied 
Islam.” 
Khalil wanted to dispel the rumor that Muslims throughout Lebanon were persecuting 
Christians: “Lebanon has freedom of religion; we can’t say Christians are oppressed by 
Muslims.  There is no religious oppression,” he said, sharing his preference for a country with 
a clear distinction between religion and the state.  He believed that “a full democracy will not 
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work in Lebanon now and not for a long time.  We can’t simply place [i.e., fully adapt to] 
democracy in Lebanon.  People are not ready to vote for the one best leader.”  However, 
Khalil also noted some improvements:  “In the past Christians in Lebanon, in general taught 
Islam as a problem.”  He added that this problem “was also vice versa.  Imams, not all of 
them, were teaching Christianity in a negative way; but now they are teaching Christianity 
better [i.e., in a more positive light].”  He felt that Muslims still needed to improve in the 
frequency and manner of teaching Christianity and believed that “Muslims have not yet been 
able to teach Christianity well.”  
He did feel that there was a double standard concerning how Christians and Muslims 
were treated from a religious viewpoint.  He complained, “If a church and a school are 
together [i.e., affiliated], then they should be filed [i.e., taxed] that way, the same as if a 
Mosque and school are together for bills.”  In Lebanon, Christians must pay separate fees for 
the church and the school, whereas preachers of Islam are paid by the government.  He 
admitted, “Christian preachers are not paid by the government because the Christians 
[themselves] refuse; they do not want government control.”  He lamented that it was unfair 
that “Christians pay [their] bills [i.e., water, electricity, etc.] while the Muslims don’t.”  
He also seemed to critique constructively what he perceived as a weakness in the 
Lebanese Christian mentality: “Democracy is something we’re not sure of.  We [Lebanese 
Christians] must be honest and think more neutral and not [just about our] community.  The 
problem is we still think in terms of community either [by] area or religion.”  He lamented, 
“Lebanon today lost a lot of their good leaders; I ask what good Christian leaders are 
around?”   




A little bit in Lebanon of extreme religion, but not so much extreme Christians, not 
[many] Sunni extremist.  There is a little bit extremist Shiite.  If they [Shiites and other 
extremists] are extreme in their own religious community, then okay.  But if it [i.e., 
their extremism] spreads to the other communities, then I disagree [i.e., disapprove]. 
 
He added, “Praying five times a day is good, but five prayers and jihad is no good.”  He 
conceded that there was some debate over the exact definition of the term jihad, but shared 
that “if there is a connection between the word [jihad] and deed [i.e., acting out under the holy 
war definition of jihad], then this is a [an extremist] problem.”   
On the other hand,  he stated that “Christian extremism is not violent, and violence is 
the question Islam has it in: one, the Quran and two, the Hadith.”  Regarding Christianity, 
Khalil offered, “If you take all the Christian texts, the aim is how to make people better [i.e., 
righteous]; Christ did not go against the Law of Moses but worked within it.”  He continued, 
“The idea of justice [i.e., holding the sinner accountable] is not the idea of the gospel; you see, 
Christ came not to condemn but to cure.”  For Khalil, through Islam, “Muslims seek justice or 
punishment of the wrongdoers; in Christianity, Christians are to forgive and even love the 
wrongdoers.”  He believed this to be a fundamental difference between Christianity and 
Islam, which resulted in Islam being more susceptible to radicalism or extremism.  He also 
mentioned that followers of Hezbollah were somewhat radical.  
Khalil believed that “Christians are doing a little more than Muslims on different 
levels” in working toward positive CMR.  SK offered, “Christians [in general] have official 
documents that say Muslims are able to reach salvation, that God wants this for all, no 
exclusions.”  He continued, “Church teaching has this principle, that everyone is my brother, 
not [simply] cousin, friend, etc.”  On the other hand, he noted  
Islam says there is no heaven [for Christians].  There are two different 
approaches between Christianity and Islam.  One is that Muslims are exclusive, 
and two, Christianity is inclusive.  It [Christianity] basically says Muslims are 
going around the [less direct] way to salvation for Christ.  
290 
 
He also pointed out that “Christians are inclusive [in that] they share services such as their 
schools, with Muslims while the Muslims are exclusive and don’t [normally] do this.”  For 
SK, Christians are doing more to foster healthy CMR.  
Addressing whether something could have been done to prevent the Lebanese Civil 
War and strained CMR, Khalil revisited IQ1, referencing the possible causes of Christian–
Muslim discord (politics, theology, economy, and social stratification):  “All of these are true 
[causes of the war that, if addressed, could have prevented the civil war]: politics, the rich 
versus the poor and so on.”  More specifically, he believed that had Israel not denied the 
Palestinians their rights and expelled them from what was Palestine, eventually to Lebanon, 
the war might not have occurred.: “The reason why the Palestinians came [were expelled to 
and accepted by] to Lebanon was because Lebanon was too liberal and weak” [politically and 
militarily].  He added, “You must have a strong army, order and structure, but then you don’t 
[necessarily] have an open and liberal society.”  Despite his belief that the civil war might not 
have occurred had it not been for the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, he asserted, “I have 
compassion for the suffering of the Palestinians and Arafat from Israel; I pray for them.”  
Khalil stated, “There will be no other wars because the Lebanese are tired and 
disillusioned by the war and they don’t want to repeat it, neither Christian nor Muslim.”  He 
also mentioned that the Lebanese “very much want and need the normal life” and are 
interested in contemporary issues such as adequate employment, supporting their families, 
and so forth. 
Although it may be true that, historically, Khalil’s position represents an extraordinary 
tolerance and openness while retaining religious differences, a Christian studying Islam while 
living in everyday interactions with Muslims represents a tremendous hope and promise for 
CMR.  His continuing of his studies and his international reputation bespeaks a continued 
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respect for his field and beliefs.  Further context is needed, however, to ascertain whether 





APPENDIX 8: PIERRE GEMAYEL 
Interview: June 6, 2005 
Faith: Maronite Catholic 
Position: MP, Minister of Industry 
Gemayel, the son and nephew of two Lebanese presidents, was interviewed for this 
assessment in his political stronghold, an area of his mainly Christian constituency.  His 
family has a long history of strong political involvement in Lebanon.  Draped on large 
buildings in the area were a few very large murals of him and some of his family members.  
His grandfather, for whom he was named, was a national soccer player, a pharmacist, and the 
founder of the Kataeb, the once powerful Lebanese Phalange party.  His uncle, Bashir 
Gemayel, was elected president of Lebanon in 1982, during the second Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon, and was known to cooperate with the Israeli government of then Prime Minister 
Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon.  Gemayel’s father, Amin Gemayel, was 
also elected president of Lebanon after Bashir was assassinated shortly after his election to the 
Lebanese presidency.  Gemayel was a member of parliament at the time of this interview; and 
the following year (2006), he became the Minister of Industry for Lebanon.  His family and 
political party, the Phalangists, have been major proponents of Lebanese/Christian 
Nationalism in Lebanon and strongly opposed Lebanon and the Lebanese being identified as 
Arab. 
Gemayel, age 33 at the time of our interview, was not known to be a major participant 
in CMR nor an advocate for CMR in Lebanon.  To the extent that he believed the author’s 
interview was focused on religion per se, he seemed less interested in the topic.  The more the 
interview was focused on the politics of CMR, the more focused and animated Gemayel 
became.  However, he also displayed a level of discontent when he discussed politics, as did 
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the other interviewees.  This was understandable because the events of the last year, prior to 
this interviews, were dizzying.  These included the extension of Lebanese President Emile 
Lahoud’s mandate against the wishes of some Lebanese factions and international countries, 
the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, subsequent street protests both in 
support and in opposition of the Syrian role in Lebanon, the departure of Syrian troops in late 
April 2005, vacillating political alliances, and additional assassinations.  In addition, Lebanon 
faced Israeli threats, over flights, bombings, and a devastating invasion of the country by 
Israeli forces. 
Gemayel felt his role in CMR had been a historical one, pointing to the over half a 
century of political involvement his family had had in Lebanon.  He also mentioned the 
natural role that his Lebanese identity held within CMR.  To be Lebanese meant to be 
Christian or Muslim; thus, a relationship by nature must exist.  He stated, “Although I am 
proud of being a Christian, I don’t like talking about sects.”  Instead, he offered his preference 
for referring to Lebanese without religious connotations.  He insisted that CMR had 
deteriorated in Lebanon with “repercussions of [intermingled] religion and politics.  The 
problem was of a political nature, but it appeared to be religious as well.”  He added that 
“politics was the bigger problem, rather than religion.”  He was the only respondent who 
clearly felt that theological and religious reasons were causes of CMR discord in Lebanon.  
Additionally, he was the only respondent who felt CMR were better than in prewar Lebanon.  
Gemayel answered IQ5 with his belief that “there are three causes of extremism: One 
is poverty, two is oppression, and three is a strong political cause.”  These factors, he stated, 
“cause extremism on both sides.”  He identified Hezbollah as Muslim extremists and felt that 
this extremism could be neutralized and resolved by “merging them [i.e., their military wing] 
into the [official, national] Lebanese Army.”  He identified Samir Gea-Gea and his political 
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party, Al-Qouwat, as radical Christian.  His  solution to Hezbollah, the Qouwat, and other 
radical groups in Lebanon was to “merge them into the Lebanese government and understand 
their point of view and positions, break down what they believe is oppressing them and then 
solve those issues.”  
He stated,  “The people of Lebanon have this idea that there is no life in Lebanon,” or 
“ma fi aish,” a common colloquial phrase meaning that the Lebanese economy is very weak 
and thus meaningful employment opportunities are hard to come by.  Additionally, it means 
that the Lebanese people are divided politically under an already-corrupt political 
establishment, leaving them feeling anxious about their financial capabilities, providing for 
their families, and the future.  Also mingled with this feeling of “there is no life” in Lebanon 
is the nationalist disunity of its people in general and the Christians and Muslims in particular. 
 To address this problem, Gemayel credited the Christians with thinking more about 
the problems and their solutions.  He stated, somewhat timidly, that it is the Christians who 
realize that “federalism won’t work, in my opinion.”  He believed that it is the Lebanese 
Christians rather than their Muslim counterparts who are more pro-active in initiating and 
maintaining Christian-Muslim dialogue. 
He also stated, “If UN Resolution 1559 had been implemented in 1975 [the start of the 
Lebanese Civil War], then there would have been no problem.”  He also believed that “if 
America and Russia at the time stopped playing with Lebanon, and implemented 1559 back 
then, Lebanon would not have had a civil war.” 
Gemayel seemed fairly certain that there would not be another Lebanese Civil War.  
He posed, “Who are we going to wage a war with?” explaining that the Lebanese Civil War 
was all-inclusive and inconclusive, claiming it had no apparent winner or goal attained.  He 
asserted that the Lebanese have become very contemporary in their needs and desires, that 
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they very much want meaningful employment opportunities and income, and that “the 
Lebanese economy could never handle another war.”  
Gemayel was serving as Minister of Industry when he was tragically assassinated on 
November 21, 2006.  He was the third member of his family to be assassinated in 25 years.  
His uncle Bashir Gemayel was assassinated in 1982, also at the age 34; and his 1-year-old 
daughter was killed in a car bomb attack in 1980 that was initially supposed to target him. 
Gemayel’s argument regarding CMR seemed somewhat simplistic and was based on 
past history rather than recent initiatives.  Be that as it may, his representative Christian views 




APPENDIX 9: SOUHEIL MATAR 
Interview: March 21, 2006. 
Faith: Maronite Catholic 
Position: Director of International Relations, Notre Dame University 
The interview was conducted on March 21, 2006, at NDU in Zouk Mosbeh, Lebanon.  
Matar is the chief counselor to the president of NDU, and the director of public relations for 
the university as well.  He spoke in both colloquial and formal Arabic throughout our 
interview; a translator was utilized when needed.  Much of Matar’s work includes interaction 
with governments and other universities in the Arab Middle East, where he is well known and 
also well acquainted with some Arab government leaders.  
Many of the administrators and faculty at NDU feel that Matar is a shrewd and 
surprisingly talented individual.  They point to the fact that he ceased his formal education at 
the bachelor’s level with a degree in Arabic literature from the Lebanese University and that 
he speaks neither French nor English like many other Lebanese do.  Yet, even so, he is able to 
manage public (including international) relations for NDU quite handily.  Matar is in his late 
50s. 
Matar shared that he was raised in a village that overwhelmingly consisted of 
Maronite Christians: “I grew up in a Maronite environment, and I never saw a Muslim or an 
Orthodox (Christian) until age 12.”  When he began to study at the Lebanese University, he 
met Muslims and began to work in the area of politics,” adding “we should separate religion 
and the state.”  He elaborated: “Some people who call for a separation of religion and state are 
socialists, but I call for this from my humane [non-political] point of view.”  Matar believed 
that he had developed a keen understanding of Middle East communities and religion because 
he “studied Arabic literature which gave me contact with everything that is Arab . . . my 
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interest and success in literature drove me to acquire interest in the Islamic and Arabic 
civilization.”  He felt that he was able to transcend many challenges of CMR because of his 
Arabic literature studies.  He taught at various schools, teaching Druze, Sunnis, and 
Maronites.  With pride, he noted that he never considered himself an outsider confined to just 
being a Maronite and stated about his Arabic studies that “this experience helped me and I use 
it now at NDU,” where “I actually find myself favoring the Muslim students at times because 
they are a minority here and I want them to feel comfortable.”  He also stated, “That’s why 
when we hold conferences here at the university, I try very hard to have religious and 
community diversity.”   
Indeed, the author observed that Muslim students seemed to admire and identify with 
Matar.  At the branch campus of NDU in the small Shouf district where many of the students 
are Druze by faith, some students remarked to this writer in admiration about how Matar 
spoke highly grammatically correct, formal Arabic.   
Regarding IQ2, Matar agreed that “religious differences exist, we acknowledge this,” 
he said, adding,  
There’s no merging of the religious theology.  They [Christianity and Islam] are 
different and so we leave it that way; as long as we don’t develop the citizen as a 
whole and the government, these religious differences will become a political 
difference and problem. 
 
He also stated, “Yes, there is still a problem with confessional fanaticism in Lebanon, 
coming from the different wars that took place in Lebanon and throughout the Middle East,” 
Matar stated, “What is causing these problems is the Zionist presence.”  He shared that “Israel 
has been detrimental to CMR in Lebanon and elsewhere.”  He also believed that the Syrian 
government was not playing a constructive role in Lebanese CMR.  Even so, he explained, 
“The Asaad [Syrian president] regime doesn’t believe in religious fanaticism and it has 
actually crushed Muslim radical organizations.  America likes this.  The Syrian Baathist 
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government is a secular government against radicalism.”  He added, “In Lebanon, the Syrians 
came to help the Christians and are now leaving Lebanon with the Christians opposed to 
them.” 
 In response to IQ6, Matar said, “There is no party in Lebanon or area of Lebanon that 
[publicly] calls for conflict between the Christians and the Muslims; everyone calls for a good 
relationship but, some people lie.”  He added, “Education, both universities and schools and 
all political parties call to establish good CMR.”  He believed that many institutions including 
the media and religious leaders agree, “but few of these entities, especially the political media 
delve into this subject area (CMR) with any depth or way to proceed.”  He suggested that 
“call[ing] for the implementation and acceptance of civil marriage, which would bring the 
Lebanese together, united.”  He also made it clear that he felt that enacting the right for civil 
marriage in Lebanon would help unite the citizens wherein they would not focus so much on 
someone’s religion.  
Matar also spoke about the murder of the former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.  “It does 
not matter if we were with or against Hariri; however, we are all against his murder, both 
Christians and Muslims so the assassination could lead to a stronger unity and interaction 
between Christians and Muslims.”  
He noted that  “many events [had taken] place since 1943 until now” that affected the 
peace of Lebanon:  
The internal influence of these events has been problematic for Lebanon.  In 
1948, this Israeli formation took place, and the Palestinians were expelled to 
Lebanon.  Then, in 1967, the Arab-Israeli war occurred, wherein the Arabs 
were defeated.  This reflected negatively in Lebanon, because then the PLO 
took up arms in Lebanon to defend themselves against the Israelis.  
 
SM added, “This instigated war in 1975 between the Lebanese and the Palestinians.”  He 
firmly believed that “the only situation that can avoid a future conflict in Lebanon is the 
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building of the state [solid civil institutions, law and order and freedom].  If we build the state, 
or had built the state since 1943, then we would not have had a war.”  He continued, “We are 
caught now between Israel and Syria.”  Matar believed that “the only guarantee to avoid 
future conflict is to develop strong government institutions that treats all citizens the same and 
dispenses the same resources and services to all.”  
He did not believe there would be a future Christian-Muslim war in Lebanon: “Nor 
will it be for Christian-Muslim reasons,” he said.  “Maybe a political war, but not Christian 





APPENDIX 10: MP DR. FARID EL KHAZEN 
Interview: November 6, 2004. 
Faith: Maronite Catholic 
Position: MP, Former director of the Political Science Department at the American University 
of Beirut  
El Khazen has a PhD in political science from Johns Hopkins University and, at the 
time of this interview, was a professor and chair of the Political Studies Department at AUB.  
He was also this writer’s professor of political science in 1999 at AUB.  El Khazen has 
written several articles and books regarding the Lebanese political situation.  He was also a 
founding member of the Christian Opposition Gathering until June 2005 when he was elected 
a member of the Lebanese Parliament for the Kesrouan (mostly Christian) district of Lebanon.  
He won election as a member of the political party headed by Gen. Michel Aoun.  El Khazen 
was re-elected to the same position in the early June 2009 Lebanese elections.  
El Khazen was interviewed for this assessment on November 6, 2004.  His family is a 
historically known Maronite family.  He answered all the questions posed in English and had 
no prior knowledge of them.  
He believed he plays an important role in CMR through his career as a university 
professor.  He pointed out that his involvement in CMR is more “political” than religious or 
sociological.  He added that the Lebanese “by nature have become political beings” and 
within the Lebanese model there is the CMR factor.  For his part, El Khazen emphasized that 
he strongly supports the separation of church and state.  With this desire, he has had a 
moderate involvement in topics directly related to CMR. 
Although El Khazen stated that Lebanese ills were not based on religious and 
theological reasons, he seemed to contradict himself later.  He reported, “Yes, radical Islam is 
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a problem” in Lebanon.  This radicalism, he explained, “invokes the Christians to feeling 
insecure,” while on the other hand, he denied that radical Christianity exists in Lebanon and 
explained that “no Christians are advocating for a Christian [only] state.” 
He stated, “It is always the Christians who initiate [CM] dialogue.”  He added, “It is 
mostly the Maronites and then the [Greek] Orthodox and then the Greek Catholics.”  This is 
the “pattern,” according to El Khazen.  He also stated that the Muslim communities “less 
often” initiate and maintain Christian-Muslim dialogue.  
El Khazen strongly believed that the Lebanese CIVIL WAR could have been 
prevented “had it not been for the presence of the armed PLO and the influx of Palestinian 
refugees.”  He blamed the PLO and its behavior in Lebanon for causing “a major political 
problem and the breakdown of the state.”  
Although he held a poor prognosis for CMR in Lebanon, he was clear to point out that 
it was not at risk of another civil war.  He expressed that the Lebanese have learned from the 
civil war and its causes and thus another conflict was highly improbable.    
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APPENDIX 11: DR. NIDAL BOU HABIB  
Interview: November 3, 2004 
Faith: Greek Orthodox 
Position: Secretary General for a regional Greek Orthodox community, PhD in Islamic studies 
Bou Habib holds a PhD in Islamic Studies from Al-Azhar University, Egypt.  His 
family has a long history of political involvement in Lebanon.  He was interviewed for this 
assessment on Thursday November 3, 2004, and answered all the questions in both written 
and semiformal spoken Arabic; he had no prior knowledge of the questions.  Translation was 
provided as needed by his son, Habib Bou Habib, a master’s degree student at Kaslik 
University in Lebanon and a well-known artist.  
Bou Habib wrote, 
In Lebanon CMR are based on the compartmentalization of shares in all aspects of 
daily life, such as jobs, parliamentary seats, cabinet seats, etc.  A common 
understanding between Christians and Muslims is an idealistic aim and consequently 
is imperfect.  Therefore, we are either to coexist under the banner of the one nation or 
we are to section the nation; the latter suggestion does not carry much hope for life for 
either party. 
 
He then discussed his answer by explaining that “as a member of the league of 
Christian Lebanese, which consists of Maronites, Protestants, Greek Catholics, and so on, I 
was also involved in CMR in that capacity.”  He also believed that his role as a secretary 
general of the Greek Orthodox Church “has to do with relations with Muslims as well.”  His 
doctoral degree has also contributed to his involvement and understanding of Islam.  
Shortly into discussing his involvement with CMR in Lebanon, Bou Habib digressed 
to his feelings of disgust regarding the poor prognosis of CMR in contemporary Lebanon.  He 
interrupted with “but there’s too much confessionalism, too much.  They [Christian and 
Muslim leaders] talk like everything is great but in truth and practice it stinks.”  With dismay 
he added, “They are going to divide Lebanon, ruin Lebanon.”  
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He offered a slightly different view “with respect to radicalism.  There are some 
radical Muslims as well as some radical Christians; each of these groups strives to rule the 
country.  The former group strives for a Muslim nation while the latter strives for a Christian 
nation.”  However, he cited politics as the main problem.  He also added, “Yes, radical Islam 
is a problem we face, but there is also radical Christianity, which is even worse.”  As an 
example, he pointed out that the Maronite Patriarch Sfeir is often in the position to influence 
and dictate political policy in Lebanon.  Bou Habib was visibly upset as he described himself 
as someone who is “secular and there’s supposed to be a separation between the religion and 
the state.” 
He expressed his dislike for a relatively new term emerging in the Middle East, 
“Islamiyoun,” or the “Islamicists.”  He felt the Muslims had begun designating themselves as 
“Islamiyoun” as opposed to “Muslimoun” or “Arab” and so on.  He also lamented, “Radical 
Christians are even worse” than radical Muslims and that there are “Protestants who are like 
Zionists,” referring to some Protestant denominations in the United States and elsewhere that 
refer to themselves as “Christian Zionists.”  With some rare optimism, Bou Habib interjected, 
“The radicals are not strong enough to destroy Lebanon and its [democratic] institutions . . . 
Many Muslims are becoming more moderate.”  
His written response to IQ6 was  
There is a committee for dialogue in Lebanon; the Arab working group for 
Christian-Muslim dialogue that works for Christian-Muslim propagation.  
Aside from that, there are organizations that work on CMR; add that to the 
political parties that have secular inclinations.  
 
He didn’t feel that either the Christians or the Muslims were doing more than the other toward 
CMR; both communities are working at the same level.  He continued, “Politics ruins 
everything; if you take away the politics, everything would be alright . . . Every political party 
has a religious party or sect attached to it and politics ruins it” (CMR and coexistence).  He 
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asserted, “There is really no religious problem; it’s politicians, they work for themselves, not 
for Christian-Muslim relations.”  
Bou Habib offered that even if the Greek Orthodox community, rather than the 
Maronite community, were the largest and thus more influential Christian group of Lebanon, 
“There would still have been a war.”  He explained, “It is human nature to argue, disagree, 
and eventually get violent regarding different issues.  Even if Wadi Nasara were included [as 
part of Lebanon)], this would not have changed things.”  He claimed, “Yes, the Greek 
Orthodox identifies with Arabism closely, and has a strong affinity to the Arab language, 
[but] CMR would still have suffered.”  In contrast to his negative reference to the Tā’if 
Accords in IQ1, he believed, “After the Tā’if Accords, everyone is equal.”  His written 
response to IQ7 stated, “The reasons for the conflicts remain the same, however after the 
implementation of the Tā’if Accords, the Muslims getting their share, the situation developed 
into conforming and dividing shares on all state levels.”  For Bou Habib, the Lebanese Civil 
War was inevitable.  
Regarding the possibility of another civil war caused by increasingly poor CMR, he 
wrote, “I do not see that happening, because the Tā’if system has defined all authorities, 
giving every confession its rights and share in the state.”  He expounded on his answer 
verbally: “No, the war situation cannot happen like before and it cannot be worse.  Everything 
must be even now and if it is not, it must be made equal.”  
 Bou Habib ended with some concerns, pointing out, “Some of the Lebanese in the 
diaspora, many of whom are Maronite, act like they are affiliated with and representing 
Lebanon, but that is false and they are [actually] creating conflict in Lebanon” (from abroad). 
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APPENDIX 12: MOHAMMED SAMMAK 
Interview: September 29, 2004 
Faith: Sunni Muslim 
Position: Journalist, secretary general of three Arab CRM working groups, Muslim envoy to 
Christian communities 
This writer met with Mohammed Sammak for the first of several interviews on 
September 29, 2004.  All the interviews took place in his office in the Al Mustaqbal (“The 
Future”) television station office building.  Sammak was selected for interview for several 
reasons.  First, local English-language Lebanese magazines such as the Monday Morning 
weekly magazine, which discusses Lebanese political, social, and religious issues, had 
featured his columns on several occasions.  Many of these dealt directly with the subject of 
CMR in Lebanon.  Also, many of his articles and interviews were published in An-Nahar (The 
Day), Lebanon’s leading newspaper.  Sammak’s writings and interviews are also found in 
many books, such as Carole Dagger’s (2001) Bringing Down the Walls.  Interviews with 
Sammak, wherein his encouraging words advocating for strong CMR can be found, also 
appear on the Internet.   
At the time of this interview, Sammak was the secretary general of the Permanent 
Committee for Muslim Dialogue in Lebanon, a secretary general for the Permanent 
Committee for Christian–Muslim Dialogue for the Arab countries, and a secretary general for 
the Permanent Committee for Christian–Muslim Dialogue in Lebanon.  He had a close 
relationship with  one-time Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri for whom he had served as 
an official advisor and representative 
Sammak reported that he was also very active in the Vatican’s second Christian Synod 
for Lebanon, spearheaded by the Maronite clerical hierarchy in 1994 (the first such synod 
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having been held in 1736).  He had met and spoken with Pope John Paul II on several 
occasions and had been asked by the pope to participate in the Christian–Muslim dialogue 
presentations at the synod.  Sammak was also a frequent speaker on Lebanese television, 
including Christian broadcast programs such as “Télé Lumière.”  
Sammak was a gentleman in his late sixties.  The ease with which he was willing to 
meet was a great asset for many reasons, not the least of which were the contact and 
accessibility challenges of Lebanon.  He was also helpful in obtaining new interview referral 
sources. 
Sammak reported being interested in CMR for many years.  He had this interest early 
on, which he explained as a natural a part of Lebanese life and society.  Within the past 20 
years, he had been directly and officially involved in CMR of Lebanon and the larger Arab 
Middle East.  He was the official representative/counselor of the late Grand Mufti (Sunni 
Muslim) of Lebanese Sheikh Hassan Khaled.  Specifically, he was Sheikh Khaled’s 
representative to the Maronite Church patriarch, Nasrallah Sfeir.  MS had also been a 
representative of the Sunni Muslim community of Lebanon to a six-member Arab League 
committee that met in Kuwait chaired by the Kuwaiti foreign minister.  The committee was 
designed to assist the Lebanese in conflict resolution.  
Sammak referred to this Arab League meeting because it demonstrated to him a vital 
understanding of CMR of Lebanon.  This meeting lasted a few days; it was composed of high-
level representatives of the various Lebanese confessional communities.  Maronite Patriarch 
Nasrallah Sfeir was present at the meeting, where representatives of the various confessional 
communities met separately with different delegations of the six-member committee of the 
Arab League.  The Lebanese community representatives did not meet together, according to 
Sammak, but rather separately with the Arab League representatives.  After a few days, the 
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meeting ended with the Kuwaiti foreign minister and Arab League members stating that the 
Lebanese community representatives’ positions “were so far apart” that the meeting ended 
with the notion that it was inconclusive and a failure.  
However, soon afterward, the Lebanese representatives found themselves together, for 
the first time, during a casual departure breakfast at a Kuwaiti hotel.  At the breakfast, the 
Lebanese representatives began talking together.  Sammak then proceeded to write a letter 
regarding possible points of agreement on a simple piece of paper and showed it to Patriarch 
Sfeir.  Patriarch Sfeir stated that he approved of the letter’s contents and simply handed it to 
another representative who stated the same.  Shortly afterwards, the various representatives 
returned to Lebanon and appeared on local news television.  Patriarch Sfeir began reading 
Sammak’s  letter of points.  After sharing this recollection with the author, Sammak declared 
happily, “You see!  Leave it to the Lebanese and we will find our way out” of conflict.  He 
relished the fact that the Lebanese representatives, after a brief, informal breakfast, were able 
to come to certain resolutions while within the official Arab League meeting, apart from each 
other, little was accomplished.  Later in 1993, there was a Lebanese summit meeting where a 
committee for Christian–Muslim dialogue was formed and for which Sammak has since been 
the secretary general.  As a journalist, he found himself involved in many of the sociopolitical 
phenomena of Lebanon as well. 
He stated, “Of course radicalism within religion affects CMR.”  He had no qualms in 
reporting that “there are a larger number of Muslim fundamentalists than Christian 
fundamentalists; Christian radicals are more controlled by the church, on the other hand, 
Muslim radicals, there is no control over them.”  He was not referring to the Western notion 
of radical Islamism in Lebanon; specifically, he did not refer to Hezbollah.  He also did not 
refer to Shiite Hezbollah as radical Islamists.  Instead, he mentioned the areas of “Akkar and 
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Tripoli,” where some radical Sunni Muslims “are rebelling against the larger Muslim church 
and need to be worked with” toward rational religiosity and CMR.  He believed that the cause 
of some of the radical Islamic beliefs and behavior was poor education and underdevelopment 
in poverty-stricken areas.  
Sammak described some Muslims as being inflexible in their relations with Christians, 
pointing out how the prophet Muhammad himself, in the heart of what is today’s Saudi 
Arabia, invited the Christians of Najran into his mosque to pray with him.  With this in mind, 
Sammak was baffled by the fact that in present-day Saudi Arabia, it is illegal to build any 
Christian churches.  He felt this hurts CMR.  
In regard to CMR and dialogue in Lebanon, Sammak reported, “Almost all the 
initiatives have been taken by the church, Christians, and then, the Muslims respond; this isn’t 
good; the Muslims should also take initiatives for dialogue.”  However, he was happy to 
report, “Now this is changing and Muslims are taking initiatives for CM dialogue.” He then 
shared a personal experience: In 1989, while attending a conference at the University of 
Malta, MS had the opportunity to meet Pope John Paul II, along with other participants and 
scholars, some of whom were Lebanese.  When his turn came to meet the pope, he greeted the 
pontiff, announced his name and asked, “What are you doing for Lebanon?” Sammak felt that 
the pope was a bit taken by surprise.  The pope hesitated and then reassuringly responded, 
“You will see what I’m going to do for Lebanon.”  
Sammak felt that his direct question to the pope, in its own small way, helped to 
inspire the pontiff to hold the Vatican’s Synod for Lebanon.  The Synod for Lebanon, only the 
second in more than 200 years, was held in 1994.  Prior to the Synod, Sammak spent a month 
at the Vatican in preparation.  The pope barely remembered MS’s name, but he did remember 
his question.  Sammak seemed proud that he was “one of the very first Muslims” ever to 
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attend the pre-synod preparation meetings at the Vatican and also to have a “private meeting 
with the Pope in his private apartment.”  The Vatican assigned Maronite Bishop Beshara Rai, 
Sammak, and Greek Orthodox Bishop George Khodr to prepare a draft document for 
implementation at the Synod.  
After the preparation work and the synod itself, Sammak reported that many of the 
Muslim communities of the Arab Middle East criticized him harshly because of his close 
work with the Vatican and Christians in general.  The Lebanese Muslim community’s 
criticism was mild or “controlled,” he stated.  However, the non-Lebanese Muslims were very 
critical and angry.  This resentment of his work with the Vatican lasted “for years, until after 
September 11” (2001, when attacks were made against the United States).  He shared that he 
was even called “Kafer” or a “nonbeliever” in God (one of the worst insults in the Arab 
Middle East).  Sammak recalled, “Then, after September 11, the Muslim world realized that 
many Christians did not know what true Islam was.  Then they [previous Muslim critics] said, 
‘you were right Mohammed; we should open dialogue and explain what Islam really is.’”  
After years of being criticized by the larger Arab Muslim world, Sammak believed he 
had since been understood and viewed as a visionary.  He reiterated, “Now it has changed” 
because “Muslims are now taking the initiative” for CMR along with the Christians for 
dialogue.  He reported, “Now Qatar is giving money to [resident] foreign Christians to build 
churches” and “the king of Bahrain donated land [for Christians] to build churches.” He also 
noted, “Kuwait now has some Catholic churches.”  
Sammak listed a few scenarios that might possibly have prevented the outbreak of the 
civil war and, specifically, the deterioration of CMR.  One would have been the Muslim 
community not over involving themselves, particularly militarily, with the PLO.  Second was 
if the Christians had only realized that the Muslims did, in fact, come around to truly believe 
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in the independence of Lebanon above the notion of being part of the larger Arab Middle 
East.  Third was if only the Lebanese government had emphasized co-existence and CMR 
within Lebanon’s educational institutions.  Fourth, he stated that though it seemed impossible 
for the Christians and Muslims to remain living together during the war, had they not 
continued to live separately for so many of the war years, this could have lessened the major 
CMR rift that resulted.  
In response to the possibility of another war,  Sammak said, “No, not [another] war . . . 
Yet, there is still a gap of misunderstanding” between the Christians and the Muslims.  He 
indicated that if this gap remained unfilled, it could lead to another war.  He reemphasized, 
“The young are not educated for living together” and “they don’t know each other, and yet 
they will be our future leaders.”  He lamented, “They are not studying together.  Yes, they are 
[studying together] somewhat at private schools, but they are separated in the public schools.”  
He mentioned, “LU [the official, public Lebanese University] has a low quality educational 
standard” and does not encourage or include promoting healthy CMR in the curriculum.  
 Sammak ended the interview with some compassionate, caring, thoughts.  He stated 
that he “cannot figure the Middle East or Lebanon without Christians; the decreasing number 
of Christians in Lebanon and the Middle East worries me and it worries the Christians.”  He 
explained, “Lebanon is a Christian need” and thus “it is very destructive for Lebanon if the 
Christians are being and feeling like minorities,” a sentiment echoed by some of the other 




APPENDIX 13: MP SAMIR FRANJIEH 
Interview: March 8, 2005 
Faith: Maronite 
Position: MP, Christian envoy to Muslim communities, an organizer of the March 14 
movement 
The interview was conducted on Tuesday, March 8, 2005.  The date and time of the 
meeting was an important because that day some Lebanese opposition groups, headed by 
Hezbollah, held a massive demonstration in Beirut.  This opposition group was protesting 
several political changes that were occurring in Lebanon at the time and came out en masse to 
show their support for the Syrian government and its presence in Lebanon.  For his part, 
Franjieh was one of the members to spearhead the eventual withdrawal of Syrian troops from 
Lebanon, a major point of contention between the Christians and Muslims.  Additionally, the 
evening before the interview, local Lebanese television reported that a meeting was held 
between Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Franjieh regarding the political situation in 
Lebanon.  Franjieh had often been deployed by the Maronite community as a liaison to the 
Muslim communities of Lebanon.  
Just 2 short months after our meeting, Franjieh was elected to the Lebanese 
Parliament.  He came from a politically involved family in Lebanese history.  His uncle, 
Suleiman Frangieh, was a former president of Lebanon.  His nephew, Suleiman Frangieh, the 
grandson of former president Frangieh, was also a Lebanese MP. 
The tense political atmosphere was due in part to Franjieh’s  belonging to the Qornet 
Shehwan [predominantly Christian] opposition movement of Lebanon.  One week after the 
interview, he and the Qornet Shehwan were part of another huge demonstration held in 
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Beirut, which later became known as the March 14 Forces and the Cedar Revolution (as it 
was known in the West) opposition group. 
Franjieh revealed that he began dialogue, stipulating that it was not Christian–Muslim 
religious dialogue, but dialogue between the Christians and Muslims fighting during the civil 
war in 1977.  The Tā’if agreement was also an instance he considers the beginning of his 
formal work with CMR.  He felt he was also involved with CMR in helping to found “The 
Lebanese National Congress for National Dialoguem” a political movement/committee.  
Franjieh belongs to the Hiwar, (“dialogue”).  This Lebanese National Congress produces 
documents wherein there is talk of compromise, dialogue,  and so forth.  He formed this group 
in the 1990s, which was a very difficult period in Lebanese history, and he was proud of the 
fact that now dialogue is ongoing and better than it had been.  He said, “We worked on the 
war memory and reconciliation, not from the religious point of view, but a societal point of 
view.”  
Franjieh seemed proud of having published The Beirut Declaration in June 2004.  This 
was a comprehensive document designed to promote the unity of the Lebanese people along 
national, not particularly religious, lines: “We put in our political programs, opposition 
members and others to help purify our memories from the war.”  One of the goals of the 
Beirut declaration was to “recognize our differences.”  He mentioned that one of his precepts 
in his work on dialogue between Lebanese communities was “We can live together, both 
equal and different—we have different personalities, but we are equal.”  In regards to his 
meeting with Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, the night before our interview, 
Franjieh said, “Nasrallah is a clever guy.”  He explained this to mean that while he was trying 
to engage Hassan Nasrallah in joining his opposition group, Nasrallah would not commit 
either way to joining or opposing Franjieh’s dialogue. 
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Regarding Lebanese religious radicalism, he began, “Look, now, no, why?  Because 
we tried it and it did not work [religious radicalism]” and that “we tried to be both Christian 
and Muslim extremists, but we finished the end of these two radical schools of thought.”  He 
observed,  
We imploded; both Muslims and Christians no longer want radicalism.  It started with 
the Christians and then the Muslims became radical.  No one can impose the Shadour 
(be forced to wear the long, black Muslim robe) or a Christian state on Lebanon.  
With disappointment, he shared, “Lebanon was the first model; we were a good laboratory for 
violence, the first non-national war in the world, like Vietnam.”  He recalled, “Beirut was a 
town of anarchy.  Now it is the opposite, it is becoming a town of harmony and consensus.  
Now it is a popular choice to get along with one another.”  SF continued, “I see young people 
downtown working hard and they know that they cannot succeed unless we unify.  Unity is 
the first factor of independence.” 
Regarding the community doing more to solidify peaceful CMR, SF remarked, “We 
don’t have the same approach in time.”  He explained that when the Christians are eager for 
dialogue, the Muslims do not seem to be as eager at the same time and vice versa while their 
methods and approaches to dialogue are different.  “When a community exits out of a war, 
then things are not finished and not synchronized — there is not one group that is bad and one 
that is good.”  He added, “When the Shiites were moderate in 1983, the Christians were 
radical and then vice versa.”  Franjieh was somewhat hopeful of a Lebanese renaissance 
occurring very soon, during this critical point in Lebanese history, a period that also saw the 
assassination of former prime minister Rafiq Hariri two months earlier of this interview in 




He offered a scenario that could have prevented the Lebanese Civil War: “Perhaps if 
the Palestinian and Israeli conflict did not exist.  The creation of Israel started a change in the 
whole Arab world.  There was some democracy in Egypt and Syria but then the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict created dictatorial regimes.”  
The question of whether Lebanon will have another civil war, Franjieh responded, 
No, I do not think so.  The people took [learned] lessons; it was a long, painful 
war and people were hurt in all aspects of their lives.  People lost their dignity 
and financial assets and there was no consideration given for the other.  So, the 
people understood that change in society had to come.  They realized we must 
change the militias and attitude.  This occurred somewhat.  I think Lebanon is 
the first good example on how to end a war. 
 
He also pointed out how “late last-century Lebanon succeeded in resolving its conflicts while 
Cyprus and Yugoslavia, even today, did not.”  
Franjieh’s involvement in CMR is another instance of realism regarding differences 
and an honest effort to sustain dialogue.  It is interesting to note that most who hold this 
position deny explicitly religious implications of this dialogue.  Yet, they emphasize the 




APPENDIX 14: GHASSAN HAJJAR 
Interview: August 5, 2005 
Faith: Greek Catholic 
Position: Editor  for Al-Nahar, Lebanon’s Leading Newspaper, Former Journalist of  
Community and Education Issues 
Ghassan Hajjar, age 34, had been a journalist for the leading Arabic newspaper in 
Lebanon for the past 10 years.  He covered education and Lebanese community/social issues.  
Information for this assessment was gathered from several informal meetings and phone calls 
with Hajjar in addition to the official interview, was held on Wednesday, August 5, 2005.  
Hajjar spoke mostly in colloquial Arabic, although he used some formal Arabic as well.  A 
translator was utilized as needed.  
Hajjar reported that his work with CMR began in 1985–1986.  He explained that at 
that time people were beginning to get expelled from their villages and so he started to get 
involved in politics and CMR to help fix this problem.  Reflecting on his work for CMR, he 
explained that “challenges are always there, because certain types of problems will always be 
there (between Christians and Muslims).  We have some differences . . . these will cause 
problems often.”  He added that he is seen by members of Muslim communities as someone 
interested in forging positive CMR.  He mentioned with pride that he was elected as the head 
of the student cabinet in a predominantly Muslim university (6 Christians and 300 Muslims), 
the University of Journalism.  
Hajjar was dismayed that “work in CMR can be hard and some Christians say it is too 
hard and can’t be done successfully.  Some Muslims feel the same.”  Yet he was proud of the 
fact that he had been working for the betterment of CMR, that it had been a main aspect of his 
life.  He reflected proudly that his having lived, studied, and worked with Muslims made him 
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optimistic and that he “has no real worries” about CMR, “although sometimes we do not get 
along.” 
He believed that “radicalism always existed in Lebanon with some groups being 
extremists while others are not.”  He was concerned that “extremism is multiplying and each 
[Christians and Muslims] blames the other but the reality is they are both to blame.”  He 
explained,  
Extremist Islam is growing, so we Christians are afraid of that; we are becoming weak 
and thus we feel more threatened and thus we are becoming radical...When we hear 
Bin Laden talking about eradicating Christians, the Christians become afraid of what 
might happen to them. 
  
 Hajjar believed that the Christians and Muslims “are all working at the same level” 
toward better CMR but that this level was “inadequate.”  He stated that most Christian and 
Muslim politicians and leaders, and even community members, are “satisfied with the status 
quo, and they don’t want improvement to become strong because they will lose their 
individual and group power.”  He also postulated, “If intermarriage was more permissible in 
Lebanon for example, there would eventually be no religious differences between the 
Lebanese and they would become a neutral people [religiously blended and tolerant], but both 
parties do not want this.” 
In regard to the prevention of the Lebanese Civil War, he stated, “No, in this kind of 
[political confessional] system, there was no way to prevent this war.  For example, if only a 
Maronite Christian can be president” (then this causes resentment from the other Lebanese).  
He added, “The Lebanese system led people to be sectarian and confessional.”  Then he 
stated,  
Each Christian and Muslim community has a quota [percentage of government 
and civil service appointments] and they do not always choose the most 
competent leader or worker.  If there are, let’s say, 10 competent Maronite 
candidates for a job, but they need a Shiite-Muslim, however underqualified 
the Shiite may be he will be chosen for the job.  
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When asked if he felt that CMR in Lebanon is so poor that another civil war could 
prevail, he answered directly, “Yes.  We are at that point where we don’t decide if there will 
be war or not; foreigners do.”  He explained that, “Yes, weapons are gone [outlawed under the 




APPENDIX 15: BISHOP SELIM GHAZAL 
Interview: October 16, 2004; November 9, 2004 
Faith: Melchite Catholic 
Position: Coordinator of CMR Projects for South Lebanon, 
Bishop Ghazal was well known in Lebanon for his work on CMR, especially in the 
south where he was stationed in the city of Sidon.  For this reason and more, he was an 
excellent informant/case study of CMR in post-war Lebanon.  At the age of 72, Ghazal was a 
Moutran or Bishop of the “Melchite” (king’s men) Greek Catholic Church of Lebanon.  The 
term Melchite denotes the followers of the king’s religion, referring to the Byzantine emperor 
Constantine, the first emperor or king to embrace Christianity.   
This writer first briefly encountered Ghazal in December 2002 at a meeting in Beirut 
to discuss the renovation of Mashghara, a war-torn village in Lebanon where Ghazal was born 
and raised.  The village had a long history of nearly evenly split Christian–Muslim 
communities.  The Christians of Mashghara were of the Greek Orthodox and Melchite Greek 
Catholic faiths, while the Muslim community was Shiite.  During the long Israeli occupation 
of Lebanon, Mashghara was a hot spot for the resistance.  Indeed, the military wing of the 
Lebanese Hezbollah and the Syrian army were positioned in Mashghara; while just a couple 
of mountains over, in the southern Lebanese village of Jezzin, stood the Israeli armed forces 
and their Lebanese allies, the Southern Lebanese Army.  Both sides were often engaged in 
battle, shelling one another from these two areas.  At the entrance to Mashghara there was a 
large picture of a skull with satanic features, capped with the Israeli flag being crushed by a 
large fist.  This picture represented Hezbollah’s victory by spearheading the Israeli 
withdrawal from nearly all of southern Lebanon.  Ghazal’s birthplace, its significance during 
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the war, and his involvement in rebuilding it afterward encapsulated the fluctuations and 
contradictions of Lebanese CMR. 
This writer met twice more with BG.  The second meeting was held Monday, October 
10, 2004 in Beirut and, although informal, lasted 2 hours.  Using colloquial Arabic, Ghazal 
spoke informally about CMR in Lebanon.  He pointed out proudly that his involvement in 
CMR was focused on shaghl ardi or “ground work” (social work).  At this second meeting, he 
was given a copy of the questions asked of all interviewees.  With keen interest, he stated he 
would write his answers to the questions and then meet with this writer again for a review of 
his answers.  Given the sociopolitical tensions of Lebanon and the nature of the questions that 
had been designed to cut right into the often emotionally charged topic of CMR in Lebanon, 
Ghazal indicated that he needed to inform his superiors of the interview and confer with them 
regarding his responses.  He conferred with a representative of the Vatican. 
Subsequently, a third meeting was held with Ghazal on November 9, 2004, at the 
Melchite Greek Catholic patriarch’s monastic residence.  Ghazal had completed all the 
questions in written Arabic and discussed his answers and other issues of CMR in semiformal 
Arabic.  A translator accompanied this writer and provided translation when needed.  
Ghazal talked about his role in a “1995 Synod in the Vatican,” where he gave a speech 
regarding CMR.  He felt that this writer’s questions were “crucial and direct” regarding CMR.  
He explained that this was the first time he had ever been  interviewed “by a Westerner so 
directly on Christian Muslim relations.” 
His reputation as an advocate for healthy CMR was well known.  For example, Fr. 
Ross Frye, an American priest residing in Lebanon and a coreligionist with Ghazal, shared 
that in the late nineteen eighties, in the southern city of Sidon, Ghazal had saved a Muslim 
youth’s life.  A mob of Christians were intent on killing this Muslim youth, but Ghazal hid  
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the youth and resisted the Christian mob’s advances, saving the youth’s life.  Because of this, 
and his groundwork in CMR in the south of Lebanon, Ghazal was highly regarded by the 
Muslim and Christian communities of the Sidon area and south Lebanon.  
For his part, when asked about this occurrence, with humility, he simply stated yes 
while nodding his head slightly.  When asked the date of the occurrence, he only stated 
“sometime in the eighties.”  Along with other projects and programs involving CMR, Ghazal 
reported that he has held several CMR youth conferences and seminars in Lebanon.  
As of this writing, his work continues with a group of 20 Christian and 20 Muslim 
students in a program he is helping to coordinate at Lebanon’s Saint Joseph University.  This 
project involves teaching them to work for the Lebanese community by promoting peace in 
society for better CMR.  Ghazal reported that even during the height of the Lebanese Civil 
War, he was coordinating a similar project; but at that time, his efforts were particularly 
hampered by Israel and by some Lebanese politicians and communities who begrudged, 
criticized, and minimized CMR and felt that productive CMR were impossible during the war.  
In addition to his verbal responses, BG also submitted a written response to IQ3:  
I started working with the young in the early 1960s through the different youth 
movements that I have established in the region of Sidon and the South.  These 
movements included Muslims and Christians.  In the beginning of the 
Lebanese War, I found myself, due to the aggravating political and security 
situations, especially after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, driven to 
work in the public arena by calling for an end to violence and helping the 
displaced people who had left their villages and homes.  I was faced with many 
difficulties from the different factions, but the majority of the people were 
convinced of the necessity of putting an end to violence, supporting national 
unity and refusing the plans of division.  This was reiterated towards the end of 
the war, when the Lebanese were convinced of the importance of coexistence 
and of moving towards dialogue as a means to solve conflicts and to build a 
Lebanon linked to the Arab World, all the while preserving its uniqueness 





He added to the last portion of his written answer regarding the Arab world that “we 
[the Lebanese] don’t have to melt [completely merge] into the Arab world, but we do not have 
to be totally separated either.”  He stated that he was he also criticized by some Christians for 
his belief regarding Lebanon’s “Arabism” and the Arab world, but that more recently his 
critics “realized I was correct.”   
Ghazal reported that CMR programs at UB (Greek Orthodox), St. Joseph’s University 
(Maronite), the Al Mukassed Institute (Sunni), the church of St. Paul (Melchite Greek 
Catholic), and others were doing good work for CMR.  Additionally, he stated, “The Shiites 
have an annual seminar called ‘souwaal’” that also deals with interfaith dialogue.  
Conversely, either by default or design, the Lebanese government, according to Ghazal, has 
depreciated CMR.  “The government doesn’t often hire the most qualified people, since 
politicians simply hear where a person is from, what religion the person is, and then uses 
these factors in his fight for [political] power,” rather than for the betterment of the Lebanese 
people and CMR.  
He stressed that there were many factors that both caused the civil war of Lebanon and 
the deterioration of CMR.  These factors worked in combination and involved internal and 
external politics, economics, religion and so on.  Rather than focus his answer on what could 
have prevented the war, he concentrated on what could be done to prevent the recurrence of 
war: proper education and learning from past mistakes. 
Ghazal was concerned with the possibility of another civil war in Lebanon.  He stated, 
“If the Lebanese stay the same and use the same old methods of problem solving, of course 
this could cause another war.  If our foundation is not strong, we can return to our same old 
difficulties.”  BG continued, 
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We have common problems and interests, both Christians and Muslims.  We 
both want good medical care and hospitals, we both want good schools for our 
children so why should we fight over who is going to be the boss or the Zaim?  
 
He pleaded:  
I call on the Lebanese to get rid of favoritism and division and not to enlist 
foreigners or outside third parties to solve our problems; we should work 
together.  Do not get help from the outside in order to subdue your brother 
[fellow Lebanese].  We need to get along, be intellectual and use dialogue.  
Christians and Muslims must work to unify one country, one nation with 
religious harmony, not for narrow personal or political gain, power or for the 
sake of being a Zaim. 
  
In sum, BG listed six factors he feels are needed to rebuild Lebanon:  
[1.] Both Christians and Muslims must cease radicalism. 
[2.] Create good, sound relations based on communication.  
[3.] Stop the speeches in churches and mosques that insult one another.  
[4.] Work on educating ourselves on the notion that we are one social, civil society 
that is related to one nation, not separate sects or ‘Ţā’ifiyye’ [confessions].  
[5.] We must encourage the Christians against leaving Lebanon; the Muslims must 
respect and not downgrade the minority state of the Christians.  When Islam is 
open to Christianity, then Christians won’t feel the need to emigrate.  
[6.] We are all called to make these things happen. 
 
Ghazal believed, “There are some, a few specific groups, Christian and Muslim that 
are radical, but they are in the minority and exist due to poor, underdeveloped thinking and a 
lack of [proper] education, especially in religion and social sciences.”  A remedy to this would 
be “for religion to be taught to accept others; this will help.”  He experienced that some 
Lebanese are more receptive to CM coexistence and noted, “Those Christians and Muslims 
who lived together are more open and accepting of each other than those that did not live 
together.”  This concept could be applied to the wathekat al-wifak or document of 
understanding between the FPM and Hezbollah parties, which represent the largest Christian 




Ghazal also offered the author some information for further assessment and study, 
referrals, and names of people working on CMR in Lebanon.    
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APPENDIX 16: MP NAWAF MUSAWI 
Interview: December 20, 2004 
Faith: Shia 
Position: Director of International Affairs for Hezbollah 
Nawaf Musawi was interviewed on Monday, December 20, 2004.  Just prior to the 
interview, a facilitation meeting was held at Hezbollah’s nearby television media station, Al-
Manar, with its political media director Dr. Ibrahim Mousawi.  Mousawi as translator when 
necessary during the meeting with Musawi.  Also present was Mr. Hassan Haidar, assistant 
secretary to Musawi.  Mr. Haidar took copious notes of the interview.  Musawi spoke mostly 
in formal Arabic and occasionally in semiformal Arabic, perhaps for the benefit of this writer.  
The interview lasted 1 hour and 15 minutes. 
Hezbollah has been engaged in CMR for years.  It is important to note that Hezbollah 
was formed just after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon (Assam, 2005).  From that point 
forward, Hezbollah, much more than any other Lebanese group, has spearheaded the drive to 
expel the Israeli armed forces from Lebanon.  Indeed, this was Musawi’s main explanation, 
on behalf of Hezbollah, of the organization helping and promoting CMR and dialogue in 
Lebanon.  By driving the Israeli armed forces from nearly all of Lebanese territory, Hezbollah 
thwarted the Israeli policy to “divide and conquer” Lebanese Christians and Muslims.  
According to Musawi, it was not only Hezbollah’s expulsion of Israeli forces that bolstered 
CMR and Muslim and Arab pride throughout the world but also Hezbollah’s absence of 
revenge against Lebanese “collaborators of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon.”   
This writer recalled numerous Lebanese Christian immigrants in the United States 
bemoaning that were Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon, Hezbollah would “massacre 
Christians.”  This supposition was refuted as Musawi proudly announced that “we expelled 
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the Israelis and we did not harm any of the collaborators.”  He added, “The only time that 
Israel was defeated with no negative consequences [without revenge being taken, as in other 
Lebanese conflicts] was [accomplished by] the Islamic forces” of Hezbollah.  He added that 
in spite of Hezbollah and other Lebanese having “brothers and families killed by the Israelis 
and their collaborators, and despite discovering who the culprits [collaborators] were, we 
didn’t retaliate” against them.  Musawi described this practice of not retaliating against the 
collaborators as being based on “our morals and upbringing, it was the right thing to do “and 
rejected a notion that this was done as political maneuver.  His point here was that Hezbollah 
did not retaliate against these collaborator forces, neither Christian nor Muslim, which was a 
main testament to Hezbollah’s interest in supporting solid CMR.  
Additionally, he explained that Hezbollah had two main, ongoing goals for CMR.  
One he explained as “dialogue should continue all the time even though we are realistic; we 
won’t feel immediate results . . . Yet this is our long term ongoing policy; we will continue 
dialogue because it is very important.”  The second goal, he set out was “to have a unified 
front against Israel, and we have done this very successfully.”  
Musawi stated that when an individual or community follows their faith strictly, “this 
is not radical.”  He felt that “some politicians spread [the notion throughout Lebanon] that you 
must be less Muslim or less Christian” to reconcile and be successful.  He believed this is 
misguided: “If you are less Muslim or less Christian, then you are less of a good citizen.”  He 
declared, “The problem is that of political corruption, financial [absconding public funds] and 
not because people are being excessive with religion.”  He believed that “the more religious 
people are, or become, the more they will find common ground to meet.” Musawi reiterated, 
“Some politicians wanted to use and achieve their political interests, their closed political 
interest, for personal gain instead of nurturing and encouraging religious diversity.”  
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Musawi felt the biggest threat to CMR in Lebanon was the external intervention from 
the U.S. and Israel.  He even predicted a large scale attack by Israel, supported by the U.S. 
against Lebanon  
It was also his feeling that the Maronite leadership, parties and community must do 
more to rectify the problems of Lebanon and CMR.  He maintained this position because, by 
and large, it was the Maronites and their leaders who were in charge of administering the 
affairs of Lebanon for decades.  He explained, “Those who made the 1943 [Lebanese 
independence formula] agreement were from the Maronite community only.”  He continued, 
“By tradition, only a Maronite could be president of Lebanon” and added that “the president 
had too much power, thus turning the Maronite president into a king-like leader.  He was in 
charge of the army, the judiciary system, and more.”  Therefore, “It was their responsibility 
for the consequences; it was the key players, the Maronites of 1943 until now that presented 
poor leadership and policies.”  
Musawi stated that he preferred the “intellectual Maronites; they are better” for CMR 
and Lebanon overall and that it is “Maronite politics and politicians, not the intellectuals and 
elites that are causing a disruption to CMR.”  He was also concerned that the good message of 
the intellectual Maronite did not seem to reach many of the members of the Maronite 
community fully.  
He was “recently invited to an ‘as Safir’ newspaper where a meeting of the Maronite 
Patriarch Council was taking place.”  There he saw Fr. Yussef Beshara and shared his 
sentiment that more needs to be done by Beshara and his community to ease tensions among 
the Lebanese communities.  Musawi also pointed out that “the pope has addressed them [the 
Maronites and Christians in general] to continue to be and take part in the Arab civilization,” 
and wondered why some still resist this message coming from such a high religious official.  
327 
 
He mentioned that the Lebanese Christians “gave a great contribution to Arab-Islamic 
civilization, Arabic literature and the Arab awakening,” so he was somewhat puzzled as to 
why some Christians deny Arabism.  
He then asked, “How about the Shiite community?  Not all the Shiite leaders and 
communities are doing enough [or] the right thing toward CMR and reconciliation in 
Lebanon.”  He did not believe at the time of this interview that the new Shiite appointees to 
the government of President Emile Lahoud in October 2004 were the best possible choices to 
help the overall recovery of Lebanon and reconciliation of its people.  Musawi revealed that 
Hezbollah was disappointed that none of its members were selected for the new government.  
Additionally, without mentioning his name, he seemed to be saying that Nabih Berri, the 
Lebanese Shiite Speaker of the House and leader of the Amal party, was not acting like an 
efficient leader intent on helping all the Lebanese.  
Musawi reiterated that had the politicians who were in charge of administering 
Lebanon’s domestic and foreign affairs acted more responsibly, the “wars” of Lebanon would 
not have occurred.  The politicians’ policy of seeking “foreign intervention” from Israel and 
the United States was a main cause of the wars.  He acknowledged that the Palestinian issue 
did cause “a political problem for Lebanon,” a sentiment strongly emphasized in some of the 
author’s other interviews.  However, he did not believe that the Palestinian issue was the main 




APPENDIX 17: MP GEN. MICHEL AOUN 
Interview: June 15, 2005 
Faith: Maronite Catholic 
Position: MP, former Army general, former Lebanese prime minister, leader of the Free 
Patriotic Movement  
Aoun was interviewed for this assessment on Thursday, June 15, 2006, in the presence 
of his sister-in-law and aide, Mrs. Nouhad Aoun, and this writer’s translator, who provided 
translation on an as needed basis during the interview.  Aoun was a general in the Lebanese 
Army during much of the Lebanese Civil War and thus retained the title  of general.  He was 
appointed acting prime minister of Lebanon in 1988 by then departing Lebanese president 
Amin Gemayel. 
The Lebanese Civil War was fought in large part over Lebanese identity issues (Musa, 
2007).  Aoun was known for his virulent anti-Syrian, anti-Arab stance and, as prime minister, 
led an unsuccessful war to drive Syrian forces and influence out of Lebanon.  His forces also 
fought fiercely against other Lebanese groups, including a very violent, high-casualty war 
with Lebanese Christian warlord Samir Gea-Gea.  Aoun was forced out of Lebanon by Syrian 
and Lebanese forces in 1991 and went into exile in France.  He returned to Lebanon 14 years 
later on May 5, 2005.  A few months after that, he was elected to the Lebanese Parliament. He 
has remained an MP and the leader of the Al-Tayyar organization, also known as the FPM.  
 In entering Aoun’s compound/residence, this writer had to pass several check points, 
protected with concrete barriers and armed soldiers, and experienced two pat-down and metal-
detecting wand searches.  The security was very heavy because Aoun, like other Lebanese 
leaders, was considered at high risk of possible assassination.  The political situation in 
contemporary Lebanon at the time of this interview was very sectarian and acrimonious.  As 
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for Aoun, he was and remains at risk of harm from several different political foes, including 
the Syrian government, Palestinian factions, Israel, and various Lebanese factions.  While 
waiting to enter Aoun’s small library and family room, this writer was observed closely by an 
aide named Rafeh Wehbe, who stood nearby.  
Aoun is known to have grown up in the Christian–Muslim neighborhood of Haret-
Hreik, Beirut.  The inhabitants were predominantly Maronites, Greek Catholic Christians, and 
Shiite Muslims at the time.  Today, Haret Hreik is predominantly inhabited by Shiite 
Muslims.  Thus, Aoun reported that his involvement in CMR was “early and natural.”  He 
believed that his having lived within a Muslim majority helped him form a professional and 
religiously balanced army in the late 1980s to 1991. 
In regards to present-day CMR, he offered that “we [FPM] and the Muslims, 
particularly the Shiite Muslims, have mutual respect for one another and frankness in 
discussions.”  In regard to his agreement with Hezbollah, he reported speaking directly and 
frankly with them, rather than pandering to the Muslim communities and simply “telling them 
what they want to hear.”  He and the FPM were sincere in their discussions with Muslims, and 
the other parties to the discussions could perceive that sincerity.  Christian–Muslim political 
dialogue must be “noncomplacent and direct, honest.” Aoun gave as an example the story of a 
well-known bishop in Lebanon who pandered to the Shiite leadership of Iran; both the 
Muslim and Christian clerical leadership of Lebanon expressed publicly that they felt the 
bishop was fawning over the Iranian leadership and being insincere.  
Therefore, according to Aoun , he has been able to work toward forging solid CMR 
and the resolution of Lebanon’s many problems because he lived within a mixed Christian-
Muslim community and dialogues naturally and sincerely with members of the Muslim 
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community.  He was particularly proud of his paper of common understanding that he and the 
FPM signed with Hezbollah.   
As to theological/religious causes, Aoun offered that “religious extremism of a 
minority of Muslims is a cause [of poor CMR] and they [extremists] even cause problems 
with other Muslims.”  He did not believe that Lebanon had a major problem with religious 
extremism.  He believed that Lebanon’s woes were caused by “political, not religious 
reasons.”  He did not consider Hezbollah to be either religious extremists or terrorists.  
However, he conceded that there were some forms of religious extremism in Lebanon but that 
they were minimal.  It was a larger problem in other, less liberal Middle Eastern and Muslim 
countries. 
In regard to which community was doing more or less for CMR, somewhat 
surprisingly, Aoun reported, “It is the elite in each and every community that is trying hard.”  
By elite, he clarified, he did not necessarily mean the rich but rather “where there is strong 
[community] leadership, and then there are better Christian-Muslim relations, such as the 
FPM, Hezbollah, and other organizations.” 
For him, it was “the repercussions of the armed clashes between the Palestinians and 
the Lebanese” that caused the war: “The Palestinians fear the Lebanese and the Lebanese fear 
the Palestinians.”  He reminded that “most of my battles were against them [the PLO].”  In the 
early 1980s, when PLO leader Yasser Arafat was exiled to Tunisia as part of an evacuation 
agreement during Israel’s long invasion and occupation of Lebanon, Aoun met with Arafat in 
Tunisia.  Just prior to the meeting, Aoun recalled feeling that somehow he and Arafat were 
“opposing brothers who fought in a trench.” He said he told Arafat, “We want you out!  But 
for your own good,” meaning that although he opposed the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, 
he wanted the Palestinians to be returned to their own land.  
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Aoun did not believe there would be another civil war in Lebanon anytime soon 
because “now we have gone a long way [toward resolving differences],” which he believed 
would continue.  He again pointed to the FPM–Hezbollah agreement as something that has 
helped coexistence in Lebanon, which has reduced the chances of another civil war.  His 
belief that the present tensions would not lead to a civil war was consistent with that of nearly 
all the other interviewees.  He concluded, “No, there is no sense (chance) of another civil war.  
We have gone a long way.  The Hezbollah–FPM agreement has helped.  It covers 80% of 




APPENDIX 18: MP NAYLA NAJIB ISSA KHOURY MOUAWAD 
Interview: November 17, 2004 
Faith: Maronite Catholic 
Position: MP, former first lady of Lebanese president-elect 
This writer first met and interviewed MP Mouawad in 1994 in her hometown of 
Waterbury, Connecticut, in the United States.  She was in Connecticut to help promote the 
René Mouawad Foundation, a charitable foundation, to the Lebanese community in 
Connecticut.  The foundation was named after her late husband, René Mouawad, who after 
being elected and briefly serving as president of Lebanon, was assassinated when the car in 
which he was riding was destroyed in a bomb explosion. 
On November 17, 2004, this writer met with Mouawad, who was the MP for Zgharta, 
located in the north of Lebanon.  She was one of only three female members of Parliament.  
She answered the set of questions regarding CMR in post-war Lebanon in English and had no 
prior knowledge of the questions. 
On a few occasions, she referred the writer to people whom she felt worked more 
directly in the field of CMR, including Samir Frangieh and Fr. Tarek Mitri, both of whom 
were known to engage in the interreligious/community relations.  However, she suggested 
that by the very nature of Lebanon, the Lebanese (including, in particular, their political 
leaders, among which she counted herself) are political Christian and Muslim participants. 
The author grasped this notion in 2000 at Yale University where he spent 2 full days 
with Palestinian MP Hanan Ashrawi.  Ashrawi explained that the Palestinians and Lebanese, 
both Christians and Muslims, are “political beings” and within this existence there is CMR.  
Mouawad completely agreed, corroborating the enmeshment posited earlier.  She also had 
important information to share about CMR, Arabism, and other elements of Lebanese society.  
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Mouawad acknowledged that Christian radicalism does exist in Lebanon and that “of 
course [it] poses a problem to CMR and to Lebanon too, in general.”  She pointed out, 
however, that Muslim radicalism poses a greater danger as it has a larger following and it is 
less controlled than Christian radicalism.  She added, “Radical Islam or Christianity hurts our 
Lebanese democracy; we are suffering from radical Islam in all the Middle East.”  With her 
affirmation that both forms of radicalism exist, she hoped that instead of radicalism, the 
Lebanese “should have common values, beliefs and democracy that was Lebanon’s choice, 
[for] democracy and with this good institutions” (education, civil service, and so forth).  
Mouawad explained, “Foreign meddling has also harmed Christian-Muslim relations,” 
referring to both Syrian and, more so, Israeli policy in Lebanon, designed to promote 
radicalism and damage CMR.  
Mouawad believed that “no community or person” in particular is doing more or less 
to promote for CMR, but rather that “it is a weakness of the system, the political system and 
the way it functions.”  She believed that 
if only the Lebanese people were united in what needed to be done [to stop the 
buildup and onset of the war] there would never have been a war here.  It is the 
political interest of some and foreign interference that pushed this war but we 
as Lebanese [politicians] were also very much at fault for not doing the right 
thing.  
 
What she meant by the “right thing” was Lebanese politicians “putting the people’s interest 
first and not joining foreign forces against one another.” 
Mouawad did not think another war was imminent: “No, we learned our lesson,” she 
said, but added, “Well, it [a recurrence of war] depends on who’s ruling the country” 
(implicitly considering Syria as ruling Lebanon and being an unhelpful, unacceptable force).  
She returned then to her first statement: “No, the people suffered enough and know that 
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violence won’t solve our problems,” she said, referring both to the past and present.  “But if 
there is too much chaos and pressure, it could cause another war.   
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( هل تعتبر أن العالقات بين مسيحيي لبنان ومسلميه 1991أن الحرب في لبنان قد انتهت )بما  -1
 ما زالت على ذاتها أم أصبحت أفضل أو أسوأ مما كانت عليه قبل الحرب؟  إلى ما تعزو  ذلك؟
 إذا كان هنالك قاسم بين المسيحيين والمسلمين، فما سبب هذا االنقسام؟ علي سبيل -2
 م ذات:المثال، هل القاس  -3
a. طبيعة سياسية 
b. طبيعة الهوتية 
c. طبيعة اقتصادية أو اجتماعية: الغني مقابل الفقير 
d. .أسباب أخرى 
متى بدأ اهتمامك بالمواضيع السياسية والدينية التي تواجه مسيحيي لبنان ومسلميه؟  أين  -4
 تمكنت من النجاح ومتى واجهت تحديات؟  ال تتردد في تفصيل جوابك بناء على خبرتك.
 لبنانيون عرب؟ وما سبب النقاش الدائم حول هذا الموضوع؟هل ال -5
هل هنالك مشكلة تطرف ديني )مسيحي و/أو إسالمي( في لبنان وهل ثؤثر على العالقات  -6
 اإلسالمية؟ كيف؟-المسيحية
-هل تعتقد أن هنالك فريق في لبنان يعمل أكثر أو أقل أو أحسن أو أسوأ على العالقات المسيحية -7
ى  آخر، هل يقوم المجتمع الماروني و/أو قادته بجهد أكبرـ على سبيل المثال؟  اإلسالمية؟ بمعن
 أو مثالً المجتمع الشيعي؟
هل بإمكانك أن تحدد شيئاً من الماضي كان ليؤثر على المنحى الذي اتخذته الحرب اللبنانية من  -8





1. Since the war in Lebanon has ended (1991) would you say the relations between the 
Christians and Muslims of Lebanon are the same, better or worse than they were before the 
war?  What makes you feel that way? 
2. If there is a divide between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon, what are the major 
causes of this divide?  For example, is the divide mostly of 
a. A political nature, 
b. A theological nature, 
c. An economic, social stratification nature: the riche vs. the poor, or 
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d. Some other causes\reasons. 
3. When did you get involved in the politico-religious issues facing the Christians and 
Muslims of Lebanon?  What have been the successes and challenges for you?  Please feel free 
to elaborate on this, as you are the expert. 
4. Are the Lebanese people Arabs and why has this issue been such a difficult one to resolve 
for the Lebanese? 
5. Is there a problem with radical or extremist religion [Christian and / or Muslim?]  in 
Lebanon and does it affect Christian-Muslim relations?  If so how?  
6. Is there any community in Lebanon that you feel does more or less, or a better or poorer job 
in working for Christian-Muslim relations.  In other words, for example could the Maronite 
Community and\or its leaders be doing more?  Or for example how about the Shiite 
Community? 
7. Can you think of anything in the past, that if it was done differently, then there may not 
have been the Lebanese war of 1975-1991 and there would not have been a conflict between 
the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon? 
8. Is the relationship between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon today, so poor that it 







APPENDIX 20: STUDENT SURVEY 
The following survey was distributed to university students in Lebanon in 1998, 2001 
2004, and 2006.  The survey references (but does not replicate)  part or parts of those 
completed by Dr. Halim Barakat, formerly of AUB, in 1975, and Dr. Hilal Khasan of the 
same in 1991.  The following survey is original in that it was specifically designed to gather 




Notre Dame University 
Lebanon  
 
Your First Name:     
Your Middle Name/Father’s 1
st
 Name:  
Your Age:      
Male or Female (circle): 
Today’s Date:  
 
How many years have you lived in Lebanon? 
 
How many days, months or years have you lived outside Lebanon? 
 
If you have lived outside of Lebanon, where did you live? 
 
 
What area of Lebanon is your family originally from?  (Circle one) 
 
 North Lebanon  South Lebanon 
 Central Lebanon  Western Lebanon  
Other area (e.g., Syria, Palestine)______________________  
 










What is the name of the religious faith that you belong to?  (circle one) 
 
 Maronite Catholic  Greek ”Room” Orthodox  
 Protestant Christian  Greek “Room” Catholic  
 Sunni Muslim   Shiite Muslim            
Druze 
Other Religion (e.g., Coptic, Chaldean, etc.)  _________________________  
 
The Education Questions 
  
What system of education did you receive in elementary school from grades 1 to 5?  
(Circle one)  
 
 Arabic-Lebanese System  French-Lebanese System 
 American-Lebanese System  British-Lebanese System 
 Armenian-Lebanese System  Other  
  
 
What system of education did you receive in Middle School, grades 6 to 8?  (Circle one)   
 
Arabic-Lebanese System  French System 
 American System   British System 
 Armenian System   Other  
 
 
What system of education did you receive in High School, grades 9 to 12?  (Circle one)  
 Arabic-Lebanese System  French System 
 American System   British System 




What systems of education have you received or are receiving at the University level?  
(Circle one)  
Arabic-Lebanese System  French System 
 American System   British System 
 Armenian System   Other  
 
 
What system of education do you think is the best one overall in Lebanon?  (Circle one)  
  
Arabic-Lebanese System  French System 
 American System   British System 
 Armenian System   Other   
 
What year are you in at the University?  (Circle one) 
 1
st
 year (Freshman)  2
nd
 year (Sophomore) 
 3
rd
 year (Junior)  4
th
 year (Senior) 
What is your Major course of study?  
What is your Minor course of study? 
 
The Questions of Identity 
What is your National identity?  (Circle one) 
 Lebanese   Syrian    Armenian  
 Palestinian   Jordanian  
Other________________________  
Do you have a second Citizenship?  (e.g., Canadian, French, American, etc.)  
 Yes    No  
If yes, what is your second citizenship?  ___________________________  





Ethnicity means the shared national origin, religion and language of a people; it is 
similarity stated as sharing the traditions, customs (rituals, way of doing things in daily 
life), and/or social views as a larger group of people. 
 
Number 1 to 6, 1 being the closest and 6 being the farthest from the ethnicity of the 
Lebanese 
 
 Arab in general_______ French_____  Syrian______ 
 Phoenician______  Iranian_____  Other_______  
 
Race is defined as a people having the same biological traits; the same genetic 
characteristics as a larger group of people.  For example, the same biological makeup 
and bloodline.  It can mean white or black or someone’s race might be stated as African, 
Asian or European.  
 
What race do you believe the Lebanese people belong to?  Number 1 being the closest to 
or the same as the Lebanese race and 6 being the farthest from the Lebanese race:  
Arab____   French ____  Phoenician____ 
European in general____ Greek_____  Persian____  
Other____   
*If you believe the Lebanese people belong to one single race, then just mark 
number 1 on your choice and do not mark the others.  
 
Culture is defined as the customs habits, skills, technology, arts, values, ideology, science 
and religious and political behavior of a group of people in a specific time period.  It is a 
shred way of living.  What culture do you believe the Lebanese belong to today?  
Number 1 is the culture closest to the Lebanese, number 5 the farthest.  
 
 Arab____ French____ Armenian____ European in general____  





Combining race, ethnicity and culture; which one of the following is closest to the 
Lebanese identity overall?  Number 1 being the closes, 5 being the farthest: 
Arab____ French____ Armenian____ European in general____  
Persian (Iranian)_____ Other____  
 
What do you consider to be the most important part to your identity?  Number 1 being 
the most important part of your identity and 3 the least important part.  
 ----- Your religion 
 ----- Your Lebanese nationality 
 ----- Your political party and political beliefs 
 ----- Other, write here________________________________                  
                          
      The Questions of Language 
What language do you speak the most in your daily live?  Number 1 most spoken, 
number 3 least spoken. 
 Arabic____ English____ French____ Other____ 
 
What language do you speak most fluently or best?  Number 1 most fluent, number 3 
least fluent: 
 Arabic____ English____ French____ Other____  
 
What language do you write most fluently or best?  Number 1 most fluent, 3 least fluent: 
Arabic____ English____ French____      Armenian         Other____   
 
What is the official spoken language of Lebanon?  (Circle one) 
  Arabic   Other   
Do you consider spoken Lebanese to be spoken Arabic? 





Of the main languages spoken in Lebanon, which language do you prefer to speak or 
like the most?  Number 1 the most, number 4 the least: 
Arabic____ English____ French____ Armenian          Other____  
 
Do you believe the Lebanese are Arabs?  
               Yes  No  
             
   Political Questions and Christian Muslim Relations 
1- In your opinion, the people of Iraq and Lebanon have 
a. A very similar and close historical relationship to one another 
b. A slightly similar historical relationship to one another  
c.  No historical similarity to each-other 
d. Completely opposite history and relationship to one another 
 
2- The U. S. invaded Iraq to stop the spread of radical/fundamentalist Islam  
 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Disagree 
d. Strongly disagree 
 
3- The U.S. invaded Iraq to obtain its oil reserve  
 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Disagree 
d. Strongly disagree  
 
4- The U.S. invaded Iraq to free the Iraqi people from the government of Saddam 
Hussein 
 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Disagree 







5- The U.S. invaded Iraq to stop Iraq from using/making weapons of Mass destruction:  
 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Disagree 
d. Strongly disagree 
 
6- Do you believe the U.S. should invade another country? 
 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Disagree 
d. Strongly disagree 
 
7- If yes, which country do you believe the U.S. should invade?  ______________  
 
8- If the U.S. did invade the other country you stated, then which of the following 
outcomes would you want?  Number it 1 to 4 with 4 being the most and 1 being the 
least.  
 
____ Defeat and expulsion of U.S. troops, 
         Government/regime change of the country           
____ Weaken the religious population 
____ Democratize the country 
  
9- The United Nations recently passed resolution 1559 regarding Lebanon.  How do you 
feel about this resolution? 
  
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Disagree 
d. Strongly disagree 






10- The tensions between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon are caused by the 
religions differences 
 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Disagree 
d. Strongly disagree 
 
11-  The tensions between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon are caused by 
Lebanon’s poor economy 
 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Disagree 
d. Strongly disagree 
 
12- The tensions between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon are caused by the 
political differences 
 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Disagree 
d. Strongly disagree 
 
What part of Lebanon’s society do you feel is the greatest challenge / problem to the 
Lebanese people?  Number 1, greatest problem, number 5 least great problem?  
  
 ____ The Economic situation 
 ____ The political system 
 ____ Religious differences 
 ____ Foreign influence in general 





APPENDIX 21: DEMOGRAPHIC DATA FOR STUDENT PARTICIPANTS 
Table 21.1 Religion 
 Religion f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid Maronite Catholic 166 57.6 57.6 57.6 
  Sunni Muslim 4 1.4 1.4 59.0 
  Greek Room Orthodox 46 16.0 16.0 75.0 
  Greek Room Catholic 38 13.2 13.2 88.3 
  Druze 22 7.6 7.6 95.8 
  Other Religion 6 2.1 2.1 97.9 
  Armenian Christian 6 2.1 2.1 100.0 



















Table 21.2 Age 
 Age (in years) f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid 17 4 1.4 1.4 1.4 
  18 42 14.6 15.2 16.7 
  19 66 22.9 23.9 40.6 
  20 52 18.1 18.8 59.4 
  21 46 16.0 16.7 76.1 
  22 32 11.1 11.6 87.7 
  23 20 6.9 7.2 94.9 
  24 4 1.4 1.4 96.4 
 25 2 0.7 0.7 97.1 
 27 4 1.4 1.4 98.6 
 >27 4 1.4 1.4 100.0 
Subtotal  276 95.8 100.0   
Missing  12 4.2     
Total  288 100.0     
 
Table 21.3 Gender 
 Gender f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid Male 130 45.1 48.9 48.9 
  Female 136 47.2 51.1 100.0 
Subtotal  266 92.4 100.0   
Missing  22 7.6     







Table 21.4 University Grade Level 
 Level f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid Freshman 30 10.4 10.6 10.6 
  Sophomore 156 54.2 55.3 66.0 
 Junior 44 15.3 15.6 81.6 
 Senior 52 18.1 18.4 100.0 
Subtotal  282 97.9 100.0   
Missing  6 2.1     
Total   288 100.0     
 
Table 21.5 Major Area of Study 
 Area f % Valid % Cumulative  % 
Valid Computer science 18 6.3 6.5 6.5 
  Business 80 27.8 28.8 36.3 
 Engineering 32 11.1 11.5 46.8 
 Health 10 3.5 3.6 50.4 
 Hotel management 12 4.2 4.3 54.7 
 Education 52 18.1 18.7 73.4 
 Art 4 1.4 1.4 74.8 
 Advertising and marketing 38 13.2 13.7 88.5 
 Political science 10 3.5 3.6 92.1 
 Interior design 2 0.7 0.7 92.8 
 Business computing 16 5.6 5.8 98.6 
 Mass communication 2 0.7 0.7 99.3 
 Undeclared  2 0.7 0.7 100.0 
Subtotal Total 278 96.5 100.0   
Missing System 10 3.5     
Total   288 100.0     
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Table 21.6 Years Lived in Lebanon 
 Years f % Valid % Cumulative  % 
Valid 3.00 2 0.7 0.7 0.7 
  4.00 4 1.4 1.4 2.2 
 6.00 2 0.7 0.7 2.9 
 7.00 2 0.7 0.7 3.6 
 8.00 4 1.4 1.4 5.0 
 9.00 2 0.7 0.7 5.8 
 10.00 4 1.4 1.4 7.2 
 11.00 2 0.7 0.7 7.9 
 12.00 4 1.4 1.4 9.4 
 13.00 4 1.4 1.4 10.8 
 15.00 10 3.5 3.6 14.4 
 16.00 2 0.7 0.7 15.1 
 17.00 4 1.4 1.4 16.5 
 18.00 48 16.7 17.3 33.8 
 19.00 54 18.8 19.4 53.2 
 20.00 38 13.2 13.7 66.9 
 21.00 40 13.9 14.4 81.3 
 22.00 30 10.4 10.8 92.1 
 23.00 12 4.2 4.3 96.4 
 24.00 2 0.7 0.7 97.1 
 25.00 4 1.4 1.4 98.6 
 26.00 2 0.7 0.7 99.3 
 36.00 2 0.7 0.7 100.0 
Subtotal Total 278 96.5 100.0   
Mission  10 3.5   
Total  288 100.0   
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Table 21.7 National Identity 
 Nationality f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid Lebanese 282 97.9 97.9 97.9 
  Armenian 4 1.4 1.4 99.3 
 Other 2 0.7 0.7 100.0 
Total   288 100.0     
 
Table 21.8 Dual Citizenship  
 Response f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid Yes 30 10.4 22.1 22.1 
  No 106 36.8 77.9 100.0 
Subtotal  136 47.2 100.0   
Missing  152 52.8     
















Table 21.9 Country of Dual Citizenship 
 Country f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid America 2 6.7 6.7 6.7 
  Austaral 2 6.7 6.7 13.4 
 Australia 2 6.6 6.6 20.0 
 Canada 4 13.3 13.3 33.3 
 Cypress 4 13.3 13.3 46.6 
 France 2 6.7 6.7 53.3 
 Ghana 4 13.3 13.3 66.6 
 Greece 2 6.7 6.7 73.3 
 Italy 2 6.7 6.7 80.0 
 Jordan 2 6.7 6.7 86.7 
 Mexico 2 6.7 6.7 93.4 
 Tunisia 2 6.6 6.6 100.0 
Total   30 100.0     
n = 30 
Table 21.10 Language Spoken: Arabic 
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid Most spoken 278 56.9 60.7 60.7 
 Spoken 10 28.5 30.4 91.1 










Table 21.11 Language Spoken: English 
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid Most spoken 18 6.3 6.4 6.4 
 Spoken 186 64.6 66.4 72.9 
 Least spoken 76 26.4 27.1 100.0 
Subtotal  280 97.2 100.0   
Missing  8 2.8     
Total  288 100.0    
 
Table 21.12 Language Spoken: French 
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid Most spoken 12 4.2 4.4 4.4 
 Spoken 98 34.0 35.8 40.1 
 Least spoken 164 56.9 59.9 100.0 
Subtotal  274 95.1 100.0   
Missing  14 4.9     
Total  288 100.0    
 
Table 21.13 Language Spoken: Other 
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid Most spoken 4 1.4 11.1 11.1 
 Spoken 12 4.2 33.3 44.4 
 Least spoken 20 6.9 55.6 100.0 
Subtotal  36 12.5 100.0   
Missing  252 87.5     




Table 21.14 Fluency of Spoken Language: Arabic 
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid Most fluent 58 20.1 21.0 21.0 
 Fluent 154 53.5 55.8 76.8 
 Least fluent 64 22.2 23.2 100.0 
Subtotal  276 95.8 100.0   
Missing  12 4.2     
Total  288 100.0    
 
Table 21.15 Fluency of Spoken Language: English 
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid Most fluent 58 20.1 21.0 21.0 
 Fluent 154 53.5 55.8 76.8 
 Least fluent 64 22.2 23.2 100.0 
Subtotal  276 95.8 100.0   
Missing  12 4.2     
Total  288 100.0    
 
Table 21.16 Fluency of Spoken Language: French 
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid Most fluent 42 14.6 15.7 15.7 
 Fluent 80 27.8 29.9 45.5 
 Least fluent 146 50.7 54.5 100.0 
Subtotal  268 93.1 100.0   
Missing  20 6.9     




Table 21.17 Fluency of Spoken Language: Other 
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid Most fluent 8 2.8 16.7 16.7 
 Fluent 4 1.4 8.3 25.0 
 Least fluent 18 6.3 37.5 62.5 
 4.0 18 6.3 37.5 100.0 
Subtotal  48 16.7 100.0   
Missing  240 83.3     
Total  288 100.0    
 
Table 21.18 Fluency of Written Language: Arabic 
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid Most fluent 124 43.1 44.0 44.0 
 Fluent 102 35.4 36.2 80.1 
 Least fluent 56 19.4 19.9 100.0 
Subtotal  282 97.9 100.0   
Missing  6 2.1     
Total  288 100.0    
 
Table 21.19 Fluency of Written Language: English 
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid Most fluent 158 54.9 56.0 56.0 
 Fluent 92 31.9 32.6 88.7 
 Least fluent 32 11.1 11.3 100.0 
Subtotal  282 97.9 100.0   
Missing  6 2.1     




Table 21.20 Fluency of Written Language: French 
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid Most fluent 82 28.5 31.1 31.1 
 Fluent 64 22.2 24.2 55.3 
 Least fluent 118 41.0 44.7 100.0 
Subtotal  264 91.7 100.0   
Missing  24 8.3     
Total  288 100.0    
 
Table 21.21 Fluency of Written Language: Armenian 
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid Most fluent 4 1.4 28.6 28.6 
 Least fluent 6 2.1 42.9 71.4 
 4.0 2 0.7 14.3 85.7 
 5.0 2 0.7 14.3 100.0 
Subtotal  14 4.9 100.0   
Missing  274 95.1     












Table 21.22 Fluency of Written Language: Other 
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid Most fluent 2 0.7 5.3 5.3 
 fluent 4 1.4 10.5 15.8 
 Least fluent 18 6.3 47.4 63.2 
 4.0 14 4.9 36.8 100.0 
Subtotal  38 13.2 100.0   
Missing  250 86.8     
Total  288 100.0    
 
Table 21.23 Preferred Spoken Language: Arabic 
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid 1.00 120 41.7 45.5 45.5 
 2.00 74 25.7 28.0 73.5 
 3.00 52 18.1 19.7 93.2 
 4.00 16 5.6 6.1 99.2 
 5.00 2 0.7 0.8 100.0 
Subtotal  264 91.7 100.0  
Missing  24 8.3     










Table 21.24 Preferred Spoken Language: English 
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid 1.00 140 48.6 51.9 51.9 
 2.00 104 36.1 38.5 90.4 
 3.00 24 8.3 8.9 99.3 
 4.00 2 0.7 0.7 100.0 
Subtotal  270 93.8 100.0   
Missing  18 6.3     
Total  288 100.0    
 
Table 21.25 Preferred Spoken Language: French 
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid 1.00 42 14.6 16.3 16.3 
 2.00 74 25.7 28.7 45.0 
 3.00 118 41.0 45.7 90.7 
 4.00 24 8.3 9.3 100.0 
Subtotal  258 89.6 100.0   
Missing  30 10.4     











Table 21.26 Preferred Spoken Language: Armenian 
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid 1.00 2 0.7 2.9 2.9 
 2.00 2 0.7 2.9 5.9 
 3.00 8 2.8 11.8 17.6 
 4.00 52 18.1 76.5 94.1 
 5.0 2 0.7 2.9 97.1 
 6.0 2 0.7 2.9 100.0 
Subtotal  68 23.6 100.0   
Missing  220 76.4     
Total  288 100.0    
 
Table 21.27 Preferred Spoken Language: Other 
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid 1.00 6 2.1 8.3 8.3 
 2.00 8 2.8 11.1 19.4 
 3.00 16 5.6 22.2 41.7 
 4.00 40 13.9 55.6 97.2 
 5.0 2 0.7 2.8 100.0 
Subtotal  72 25.0 100.0   
Missing  216 75.0     





































APPENDIX 22: DATA ON STUDENT RESPONSES TO SURVEY QUESTIONS 
These tables show the survey responses students gave concerning the various issues 
under investigation in this study.  Unless noted, of the 288 total student responses, 256 
(88.9%) were Christian, of which 166 (57.6%) were Maronite Christian.  
Table 22.1 Cause of Christian–Muslim Relations Problems: Religious Differences 
 Response f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid Strongly agree 42 14.6 33.3 33.3 
  Agree 44 15.3 34.9 68.3 
  Disagree 26 9.0 20.6 88.9 
  Strongly disagree 14 4.9 11.1 100.0 
Subtotal  126 43.8 100.0   
Missing  162 56.3     
Total   288 100.0     
 
Table 22.2 Greatest Problem in Lebanon: Religion 
 Response f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid 1st greatest problem 38 13.2 16.8 16.8 
  2nd greatest problem 50 17.4 22.1 38.9 
  3rd greatest problem 50 17.4 22.1 61.1 
  4th greatest problem 42 14.6 18.6 79.6 
  5th greatest problem 44 15.3 19.5 99.1 
  6th greatest problem 2 0.7 0.9 100.0 
Subtotal  226 78.5 100.0   
Missing  62 21.5     





Table 22.3 Greatest Problem in Lebanon: Inter-Lebanese Conflict 
 Response  f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid 1st greatest problem 24 8.3 9.3 9.3 
  2nd greatest problem 22 7.6 8.5 17.8 
  3rd greatest problem 34 11.8 13.2 31.0 
  4th greatest problem 68 23.6 26.4 57.4 
  5th greatest problem 108 37.5 41.9 99.2 
  6th greatest problem 2 0.7 0.8 100.0 
Subtotal  258 89.6 100.0   
Missing  30 10.4     
Total   288 100.0     
 
Table 22.4 Best System of Education 
 Educational system f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid Arabic–Lebanese 4 1.4 1.4 1.4 
 American  220 76.4 78.6 80.0 
 Armenian  4 1.4 1.4 81.4 
 French  40 13.9 14.3 95.7 
 British  10 3.5 3.6 99.3 
 Other 2 0.7 0.7 100.0 
Subtotal  280 97.2 100.0   
Missing  8 2.8     








Table 22.5 Cause of Christian–Muslim Relations Problems: Economy 
 Response f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid Strongly agree 4 1.4 3.2 3.2 
 Agree 38 13.2 30.2 33.3 
 Disagree 74 25.7 58.7 92.1 
 Strongly disagree 10 3.5 7.9 100.0 
Subtotal  126 43.8 100.0   
Missing  162 56.3     
Total  288 100.0     
 
Table 22.6 Greatest Problem in Lebanon: Economy 
 Response f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid 1st greatest problem 96 33.3 34.5 34.5 
 2nd greatest problem 70 24.3 25.2 59.7 
 3rd greatest problem 62 21.5 22.3 82.0 
 4th greatest problem 40 13.9 14.4 96.4 
 5th greatest problem 10 3.5 3.6 100.0 
Subtotal  278 96.5 100.0   
Missing  10 3.5     










Table 22.7 Cause of Christian–Muslim Relationship Problems: Political Differences 
 Response f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid Strongly agree 50 17.4 39.7 39.7 
 Agree 60 20.8 47.6 87.3 
 Disagree 12 4.2 9.5 96.8 
 Strongly disagree 4 1.4 3.2 100.0 
Subtotal  126 43.8 100.0   
Missing  162 56.3     
Total  288 100.0     
 
Table 22.8 Greatest Problem in Lebanon: Politics 
 Response f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid 1st greatest problem 102 35.4 37.2 37.2 
 2nd greatest problem 82 28.5 29.9 67.2 
 3rd greatest problem 60 20.8 21.9 89.1 
 4th greatest problem 26 9.0 9.5 98.5 
 5th greatest problem 4 1.4 1.5 100.0 
Subtotal  272 95.1 100.0   
Missing  14 4.9     










Table 22.9 Greatest Problem in Lebanon: Foreign Intervention 
 Response f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid 1st greatest problem 100 34.7 37.3 37.3 
 2nd greatest problem 30 10.4 11.2 48.5 
 3rd greatest problem 40 13.9 14.9 63.4 
 4th greatest problem 46 16.0 17.2 80.6 
 5th greatest problem 50 17.4 18.7 99.3 
 6th greatest problem 2 0.7 0.7 100.0 
Subtotal  268 93.1 100.0   
Missing  20 6.9     
Total  288 100.0     
 
Table 22.10 Ethnicity: Arab  
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid 1st 92 31.9 34.6 34.6 
 2nd 48 16.7 18.0 52.6 
 3rd 60 20.8 22.6 75.2 
 4th 42 14.6 15.8 91.0 
 5th 4 1.4 1.5 92.5 
 6th 20 6.9 7.5 100.0 
Subtotal  266 92.4 100.0  
Missing  22 7.6     







Table 22.11 Ethnicity: Phoenician  
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid 1st 120 41.7 48.4 48.4 
 2nd 42 14.6 16.9 65.3 
 3rd 44 15.3 17.7 83.1 
 4th 26 9.0 10.5 93.5 
 5th 6 2.1 2.4 96.0 
 6th 10 3.5 4.0 100.0 
Subtotal  248 86.1 100.0   
Missing  40 13.9     
Total  288 100.0     
 
Table 22.12 Ethnicity: French  
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid 1st 120 41.7 48.4 48.4 
 2nd 42 14.6 16.9 65.3 
 3rd 44 15.3 17.7 83.1 
 4th 26 9.0 10.5 93.5 
 5th 6 2.1 2.4 96.0 
 6th 10 3.5 4.0 100.0 
Subtotal  248 86.1 100.0   
Missing  40 13.9     







Table 22.13 Racial Identity: Arab 
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid 1st 88 30.6 36.1 36.1 
 2nd 78 27.0 32.0 68.0 
 3rd 18 6.3 7.4 75.4 
 4th 18 6.3 7.4 82.8 
 5th 14 4.9 5.7 88.5 
 6th 26 9.0 10.7 99.2 
 7th 2 0.7 0.8 100.0 
Subtotal  244 84.7 100.0   
Missing  44 15.3     
Total  288 100.0     
 
Table 22.14 Racial Identity: Phoenician 
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid 1st 160 55.6 66.7 66.7 
 2nd 32 11.1 13.3 80.0 
 3rd 26 9.0 10.8 90.8 
 4th 8 2.8 3.3 94.2 
 5th 12 4.2 5.0 99.2 
 6th 2 0.7 0.8 100.0 
Subtotal  240 83.3 100.0   
Missing  48 16.7     






Table 22.15 Cultural Identity: Arab 
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid 1st 92 31.9 37.4 37.4 
 2nd 46 16.0 18.7 56.1 
 3rd 50 17.4 20.3 76.4 
 4th 30 10.4 12.2 88.6 
 5th 20 6.9 8.1 96.7 
 6th 8 2.8 3.3 100.0 
Subtotal  246 85.4 100.0   
Missing  42 14.6     
Total  288 100.0     
 
Table 22.16 Cultural Identity: Phoenician 
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid 1st 120 41.7 48.4 48.4 
 2nd 42 14.6 16.9 65.3 
 3rd 44 15.3 17.7 83.1 
 4th 26 9.0 10.5 93.5 
 5th 6 2.1 2.4 96.0 
 6th 10 3.5 4.0 100.0 
Subtotal  248 86.1 100.0  
Missing  40 13.9   







Table 22.17 Overall Racial, Ethnic, and Cultural Identity of the Lebanese: Arab 
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid 1st 116 40.3 47.2 47.2 
 2nd 36 12.5 14.6 61.8 
 3rd 56 19.4 22.8 84.6 
 4th 118 6.3 7.3 91.9 
 5th 16 5.6 6.5 98.4 
 6th 4 1.4 1.6 100.0 
Subtotal  246 85.4 100.0   
Missing  42 14.6     
Total  288 100.0     
 
Table 22.18 Lebanese Identity: Arab 
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid 1st 116 40.3 47.2 47.2 
 2nd 36 12.5 14.6 61.8 
 3rd 56 19.4 22.8 84.6 
 4th 118 6.3 7.3 91.9 
 5th 16 5.6 6.5 98.4 
 6th 4 1.4 1.6 100.0 
Subtotal  246 85.4 100.0   
Missing  42 14.6     







Table 22.19 Spoken Lebanese Identified as Spoken Arabic 
 Choice f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid Yes 152 52.8 53.1 53.1 
 No 134 46.5 46.9 100.0 
Subtotal  286 99.3 100.0  
Missing  2 0.7   
Total  288 100.0   
 
Table 22.20 Ethnicity of Fathers’ First Names  
 Ethnicity f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid French 66 22.9 26.2 26.2 
 English 16 5.6 6.3 32.5 
 Arabic 164 56.9 65.1 97.6 
 Armenian 4 1.4 1.6 99.2 
 Other 2 0.7 0.8 100.0 
Subtotal  252 87.5 100.0   
Missing  36 12.5     











Table 22.21 Ethnicity of Students’ First Names 
 Ethnicity f % Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid French 94 32.6 34.3 34.4 
 English 22 7.6 8.0 42.3 
 Arabic 140 48.6 51.1 93.4 
 Armenian 4 1.4 1.5 94.9 
 Other 14 4.9 5.1 100.0 
Subtotal  274 95.1 100.0   
Missing  14 4.9     





APPENDIX 23: ATALLAH FAMILY CASE STUDY 
As can be seen in the following table, the ethnicity of the Atallah family names 
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Nadim Shehadi, personal communication, June 21, 2011. 
Marie-Therese Obeid, January 11, 2009 
Jorgen Nielsen, PhD 
Norman Finkelstein PhD 
B. Frangieh PhD, personal communications, April 6, 2008, and November 16, 2008 
Bishop Gregory Mansour, personal communications, April 6, 2010, and November 16, 2010 
N.Atallah, personal communication, September 29, 2008 
Fr. Wehbe, personal communication, April 6, 2006 
 Mansour Eid PhD, Chair, Department of Social and Behavioral Science, Notre Dame 
University, Lebanon, personal communication, June 21, 2004 
Gebran Ghassan Tueni, personal communication, May 15, 2005 
Archbishop George Saad Abi-Younes, personal communication, July 6, 2011 
Fr. Naji Kiwan, personal communications, April 6, 2010, and April 18, 2010 
Rev. Archimandrite Joseph Haggar, personal communication, April 18, 2010 
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